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other men have not, of fummoning up, on a particular occafion, CHA P. a number of words different from each other in meaning, and resembling each other more or lefs in found. I am inclined to think that even genuine wit is a habit acquired in a fimilar way; and that, although fome individuals may, from natural conftitution, be more fitted than others to acquire this habit; it is founded in every cafe on a peculiarly ftrong affociation among certain claffes of our ideas, which gives the perfon who poffeffes it, a command over thofe ideas which is denied to ordinary men. But there is no inftance in which the effect of habits of affociation is more remarkable, than in those men who poffefs a facility of rhyming. That a man should be able to exprefs his thoughts perfpicuously and elegantly, under the restraints which rhyme impofes, would appear to be incredible, if we did not know it to be fact. Such a power implies a wonderful command both of ideas and of expreffions; and yet daily experience fhews, that it may be gained with very little practice. Pope tells us with respect to himself, that he could exprefs himself not only more concifely, but more easily, in rhyme than in profe*.

NOR is it only in these trifling accomplishments that we may trace the influence of habits of aflociation. In every inftance of invention, either in the fine arts, in the mechanical arts, or

fo

* "When habit is once gained, nothing so easy as practice. Cicero writes, "that Antipater the Sidonian could pour forth hexameters extempore; and "that, whenever he chofe to verify, words followed him of courfe. We may "add to Antipater, the antient rhapfodifts of the Greeks, and the modern improvifatori of the Italians." HARRIS'S Phil. Inq. 109, 110.

CHA P. in the fciences, there is fome new idea, or fome new combina

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tion of ideas, brought to light by the inventor. This, undoubtedly, may often happen in a way which he is unable to explain; that is, his invention may be fuggefted to him by fome lucky thought, the origin of which he is unable to trace. But when a man poffeffes a habitual fertility of invention in any particular art or fcience, and can rely, with confidence, on his inventive powers, whenever he is called upon to exert them, he must have acquired, by previous habits of study, a command over certain claffes of his ideas, which enables him, at pleasure, to bring them under his review. The illuftration of these subjects will, I flatter myself, throw light on fome proceffes of the mind, which are not in general well understood: and I fhall, accordingly, in the following Section, offer a few hints, with respect to thofe habits of affociation which are the foundation of wit; of the power of rhyming; of poetical fancy; and of invention in matters of science.

Illuftrations of the Doctrine ftated in the preceding Section.

I. Of Wit.

ACCORDING to Locke, Wit confifts" in the assemblage "of ideas; and putting thofe together with quickness "and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity." I would add to this definition, (rather by way of explanation than amendment,) that Wit implies a power of calling up at pleasure the ideas which it combines: and I am inclined to believe, that the entertainment which it gives to the hearer, is founded, in a confiderable degree, on his surprise, at the command which the man of wit has acquired over a part of the constitution, which is fo little fubject to the will.

THAT the effect of wit depends partly, at leaft, on the circumftance now mentioned, appears evidently from this, that we are more pleased with a bon mot, which occurs in conversation, than with one in print; and that we never fail to receive difguft from wit, when we fufpect it to be premeditated. The pleasure, too, we receive from wit, is heightened, when the original idea is ftarted by one perfon, and the related idea by another. Dr. Campbell has remarked, that, "a witty repartee is infinitely more pleafing, than a witty attack; and

* Effay on Human Understanding, book ii. chap. 11.

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" that

CHA P.
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CHAP. "that an allufion will appear excellent when thrown out extempore in converfation, which would be deemed execrable "in print." In all these cafes, the wit confidered abfolutely is the fame. The relations which are difcovered between the compared ideas are equally new: and yet, as foon as we fufpect that the wit was premeditated, the pleafure we receive from it is infinitely diminished. Inftances indeed may be mentioned, in which we are pleafed with contemplating an unexpected relation between ideas, without any reference to the habits of association in the mind of the perfon who difcovered it. A bon mot produced at the game of crofs-purposes, would not fail to create amufement; but in fuch cafes, our pleasure feems chiefly to arife from the furprise we feel at fo extraordinary a coincidence between a question and an answer coming from perfons who had no direct communication with each other.

I BEFORE obferved, that the pleafure we receive from wit is increased, when the two ideas between which the relation is difcovered, are fuggefted by different perfons. In the case of a bon mot occurring in converfation, the reafon of this is abundantly obvious; because, when the related ideas are fuggefted by different perfons, we have a proof that the wit was not premeditated. But even in a written compofition, we are much more delighted when the fubject was furnished to the author by another perfon, than when he chufes the topic on which he is to dif play his wit. How much would the pleasure we receive from the Key to the Lock be diminished, if we fufpected that the author had the key in view when he wrote that poem; and that he introduced fome expreffions, in order to furnish a subject for

the

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the wit of the commentator? How totally would it deftroy the CHA P. pleasure we receive from a parody on a poem, if we fufpected that both were productions of the fame author? The truth feems to be, that when both the related ideas are fuggefted by the fame person, we have not a very fatisfactory proof of any thing uncommon in the intellectual habits of the author. We may fufpect that both ideas occurred to him at the fame time; and we know that in the dulleft and moft phlegmatic minds, fuch extraordinary affociations will fometimes take place. But when the subject of the wit is furnished by one person, and the wit fuggested by another, we have a proof, not only that the author's mind abounds with fuch fingular affociations, but that he has his wit perfectly at command.

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As an additional confirmation of these observations, we may remark, that the more an author is limited by his fubject, the more we are pleased with his wit. And, therefore, the effect of wit does not arise folely from the unexpected relations which it presents to the mind, but arises, in part, from the surprise it excites at thofe intellectual habits which give it birth. It is evident, that the more the author is circumfcribed in the choice of his materials, the greater muft be the command which he has acquired over thofe affociating principles on which wit depends, and of confequence, according to the foregoing doctrine, the greater must be the furprise and the pleasure which his wit produces. In Addison's celebrated verses to Sir Godfrey Kneller on his picture of George the First, in which he compares the painter to Phidias, and the fubjects of his pencil to the Grecian Deities, the range of the Poet's wit was neceffarily confined within very narrow bounds; and what princi