Academical Constitution, which makes Congregation and the whole body of the University the judge of the fitness of the Candidate for his Degree: and that, though the Vice-Chancellor, in common with the two Proctors, has a power of veto in Congregation; this new power, which prevents the question from coming into Congregation at all, is quite a different thing from that veto.

A few words to the resident members of convocation, on the subject of the statute shortly to be proposed.—It is always somewhat invidious for a junior member of the University to raise his voice upon a grave question of legislation. Age, knowledge, and experience are quoted against him, and in many cases he can have little to say in answer, without going through an inquiry more laborious than his regular avocations permit. Still there are certain broad principles which can be discerned without minute information, and which may reasonably be a guide to the opinions and to the votes of all members of our legislative body, and it may be allowable to one of that number, even on a brief consideration, to suggest some points to the notice of others.

In the first place, then, it may be remarked, that the statute now to be proposed is still more inconsistent with that which was passed relating to the Regius Professor of Divinity in 1836 and confirmed in 1842, than was the late statute for Divinity Lectures. In this the Regius Professor is put forward alone, and invested with an authority entirely new. I say entirely new, because although one part of it has been claimed of late, and the proceedings at law against that claim have been withdrawn, still this withdrawal has been probably rather owing to the difficulty of remedy, than to the slightest appearance of legality in the claim. There are but two answers that can be made to this objection. One, that the authority conferred is altogether insignificant; the other, that it is either right, or expedient, or both, to remove the censure of 1836.

Secondly, it is worth while consider

ing what is the nature of the power to be conferred on the Regius Professor, and whether it is a power that ought ever to be entrusted to an individual, especially to one appointed for life by the Crown. Now I will not impute to the heads of the University the absolute madness of proposing to constitute any individual so appointed a judge of orthodoxy. They cannot have thought of such a thing as thus laying the Faculty of Theology prostrate at the feet of the secular power. The very Statute for the trial of heterodoxy in Sermons, points out the gravity of the danger, by providing a Court of several members. It must, therefore, be imagined that the power is so indefinite in its results, that it will not, in fact, constitute either a lawful right of judicature, or an opportunity of usurpation.

Now it is perfectly true that the Regius Professor has his legitimate and limited power as a Member of Congregation, and that he can there withhold a Degree for a time, and then lay his objection before the House, and put it to the vote. This, of course, he may do on the ground of heterodoxy, appearing in any exercise performed in his presence, and no one would wish to prevent his having or using such a power.* But recent experience has shown, that it is possible for a Professor to make an indirect use of authority, such as it is here proposed to place in his hands, and that in such a manner as to constitute him not a judge, but an arbitrary and irresponsible authority in the Theological Faculty.+ It would be well, if the Members of Convocation could be informed, before they vote upon this question, what degree of security the ViceChancellor's power in doubtful cases will give-whether, for instance, the ViceChancellor, even if willing, will be able to take cognizance of the Professor's reasons for refusing a Thesis; and again, whether he will have any summary means of compelling him to do his duty, if he should simply decline performing it; or again, of causing that duty to be performed by another. Unless these points

are settled, it will be but a leap in the dark to sanction the proposed measure.

Again, with regard to the proposed form of exercise for the Doctor's Degree, it must be observed, that it alters the constitution of the University by placing the Bachelors of Divinity so far on the same footing as those on whom that Degree has not been conferred. This is a grave alteration, though implied but by a slight form.*

As to the delivery of the Exercises to the Professor, is chiefly important as tending to give an opportunity for future usurpation. What is it for, unless he is to be a judge of orthodoxy?

And here the difference of the two cases of Law and Theology, which are tacked together, comes out clearly. In Law, the question is of knowledge or ignorance, and so it may be in Theology, but it may be also between true knowledge, and knowledge falsely so called. It is an evil to destroy the hope of recovering Lectures instead of mere Examination Exercises in Law, and the same evil appears in the case of Divinity; but the cases are distinct, and ought not to be treated as the same. In short, the proposed plan seems to be seriously deficient in the important article of facing the question, and likely to do nothing better than serve indifferently the wants of the present generation. The next is likely either to suffer from it, or to undo it. C. M.

Oriel, Ash-Wednesday, 1844. Questions on the Proposed New Statute. 1. Whether the Statute does not enable the Queen's Professor of Divinity to force each Candidate to adopt the Professor's own questions, by refusing

his approbation to those of the Can

didate.

2. Whether in the case of the Professor's refusing to approve of the Candidate's questions, the Vice-Chancellor may then be appealed to.

3. Whether the Professor can be compelled to approve.

4. Whether the proceedings before the Vice-Chancellor are to be in the Court of the University, or in private:-if in private, are they to be conducted according to the Statutes?

5. Whether an appeal will lie from the sentence of the Vice-Chancellor to the superior Courts of the University.

6. Whether, if the Vice-Chancellor's decision be without appeal from, the authority of congregation in granting degrees be not irrecoverably lost.

7. Whether Sect. viii. by giving this power to the Vice-Chancellor, do not partially repeal the Statute that provides him the advice of six doctors in the case of erroneous doctrine.

8. Whether in the case of a dispute about doctrine between the Queen's Professor and the Candidate, the ViceChancellor, being a Layman, or not a Graduate in Theology, can decide it.

9. Whether in the case of a dispute between the Professor of Civil Law and the Candidate, on a legal question, the Vice-Chancellor, being a Graduate in Theology or Arts, and not learned in the Law, can decide it.

Finally, Whether it be fair by means of this Statute to make the voluntary provisions of the Statute, de Disciplina Theologica, compulsory on all Candidates for Degrees in Theology, who have been matriculated since Michaelmas, 1838.