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culated that thus a reserve would be constituted, consisting of 4000 seamen in the home ports, of a reserve force of 11,000 marines, of 12,000 Coast Guard men, and of the shortservice pensioners and the Naval Coast Volunteers, amounting altogether to 30,000 men, allowing for a certain proportion of the CoastGuard who would be retained as a staff and nucleus "to bring forward with rapidity detachments of volunteers as they arrived, to discipline pensioners, enlist men for the navy, and create new reserves." Of these, the seamen and marines would be available on the instant, the Coast Guard in two or three days, the shortservice pensioners in a few weeks.

possible to obtain from the mercantile marine and the seafaring population of the kingdom a volunteer force of seamen, all trained in gunnery, who could be relied upon to come forward when their services were required." It seemed, indeed, both strange and hard that the country should possess such vast resources of seamen, and yet not be able to depend or rely on a sufficiency for national need and national defence; but the extraordinary exigencies and the varied de mands of our commerce, its extent and its continuity, have beretofore rendered it difficult to establish a system which would give the State this advantage, and yet not interfere with the pursuits or the privileges of trade.

The Commission, after considering a great variety of schemes, determined on a plan which appeared to them best suited to attain that ob

been matured into an Act, and we can study it best in the form in which it appears, as a part and a law of our naval system. The Government has decided on constituting a volunteer reserve force from the mercantile marine of 30,000 men.

This has the look of a formidable reserve. It is, however, as yet, partly a paper force. A great portion of it does not exist, and another portion might not be available to the extent anticipated. Of the components, ject. That plan, however, has now there are only two (for the Coast Volunteers are given over as useless) which could be increased or formed without subtracting from the vital acting force of the navy; those are the reserve seamen and the marines. And this is the main objection of the scheme,-that it opens few resources which would not exhaust the main-springs of the system. The men to form the reserve must be drawn from the best and worthiest of those serving afloat; and the question would be, in which position they are the most valuable. In the present stage of the man-difficulty, there could be no doubt that the policy would be to induce such men to re-enter or re-enlist, and have their full services; if they declined such terms, of course it would be expedient to have some hold upon them.

Such is the standing reserve, and it would go far to meet the first outbreak of a war; but the difficulty would still remain, "how to provide for the rapidly-growing demands of a continued contest, how to man the ships which must be successively put in commission, in order to maintain the navy at a war standard."

This is the great question, the key to the man difficulty. "The problem to be solved is, how far it may be

"These volunteers must be British subjects, must be free from infirmity, be not more than thirty-five years of age, and within the ten years previous to their joining the Reserve have been five years at sea, one year of that time as an able seaman."

These are the qualifications required. The terms of service are"That each volunteer must attend drill for twenty-eight days during the year, and he may do it, so far as the convenience of the public service will permit, at a time and place most convenient to himself; but he cannot in any case take less than seven days' drill at a time; that he shall not, without special permission, proceed on a voyage which will occupy more than six months; that he must appear before some shipping-master once in every six months, unless he has leave to be abroad longer, and must also report every change of residence or employment; that in order to obtain a pension he must continue in the Reserve as long as he is physically competent to serve; and

he must also have been in the force uous-service seaman of the fleet, fifteen years if engaged above thirty, and he will, on joining, receive the or twenty years if engaged under same clothing, bedding, and messthirty, the time of actual service in traps; that he will, if wounded or the fleet counting double; that volun- injured in actual service, receive the teers may be called upon for actual same pension as a seaman of the service in the navy by Royal Procla- navy of the same rating; that he mation, though it is intended to ex- will be eligible for Greenwich Hosercise this power only when an emer- pital and the Coast-Guard service; gency requires a sudden increase in that he may quit the Reserve, if not the naval force of the country; that at the time called out for actual sera volunteer may, in the first instance, vice, at the end of every five years; be called out for three years if there is that he may also quit it, when not actual war; and if he is then serving called out, on paying back the rein one of her Majesty's ships, he may tainers he has received, or without be required to serve for two years payment, if he passes an examinalonger, but for the additional two tion as master or master's mate, and years he will receive 2d. a-day ad- obtains bonâ fide employment as ditional pay; that volunteers, when master or mate. on drill or actual service, will be subject to naval discipline; that a volunteer who fails to fulfil the obligations of the Reserve, will forfeit his claim to retainer and pension; and if he fails to join when called out for actual service, may be treated as a straggler or deserter from the navy."

Such are the obligations of the Reserve; and they are certainly not onerous, nor more than commensurate with the advantages offered. The advantages are--that a volunteer will at once receive an annual payment or retainer of £6, payable quarterly; that he will, if he fulfils the conditions and is in the Reserve the requisite time, receive a pension of not less than £12 a-year, whenever he becomes incapacitated from earning a livelihood, or at sixty years of age, if not previously incapacitated; that he may elect either to take the whole pension himself, or to take a smaller pension for himself during his life, and to allow his wife a pension after his death for the remainder of her life; that he will not, on account of belonging to the Reserve, forfeit any interest in any friendly or benefit society; that his expenses to and from the place of drill will, when necessary, be provided; that he will during drill receive, in addition to the retaining fee, the same pay, victualling, and allowance as a seaman of the fleet; that he will, if called out on actual service, receive the same pay, allowances, and victuals, and have the same prospect of promotion and prize money as a contin

This offer of the State is not only just-it is generous. The retaining-fee is equal to one-fourth of a merchant seaman's annual pay, and is the same as a Naval Coast Volunteer will receive for five years; and the demand made on him in return involves a very trifling sacrifice of time or service, especially as he may perform his drill in broken periods of seven days. The pension, too, is granted on the most liberal and advantageous terms; and the voluntary principle is so thoroughly acknowledged, that he may at any time free himself from his obligations on very reasonable conditions.

Such a proposal ought-so fair and so advantageous is it to meet with a ready response; and we believe it must and will be appreciated. As to the advantages it offers, we cannot object or demur; they are such as are worthy of a great State, in making a demand on the persons and services of certain of its citizens for national defence; but we must express our doubts as to the results. The fourth qualification would appear to raise a difficulty-the requirement of five years' previous service, one as A.B., will limit the range of choice, and confine it to those who, from being certain of advancement in their own service, may be most indifferent. This, especially as the Reserve must necessarily be limited almost entirely to the short voyage men, will probably create a difficulty in obtaining the necessary number. The drill, too, is

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too short to admit of that efficiency tenance of this force, and their re-
which a man called upon to serve commendation was one which would
in these times of practised gunnery have given it a certain permanency.
should possess, and which would be They thought that, though it must
still further decreased by the system be first constituted of adults carefully
of broken periods. It is supposed selected from the merchant service,
that twenty-eight days will be as it must be supplied and fed by
much time as could conveniently be boys. They acknowledge, through-
exacted from a merchant-seaman, out, the principle, that every force
without great detriment to his inter- which is to be permanent and re-
ests; but it is also supposed that liable must have a certain feeding
every seaman is on shore and out of source; and they wisely recommend,
employ for about three months in the in all instances, that this source
year. Why not, then, give him the should consist of boys chosen, trained,
option of serving that time, or any and educated for the purpose.
In
portion of it, in a training ship or this case they propose "that school.
man-of-war? Many, instead of slop ships should be established in all the
ing and loafing about the seaports, principal commercial ports, capable
casting about for a meal or a bed, of accommodating from 100 to 200
would be glad of such a provision boarders in each ship, 100 of whom
and maintenance, and would be should be supported by the State; that
rendering themselves more efficient these boys should be carefully chosen ;
members of the Reserve.
and that they should receive not only
instruction for the merchant service,
but also certain instructions in gun-
nery; that the schools should be open
to day scholars, children residing at
the ports; and that, at the expiration
of the training, a certain number
(limited, however) should have the
option of entering the Royal Navy,
the remainder being taken as ap-
prentices by the shipowners, who, in
return for the education given, would
be required to subscribe to a certain
fund in favour of the boys thus re-
ceived. It is thought that, at the
close of the apprenticeship, the
habits acquired, the inducements of
pay, and promised pension, would
draw the sailor at once into the body
of volunteers." Why not make it
compulsory, at any rate on those who
receive their education and main-
tenance gratis from the State?
would not be any severe exaction from
the others in return for the advan-
tages given, and would insure a cer-
tain feeding source.

Allowing, however, that the required numbers are raised-that the organisation is made, and the whole system brought into fair working order-we have still to ask how those men, or how many of them, will be available at a sudden summons? How many of the 30,000 would be forthcoming, or could be depended on at any instant? The obligation that each volunteer should report himself every six months, insures bis not being long absent; but it would be entirely a matter of accident whether he would be present when required. It might be that, when the need arose, two-thirds of the force would be in the home ports, or it might also happen that the same proportion would be absent; at any rate, it could never be fairly calculated that more than one-half would be available. Even thus we believe that we overstate the actual dependence.

However, even with these objections, it is the best plan for a volunteer force yet enacted; it will at any rate give us some hold on the merchant seamen, and, by familiarising them with the navy, will no doubt popularise that service, and open a wide field for recruitment; and as it is only the last reserve, we may accept it as a worthy addition to the national defences. The Commission further provided for the future main

It

This part of the plan, like the other, will have a great effect in cementing the union betwixt the two services, and in creating a kindly feeling which, after some years' working and trial, would no doubt popularise the naval service and annul the man-difficulty.

The Commissioners, in closing their labours, arrive at the conclusion that, by the means proposed, there

would be placed at the disposal of the country, inclusive of the standing and the volunteer force, a body of 60,000 men available for defence. These are, however, paper figures, and any calculation which based a dependence on much more than one-half that number, would be illusory and dangerous. It must be allowed, however, that this Report contains sound and valuable suggestions-has added to our knowledge of the service-has produced most profitable investigation-has already led to great and worthy improvements; but it shrinks from the only real alternative left us —a standing navy.

These plans and propositions are all good in themselves-good as auxiliaries; but they are all uncertain, all dependent on casualties and circumstances; and the safety, the glory of England, cannot be trusted to ropes of sand.

Suppose these propositions all carried out these plans successful-all productive of the promised result. An invasion is threatened; war is imminent. We have our Channel fleet, fully manned, of ten or twelve sail; and, according to the Comptroller of the Coast Guard, we could, from that force and the Naval Coast Volunteers, man ten or eleven more, making allowance for the boys and marines who would be sent to complete the crews. Thus we should have a fleet equal, but not more than equal, to going forth to meet the first burst of a war, and thus we have at once used up almost all our standing reserve; for the reserve of seamen would be nearly absorbed in manning the additional frigates and gunboats required, and a great proportion of the marines on shore would be also disposed of. Then what have we left? The volunteer force; but these could not of themselves be trusted to form a fleet; there must be a large nucleus left of trained men to effect their organisation. This would effect large reductions in the fleet, and the vacant places must be filled by incapables, or left void. Our standing reserves are not more than enough not enough to insure the country a fleet of twenty sail, inclusive of the

Channel squadron, with the proper proportion of frigates and gunboats, to enter on the first onset, or meet the first attack. Do our naval anuals tell us that we could trust to less? Supposing this first fleet started, we have to form the second. There is a certain number of reserve seamen, of Coast-Guard men, retained for the purpose; some short-service men join; the volunteers are scattered in all parts; they have to come from distant stations; in a week they may be assembled, and this amalgamated force is organised for the manning of this second fleet. This, however, cannot be done at once, and yet this is all we could depend upon, did the first fleet meet with a reverse or disaster. Were the Channel the scene of action, the reinforcement would be required in a day or two. Could it with the present resources and appliances be ready?

England must have fuller and better assurance of defence than this. She should have a standing body of seamen, which would suffice at once, and on the instant, to increase the Channel fleet to the required strength, without drawing on a single reserve, and should also furnish a nucleus on which the reserves might form. Thus a powerful fleet might go forth at once to challenge the danger; a second, almost equally efficient, manned by the Coast-Guard, Coast Volunteers, and marines, would be ready immediately to reinforce; and there would remain the Volunteers, formed and organised as trained seamen, to constitute the third fleet, the last reserve, the last resource of naval might and naval defence.

To trust the existence, the glory, the defence of England, to less than this, would be a national crime; and this security can only be attained by the constitution of a standing navy, which should not only suffice for a peace establishment, but be capable of supplying a force of seamen numerous and efficient enough to satisfy the nation that it held the power of an instant and powerful war-development. On what principles this standing navy should be constituted, we must discuss hereafter.

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INDEX TO VOL. LXXXVI.

Absolute, the, Dr. Marsel on, 49 et seq.
Etna, ascent of, 459, 469.
Africa, sketches in interior of, by Cap-
tain Speke, 340 et seq.-the mountains
of, 459-character of the agricultural
and pastoral tribes of, 566.
Aletsch glacier, passage of the, 467.
Alexandretta, sketches at, 256.
Alleleinhorn, ascent of the, 467.
ALLIED OPERATIONS IN CHINA, ON, 627.
ALPINE CLUB, PEAKS, PASSES,
GLACIERS, BY THE, reviewed, 456-for-
mation, objects, &c., of it, 457 et seq.
Alpine rose, the, 465.
Alps, range of the, 459.

AND

Alva, the Duke of, his character, &c., 703.
Ames, Mr., ascent of the Allelein and
Fletsch horns by, 467.

Anazeh, sketches among the, 267 et seq.,
420 et seq.

Angelico, Fra, the paintings of, 601.
Anglo-Saxons, settlement of the, in Eng-
land, 542.

ANOTHER PLEASANT FRENCH Bоок, 669.
Anselm, the contest with, 183.

Arab horses, the, 268 et seq.-character,
prices, &c. of, 430.

Arabs, sketches among the, 265 et seq.
420 et seq.-on the march, 426.
Argyll, the duke of, his speech against

the war, 116.

Armada, connection of the, with Queen
Mary, 527.

Armstrong gun, the, 336, 337.
Arno, the, Florence, 586.

Art, conflict between the schools of, 127
-modern Italian, 599-historical de-
velopment of, 715 et seq.
Artists, Italian and English, 588.
Arthur, King, the legends of, 608.
Ashburton election petition, the, 368.
Atheism, progress of, in France, 89.
Augustine, propagation of Christianity
in England by, 545, 547.
AUSTEN, MISS, THE NOVELS OF, 99.
Austria, feeling in the country against,
116-conduct of the Derby ministry
regarding, 117 et seq.-alienation of,
from England, and policy of Napoleon
to, 246-the navy of, 326-conduct
of the Whig ministry toward, 375.
Avalanches, effects of the voice on, 462.

Aylesbury election petition, the, 368.
Baalbec, the plain of, 258.
Bagnes, Val de, explorations in, 463.
BAIN, A., THE EMOTIONS AND THE WILL,
BY, reviewed, 295.

Baptistery of Florence, the, 593.
BARNEY O'CARROLL, THE LEGEND OF, 492.
Bedouins, sketches among the, 265 et seq.
-character of the, 426.

Bellievre, M., mission of, to Elizabeth on
behalf of Queen Mary, 525.
Bernese Oberland, scenery of the, 467.
Beverley election petition, the, 369.
Beyrout, sketches at, 256.

Bible, Mansel on the, 50 et seq.
Breadalbane, the marquis of, convention
with the Highlanders by, 2-his con-
nection with the massacre of Glencoe,
4, 9 et seq. passim.
BRETON BALLADS

King Louis the
Eleventh's page, 488-the Crusader's
return, 490.

Bribery, the election petitions against,
363 et seq.

Bright, Mr., arguments of, against the
Conservative ministry, 115-on the
Maidstone election, 370.

Bristenstock, ascent of the, 468.
Britons, the aboriginal, 540.
Bronté, Charlotte, on Miss Austen's
novels, 107.

Brown, Dr. T., Sir W. Hamilton on 500.
Buchanan's History of Scotland, on, 519.
Buckenham, Friar, and Latimer, 184.
Burnett, bishop, his account of the mas

sacre of Glencoe, 12 et seq.

Burt's Account of the Highlands, and
Macaulay's use of it, 169 et seq.
Butler, bishop, on revelation, 52.
Calvin, Principal Tulloch's picture of,
178, et seq.

Camel, the, among the Arabs, 424.
Campagna, the Roman, its scenery, 471.
Campanile, the, at Florence, 590 et seq.
Campbell, captain, of Glenlyon, and the

massacre of Glencoe, 16 et seq.
Canute, the reign of, 545.
Carlos, Don, projected marriage of Queen
Mary to, 523.

Carnival, the, in Florence, 595.
Castellio, Sebastian, Calvin's conduct to,

181.

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