CHAP. VII.

In regard of the precept of charity towards one's self, protestants are in a state of sin, as long as they remain separated from the Roman church.

1. “THAT due order is to be observed in the theological virtue of charity, whereby we are directed to prefer some objects before others, is a truth taught by all divines, and declared in these words of holy scripturea; He hath ordered charity in me. The reason whereof is, because the infinite goodness of God, which is the formal object or motive of charity, and for which all other things are loved, is differently participated by different objects; and therefore the love we bear to them for God's sake must accordingly be unequal. In the virtue of faith, the case is far otherwise; because all the objects or points which we believe do equally participate the Divine testimony or revelation, for which we believe alike all things propounded for such. For it is as impossible for God to speak an untruth in a small, as in a great matter. And this is the ground for which we have so often affirmed, that any least error against faith is injurious to God, and destructive of salvation.

2. "This order in charity may be considered, towards God, our own soul, the soul of our neighbour, our own life or goods, and the life or goods of our neighbour. God is to be beloved above all things, both objectivè, (as the divines speak,) that is, we must wish or desire to God a good more great, perfect, and noble, than to any or all other things; namely, all that a Cant. ii. 4.

indeed he is, a nature infinite, independent, immense, &c.; and also appretiativè, that is, that we must sooner lose what good soever, than leave and abandon him. In the other objects of charity, of which I spake, this order is to be kept: we may, but are not bound to prefer the life and goods of our neighbour before our own: we are bound to prefer the soul of our neighbour before our own temporal goods or life, if he happen to be in extreme spiritual necessity, and that we by our assistance can succour him, according to the saying of St. John', In this we have known the charity of God, because he hath yielded his life for us: and we ought to yield our life for our brethren. And St. Augustin likewise saithe, "A Christian will not doubt to lose his own temporal life, for the eternal life of his neighbour." Lastly, we are to prefer the spiritual good of our own soul, before both the spiritual and temporal good of our neighbour, because as charity doth of its own nature chiefly incline the person in whom it resides to love God, and to be united with him, so of itself it inclines him to procure those things whereby the said union with God is effected, rather to himself than to others. And from hence it follows, that in things necessary to salvation, no man ought in any case, or in any respect whatsoever, to prefer the spiritual good either of any particular person or of the whole world before his own soul, according to those words of our blessed Saviourd, What doth it avail a man, if he gain the whole world, and sustain the damage of his own soul? And therefore (to come to our present purpose) it is directly against the order of charity, or against charity as it hath a reference to ourselves, which divines call charitas propria, to adventure either the omitting of any means necessary to salvation, or the

b 1 Joan. iii. 16. c De Mendac. cap. vi. d Matt. xvi. 26.

committing of any thing repugnant to it, for whatsoever respect; and consequently, if by living out of the Roman church we put ourselves in hazard either to want something necessarily required to salvation, or else to perform some act against it, we commit a most grievous sin against the virtue of charity, as it respects ourselves, and so cannot hope for salvation without repentance.

3. "Now of things necessary to salvation there are two sorts, according to the doctrine of all divines. Some things, say they, are necessary to salvation, necessitate præcepti, necessary only because they are commanded; for, If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandmentse. In which kind of things, as probable ignorance of the law or of the commandment doth excuse the party from all faulty breach thereof; so likewise doth it not exclude salvation in case of ignorance. Some other things are said to be necessary to salvation, necessitate medii, finis or salutis; because they are means appointed by God to attain our end of eternal salvation, in so strict a manner, that it were presumption to hope for salvation without them. And as the former means are said to be necessary because they are commanded, so the latter are commonly said to be commanded because they are necessary; that is, although there were no other special precept concerning them, yet supposing they be once appointed as means absolutely necessary to salvation, there cannot but arise an obligation of procuring to have them, in virtue of that universal precept of charity which obligeth every man to procure the salvation of his own soul. In this sort, 'divine infallible faith' is necessary to salvation; as likewise repentance of every deadly sin, and in the doctrine of catholics, baptism in re, that is, 'in act,' to

e Matt. xix. 17.

children, and for those who are come to the use of reason, in voto, or hearty desire, when they cannot have it in act. And as baptism is necessary for remission of original and actual sin committed before it, so the sacrament of confession or penance is necessary in re, or in voto, in act or desire, for the remission of mortal sins, committed after baptism. The minister of which sacrament of penance being necessarily a true priest, true ordination is necessary in the church of God for remission of sins by this sacrament, as also for other ends not belonging to our present purpose. From hence it riseth, that no ignorance or impossibility can supply the want of those means which are absolutely necessary to salvation. As if, for example, a sinner depart this world without repenting himself of all deadly sins, although he die suddenly, or unexpectedly fall out of his wits, and so commit no new sin by omission of repentance; yet he shall be eternally punished for his former sins committed, and never repented of. If an infant die without baptism, he cannot be saved; not by reason of any actual sin committed by him in omitting baptism, but for original sin, not forgiven by the means which God hath ordained to that purpose. Which doctrine all or most protestants will (for aught I know) grant to be true, in the children of infidels; yea, not only Lutherans, but also some other protestants, as Mr. Bilson, late of Winchesterf, and others, hold it to be true, even in the children of the faithful. And if protestants in general disagree from catholics in this point, it cannot be denied but that our disagreement is in a point very fundamental. And the like I say of the sacrament of penance, which they deny to be necessary to salvation, either in act or in desire: which error is likewise fundamental, because it concerns (as I said) a thing necesf In his True Difference, &c. part 4. page 368 and 369.

sary to salvation: and for the same reason, if their priesthood and ordination be doubtful, as certainly it is, they are in danger to want a means, without which they cannot be saved. Neither ought this rigour to seem strange or unjust for Almighty God having, of his own goodness, without our merit, first ordained man to a supernatural end of eternal felicity; and then after our fall in Adam, vouchsafed to reduce us to the attaining of that end, if his blessed will be pleased to limit the attaining of that end, to some means which in his infinite wisdom he thinks most fit; who can say, Why dost thou so? or who can hope for that end without such means? Blessed be his Divine Majesty, for vouchsafing to ordain us, base creatures, to so sublime an end, by any means at all!

4. "Out of the foresaid difference followeth another, that (generally speaking) in things necessary only because they are commanded, it is sufficient for avoiding sin, that we proceed prudently, and by the conduct of some probable opinion, maturely weighed and approved by men of virtue, learning, and wisdom. Neither are we always obliged to follow the most strict and severe, or secure part, as long as the doctrine which we embrace proceeds upon such reasons as may warrant it to be truly probable and prudent, though the contrary part want not also probable grounds. For in human affairs and discourse, evidence and certainty cannot be always expected. But when we treat not precisely of avoiding sin, but moreover of procuring something without which I cannot be saved; I am obliged by the law and order of charity, to procure as great certainty as morally I am able, and am not to follow every probable opinion or dictamen, but tutiorem partem, the safer part,' because, if my probability prove false, I shall not probably, but certainly, come short of salvation. Nay, in

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