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gradually out of Asia Minor, and that London would soon be holding dominion over Syria. It was going to be another situation like that of India, they said. The resentment against the British Foreign Office and its alleged underhand tactics became intense.

Consequently, France herself initiated a little arch-conspiracy, and proved herself past-master in the Machiavellian arts. France wished first to protect herself in Syria and next to extract herself from the San Remo Pact. So she tried to pass the Arab menace on to the British in Mesopotamia, and at the same time make the newly signed Pact untenable for England. This she accomplished in one move. Secret negotiations were entered upon with Turkey, which resulted in the signing in London, on March 9, 1921, of the preliminary articles of a treaty through which France returned to Turkey a portion of her Syrian mandate, consisting of Cilicia and a long narrow strip running just south of England's Mosul holdings, which formed a kind of barrier between the French and British mandates. In return, France was promised first consideration in the granting of all concessions by the Turkish Government. This treaty was concluded without any consultation of Great Britain or the League of Nations. French had the Turks on their side to throw back the Arabs, who, meeting this new barrier, would probably turn their energies upon Mesopotamia. Concerning the San Remo Pact, if the Anglo-Persian Oil or Turkish Petroleum Company wished to run pipelines through to the sea, the guaranties of the San Remo agreement were not sufficient, since Turkey's consent must be obtained to cross this strip of northern Syria.

Now the Now the

As a sequel, the French withdrew 50,000 soldiers from the Anatolian

army, on the plea that their maintenance was too expensive. The spectacle of the combined French and British forces had been sufficient to quell the restless movements of the Arabs; but now that one half of this strength had disappeared, insurrection again loomed up as imminent. The determined attitude of the Turks in their newly acquired territory turned the Arab energies upon Mesopotamia. The British hold seemed very precarious. Lloyd George bitterly denounced these acts of France in a public address delivered on November 24, 1921, saying that it was a pure case of 'one power stealing a march on the other.'

British diplomats saw only one solution of the difficulty. In August 1921, England recognized Emir Feisal as King of Iraq, or Mesopotamia, and by the treaty of October 10, 1922, Mr. Lloyd George's Government guaranteed the new country financial and military protection for twenty years. It was no more than recognition of naturally asserted nationality, the English maintained in accordance with the catch-phrase of the year. In fact, the English felt that Iraq was destined to become a more consolidated nation than Turkey, and consequently favored the dismembering of the latter country and the corresponding growth of Iraq. Needless to say, King Feisal was immeasurably grateful, and willing to grant the British limitless concessions of any nature.

Again the French felt themselves being outwitted. If Great Britain's Near East policy were realized, Feisal would be the dominating authority in Asia Minor. The young kingdom of Iraq seemed ready to burst its bounds and take in Syria. The Paris periodicals shrieked that England was trying to deny France her share of the oil in Mesopotamia, and that Great

Britain was deliberately forcing France to give up the mandate of the League of Nations in Syria. Obviously it was to France's advantage to see that the Turkish dominion should be extended as widely as possible.

IV

The dramatic scenes of the Turkish defiance before Great Britain followed. Smyrna was burned in September 1922, and the forces of Mustapha Kemal swept up the Anatolian coast and confronted Constantinople. The British threatened to chastise the audacious participants in this disrespectful disorder; but the Turks, far from yielding, continued to advance their forces and increase their demands. In London there was a tense situation between the aggressive and pacifist parties, which eventually resulted in the resignation of Lloyd George; and finally the London Government agreed to 'compromise' with the Turkswhich meant almost a complete acquiescence with the Turkish demands.

It cannot be asserted with any degree of conviction that the Paris envoys coolly proposed the Turkish venture. However, the British were uncertain of the support of the French in the event of armed conflict, and it Iwas this doubt that lent the Turkish position its strength. A new 'balance of power' was being effected. The Turks persisted in a mode of conduct which assaulted the dignity of England, but the British exhibited the greatest self-control evidenced in centuries and extracted themselves from the arena without a tussle. When the dismay of Europe was at its height, France sent Franklin Bouillon to treat with the rowdy Turks, who were ready to fight anyone. This gentleman and diplomat, who had so nicely arranged the Bouillon Treaty of 1921, now

whispered a little counsel in the ear of his old acquaintance, Mustapha Kemal, telling him that France considered Turkey had done well enough with her show of armed force, and that Angora must look for further support from Paris only through a diplomatic conference. So the informal Turkish conquest ceased, and Franklin Bouillon advised the world that he considered himself one of the greatest peacemakers of history.

Then the sessions of a new Lausanne Conference opened, on November 20, 1922. On this occasion the representatives from Angora spoke as often and as loudly as those of any government. Turkey had suddenly become a power, not a pawn. France, too, gazed with some wonder and chagrin upon her determined protégé. She had reason for dismay, because the promises of preference in the way of concessions, specifically stated in the Bouillon Treaty, were now ignored by the new Angora Government. This time the cat's-paw scratched the cat. Angora was skeptical commercial agreements offered too much opportunity for political intervention. So the Government determined to repudiate unequivocally all the old English and French agreements. At the same time it wished to keep the good-will of France so much depended on keeping the two Allies estranged in their Near East policies and on preventing united opposition to Turkey's growth. The Government's problem was to escape from the binding conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres-through which such sweeping concessions were placed in the hands of the Turkish Petroleum Company as practically to give this corporation control of the industrial future of the country- and also to evade the obligations to France specified in the Bouillon and previous treaties, without embittering Paris.

The way out was the Chester concessions, old, never ratified, antedating and embracing all the later concessions granted to the British and French. In April 1923, a thrill ran through the diplomatic world when it was broadcasted that Turkey had recognized without reservations the validity of the Chester grant. This meant that the exclusive right to exploit the valuable oil regions of Asia Minor was placed in American hands, and that the British claims to the earliest concessions in these petroleum-bearing lands were discredited beyond dispute. The French raised a disturbance on the ground that the Chester concession included privileges granted to the French in 1914, for which France had advanced a large loan to the Turkish Government. However, the validity of the Chester claims was held not to be affected by these French objections, and American capital possessed an absolute monopoly on Turkish trade.

Notwithstanding, remarkably little fuss was stirred up through diplomatic channels over the recognition of the Chester grant. The feeling in England and France was that the exclusive rights given American interests would never be exerted, because the widely proclaimed policy of the 'open door,' guiding the Washington Government, would permit no such inconsistency. This sentiment was verified when, on May 2, Mr. Grew, the American Minister to Switzerland, announced officially that the United States would not support any claim against the acquired rights of other nations. This sounded the death knell for the Chester programme, since without the support of Washington, American capital was afraid to embark upon the enterprise. The Chester concessions were annulled in December.

So Turkey cleaned the sheet in the way of concessions. She is now starting

a new page in her economic and political history. The successful termination of the Lausanne Conference has confirmed the return to Turkey of the territories given her by France through the Bouillon Treaty. Equality of all nations in commercial matters is guaranteed. Apparently the diplomatic bout of Great Britain and France over Asia Minor has failed because neither nation now holds advantage in the dominions of the Angora Government, while Iraq may soon pass under the control of the League of Nations.

We cannot, however, expect this state of equilibrium to remain undisturbed long, since in politics as well as in athletics a neutral victory means another struggle. Already there is a new uneasiness in the air. A corporation backed by French capital has recently obtained the promise of concessions duplicating the annulled Chester grant. British commercial enterprises are stubbornly combating this project on the same ground. Turkey's prosperity still depends in large degree in continuing her game of playing France and England against each other, and she will endeavor to sustain the hopes of each in the success of their Near East programme. The 'eternal triangle' means that Turkey is safe as long as two strong nations are courting her favors. Angora will keep on flirting with London and Paris.

Other events in Europe are not drawing France and England more closely together, and it seems a safe wager that the diplomatic war in Turkey is not yet concluded. The oil lies in the Mosul, and in the recently signed Lausanne Treaty it was left in abeyance whether these valuable petroleum regions should be included in Iraq or Turkey. Here lies the prize for which the French and English leaders have dared so much. How much further will they dare?

'GRAVE CONSEQUENCES'

BY H. H. POWERS

At a time when the American Congress seems incapable of mustering a majority on any subject, it has with practical unanimity passed upon an issue probably the most momentous upon which it has ever taken action. By majorities of five to one in the House and ten to one in the Senate, Congress has voted the practical exclusion of foreigners and the total exclusion of Asiatics from settlement in the United States. This action may have been wise; indeed I am inclined to think it fundamentally right and inevitable. But it is not so clear that the actors were wise or that the manner and motive of their action were justifiable. The avowed reason for this action, at least in individual cases, was a trivial diplomatic incident, capable, perhaps, of the construction placed upon it, but equally capable of a different construction had such been desired. The real reason was a political and economic situation superficially perceived and little understood, and the compelling cause a vast, cosmic pressure of which political discussion has as yet betrayed no consciousness. This action, considered in its immediate international reactions, in its relation to our traditional policy, and in the immeasurable scope of the forces which it challenges connotes a crisis, not only in our national life but in the life of the world, compared with which our struggles for national union and for the abolition of slavery are of but secondary importance.

The action in question presents three distinct problems which, begin

ning with the trivial, rise in overwhelming crescendo, to the momentous. The first is a diplomatic episode; the second is the problem of race discrimination; the third, the problem of exclusion. Let us give to each of these an attention somewhat proportioned to its merits.

I

The diplomatic episode looms large in the discussion of the moment and obscures the larger issues. Its details are familiar. The exclusion of the Japanese, long a recognized policy of our government, has for some years been effected without law or treaty by the so-called 'Gentleman's Agreement,' a pledge on the part of the Japanese Government not to grant passports to Japanese settlers and a perfectly correct refusal of our Government to admit them without. This considerate method of exclusion, so passionately desired by Japanese sensibilities, was unsatisfactory to the radical elements of the Pacific Coast, apparently not because it was ineffectual, but because it was too gentlemanly. The stigma which the Japanese sought to avoid is precisely the thing which certain elements desire to affix, race competition having long since engendered race antipathy. The minor issue in the immigration bill was, therefore, between the Gentleman's Agreement and a flat law of exclusion.

As a compromise it was suggested that the Gentleman's Agreement be itself enacted into law, thus ensuring

greater sanction and perhaps greater stability. It was in support of this measure that Ambassador Hanihara addressed to Secretary Hughes his letter in which he made the unfortunate allusion to 'grave consequences.' This letter was sent by Secretary Hughes, a pronounced supporter of the proposed compromise, to the Senate, apparently with the thought that it would further the desired end.

The effect was the reverse. The Senate chose to construe the letter as a threat and found in it a reason or a pretext for the overwhelming rejection of the compromise.

Need the Senate have taken this attitude in deference to our national interests? The expression, 'grave consequences,' is one of a series including: 'would regard as an unfriendly act,' 'could not view with indifference,' and so forth which, in the euphemistic language of diplomacy, have acquired a more or less technical meaning. I think, however, that no one experienced in diplomatic usage will claim that these expressions are equivalent. To 'regard as an unfriendly act' is a direct threat of war and must be followed by a declaration of war if the other country persists in the objectionable course. A statement that we 'could not view with indifference' means a very strong protest with war as a possibility, but it hardly necessitates an immediate declaration of war as an alternative or precludes another settlement. An allusion to 'grave consequences,' though serious, is a much milder term and by no means implies a threat of war.

Not only is this term milder and more vague, but it can hardly be said that this technical meaning debars the phrase from use in the looser, popular sense. It is obvious that very many relations between nations might be characterized as grave even when the

possibility of war was excluded. Thus the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods following the episode of 'the twentyone points' was certainly a grave consequence. Nor is it too much to say that the situation already created by the action of Congress is to be thus characterized.

It is clear, therefore, that these words, whether used technically or popularly, did not necessarily imply a threat of war or of other unfriendly action on the part of the Japanese Government. They did imply, of course, deep resentment on the part of the Japanese people with whatever of inconvenience and loss that might entail. That was a foregone conclusion. Whether it meant more than this was to be inferred from the situation.

Now the situation was to a remarkable degree reassuring. There has, undoubtedly, long been a party in Japan which looks forward to the necessity, possibly even the desirability of eventual war with the United States; but there is reason to believe that this party has steadily lost ground in recent years. The Washington Conference with its cancellation of the AngloJapanese Alliance and other measures greatly lessened the power of Japan for such an offensive. On top of this came the earthquake, which for a considerable time virtually paralyzes Japan as a military nation. These, one and all, do not preclude the possibility of war between Japan and the United States, but they do postpone that possibility for a considerable period. Economic relations, in turn, amounting to little less than dependence, preclude any rational resort resort to other forms of hostility.

If Ambassador Hanihara, therefore, intended his message as a threat, it was peculiarly ill-timed and foolish. Japanese statesmen have rarely been open to this charge. In astuteness, ability to

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