At the head of the first experiment, to fhew how the electric fluid acts, he adds, Pafs an excited glafs-tube near the end of the prime conductor, fo as to give it fome fparks‡.' From these words I am led to conclude, the doctor did believe the excited tube communicated the electric fluid to the infulated conductor.

If we examine the fimilar experiments made by his followers, in order to fupport their theory, we are taught to believe quite the reverfe.

Mr. Cavallo, in explaining the caufe of the divergency of two pithballs fufpended from the end of an infulated metallic-rod, tells us, "The • reason of this experiment is, that the repelling power of the excited tube, driving the fluid of one end of the tube to it's other end, i. e. to that with which the electrometer is connected, renders this end electrified pofitively; but in fact the tube communicates no electricity to the rod, it only disturbs the equable diffufion of it's fluid||.' If there be any meaning in words, the before-cited authors appear to contradict each other. But, before I ad

vance, it may be neceffary to afk the advocates for the Franklinian theory, what reafon they can have to fuppofe that the fame caufe fhould produce diffimilar effects? it's

When a cylinder, turning upon axis, and rubbing against a cushion, is excited, we conclude it communicates the electric fluid to the conductor. Excite a glafs-tube with the fame materials the cushion is made of, by rubbing it in the hand, and the tube, we are told, does not communicate any electric fluid to the infulated rod, but it acts by pressure.

Surely, only the credulous, and thofe who are too idle to think for themfelves, can much longer admit fuch inconfiftencies!

As I have learnt, in my philofophical inquiries, not to take any thing upon truft, I fhall beg a minute to examine this fuppofed doctrine of preffure.

B

C A

Let A, B, represent an infulated metallicrod, and C, D, another in contact with the rod A, B, at C, placed in any direction and at any diftance from the point A, towards B. Sufpend a pair of pith-balls in the ufual manner from the ends of the rods. at B and D; and bring an excited tube near to the end A, the balls will diverge both at B and D, as they ought to do, for the preffure of elastic fluids will be propagated obliquely, as well as in right lines.

Let a perfon put his finger upon the end of the rod at D, when the excited tube is prefented near the end A, and the effects of this fuppofed preffure ceafe immediately, there being no divergency of the pith-balls either at B or D.

If the preffure upon elaftic bodies be propagated, as Sir Ifaac Newton has demonstrated§, there is no reason, I know of, can be affigned for the pith-ball's, not diverging at B when

the

the finger is at D; for if it deftroys the effects of the latteral, how is it to take off the effect of the direct preffure? As this is far beyond my comprehenfion, I now call upon the fupporters of the Franklinian theory to reconcile their fyftem to the Newtonion doctrine of the preffure of electric bodies. But we are informed, by Mr. Wilfon*, that excited glafs oppofed very near to the end of a cylinder of wood, will communicate a quantity of it's accumulated fluid to it; and Dr. Milnert, in a very late publication, has informed us, that he can change glafs, by exciting a fmooth glafs-tube of the common fize with filk, and applying it repeatedly

to the bent wire.

He fays, This neceffarily follows from confidering the quality of the « power employed in the prefent cafe, that the upper furface of the glafs, together with the upper coating, must be electrified pofitively.' From the foregoing results, drawn from experiments, almost every perfon would readily conclude it would be granted me what I think I have fairly proved t-that excited electrics do communicate their accumulated fluid to infulated rods, and other bodies; but this is not the cafe.

Though Dr. Milner charged his glafs politively by repeatedly applying the excited glass-tube to the wire, he is by no means willing to allow that an excited electric acts by communication in other inftances. He tells us, if an excited electric of either kind be brought within half an inch of one fide of a pane of glass, the furface of the glass-plate, immediately oppofite to the excited body, acquires a perment contrary electricity, from the influence of that body, which caufes a portion of the electric fluid belonging to the glafs to fhift from fome parts of the furface to

others. By this, I prefume, the glafs becomes pofitively electrified.

But admitting for a minute, what I do not in both cafes allow, that an excited electric acts by communication in contact, and by preffure at the diftance of half an inch, can any of the friends and fupporters of the Franklinian doctrine aflign any probable reafon why the very elastic particles of the electric fluid do not reaffume their firft ftation as foon as the preffure is removed?

If I understand Dr. Franklin accurately, when speaking of furfaces, he does not mean a mathematical furface; and he says, the pores of the glass are as full of the fluid as they can hold, and that they repel the particles of the electric fluid fuperinduced upon the furface of the glafs.

How the particles of the electric fluid are removed out of the pores of the glafs by preffing upon them by a force fuperior to their repelling power without being driven through the glafs, may be, perhaps, difficult to determine; but furely the friends to this theory ought to tell us how it is done. At prefent we are taught to believe, that the laws of motion of the electric fluid are different from all other laws of matter; and yet we have no better rule it is fo, but because it is fo; which is with many perfons a very forcible argument.

But, if I admit that an excited electric acts by communication in contact, and by preffure, at the fmall distance of half an inch, the Franklinists will not grant me even this, if I give it them to help out with an inconfiftency.

Cavallo, fpeaking of the electrophorus, fays§, The action of thefe plates depends upon a principle long ago difcovered, viz. the power that an excited electric has to in<duce a contrary electricity into a

• body

body brought within it's sphere of action.' This power, if I underftand him, is not by communication, but by preffure. He explains all his experiments on the electrophorus, by what he calls the two well-known principles; which is, in effect, denying that excited electrics act by communication, even in contact with the cover of the electrophorus.

If any of the tenacious fupporters of the Franklinian fyftem will fo far condefcend as to reconcile the foregoing apparent contradictions and inconfiftencies, and to folve the difficulties I have pointed out, I shall be much obliged to them; and I promise them, for the favour, I will next go into their doctrine of influence, and of bodies acting upon bodies through impenetrable fubftances, where they cannot pafs. If they chufe rather to retire filently behind fyftems, to cover their errors and inconfiftencies, they must not think the world will much longer implicitly follow them; for truth, though long and anxiously fuppreffed by prejudices and intereft, will finally prevail.

DOVER, Nov. 16, 1783.

MA

JOHN LYON.

ESSAY ON BRUTES.

AN is defined a reasonable animal, because he can reafon from caufes to effects, and can trace effects to caufes; because he poffeffes all the paffions, love, hope, fear, &c. and that important qualification, memory.

But I will boldly hazard to aver, that there are many animals denominated brutes, which, in a degree, are capable of all thefe emotions, and poffeffed of that eminent qualification.

Let us examine a dog, that faithful and fagacious animal, the humble friend of man; who is allowed univerfally to be as acute and fenfible a creature as, after the human fpecies, can be imagined, and try whether, in the first place, he cannot reafon from caufes to effects, and reverfely,

VOL. III.

Now the reasoning faculty is effected by combination of ideas. For instance; a man previously perfuaded that there is a God, when he furveys the wonders of creation, is by that combination reminded of God; or, in a lower example, a child having once feen and felt the rod, is for the fame reafon afterwards effectually fcared by the fight of it. Here it is evident, that the child, by an operation of the mind imperceptible to itself, tacitly confi ders the rod as the caufe of it's smart, and the fmart as the effect. Apply this remark to a dog. Does not the fight of a flick, if ever he has been beaten with one, keep him in awe as effectually as the ftripe? Whence is this, but from the reciprocal reasoning he forms from the cause to the effect, and from the effect to it's caufe?

Who will doubt that he poffeffes all the emotions, in a degree, which fill the human bofom, both fierce and tender, joy, forrow, hope, fear, rage, pride, envy, who has obferved one dog, or the different fpecies, in different fituations? What animal can more expreffively fignify his joy, by the fparkling of his eye, the sportiveness of his gambols, his brifknefs, his agitation, and (not to mention the fymptoms of joy peculiar to the kind) the erection of his ears, and the chearful tones of his barking?

On the contrary, what appearance, and what founds, are more poignant. and expreffive demonftrations of forrow, than the downcaft eye, the flow and lowly motions, the crouched tail, the fallen ears, and the whining or melancholy howling?

If you give figns of again receiving him into favour, how do his eyes and motions resume their former alacrity, until you again fignify your difplea fure, which finks him into his former fituation!

Of the rage of this animal I need not fpeak, as it is at times evident in all the fpecies. But his pride is not fo univerfal and obvious; for pride is the offfpring of good living, of favour, and careffes, or confcioufnefs of fuperior power. Accordingly, what human 2 Z

tyrants

tyrants can lord it more imperioufly, or fhew more indubitable figns of haughtiness, than a lady's favourite lap-dog over a ftrange or lefs favoured animal of his fpecies? Or when two are kept and careffed by the fame perfon, can there be more unequivocal figns of envy and hatred, than they will exhibit towards each other in acts of rivalry and emulation for their protector's favour? And, laftly, who has not obferved the carelefs and fuperior air with which a great dog regards the yelping and impertinence of the tiny crew who pefter him? nor feen him fometimes even returning their feeble attacks with an ignominious and expreffive elevation of one of his hindlegs?

A true philofopher, or any perfon who is fond of accurately obferving nature, will not be difpleafed with the humility of thefe inftances; as they directly conduce to the grand point, namely, that thefe animals do actually poffefs, in a degree, those fenfations on which we fo much value ourfelves, and that memory is the foundation of thefe qualifications.

What, then, is the cause of that vaft and eminent fuperiority of reafoning in man, the exercife of which elevates him fo prodigiously above other animals; which renders them fubfervient to his pleasure, and enables him to cultivate arts and fciences?

If you admit that all this is done by the faculty of reafoning, I reply, that fince dogs fhew undeniable proofs that they can reafon after the fame manner, though in inferior degree, and fince they are fufceptive of the fame fenfations, therefore the caufe of man's preeminence is his fuperiority in degree as to reafoning; that the faculty in dogs of reafoning is limited to a confined degree; and that fo far as man exceeds them in that fcale or gradation of reafon, fo far he will exceed them in the effects and operations of that faculty.

Thefe obfervations lead to that most interesting and much-agitated question refpecting the quality of the foul: for as thefe powers of thinking are proved

to be in a degree belonging to dogs, and the powers of thinking neceffarily fuppofe the existence of a foul, it follows that dogs have fouls.

If you maintain the immateriality of the human foul, you infallibly inveft the foul of a dog with the fame quality; a conceffion which I prefume an immaterialist would not indulge to that animal. Yet it is inevitable; for fo clofely do the operations of a dog's power of thinking refemble the human, fo clearly deducible are they from the fame fource, and fo evidently do they befpeak the fame quality, that fuch as the one is, of the fame fubftance muft be the other; unless you unphilofophically and unreafonably establish two principles to account for the fame appearance, when one is fufficient.

Now, as all the fagacious actions and obfervations of a dog will probably be allowed to be practicable by corporeal organization, and as the fuperiority of man arifes only from pre-eminence in the fame power of reafoning, why may not that fuperiority of reafoning be effected by a fuperiority of corporeal organization? For how do we know of what degree of refinement matter is fufceptive? Because we have been pleased to term matter inert, ftupid, and inanimate, therefore fhall we deem it impoffible to be modified or impregnated with perception and information? If the immaterialist argues thus, he confutes himself: for can he conceive mere matter to be fo exquifitely modified as to form the power of perception in brute animals? And yet, if he does not grant that all their intelligence is effected by mere ftupid matter, he must allow it to be produced by a fpiritual immaterial power, fimilar in kind to the compofition of his own foul.

But perhaps he will argue, that corporeal organization cannot be wrought to a more exquifite degree than in the brain of brute animals, and that to this refined modification in the brain of man the power of an immaterial foul is fuperadded, which creates the vaft difference between men and dogs.

But to reafon thus, is in the firft

place

place to determine how far, and no farther, the Almighty power could go in the modification of matter; and, in the next, it is to establish an additional principle, when for aught we know, and indeed in agreement to every appearance whatever, one is quite fufficient. Methinks it is a felf-evident argument, if the Almighty power could fo modify inert and fenfelefs matter, as to make it fufceptive of fuch rational perception and reafoning as is obfervable in brutes, what caufe have I to deny (unless I prefume to fet bounds to that power) that it could ftill more exquifite ly modify matter, and render it capable of thofe fuperior reasonings which distinguish man?

Man is extremely fond of affecting to know the utmost qualities and capabilities of every object of fcience; he delights to circumfcribe the boundaries of knowledge, and to fay, Thus far fhalt thou go, and no farther.' He glories likewife in diftinguishing himfelf by all means from the beafts that perifh; and he cannot endure the thought of being organized and rendered fufceptive of information in the fame way as brutes: he therefore fupposes himself informed in a fuperior, Spiritual, divine manner; laying it down as an impoffibility that any thing beneath an immaterial foul can produce thinking and reafoning in fo high a degree as he poffeffes them, and that the power of Godisnot competent to render matter fo fufceptive of them as he is; that therefore he, and he alone, is informed by an immaterial, divine foul, diftinct in it's nature and operations from the mean and lowly imitation of thinking, which he cannot but allow to brutes.

This averfion to be efteemed in any refpect fimilar to brutes, is increafed by the perfuafion that they will perish for ever when they have once ceased to exift here, and that nothing but the immateriality of a man's foul will occafion him to live again at a future time.

But let not thofe who are piously anxious for the immortality of their

existence, who feel in themselves a rational perfuafion that they are defigned for an eternal state, and who rely on thepromifes of God to that purpose, be alarmed at this doctrine, on the fuppofition that it oppofes the poffibility of

their future and eternal existence. Their immortality is by no means concerned with the materiality or immateriality of the foul; fince the fame power that could fo miraculously form matter as we find it in this world, is indubitably able to make it live for ever. If of this there be any doubt, let the ve ry Creed, the treasure of our belief, be confulted; and it will appear that not the foul only, but alfo the body, is to be made happy in regions of future blifsfulness. So that, if the body can be by Almighty power rendered capable of immortality, why fhould we oppofe the material compofition ofthe foul,on the prefumption that a material fubftance is not capable of eternal existence ?

As to the fcriptural objections to this doctrine, it were impoffible in this limited effay to confider them; they are fufficiently explained by a most able and well-known writer on the fubject. All I wished to establish was, that the powers of thinking and reafoning being practicable by corporeal organization, as in the case of dogs, there was on that account no reafon to doubt that the organization of all thinking animals, however differing in degree and excellence of percep tionand reafoning, isof the fame com pofition.

But though animal be of the fame compofition with human fouls, yet are they fo very inferior in degree, that perhaps they are not capable of deferving immortality by their actions: at the fame time, man is fo very fuperior in his foul, that by proper reafoning he can render himself worthy of eternity. And from this vaft difproportion in the poffible improvements and fublimer capacity of the human foul, may be inferred it's immortality in preference to that of a dog, whofe utmoft attainments, though inferior exercifes of the fame organization, can223

not