that events are moving that way. Explaining that the attention of the Premier had been fully occupied during the last few months with international affairs, Mr. Ammon proceeded: 'But as soon as possible every step will be taken to call together something in the nature of an international conference to see whether we can arrive at an agreement on the reduction of armaments that might lead to eventual disarmament.' And later, in the same debate, when the question of develop ing Singapore cropped up again, Mr. Ammon added significantly: "The Government would have something to bargain with in a conference if they were able to say that failing a satis factory agreement being reached, however much they might regret it, they would have to go on with the naval base at Singapore.' So it is quite on the cards that the other four Powers affected by the original treaty of naval limitation may soon receive an invitation from the British Government to meet in conference again, for the purpose of amplifying that pact.

Most of those who have given careful study to politico-naval developments since the winter of 1921-22 feel dubious as to the prospects of a new Arms Conference. The conditions now prevailing are very different, they point out, from those which obtained three years ago. The Powers chiefly involved in naval competition at that time were the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. France and Italy stood by as more or less indifferent spectators. Dominating the whole position at sea was the formidable programme of battleship construction on which the United States was engaged. This scheme embraced sixteen capital ships of unique dimensions and battle power, the completion of which would have ensured American primacy in the strongest types of fighting craft. In

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process of execution, though much less advanced, was the Japanese 'eighteight' programme. This also embodied sixteen capital ships, individually rather more powerful than the American vessels. In the meantime Great Britain watched with growing uneasiness the rapid expansion of these two navies, for her own resources were just as rapidly dwindling. Shortly after the war, in a perfect frenzy of retrenchment, she had begun scrapping battleships right and left, until by the spring of 1921 there remained only the skeleton of that mighty Grand Fleet which for five years had exercised complete mastery over the seas.

Many of the vessels discarded were, no doubt, of a type verging on obsolescence, and their retention would not of itself have guaranteed the future preeminence of the British Navy. A new class of capital ship, based on the experience gained at Jutland, and designated the 'post-Jutland' type, had been evolved since the war, and against thirty-two vessels of this class, building and projected for the navies of the United States and Japan, Great Britain had but one. To replace her aging dreadnoughts with battleships of the new type seemed to be out of the question. The cost of construction had risen enormously-from $15,000,000 per ship in 1914 to $35,000,000 in 1921

and her finances were in no condition to stand a new burden of this magnitude. Still, the sentiment of the British people was altogether opposed to the surrender of that supremacy at sea which they had grown to regard as their inalienable heritage. Exhausted by the war and its sacrifices, and staggering under a colossal load of debt, they were as yet unprepared to see the trident pass out of their hands. It is the writer's belief that if naval limitation had failed to materialize Great Britain would have contrived sooner or

later to recover her former lead. It would have required a superhuman effort of many years; but that she would have accomplished it in the end, few who know her history will be inclined to doubt.

II

In the United States a perceptible reaction was setting in against prodigal expenditure on naval armament. By the beginning of 1921 popular enthusiasm for the great shipbuilding programme was on the wane. Owing to inadequate appropriations by Congress, most of the ships were in a backward state of construction, and it began to seem doubtful whether all of them would be completed. In the Navy itself influential voices were heard protesting against this lavish outlay on vessels which new methods of attack might soon render obsolete, if they had not already done so. Admiral W. S. Sims, U. S. N., whose wide experience naturally lent great weight to his views, publicly declared the battleship to have outlived its utility. This was the situation when President Harding went to the White House. But to cancel, or even to curtail, a naval programme on which large sums of money had already been spent, without gaining a quid pro quo of some sort or another, would have been unstatesmanlike and wasteful. The President and his Secretary of State saw in this half-built fleet of dreadnoughts a potent instrument of diplomacy. The original motive had been to secure for the United States, if not absolute supremacy in naval strength, at any rate equality with Great Britain; and the country at large, for all its declining interest in the matter, would not have approved the complete abandonment of this policy.

But could not the same goal be reached by other and less expensive

means? President Harding and Mr. Hughes thought it could, nor did events belie their judgment. Fully apprised of the predicament in which Great Britain found herself, faced as she was with the alternative of taking secondary rank at sea or risking insolvency in an effort to build up a postJutland fleet, they had every reason to believe she would welcome with eagerness any rational proposals for stabilizing the balance of naval power as between herself and the United States. To this end the coöperation of Japan would be essential, but there again the outlook was decidedly promising. Thoughtful Japanese were aghast at the prodigious growth of their defense budget, which in 1921 was absorbing not far short of one half the entire revenue. Naval expenditure, in particular, was advancing by leaps and bounds, although the eight-eight programme was still in an early stage of development.1 What it would ultimately cost to complete they trembled to think. Trade was depressed in consequence of the slump which had followed the great war-boom; popular discontent with the cost of living and heavy taxation was becoming articulate, and indispensable public services were being starved in order to release more money for battleships. To Japan, therefore, an arrangement which would have the effect of halving her naval budget without detriment to the relative standing of her fleet could not be other than highly agreeable.

No opposition was anticipated from France or Italy, though one is forced to admit that the authors of the limitation scheme did not make sufficient allowance for the former's maritime interests and proud traditions. On the whole, however, the international situation in

1Of the sixteen capital ships included in this programme, only six had been actually laid down by the summer of 1921.

1921 was such as to justify the most sanguine hopes respecting naval disarmament by mutual accord. None of the Great Powers wished to be drawn into a ruinous dreadnought competition; all were anxious to avoid fresh commitments after the orgy of spending provoked by the World War. In fine, the psychological moment had arrived, and American statesmen were prompt to seize it.

Now let us review as briefly as possible the very different situation which meets the eye to-day. While the building of capital ships has all but ceased, scores of other and smaller fighting craft are constructing in the world's shipyards. The United States, which three years since was leading the world in the production of combatant ships, has practically dropped out of the running. The great programme which constituted her trump card at the Washington parley is no more. Her place has been taken by Japan, who now has a larger quota of tonnage in hand than any other Power, though France is not far behind her. Great Britain has authorized the first batch of new cruisers designed to safeguard her sea routes, which must be kept open if she is to live. It may not be long before she is driven, by the steady expansion of the French submarine flotilla, to adopt a counter programme of the requisite dimensions. Italy, which claims parity of strength with France in the Mediterranean, has recently laid down her first fighting ships of post-war design. The way is thus prepared for a new era of competitive shipbuilding, less costly, perhaps, than when the dreadnought was the unit of power, but just as liable to engender international friction.

Japan is vigorously exploiting the opportunity with which a somewhat liberal interpretation of the Washington Treaty has provided her. The

eight-eight programme is supposed to have gone by the board; actually, as we shall see anon, an integral and very considerable section of it remains, and is being proceeded with. In the last two and a half years she has laid down more vessels of war than the United States, Great Britain, and Italy combined. Thanks to the status quo agreement concerning Pacific naval bases, the political reaction of this Japanese activity is, so far, much less serious than it would otherwise have been. The American public, appreciating the vastness of the Pacific, does not as yet see cause for alarm in the imposing fleet of cruisers and submarines which Japan is building up. This process, however, is watched with less equanimity in Australia and New Zealand, where Japan is always regarded as a potential aggressor, and where a vigilant watch is kept on the growth of her navy. It was mainly in deference to the wishes of these Dominions that the late British Government undertook to develop Singapore as a major naval base. Already the repudiation of this scheme by the Labor Government has caused Australia to look to her own defense by ordering two big cruisers for the Commonwealth fleet. Nor is the new British cruiser programme unconnected with Japanese building activity. We seem, in fact, to be reverting to that pre-war condition of affairs in which the laying-down of a new warship by one Power automatically led to the building of another warship by a neighboring State. Compared with the old dreadnought rivalry, this new competition has begun on a modest scale; but the suggestive fact is that it has begun, and experience warns us to be prepared at any moment for a sudden acceleration of tempo. If, therefore, the movement is to be checked before it has gathered weight and momentum, now is the time to act.

But one looks in vain for any of the favoring circumstances which heralded the first Conference. Between most of the Powers concerned political differences of varying degrees of gravity have intervened. For example, it would be idle to pretend that AngloFrench relations have not deteriorated since 1921. At Washington, in that year, France definitely refused all such proposals for the limitation of submarines as were acceptable to Great Britain, though at that time there was a friendlier feeling between them than exists to-day. Since then France has embarked on a submarine programme of considerable dimensions; moreover, it was made clear by official statements during the debates in Chamber and Senate which preceded ratification of the Five-Power Treaty that France, in her present mood, would be averse even to discussing any further scheme of naval limitation. Yet without French coöperation it would be utterly futile to stage another conference.

And what of Japan? Until lately her newspapers were not unsympathetic toward the idea of extending the Treaty to include auxiliary ships, though they invariably stressed the 'special strategical requirements' which impelled Japan to maintain a powerful establishment of such craft; and with one accord they scouted the American suggestion that the 5-5-3 ratio be applied to vessels other than battleships. This indicates that Japan would not easily be persuaded into cutting down her auxiliary programme, though this would have to be done before naval strength in the Pacific could be regulated according to the Washington ratio. And, above all, in her present mood of bitter resentment at the exclusion of her nationals from the United States, she can hardly be expected to welcome proposals which would have the effect of still further reducing her naval armament.

However desirable or expedient it may have been have been on other grounds, the brusque action of Congress has probably wrecked whatever chance there was of extending the principle of naval limitation, at least for the immediate future.

III

Finally, it is by no means certain that the United States and Great Britain are themselves in agreement with regard to the restriction of auxiliary tonnage. The original plan put forward by Mr. Hughes on November 12, 1921, aimed at reducing both navies to a common standard of strength. Absolute equality was demanded by the United States, in cruisers, submarines, and so forth, no less than in capital ships and airplane carriers. Would Great Britain have agreed to this if the matter had been pressed to a decision? She might have claimed, not without reason, that her unique dependence on sea communications entitled her to a higher ratio of cruiser tonnage than the United States, with its immense domestic resources, stood in need of. Unlike that country, Great Britain is not self-supporting in regard to foodstuffs and other essential commodities. If her seaborne trade were interrupted, even for a few weeks, her people would starve and her entire economic system break down. For her, therefore, the maintenance of open searoutes is literally a question of life and death, and since the cruiser is the type of ship best adapted to the protection of those routes, it is more than doubtful whether she would, or could, accept a fifty-fifty ratio which would naturally be determined by the more limited requirements of the United States. At the same time we are assured by those in touch with official circles in Washington that the United States would agree to nothing less than parity with Great

Britain in cruisers as in all other types. If that be so it is difficult to see how a deadlock could be avoided at the very outset of a new conference. Nor should it be overlooked that serious differences of opinion on certain technical aspects of the existing Treaty are still outstanding. The proposal to renovate ships of the United States battle fleet has already led to representations by the British Government, which challenges America's right to increase the elevation of turret guns or convert coal-burning ships to oil-fuel, though American naval experts stoutly maintain that such changes would in no way contravene the letter or the spirit of the Treaty. This dispute, of which we are likely to hear more, is mentioned merely as a reminder that perfect unanimity between the two dominant Powers, which would be a condition precedent of success in a future Arms Conference, has yet to be achieved.

No doubt it is due to their appreciation of the considerations outlined above that President Coolidge and his advisers have not yet seen fit to act upon the suggestion of Congress with regard to the summoning of a new conference. On the previous occasion the chances of a successful outcome heavily outweighed the risks of miscarriage. Had it been otherwise the American Government, realizing as they must have done the serious consequences of failure, would hardly have taken the initiative. They could not have ignored the lesson of the abortive conferences at The Hague, each of which was followed by a substantial increase in the armaments of Europe. Just before the delegates assembled at Washington a leading London journal wrote: 'We have said all along, and we repeat now, that some definite agreement for the restriction of naval armaments must be arrived at before the assembly disperses. The very fact that

it has been convened is an admission that international rivalry in these armaments does exist. Failure to reach an agreement would, in all likelihood, intensify that rivalry, which might then become a grave menace to peace. The world's statesmen have taken a momentous step, which can only be justified by a successful issue.'

In so far as it halted competitive building in the most powerful warship types, and incidentally relieved a situation in the Pacific which contained elements of real danger, the first Conference was a signal success. On the other hand, it did nothing to improve relations between Britain and France. The unfortunate submarine dispute left an aftermath of bitterness which has never since been allayed. It may be that the formidable submarine programme on which France embarked so soon afterward would have been adopted in any event, though there are many who regard it as a direct sequel to the controversy at Washington. It is therefore devoutly to be hoped that before Mr. Ramsay MacDonald makes up his mind to call a second conference on armaments he will satisfy himself that the moment is well chosen, the political atmosphere favorable, and the prospect of success more than reasonably good. In no other sphere of foreign politics is hasty or ill-considered action more to be deprecated. Not by any means does it follow that, because Great Britain and the United States both desire to regulate the construction of auxiliary warships, all the other Powers are bound to fall into line. At this juncture of affairs it is necessary at all costs to avoid any line of action calculated to generate ill will between Great Britain and France. The latter is convinced that her interests were prejudiced by the proceedings at Washington three years ago; her attitude toward the