1823. The KING The Justices of Bird. (a). And the same principle applies here. . Now it is not pretended that the respondents were misled by the informality of the notice. ABBOTT C. J. The 49 G. 3. c. 68. s. 5. requires, that notice shall be given of the intended appeal, and of the causes and matters thereof, and then proceeds to 要说 direct that the justices shall hear and determine those causes and matters. It is, therefore, requisite that they should be set out in the notice, in order to satisfy the words of the act. The object of the legislature appears to have been, that the respondents should know precisely what objections they have to meet. Now it is admitted, that under the notice given in this case, the appellant might either have contended that he was not the father of the child, or that it was not born in the parish of S., so that he could not be compelled to pay the churchwardens of that parish for its maintenance. The respondents would, therefore, be under the necessity of coming prepared to meet two objections, when one only was relied upon by the appellant. In that view of the case, the notice would be informal, but it does not appear to me to contain any information of the cause and matter of appeal; it is merely a description of the order itself, and not of the objections which the party charged, intended to make to it. The justices were, therefore, right in refusing to hear the appeal, and this rule must be discharged. THE plaintiff had recovered a verdict for 31. 10s. in an action for money had and received. A rule nisi had been obtained by Reader for entering a suggestion, that the defendant lived within the jurisdiction of the London Court of Requests. It appeared by the affidavits in answer to the rule, that the plaintiff's wife was the only child of one Eli Stott, lately deceased, who by his will had devised a real estate to persons therein named. The plaintiff, in right of his wife as heir at law, claimed this estate, on the ground that the testator was insane at the time he made his will, but could not maintain an ejectment, inasmuch as a lease granted by the testator had not expired. The defendant had been in the habit of receiving the rent of the estate during the testator's life-time, and had actually received a quarter's rent which had accrued due since his death; and this action was brought against him for the purpose of trying who was entitled to that rent, and consequently the title to the estate, was the real question at the trial. J. Williams shewed cause, and referred to the 39 and 40 G. 3. c. 104. s. 13., by which it is provided, "that an action may be brought for rent notwithstanding that statute, and that the plaintiff should not be prevented from recovering his costs though the verdict were for less than 51. ;" and he contended that this, though in Wednesday, An action for and received brought against money had the receiver of an estate to recover money received by him for rent, for the purpose of trying the title of the estate, is an action for rent within the meaning of the 39 & 40 G. 3. c. 104. s. 13. the London Court of Re quest Act; and the plaintiff, although he recovered less than 51. was held to be en titled to costs. 1825. DREW against, FLETCHER. nbesabs W form an action for money had and received, was in substance an action brought for the rent. Reader, contrà, contended that the clause referred to only applied to actions between landlord and tenant. fied starW.- ¿Prod~od) 13 frangon vð feiteni, had 9251 25/1 W JE DRUL Per Curiam. This is in substance an action for rent. yd z19dms.) The plaintiff could not have recovered without proving 792 ton his title to the rent of the premises, in respect of which. so wollens the defendant received the money. It is, therefore, Und Nt cha? within the meaning of the 13th section. Where the lessor of the DoE demise of PAIN against GRUNDY. plaintiff having ordinary rule to pay costs. entered into THE lessor of the plaintiff had entered into the ordinary rule to pay costs. After the commission day, but before the trial, the lessor of the plaintiff died. The cause was tried, and the plaintiff was nonsuited on tween the com- the merits. Comyn had obtained a rule nisi to compel mission day the executors of Pain to pay costs. the common rule to pay costs, died be and the trial, and the plaintiff was nonsuited on the merits: Held, that the executor of the lessor was not liable to pay the costs. Reader shewed cause, and cited Thrustout v. Bedwell. (a) Per Curiam. The rule entered into by the lessor of the plaintiff was merely personal, to make him liable to an attachment if he refused to pay the costs. The executor would not be liable to an action for them, and therefore, to grant this motion would be taking by a summary mode, a sum of money out of the assets which the executor could not otherwise be compelled to pay. Rule discharged. (a) 2 Wils. 7. IN Where bail justified at Chambers by consent, but N this case, bail justified by consent at Chambers, but the defendant did not serve any rule for the allowance of bail, or give any notice that the bail had justified. The plaintiff, afterwards, took an assignment did not serve of the bail bond. the defendant or show but the allowance, or give notice * that the bail had justified: Held, that the plaintiff' might take an assign. R. Pollock, for the defendant, obtained a rule to shew cause why the proceedings on the bail bond should not be set aside for irregularity. Walford shewed cause, and contended, that it was necessary that the defendant should have served a rule for the allowance of bail, or at least have given notice that the bail had justified. The Court held, that a rule for the allowance of bail ought to have been served, but as the defendant had an affidavit of merits, made the rule absolute on payment of costs. 1823. RICHLEY against PROONE. Declaration in DECLARATION for use and occupation. Plea, that after the making of the promises, and the assumpsit for cause of action before the cx 1 accruing of the several causes of action in the declaration mentioned, and before the exhibiting of the plaintiff's bill, the defendant delivered to the plaintiff, one ton weight of Riga hemp, and one hundred delivered to the weight of Russia tallow of the value of 30%., in full hibiting of the the defendant plaintiff certain A goods in satis satisfaction and discharge of the promises in the de faction of the declaration, promises in the claration mentioned; and that the plaintiff accepted the plea being in every respect permitted the for want of a plaintiff to sign by Platt that the plaintiff might sign judgment, as for plea, E. Lawes shewed cause, and contended that this was a plea in common use, and that the courts had never gone the length of saying that a party might not use a plea for the purpose of delay, provided he did not put the opposite party to the unnecessary expence of consulting counsel, by pleading pleas which require different modes of trial. Su the subiquant. The Court, without assigning any reasons, made the Case of Merington rule absolute.. Contra Rule absolute. (a) (a) This case was heard and determined at the sittings after term in the absence of Abbott C. J. |