IV.

judice from which the whole fyftem of universal ideas gradually CHA P. took rife. If, even in the case of individuals, we have no reafon to believe the existence of any object of thought in the mind, diftinct from the mind itself, we are at once relieved from all the difficulties in which philofophers have involved themselves, by attempting to explain, in consistency with that antient hypothefis, the process of the mind in its general fpe

culations.

On the other hand, it is no less clear, from Dr. Reid's criticisms on Berkeley and Hume, that his opinion does not coincide with that of the Nominalifts; and that the power which the mind poffeffes of reafoning concerning claffes of objects, appears to him to imply fome faculty, of which no notice is taken in the systems of these philofophers.

THE long experience I have had of the candour of this excellent author, encourages me to add, that, in ftating his opinion on the subject of universals, he has not expreffed himself in a manner fo completely fatisfactory to my mind, as on most other occafions. That language is not an effential inftrument of thought in our general reasonings, he has no where pofitively afferted. At the fame time, as he has not affirmed the contrary, and as he has declared himself diffatisfied with the doctrines of Berkeley and Hume, his readers are naturally led to conclude, that this is his real opinion on the fubject. His filence on this point is the more to be regretted, as it is the only point about which there can be any reasonable controverfy among those who allow his refutation of the ideal hypothefis to be fatisfactory.

IV.

CHAP. In confequence of that refutation, the whole difpute between the Realifts and the Conceptualifts falls at once to the ground; but the dispute between the Conceptualifts and the Nominalists (which involves the great question concerning the use of signs in general fpeculation) remains on the fame footing as before.

In order to justify his own expreffions concerning universals ; and in oppofition to the language of Berkeley and Hume, Dr. Reid is at pains to illuftrate a diftinction between conception and imagination, which, he thinks, has not been fufficiently attended to by philosophers. "An univerfal," fays he, "is "not an object of any external sense, and therefore cannot be imagined; but it may be diftinctly conceived. When Mr. "Pope fays, "The proper ftudy of mankind is man;" I con"ceive his meaning distinctly; although I neither imagine a "black or a white, a crooked or a ftraight man. I can con"ceive a thing that is impoffible; but I cannot diftinctly ima"gine a thing that is impoffible. I can conceive a propofition

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or a demonstration, but I cannot imagine either. I can con"ceive understanding and will, virtue and vice, and other "attributes of the mind; but I cannot imagine them. In like “manner, I can distinctly conceive universals; but I cannot imagine them."

IT appears from this paffage, that, by conceiving univerfals, Dr. Reid means nothing more, than understanding the meaning of propofitions involving general terms. But the obfervations.

* P. 482

he

IV.

he has made (admitting them in their full extent) do not CHA P. in the least affect the question about the neceffity of figns, to enable us to fpeculate about fuch propofitions. The vague ufe which metaphysical writers have made of the word conception, (of which I had occafion to take notice in a former chapter,) has contributed in part to embarrass this subject. That we cannot conceive univerfals in a way at all analogous to that in which we conceive an absent object of sense, is granted on both fides. Why then should we employ the fame word conception, to exprefs two operations of the mind which are effentially different? When we speak of conceiving or underfstanding a general propofition, we mean nothing more than that we have a conviction, (founded on our previous use of the words in which it is expreffed,) that we have it in our power, at pleasure, to fubftitute, inftead of the general terms, fome one of the individuals comprehended under them. When we hear a propofition announced, of which the terms are not familiar to us; we naturally defire to have it exemplified, or illuftrated, by means of fome particular inftance; and when we are once satisfied by fuch an application, that we have the interpretation of the propofition at all times in our power, we make no fcruple to fay, that we conceive or understand its meaning; although we should not extend our views beyond the words in which it is announced, or even although no particular exemplification of it should occur to us at the moment. It is in this fenfe only, that the terms of any general propofition can poffibly be understood: and therefore Dr. Reid's argument does not, in the least, invalidate the doctrine of the Nominalists, that, without the use of language, (under which term I comprehend

Cc 2

IV.

CHA P. prehend every species of figns,) we should never have been able to extend our speculations beyond individuals.

THAT, in many cafes, we may fafely employ in our reafonings, general terms, the meaning of which we are not even able to interpret in this way, and confequently, which are to us wholly infignificant, I had occafion already to demonstrate, in a former part of this fection.

SECTION IV.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Inferences with respect to the Ufe of Language as an Inftrument of Thought, and the Errors in Reafening to which it occafionally gives rife.

IN

N the laft Section, I mentioned Dr. Campbell, as an ingenious defender of the fyftem of the Nominalists; and I alluded to a particular application which he has made of their doctrine. The reafonings which I had then in view, are to be found in the seventh chapter of the fecond book of his Philofophy of Rhetorick; in which chapter he proposes to explain how it happens," that nonsense so often escapes being detected, "both by the writer and the reader." The title is somewhat ludicrous in a grave philosophical work; but the difquifition to which it is prefixed, contains many acute and profound re

marks

IV.

marks on the nature and power of figns, both as a medium of CHA P. communication, and as an instrument of thought.

DR. CAMPBELL's fpeculations with refpect to language as an inftrument of thought, feem to have been fuggefted by the following paffage in Mr. Hume's Treatife of Human Nature. "I be"lieve, every one who examines the fituation of his mind in rea"foning, will agree with me, that we do not annex diftinct and "complete ideas to every term we make use of; and that in

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talking of Government, Church, Negotiation, Conquest, we "feldom spread out in our minds all the fimple ideas of which "these complex ones are compofed. It is, however, obferv"able, that, notwithstanding this imperfection, we may avoid

talking nonfenfe on these subjects; and may perceive any "repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we had a full "comprehenfion of them. Thus if, instead of saying, that, in

war, the weaker have always recourfe to negotiation, we "should say, that they have always recourfe to conqueft; the "custom which we have acquired, of attributing certain rela❝tions to ideas, ftill follows the words, and makes us immediately perceive the abfurdity of that propofition."

In the remarks which Dr. Campbell has made on this paffage, he has endeavoured to explain in what manner our habits of thinking and fpeaking, gradually establish in the mind fuch relations among the words we employ, as enable us to carry on proceffes of reafoning by means of them, without attending in every inftance to their particular fignification. With most of his remarks on this fubject I perfectly agree; but the illustrations he