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qualities and distances, seems, from early and conftant habits, to CHA P. be an inftantaneous perception; yet, in many cafes, it implies an exercise of the judgment, being founded on a comparison of a variety of different circumstances.

FROM these principles, it is an obvious confequence, that the knowledge we obtain, by the eye, of the tangible qualities of bodies, involves the exercise of conception, according to the definition of that power which has already been given. In ordinary difcourfe, indeed, we afcribe this knowledge, on account of the inftantaneousness with which it is obtained, to the power of perception; but if the common doctrine on the fubject be just, it is the refult of a complex operation of the mind; comprehending, firft, the perception of thofe qualities, which are the proper and original objects of fight; and, fecondly, the conception of thofe tangible qualities of which the original perceptions of fight are found from experience to be the figns. The notions, therefore, we form, by means of the eye, of the tangible qualities of bodies, and of the dif tances of these objects from the organ, are mere conceptions; ftrongly, and indeed indiffolubly, affociated, by early and constant habit, with the original perceptions of fight.

WHEN we open our eyes on a magnificent profpect, the various distances at which all its different parts are placed from the eye, and the immenfe extent of the whole fcene before us, seem to be perceived as immediately, and as inftantaneously, by the mind, as the coloured furface which is painted on the retina. The truth, however, unquestionably is, that this variety of distance,

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CHA P. diftance, and this immenfity of extent, are not objects of sense but of conception; and the notions we form of them when our eyes are open, differ from thofe we fhould form of them with our eyes fhut, only in this, that they are kept fteadily in the view of the mind, by being ftrongly affociated with the fenfations of colour, and with the original perceptions of fight.— This obfervation will be the more readily admitted, if it is confidered, that, by a skilful imitation of a natural landscape, in a common fhew-box, the mind may be led to form the fame. notions of variety of diftance, and even of immenfe extent, as if the original fcene were prefented to our fenfes and that, although, in this cafe, we have a fpeculative conviction that the sphere of our vision only extends to a few inches; yet fo strong is the affociation between the original perceptions of fight, and the conceptions which they habitually produce, that it is not poffible for us, by any effort of our will, to prevent these conceptions from taking place.

FROM these obfervations it appears, that when the conceptions of the mind are rendered fteady and permanent, by being ftrongly affociated with any fenfible impreffion, they command our belief no less than our actual perceptions; and, therefore, if it were poffible for us, with our eyes fhut, to keep up, for a length of time, the conception of any fenfible object, we fhould, as long as this effort continued, believe that the object was prefent to our senses.

Ir appears to me to be no flight confirmation of these remarks, that although, in the dark, the illufions of imagination

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are much more liable to be mistaken for realities, than when CHA P. their momentary effects on the belief are continually checked and corrected by the objects which the light of day presents to our perceptions; yet, even total darkness is not fo alarming to a perfon impreffed with the vulgar ftories of apparitions, as a faint and doubtful twilight, which affords to the conceptions an opportunity of fixing and prolonging their existence, by attaching themselves to fomething which is obfcurely exhibited to the eye. In like manner, when we look through a fog, we are frequently apt to mistake a crow for a man; and the conception. we have, upon fuch an occafion, of the human figure, is much more distinct and much more fteady, than it would be poffible for us to form, if we had no fenfible object before us; infomuch that when, on a more attentive obfervation, the crow shrinks to its own dimenfions, we find it impoffible, by any effort, to conjure up the phantom which a moment before we feemed to perceive.

IF thefe obfervations are admitted, the effects which exhibitions of fictitious diftrefs produce on the mind, will appear less wonderful, than they are fuppofed to be. During the reprefentation of a tragedy, I acknowledge, that we have a general conviction that the whole is a fiction; but, I believe, it will be found, that the violent emotions which are fometimes produced by the diftreffes of the stage, take their rife, in most cafes, from a momentary belief, that the distreffes are real. I say, in most cafes; because, I acknowledge, that independently of any fuch belief, there is fomething contagious in a faithful expreffion of any of the paffions.

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THE emotions produced by tragedy are, upon this fuppofition, fomewhat analogous to the dread we feel when we look down from the battlement of a tower *. In both cases, we have a general conviction, that there is no ground for the feelings we experience; but the momentary influences of imagination are fo powerful as to produce these feelings, before reflexion has time to come to our relief.

* With respect to the dread which we feel in looking down from the battlement of a tower, it is curious to remark the effects of habit in gradually destroying it. The manner in which habit operates in this cafe, feems to be by giving us a command over our thoughts, fo as to enable us to withdraw our attention from the precipice before us, and direct it to any other object at pleasure. It is thus that the mafon and the failor not only can take precautions for their own safety, but remain completely masters of themselves in fituations where other men, engroffed with their imaginary danger, would experience a total fufpenfion of their faculties. Any ftrong passion which occupies the mind produces, for the moment, the fame effect with habit. A perfon alarmed with the apprehenfion of fire, has been known to escape from the top of a house, by a path which, at another time, he would have confidered as impracticable; and foldiers, in mounting a breach, are faid to have fometimes found their way to the enemy, by a route which appeared impracticable after their violent passions had fubfided.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

Of Abftraction.

SECTION I

General Obfervations on this Faculty of the Mind.

THE origin of appellatives, or, in other words, the origin CHA P. of those claffes of objects which, in the schools, are called

genera, and species, has been confidered by fome philofophers as one of the most difficult problems in metaphyfics. The account of it which is given by Mr. Smith, in his Differtation on the Origin of Languages, appears to me to be equally fimple and fatisfactory.

"THE affignation" (fays he)" of particular names, to denote "particular objects; that is, the inftitution of nouns fubftantive; "would probably be one of the first steps towards the formation "of Language. The particular cave, whofe covering sheltered "the savage from the weather; the particular tree, whose fruit

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