Prolegomena: Philosophic Basis of Theology; Or, Rational Principles of Religious Faith, 1. kötetHunt & Eaton, 1889 - 344 oldal |
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absolute accept adequate proof admit affirm answer apprehended authority become Bible certainty Christian cognition concept conclusion concrete consciousness contradiction deliverances demand determine divine doctrine dogmatics doubt edge effect error essence evidence existence experience external fact faculties faith false feeling finite forever furnish give given grounds of belief human ical idea ignorance impossible inquiry inspiration intel intelligence intuition intuitive knowledge irrational kind knowl knowledge known law of identity law of thought limited matters of belief means mental mind knows moral nature necessary truths necessity never perceived perception possession possible precisely predicate present principles proposition question rational belief reality realm relations religion religious respect revelation rience self-consciousness sensation sense simply Sir William Hamilton soteriology soul speculative reason spiritual subject and object supersensible supposed testimony Theism theology things thought thought-form tion true universe verities volition word
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86. oldal - For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other : and this, I think, we may call
82. oldal - Thus the mind has two faculties, conversant about truth and falsehood. First, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly, judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears.
89. oldal - But reason itself must rest at last upon authority ; for the original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, beliefs or trusts. Thus it is, that in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically admit, that belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of belief. We are compelled to surrender the proud Intellige ut credos of Abelard,...
85. oldal - ... a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention; or a shop for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate.
86. oldal - For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives, that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two.
84. oldal - A thing is known immediately or proximately, when we cognize it in itself ; mediately or remotely, when we cognize it in or through something numerically different from itself. Immediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves the fact of its existence ; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the possibility of its existence. 2. — An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is itself presented to observation,...
198. oldal - ... in belief not so. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of, those ideas that are under consideration. The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our own experience, or the testimony of others
197. oldal - ... is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true or false, rather than the contrary.
133. oldal - They who talk thus may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say, that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it : whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks.