દ 393 V. ART II. THERE is indeed good reafon for believing, that many of CHA P. the facts which our consciousness would lead us to con- PA fider, upon a fuperficial view, as ultimate facts, are refolvable into other principles ftill more general. "Long before we are "capable of reflection," (fays Dr. Reid,) the original percep"tions and notions of the mind are fo mixed, compounded, "and decompounded, by habits, affociations, and abftractions, "that it is extremely difficult for the mind to return upon its own footsteps, and trace back thofe operations which have employed it fince it first began to think and to act.” The fame author remarks, that, "if we could obtain a distinct and "full hiftory of all that hath paffed in the mind of a child, "from the beginning of life and fenfation, till it grows up to "the use of reafon; how its infant faculties began to work, "and how they brought forth and ripened all the various no"tions, opinions, and fentiments, which we find in ourfelves "when we come to be capable of reflection; this would be a "treasure of Natural Hiftory, which would probably give more "light into the human faculties, than all the fyftems of philofophers about them, fince the beginning of the world." To accomplish an analysis of these complicated phenomena into the fimple and original principles of our conftitution, is the great object of this branch of philofophy; but, in order to fucceed, it is neceffary to ascertain facts before we begin to reason, and to avoid generalizing, in any inftance, till we have completely fecured the ground that we have gained. Such a caution, which is neceffary in all the fciences, is, in a more peculiar manner, necessary here, where the very facts from which all V. CHA P. our inferences must be drawn, are to be ascertained only by the PART II. moft patient attention; and, where almost all of them are, to a great degree, disguised; partly by the inaccuracies of popular language, and partly by the mistaken theories of philofophers. I HAVE Only to add, that, although I have retained the phrase of the Affociation of Ideas, in compliance with common language, I am far from being completely fatisfied with this mode of expreffion. I have retained it, chiefly that I might not expofe myself to the cenfure of delivering old doctrines in a new form. As I have endeavoured to employ it with caution, I hope that it has not often misled me in my reasonings. At the fame time, I am more and more convinced of the advantages to be derived from a reformation of the common language, in most of the branches of fcience. How much fuch a reformation has effected in Chemistry is well known; and it is evidently much more neceffary in the Philofophy of Mind, where the prevailing language adds to the common inaccuracies of popular expreffions, the peculiar disadvantage of being all suggested by the analogy of matter. Often, in the composition of this work, have I recollected the advice of Bergman to Morveau *. Le favant Profeffeur d'Upfal, M. Bergman, écrivoit à M. de Morveau "dans les derniers temps de fa vie, ne faites graces à aucune denomination im"propre. Ceux qui favent déja entendront toujours; ceux qui ne favent pas "encore entendront plutôt." Methode de Nomenclat. Chèmique, par MM. MORVEAU, LAVOISIER, &c. "In reforming the nomenclature of chemistry, spare no word "which is improper. They who understand the fubject al"ready, will fuffer no inconvenience; and they to whom the "subject is new, will comprehend it with the greater faci"lity." But it belongs to fuch authors alone, as have extended the boundaries of science by their own discoveries, to introduce innovations in language with any hopes of fuccefs. CHAP. A CHAPTER SIX T H. Of Memory. SECTION I. General Obfervations on Memory. MONG the various powers of the understanding, there is none which has been fo attentively examined by philofophers, or concerning which fo many important facts and obfervations have been collected, as the faculty of Memory. This is partly to be afcribed to its nature, which renders it easily distinguishable from all the other principles of our constitution, even by those who have not been accustomed to metaphysical investigations; and partly to its immediate fubferviency, not only to the purfuits of science, but to the ordinary business of life; in confequence of which, many of its most curious laws had been obferved, long before any analysis was attempted of the other powers of the mind; and have, for many ages, formed a part of the common maxims which are to be found in every treatife of education. Some important remarks on the fubject may, in particular, be collected from the writings of the antient rhetoricians. THE 397 VI. THE word Memory is not employed uniformly in the fame CHA P. precife fenfe; but it always expreffes fome modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future ufe, the knowledge we acquire; a faculty which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which, no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty implies two things: a capacity of retaining knowledge; and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occafion to apply it to ufe. The word Memory is fometimes employed to exprefs the capacity, and fometimes the power. When we speak of a retentive memory, we use it in the former sense; when, of a ready memory, in the latter. THE various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge are, from time to time, recalled to our thoughts, in one of two ways: fometimes they recur to us fpontaneously, or at leaft, without any interference on our part; in other cafes, they are recalled, in confequence of an effort of our will. For the former operation of the mind, we have no appropriated name in our language, diftin&t from Memory. The latter, too, is often called by the fame name, but is more properly distinguished by the word Recollection. THERE are, I believe, fome other acceptations befides these, in which the word Memory has been occasionally employed; but as its ambiguities are not of fuch a nature as to mislead us in our prefent inquiries, I fhall not dwell any longer on the illustration of diftinctions, which to the greater part of readers 4 |