4748. No Exact Time.-There is no defined time for winding up estates, and reasonable time must be interpreted according to the magnitude of the estate, and the complication or simplicity of its character.

4749. Twelve Months.-Some criterion is to be had from the legal proviso, that no executor can be compelled to pay a legacy in less than twelve months, and a creditor must make out a strong case to go successfully into Court under that time.

4750. Over Twelve Months.-How far over twelve months either a creditor or a legatee may be compelled to wait, depends entirely upon circumstances.

OPTIONAL PRIORITY.

4751. Executor's Favourites.—Though, as far as it goes, the law makes compulsory the preference of certain creditors over others deemed legally inferior, the executor has the option of favouring any one of many of the same class; thus,

4752. Judgments. If there are several judgments against the deceased (4), the executor may pay any one of them in full, though there be consequently nothing left for the rest, and so on in cases of k, m, t, u, v, w, y, and z.

4753. Executor's Own Claim.-Where the executor is duly a creditor of the deceased (y) he may give himself the preference over any of his own class of debt, whether it happen to be in z, x, w, q, #, or other class as it may be (4893).

4754. Common Debts.—Where all debts but common debts are fully paid, and there is not enough to pay all common debts (2), the executor is at liberty to pay any one or more of them in full to the entire exclusion of all the rest; but,

4755. Composition Deed.-If all the unsatisfied creditors agree together to accept a composition and enter into a deed to that effect, there is nothing to prevent its provisions being carried out, as in the case of any other composition (a).

FRAUD.

4756. If an executor pays a legacy or an inferior creditor to the exclusion of a superior creditor, he is liable to pay the superior claim himself, as before stated (4729), or he may, in the absence of an unqualified good defence, be convicted of fraud and punished as a criminal (5026).

(a) See "Compositions."

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resisted by the Court, if it suspects that the petitioner thereby seeks to close the mouth of such co-respondent; on the other hand,

3692. Former Rule.-Formerly, a co-respondent could not be in any way withdrawn or excluded; but, by an amendment of the law, 3693. Revised Rule.-The Court now has power to discharge a co-respondent from the suit, at the instance of the petitioner, but not at the instance of the respondent.

3694. When Available Witnesses. -A co-respondent, after being discharged by the Court from the case, is then eligible as a witness, and can be compelled to attend and give evidence, just as though he had never been named as a co-respondent.

THE CITATION.

3695. On All the Parties.-Every co-respondent, as well as the respondent, must be served with a citation" (3491), calling upon them to answer to the suit, and they are bound to answer, or fail at the peril of consequent adverse judgment.

3696. Address Unknown-Where the address of any person to be cited upon a petition for divorce is unknown, it is sufficient to send it by post or messenger, addressed "late of" the last place known as such address; but,

3697. Personal Service.-The Court enforces personal service, as far as possible; and

3698. Through Solicitor.-The Court will not allow a suit to proceed upon the mere undertaking of a solicitor to accept service of a citation; and

3699. Co-Respondent's Husband. If the co-respondent is a married woman, the citation should if possible, under a rule of Court, be served upon her in the presence of her husband.

THE ANSWER.

3700. As a Defence.-Any person who is served with a citation upon a petition in the Divorce Court, is entitled to put in a defence, technically called an "answer."

3701. Interval Allowed.-The interval wherein answer to a citation will be admitted is always stated upon the citation.

3702. Eight Days Usual.-Eight days is the usual time given for an answer to a citation; but,

3703. Six Weeks.-Where it was shown that the party cited was in America, six weeks was allowed for the answer.

COLLUSION.

3704. Shallow Lawyers.-Some lawyers, who ought to have

known better, have blunderingly confounded collusion with connivance, an error for which non-professional persons might be excused in the absence of express warning; therefore,

3705. Distinction of Terms.-In considering collusion, between parties to a petition for divorce, it is expressly necessary to bear in mind that the term must not be confounded with "connivance," which comes under notice at an earlier stage of the proceedings (3590); though,

3706. Slight Indication Sufficient.-As with connivance, so with collusion, the theory of the law (3590) causes the Court to watch with a peculiarly jealous eye for the slightest indication of a tendency to make divorce a gratification instead of a punish

ment.

ILLUSTRATIVE SUGGESTIONS.

3707. Tired of Each Other.-Supposing John and Mary, being husband and wife, grow mutually tired of each other, and there is no countervailing consideration of family or property, of course they would both desire and be glad of a divorce. The case may be put even stronger, thus ::

3708. Cross Motives. Supposing John desires to marry Julia, and Mary entertains a preference for Marmaduke, and supposing Julia and Marmaduke respectively reciprocate the affection entertained towards them, of course it would suit the views of all parties to procure a divorce between John and Mary as soon as possible; hence,

3709. Collusive Suit.-If Mary commits adultery, or is only presumed to have committed adultery, with Marmaduke, John may thereupon petition for a divorce.

3710. Concealed Facts.-John may not be entitled to a divorce. He may himself have been guilty of adultery (3636) with Julia; he may have ill-treated Mary; he may be guilty towards her of everything she could be permitted to plead; namely, connivance (3590), cruelty (3355), desertion (3450), and wilful neglect and misconduct ; yet,

3711. Apparent Suppression of Evidence.-It has been decided that the absence of a defensive plea on the part of a wife, or her refraining from interrogating witnesses, cannot of itself be admitted as evidence against a petition (3353); therefore,

3712. Divorce Inevitable.-If Mary refrains from pleading in opposition to the petition; if Julia keeps quiet as to her knowledge of the circumstances; if Marmaduke does not dispute his

delinquency; and if the Court fails otherwise to become informed of the facts, it must grant the required divorce.

3713. Reward of Guilt.-In the case suggested, the granting of a divorce would be to reward four guilty parties and to punish nobody (3590), and such an abuse of its functions is what the Court stigmatises as collusion.

OBJECT OF AFFIDAVIT.

3714. It is for the purpose of making collusion as difficult as possible that the Act requires every petitioner, upon presenting a petition, to make affidavit that No collusion or connivance exists between myself and my said wife" [or "husband," as the case may be] (3674); and

3715. Extreme Severity of Punishment.—If such declaration be untrue, and the Court should discover its untruth, the party making the declaration, upon conviction of having made it falsely, is liable to the severest punishment known to the law, short of capital execution; notwithstanding,

3716. Dead Letter. - Numerous cases prove that the terrible severity of the law, in threatening to punish false declarations, is a dead letter, and is rarely resorted to in a mild form, even in the most flagrant and palpable cases; and, in fact,

3717. Deliberate Lics. It is clearly evident that many of the declarations made in the Divorce Court are deliberate lies, and that,

3718. Simulated Opposition.-A large proportion of the opposition so assiduously exhibited in the Divorce Court is advisedly simulated, in order to meet the requirements of a law which appears designed to encourage ingenuity in deceit and fraud.

DISTINCTIVE INTERPRETATIONS.

3719. Consent to the Offence.-Formerly, collusion was interpreted to mean a mutual consent to and approval of the commission of the offence charged in the petition; but,

3720. Consent to the Petition. Modern interpretation of collusion supposes it to be a consent to, or acquiescence in the petition, entertained by the party petitioned against; therefore,

3721. Mutual Desire Sufficient.-Collusion exists in any and every case where the husband and the wife both desire a divorce or judicial separation (3477).

3722. Mutual Agreement Unnecessary.-Agreement together to present a petition is not necessary to constitute collusion; for,

PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION.

ORIGIN OF THE ASSOCIATION.

4406. As the bishops of old (4267) had the disposition of intestate effects, the proving or probate of wills naturally fell into the same hands; for it was only to be expected that claimants under a will should have the right, and be subjected to the obligation, of proving their claims in opposition to the extravagant rights exercised by the bishops in the event of no will being proved; and

COMPLETE TRANSFER OF POWERS.

4407. All the business of probate and administration, as formerly carried on by the bishops in their ecclesiastical courts, is now transferred to the Court of Probate.

COURT OF PROBATE.

4408. Constitution.-The Court of Probate consists of a judge, sitting at Westminster, to try "contentious business" (4477), a chief registry, and sundry district registries.

4409. Chief Registry.-The chief registry is in Doctors' Commons, London; and

4410. The chief registry is available for any business respecting probate or administration which may arise in any part of the country; and 4411. The chief registry may be most conveniently selected for business of a special character; but,

4412. It is usual and more convenient for probate and administration business to be transacted at the registry of the district wherein it arises (4481); and

4413. District Registries.-The various district registries, and the districts for which they are respectively available, are constituted by the Probate Act as follows:

4414. THE Chief Registry, Doctors' Commons, London, serves also as the district registry for the counties of Middlesex, Surrey, and Hertford, the Western Division of Kent, and Southern Division of Essex.

4415. NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE, for the county of Northumberland. 4416. DURHAM, for the county of Durham.

4417. CARLISLE, for counties of Cumberland and Westmoreland. 4418. WAKEFIELD, for the West Riding of Yorkshire.

4419. YORK, for the East and North Ridings of Yorkshire, including the city of York and Ainsty.

4420. MANCHESTER, for the city of Manchester.

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