V. CHA P." and here, on this bench, fat his difciple Polemo. To me, our antient fenate-house seems peopled with the like visionary "forms; for, often, when I enter it, the fhades of Scipio, of "Cato, and of Lælius, and, in particular, of my vene"rable grandfather, rise to my imagination. In short, such "is the effect of local fituation in recalling affociated ideas to the mind, that it is not without reafon, fome philofophers have founded on this principle a fpecies of artificial memory." THIS effect of perceptible objects, in awakening affociated thoughts and affociated feelings, feems to arise, in a great measure, from the permanence of the impreffions which fuch objects produce. Before one idea can fuggeft another idea, it must itself disappear; and a train, perhaps, fucceeds, to which the first bears a very flight relation. But, in the case of perception, the object remains before us; and introduces to the mind, one after another, all the various ideas and emotions with which it has any connexion. I ALREADY obferved, that the connexions which exift among our thoughts, have been long familiarly known to the vulgar, as well as to philofophers. It is, indeed, only of late, that we have been poffeffed of an appropriated phrase to express them; but that the general fact is not a recent difcovery, may be inferred from many of the common maxims of prudence and of propriety, which have plainly been fuggested by an attention to this part of our conftitution. our conftitution. When we lay it down, for example, as a general rule, to avoid in conversation V. 279 all expreffions, and all topics of difcourfe, which have CHAP: any relation, however remote, to ideas of an unpleasant nature, we plainly proceed on the fuppofition that there are certain connexions among our thoughts, which have an influence over the order of their fucceffion. It is unneceffary to remark, how much of the comfort and good-humour of focial life depends on am attention to this confideration. Such attentions are more par-ticularly effential in our intercourfe with men of the world; for the commerce of fociety has a wonderful effect in increasing the quickness and the facility with which we affociate all ideas which have any reference to life and manners; and, of consequence, it must render the fenfibility alive to many circumftances which, from the remoteness of their relation to the fituation and hiftory of the parties, would otherwife have produced no impreffion. WHEN an idea, however, is thus fuggefted by affociation, it produces a flighter impreffion, or, at leaft, it produces its impreffion more gradually, than if it were presented more directly and immediately to the mind. And hence, when we are under a neceffity of communicating any disagreeable information to another, delicacy leads us, inftead of mentioning the thing. * The fuperiority which the man of the world poffeffes over the reclufe ftudent, in his knowledge of mankind, is partly the refult of this quickness and facility of affociation. Thofe trifling circumftances in converfation and behaviour; which, to the latter, convey only their most obvious and avowed meaning, lay open to the former, many of the trains of thought. which are connected with them, and frequently give him a diftinct view of a character, on that very fide. where it is fuppofed to be moft concealed from his obfervation.. itself, V. CHA P. itself, to mention fomething else from which our meaning may be understood. In this manner, we prepare our hearers for the unwelcome intelligence. THE distinction between grofs and delicate flattery, is founded upon the fame principle. As nothing is more offenfive than flattery which is direct and pointed, praise is considered as happy and elegant, in proportion to the flightness of the affociations by which it is conveyed. To this tendency which one thought has to introduce another, philofophers have given the name of the Association of ideas; and, as I would not wifh, excepting in a cafe of neceffity, to depart from common language, or to expofe myself to the charge of delivering old doctrines in a new form, I fhall continue to make ufe of the fame expreffion. I am fenfible, indeed, that the expreffion is by no means unexceptionable; and that, if it be ufed (as it frequently has been) to comprehend those laws by which the fucceffion of all our thoughts and of all our mental operations is regulated, the word idea must be understood in a fenfe much more extenfive than it is commonly employed in. It is very juftly remarked by Dr. Reid, that "memory, judgment, reasoning, paffions, affections, and purposes; in a word, every operation of the mind, except"ing those of sense, is excited occafionally in the train of our "thoughts: fo that, if we make the train of our thoughts to "be only a train of ideas, the word idea must be understood to denote all these operations." In continuing, therefore, to employ V. employ, upon this fubject, that language, which has been CHA P. THE ingenious author whom I laft quoted, feems to think that the affociation of ideas has no claim to be confidered as an original principle, or as an ultimate fact in our nature. "I believe," (fays he,)" that the original principles of the "mind, of which we can give no account, but that fuch is our conftitution, are more in number than is commonly "thought. But we ought not to multiply them without neceffity. That trains of thinking, which, by frequent repe"tition have become familiar, fhould fpontaneously offer them"felves to our fancy, feems to require no other original qua"lity but the power of habit." WITH this obfervation I cannot agree; because I think it more philofophical to refolve the power of habit into the affociation of ideas, than to refolve the affociation of ideas into habit. THE word babit, in the fenfe in which it is commonly employed, expreffes that facility which the mind acquires, in all its exertions, both animal and intellectual, in confequence of practice. We apply it to the dexterity of the workman; to the extemporary fluency of the orator; to the rapidity of the arithmetical accountant. That this facility is the effect of practice, Оо V. CHA P. practice, we know from experience to be a fact: but it does not seem to be an ultimate fact, nor incapable of analysis. In the Effay on Attention, I fhewed that the effects of practice are produced partly on the body, and partly on the mind. The muscles which we employ in mechanical operations, become ftronger, and become more obedient to the will. This is a fact, of which it is probable that philofophy will never be able to give any explanation. But even in mechanical operations, the effects of practice are produced partly on the mind; and, in fo far as this is the cafe, they are refolvable into what philofophers call, the affociation of ideas; or into that general fact, which Dr. Reid himself has stated, "that trains of thinking, which, by frequent repe"tition, have become familiar, fpontaneously offer themselves "to the mind." In the case of habits which are purely intellectual, the effects of practice refolve themselves completely into this principle: and it appears to me more precise and more fatisfactory, to ftate the principle itfelf as a law of our conftitution, than to flur it over under the concife appellation of habit, which we apply in common to mind and to body. THE tendency in the human mind to affociate or connect its thoughts together, is fometimes called (but very improperly) the imagination. Between these two parts of our constitution, there is indeed a very intimate relation; and it is probably owing to this relation, that they have been fo generally confounded under the fame name. When the mind is occupied about |