Introduction. arrive at the firft eminence; and in which he will perhaps be the more likely to excel, the more he has concentrated the whole force of his mind to one particular object. But such a perfon, however diftinguished in his own sphere, is educated merely to be a literary artisan; and neither attains the perfection, nor the happiness, of his nature. "That education only

can be considered as complete and generous, which” (in the language of Milton)" fits a man to perform justly, skilfully, " and magnanimously, all the offices, both private and public, " of peace, and of war

* ""

I HOPE it will not be fuppofed, from the foregoing obfervations, that they are meant to recommend an indifcriminate attention to all the objects of speculation and of action. Nothing can be more evident, than the neceffity of limiting the field of our exertion, if we wish to benefit fociety by our labours. But it is perfectly confiftent with the most intenfe application to our favourite pursuit, to cultivate that general acquaintance with letters and with the world, which may be fufficient to enlarge the mind, and to preserve it from any danger of contracting the pedantry of a particular profeffion. In many cafes, (as was already remarked,) the sciences reflect light on each other; and the general acquifitions which we have made in other pursuits, may furnish us with useful helps for the farther profecution of our own. But even in those inftances in which the cafe is otherwife, and in which these liberal accomplishments must be purchased by the facrifice of a

*Tractate of Education.

part

part of our profeffional eminence, the acquifition of them will Introduction. amply repay any lofs we may fuftain. It ought not to be the leading object of any one, to become an eminent metaphysician, mathematician, or poet; but to render himself happy as an individual, and an agreeable, a respectable, and an useful member of fociety. A man who lofes his fight, improves the fenfibility of his touch; but who would confent, for fuch a recompence, to part with the pleasures which he receives from the eye?

It is almost unneceffary for me to remark, how much individuals would be affifted in the proper and liberal culture of the mind, if they were previously led to take a comprehenfive furvey of human nature in all its parts; of its various faculties, and powers, and fources of enjoyment; and of the effects which are produced on these principles by particular fituations. It is such a knowledge alone of the capacities of the mind, that can enable a person to judge of his own acquifitions; and to employ the most effectual means for fupplying his defects, and removing his inconvenient habits. Without fome degree of it, every man is in danger of contracting bad habits, before he is aware; and of fuffering fome of his powers to go to decay, for want of proper exercise.

Ir the business of early education were more thoroughly, and more generally, underftood, it would be lefs neceflary for individuals, when they arrive at maturity, to form plans of improvement for themselves. But education never can be fyftematically directed to its proper objects, till we have ob

tained,

Introduction. tained, not only an accurate analysis of the general principles of our nature, and an account of the most important laws which regulate their operation; but an explanation of the various modifications and combinations of these principles, which produce that diversity of talents, genius, and character, we observe among men. To inftruct youth in the languages, and in the sciences, is comparatively of little importance, if we are inattentive to the habits they acquire; and are not careful in giving, to all their different faculties, and all their different principles of action, a proper degree of employment. Abstracting entirely from the culture of their moral powers, how extenfive and difficult is the bufinefs of conducting their intellectual improvement! To watch over the affociations which they form in their tender years; to give them early habits of mental activity; to rouze their curiofity, and to direct it to proper objects; to exercife their ingenuity and invention; to cultivate in their minds a turn for fpeculation, and at the same time preferve their attention alive to the objects around them; to awaken their fenfibilities to the beauties of nature, and to inspire them with a relish for intellectual enjoyment;—these form but a part of the business of education; and yet the execution even of this part requires an acquaintance with the general principles of our nature, which feldom falls to the share of those to whom the inftruction of youth is commonly intrusted. Nor will fuch a theoretical knowledge of the human mind, as I have now described, be always fufficient in practice. An uncommon degree of fagacity is frequently requifite, in order to accommodate general rules to particular tempers, and characters. In whatever way we chufe to account for it, whether

by

by original organisation, or by the operation of moral causes, in Introduction. very early infancy; no fact can be more undeniable, than that there are important differences difcernible in the minds of children, previous to that period at which, in general, their intellectual education commences. There is, too, a certain hereditary character (whether resulting from phyfical conftitution, or caught from imitation and the influence of fituation), which appears remarkably in particular families. One race, for a fucceffion of generations, is diftinguished by a genius for the abstract sciences, while it is deficient in vivacity, in imagination, and in tafte: another is no lefs diftinguished for wit, and gaiety, and fancy; while it appears incapable of patient attention, or of profound research. The fyftem of education which is proper to be adopted in particular cafes, ought, undoubtedly, to have some reference to these circumftances; and to be calculated, as much as poffible, to develope and to cherish those intellectual and active principles, in which a natural deficiency is moft to be apprehended. Montefquieu, and other fpeculative politicians, have infifted much on the reference which education and laws fhould have to climate. I fhall not take upon me to fay, how far their conclufions on this fubject are juft; but I am fully perfuaded, that there is a foundation in philosophy, and good fenfe, for accommodating, at a very early period of life, the education of individuals to those particular turns of mind, to which, from hereditary propenfities, or from moral fituation, they may be presumed to have a natural tendency.

Introduction.

THERE are few subjects more hackneyed than that of edu cation; and yet there is none, upon which the opinions of the world are still more divided. Nor is this furprifing; for most of those who have fpeculated concerning it, have confined their attention chiefly to incidental questions about the comparative advantages of public or private inftruction, or the utility of particular languages or fciences; without attempting a previous examination of thofe faculties and principles of the mind, which it is the great object of education to improve. Many excellent detached obfervations, indeed, both on the intellectual and moral powers, are to be collected from the writings of ancient and modern authors; but I do not know, that in any language an attempt has been made to analife and illuftrate the principles of human nature, in order to lay a philofophical foundation for their proper culture.

I HAVE even heard fome very ingenious and intelligent men dispute the propriety of so systematical a plan of instruction. The most successful and fplendid exertions, both in the sciences. and arts, (it has been frequently remarked,) have been made by individuals, in whofe minds the feeds of genius were allowed to shoot up, wild and free; while, from the most careful and skilful tuition, seldom any thing results above mediocrity. I shall not, at prefent, enter into any difcuffions with respect to the certainty of the fact on which this opinion is founded. Suppofing the fact to be completely established, it must still be remembered, that originality of genius does not always imply vigour and comprehensiveness, and liberality of mind; and that