found in our ablest soldiers and in many of our leading statesmen, holds to the second assumption, and insists that the safety of the nation demands that it be prepared both by land and sea. That is not to say that intelligent patriotism admits that our sea fighters can be conquered, but that it is willing to assume, in seeking to find what absolute safety demands, that our fleet can be rendered powerless to defend our shores.

This second assumption was the basis of the speculation in the preceding chapter. It is at the bottom of the contention that it will be profitable for the American people to consider the facts of our military preparedness. Whether or not this is warranted can be established only in actual warfare. In a discussion of our military strength, there is little space for an exhaustive analysis of our naval strength.

There are, however, certain general grounds, which it may be well to indicate at this point, for assuming that a naval defeat is possible.

Size alone cannot always be counted upon to win battles, as the schoolboy bully has often

discovered to his amazement and chagrin. So long as the issues of modern warfare are decided by explosives and projectiles, battles will be won and lost by superiority of fire. Larger numbers and bigger guns, greater weight and superior agility, all are distinct advantages; but the ultimate test lies in how the guns are handled, how well trained are the men behind them, and whether the agility is converted into fighting efficiency.

It is not our policy to excel all nations in greater numbers of men, ships, or guns. We do make an effort, however, to keep ahead of all nations in the size of our guns. If under this policy we are able, under any circumstances, to maintain superiority of fire, both in volume and accuracy, we are justified in assuming that our navy is unconquerable. There are very definite grounds for seriously questioning such ability.

Throughout our history, the general trend of our naval policy has been weak. It has been "off again, on again, back again, Finnegan," with us.

We started the "little navy" policy immediately after the Revolution. Contrary to the advice of Washington, our navy was abolished and for eight years we had none. It was not until the outrageous decree of the Directory of France in 1796, followed by the capture of American vessels bound to and from English ports, that the necessity of fighting ships was driven home to us, and we established a sea power which forced peace. After the Constellation defeated the French frigate Insurgente, and strife on the sea was stopped, we went back again to our "little navy" policy. We soon found ourselves paying tribute to the pirates of Algiers. Once more we provided ourselves with warships and eventually the piracy was put down.

England's interference in 1807 with commerce between the United States and continental Europe should have warned us of the folly of our weak naval policy. Jefferson, without a navy, and with a distaste for war, persuaded Congress to pass the Embargo Act as a substitute for a navy. One historian has said

that "the cost of this experiment emptied the treasury, bankrupted the mercantile and agricultural classes, and ground the poor beyond endurance."

By 1811, it was plain as the nose on our face that we were rapidly moving, totally unprepared, toward war. When war was declared in 1812, we had six frigates and eight sloops, against the hundreds of ships in England's navy. We had three years of the War of 1812. We called out over 500,000 men and burdened ourselves with a large pension list. A hundred years after the war, there were still over two hundred widows on the pension roll of 1812. A strong naval policy at that time, if not actually preventing the war, would very probably have limited its duration to a few weeks or months.

It is interesting to consider the pension figures in connection with the argument of the "little navy" men that we cannot stand the expense of a larger navy. Up to 1914, the cost of pensions, due to the Civil War, had been about $4,000,000,000. The pension appro

priation for 1913 was in the neighborhood of $185,000,000. This is about $50,000,000 more than was appropriated in the same year for the navy. Since we began to be the United States of America, we have paid $1,250,000,000 more for pensions than we have paid out for our navy. How much of this enormous sum a strong naval policy would have saved us can only be guessed at.

No one seriously questions the assertion, frequently made, that had the Northern States in 1861 been possessed of an adequate navy, there would not have been four years of cruel and costly conflict. With a navy of adequate proportions, the Norfolk Navy Yard would have been seized, the Mississippi would have been blockaded, and the export of cotton and the importation of war material from other nations would have been prevented. The exploits of the Alabama and other vessels which were built in English ports would have been impossible.

If Russia in 1905 had been able to assemble a sufficiently strong fleet at Port Arthur, Japan