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ery and equipment of these boats. Technical committees were appointed to examine and report upon the seven ex-German submarines which were delivered to her in 1919, and close touch has been maintained by Japanese agents with German designers who claim to have evolved new principles of submarine construction, stability, and armament. On account of the impenetrable veil of secrecy behind which the Japanese naval authorities carry on their work, it is impossible to state with confidence precisely how many boats, and of what type, they have launched and laid down within the past four years. A British Admiralty estimate, published last March, credits Japan with 44 submarines built and a further 33 built or projected. This figure has been generally accepted as accurate, though the writer prefers to treat it with caution.

Our definite knowledge is limited to a few facts, which may suitably be recorded here. First, the present Japanese submarine flotilla consists almost entirely of boats completed since the war. Most of the old vessels have been scrapped, which accounts for the circumstance that the total remains more or less constant, despite the completion of new boats at the rate of eight to twelve every year. Secondly, Japan in the post-war era has built only sea-going and oceangoing boats. Of her forty-four completed units, the majority are craft of 800 to 1000 tons, with a cruising range disproportionately large to their displacement. A few are of the 1500-ton ocean type, which also forms the bulk of the other thirty-three boats building or projected in the spring of this year. She is constructing, in addition, several experimental submarines of very large dimensions, variously reported to be of 2500 to 3500 tons, designed from plans acquired in Germany. The build

ing of these vessels is believed to be proceeding under the supervision of German engineers, a party of whom is said to be employed at the Kure arsenal.

We shall be well on the safe side if we assess the number of Japanese ocean-going submarines at thirty-five. Every boat of this class would be capable not only of making the round voyage across the Pacific on one load of fuel and stores, but of remaining for some time in the vicinity of the American seaboard, where its presence would doubtless interfere with the movements of shipping and create alarm in the coastal cities, which would be liable to bombardment by shell fire. Certain of these big submarines are probably equipped with high-powered engines, in which case they would be able to accompany the battle fleet in the capacity of scouts and submersible destroyers. The comparative figures as to ocean-going submarines are: Japan 35, Great Britain 9, United States 6. Such vessels would be of supreme value in a Pacific campaign on account of their extensive cruising range, and if American naval policy was governed by sound principles a liberal program of fleet submarine construction would long since have been put into effect. As it is, the three fleet boats and the three minelayers recommended by the Navy Department have been stricken from the current building scheme.

V

Since it is true that 'men fight, not ships,' the question of personnel is the all-important factor in gauging the war-readiness of any navy. At the present time the United States Navy is undermanned. The authorized establishment of 86,000 enlisted personnel is a purely arbitrary figure,

bearing no real relation to the minimum requirements of the fleet in case of mobilization. Worse than this, it does not suffice to provide full complements for the ships now in commission, few of which, if any, are up to their full strength in officers and men. On paper, the American personnel is slightly larger than that of the British Navy, owing, among other reasons, to the inclusion of the Marine Corps. In fact, however, the British personnel trained for sea-going duty is larger by several thousands.

Since the Washington Conference Japan has released 12,000 officers and men; but this notwithstanding, her personnel remains considerably above the 5-3 ratio. Early in the current year there were 69,000 officers and men on active duty in the Japanese Navy. In view of the steady growth in the number of new cruisers, submarines, and so forth, this figure is more likely to be increased than reduced. Behind the Japanese first-line personnel stands a large reserve, estimated to number at least 40,000, including 4000 officers. All these men, having served afloat for a long term of years, would be available for active service with the fleet very soon after the outbreak of war. Great Britain, too, has at her disposal a great body of trained naval reservists, liable to be called up for duty in time of crisis.

While no precise figures can be given to show the present strength of the U. S. Navy Reserve Force, it is well below the proportionate strength of the British and Japanese reserves. There are not now on the books of the Navy Department sufficient reservists, officers and men, to provide crews for the laid-up ships which would have to be commissioned in the event of a threat of war. That no difficulty would be met with in enrolling the requisite number of personnel was made evident

by the response to the Navy's call in 1917; but untrained men, however zealous, are useless in a modern fleet, and it would take many months of intensive training to mould these 'green' recruits into passable seamen. Finally, there is the crucial problem of length of service for the enlisted men of the Navy. Enlistment is now for a period of four years, and while this is a distinct advance over the two- and three-year terms which were in vogue until recently, it is not long enough to turn out thoroughly efficient man-ofwar's men. A six- to seven-year term of service is the least that would provide for that long and continuous training which alone can weld the naval personnel into a thoroughly efficient fighting organism. There is a popular notion that the average American youth is so much brighter mentally that he requires less training for any job, ashore or afloat, than the young men of other nationalities. To this the Navy replies, through the mouth of one of its officers: 'Other Powers have six- and eightyear service periods. Is it not somewhat fatuous to believe that we can do as much with our recruits in four years?'

The British naval seaman enlists for twelve years, the Japanese for six years, and there is no reason to suppose that drill and instruction in either of those navies are conducted on a system less practical or less intensive than in the American service. Moreover, it is well known that a majority of the Japanese personnel consists of men in their second period of enlistment. Hence we are entitled to infer that the enlisted men of the Japanese Navy are better trained and more proficient at their work than the non-rated men of the United States Navy. In the writer's opinion, the adoption of a six-year term of service is of infinitely greater importance than the laying down of new

ships, urgently as these are needed.

Naval policy is, or should be, based upon a frank recognition of hard realities. A navy is not maintained for show: it is far too expensive to be kept up merely as an ornamental appanage of the State. The United States Navy has definite functions to perform, chief among which is the safeguarding from foreign aggression of the national territories, properties, and interests. This task-let us face the fact quite frankly has been rendered much more difficult than before by the restrictions imposed by the Washington Treaty. The Navy of to-day probably is capable of defending the Continental seaboard of the United States, both on the Atlantic and the Pacific, from serious attack from any quarter whatsoever. It is equally capable of guarding that vital artery, the Isthmian Canal, from dangerous assault, provided the local defenses of the Canal Zone are renovated and strengthened in accordance with the advice of the War and Navy Department experts who have submitted recommendations on this head. So much for what the Navy can undertake to do with reasonable prospects of success.

What, in its present state of personnel and material, it cannot undertake to do is (1) to guarantee the safety of the more distant oversea territories of the United States; and (2) to afford adequate protection to American shipping and seaborne trade. Consequently, the Navy is not strong enough to perform an important, not to say a vital, part of the task allotted to it. By renouncing their right, under Article XIX of the Washington Treaty, to develop major naval bases in the Western Pacific, the American people gave hostages to fortune which most strategists believe to be irredeemable. Be that as it may, the problem of how to

overcome the drawback of nonexistent bases in the Philippine and the Mariana Islands in the contingency of war with a strong Asiatic Power is one which has hitherto baffled the keenest brains in the War College. It can be solved, however, provided the very modest demands of the Navy Department in respect of material and personnel reinforcement to the fleet are conceded by the nation, which has a much greater stake in the maintenance of American sea-power than the average citizen appears to realize.

The whole philosophy of armed preparedness is epitomized in a speech which an eminent British soldier, the late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, made to his countrymen a few weeks before his death in 1922, and which I shall venture to paraphrase as follows:

'It has always seemed to me that the primary duty of a Navy is to prevent war. I know no cheaper way of conducting the business of a State than that of conducting it in a profound peace. One of the ways of doing this is to have a Navy sufficiently strong to prevent war. But if a State cannot, for reasons of policy, prevent a war, then the next duty of a Navy is to win the war. To win a war is a terribly expensive thing, both in men and money. Therefore, it is infinitely cheaper to have a force which will prevent a war rather than to have a force which, if it has to go to war, could even win the war. But there is a third possibility: which is, to have a Navy not sufficiently strong to prevent war, nor yet sufficiently strong to win the war- but one just sufficiently weak to lose the war.'

That, in the writer's estimation, is precisely the kind of 'third Navy' which the United States is maintaining to-day.

THE SENATE: NEW STYLE

BY GEORGE H. HAYNES

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To be sure, the purist did not fail to notice that this was not a mere forecast of what was to result, but that the repetition of that phrase 'we will find' indicated a fixed determination to find the representatives of predatory wealth eliminated from the Senate, and their places reserved as prizes for those who seek the things that the people love.'

There were those who doubted whether Mr. Bryan was warranted in implying that the signing of that proclamation was to mark the moment when this epoch-making reform has arrived.' By direct primaries, by primary elections, by pledges exacted from

candidates for State legislatures, the legal election of Senators by the legislatures in many of the States had been reduced to as much of an empty formality as the choice of President by the Electoral College. The people pressed the button; the members of the State legislature did the rest.

Into the Senate came an increasing number of members who recognized that their real electors had not been the legislatures. Their presence there was evidence of the growth the movement was making, and their votes overcame the Senate's resistance. Four times the House had passed a popular-election amendment, but the Senate had not allowed it to come to a vote. At last the Senate yielded to the inevitable and gave its concurrence. By such slow degrees, through a score of years, had this epoch-making reform arrived.

Nevertheless, that proclamation did set up a milestone of some importance. It determined that in form as well as in fact the process of election under which had been chosen the men who had made the Senate the most powerful upper chamber in the world was now to give place to the process identical with that by which governors and congressmen are chosen.

The Senate of the Sixty-third Congress was the last Senate all of whose members, in form at least, had been chosen by the process which the States, by their ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, had discredited and discarded.

I

What manner of men filled that Senate? It may prove of interest, as a basis for comparison, to review certain easily ascertainable facts as to the personnel of the last Senate elected by the process ordained by the framers of the Constitution.

In making such a comparison, it is to be remembered that a single decade is a very brief period in the life of such a great historic legislative body as the Senate. Furthermore, this particular decade has brought revolutionary changes: woman suffrage, doubling the potential electorate and introducing puzzling variables among the assumed constants of politics; the World War, with its upheaval in economic conditions, in industrial methods, and in political thought; and the inevitable reaction from the autocratic tendencies developed under war stress. Differences which may be noted between the Senates of to-day and of ten years ago may be merely sporadic and transient. In a decade of such kaleidoscopic change, none but the merest tyro will expect to discover clearly marked tendencies which can confidently be attributed to the arrival of that epoch-making reform which Mr. Bryan took such pride in proclaiming.

The shifting of politics has given us a Senate to-day made up of 51 Republicans, 43 Democrats, and two FarmerLabor members, in contrast with the 43 Republicans, 52 Democrats and one Progressive in the membership in 1914.

Ku-Kluxers may be relieved to know that in the present Senate all but three (as compared with five in 1914) are natives of the United States, the exceptions being Senators Couzens (born in Ontario), Gooding (born in England), and Magnus Johnson (born in Sweden). Less migratory conditions

within the United States may be indicated by the fact that 51 (as compared with 45 in 1914) are sons of the States that they represent. Ohio, as in 1914, leads as the 'Mother of Senators,' with seven of her 'jewels' in the Senate. Pennsylvania has six; Massachusetts and New York, five each; Maine, Illinois, Virginia, and Kentucky, four each. There is a striking contrast in this matter between the Senate of to-day and that of 1897, when, according to McConachie, 'thirty-six [members] were of Southern nativity, twenty-eight from the Atlantic group north of Mason and Dixon's line, nineteen from the Northwest and the West.' No such proportion now holds true, nor does the following generalization appear to retain its validity: "The South not only reared her own Senators but cradled those of the new frontier States, which one by one enlarged the Union.' Of the twelve States that have no sons in the Senate, all but three (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Florida) are States of the Far West. In further contrast between the different sections, it may be observed that in the section made up of the New England, the North Atlantic, and the North Central States only two sons of States outside that region were sent to the Senate; the eight South Atlantic States chose no Senator bred outside that section five of them sent only their own sons; on the other hand, of the sixteen Senators from the great Mountain region, twelve had been born outside its borders, and half the Senators from the Pacific States were born in the Mississippi Valley.

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