Danubian provinces, and a liberation of the mouths of the Danube from all hurtful obstructions and disputed ownership, were regarded by the Earl of Clarendon as simple and easily managed. The Fourth Point, concerning the rectification of the Turkish rule over Christian subjects, was treated by him as being more delicate and difficult, calling for much abnegation and self-control on the part of the Christian powers in their dealings with the Porte. It would tend greatly to the peace of Turkey,' said his lordship, in relation to this matter, if the powers of Europe would mutually renounce all sectarian prejudices as applied to the subjects of the sultan, and look upon all Christians, whatever ritual they may belong to, as entitled to an equal share in the religious privileges and immunities which the sultan may, at the instance of the great powers of Europe, consent to accord them.' Summing up these explanatory elucidations, therefore, the Earl of Clarendon regarded the First and Second Points as comparatively easy, the Fourth as the most delicate and difficult, but the Third as the most important in relation to the subsequent peace of Europe.

Armed with these instructions, Lord John Russell met the other plenipotentiaries at Vienna. As assembled for business about the middle of March, the diplomatists were nine in number— namely, for England, Lord John Russell and the Earl of Westmoreland; France, the Baron de Bourqueney; Austria, Count de Buol-Schauenstein and Baron de Prokesch-Osten; Turkey, Aali Pacha and Aariff Effendi; Russia, Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as a second plenipotentiary for France, did not reach Vienna until a later period. At the commencement of the proceedings, on the 15th of March, Count Buol was elected chairman of the conference, and opened it with a speech relating to the important matters at issue; he stated, among other things, that the Emperor of Austria had made up his mind on the indispensable conditions of peace, and that nothing-not even the most serious consequences-would prevent his majesty from scrupulously adhering to the engagement he had contracted with his Allies.' The Russian plenipotentiaries, in accordance with a promise made by the czar, expressed their willingness to accept the oft-quoted Four Points as bases of negotiation; and it was agreed by all that these Points should be taken for discussion in their regular order. The Russians made an attempt to introduce Prussia to the conferences; but the other powers refused.

After much amicable negotiation affecting the First and Second Points, on several days of meeting, a difficulty suddenly arose on the 26th. When the Third Point came on, the Russian plenipotentiaries were invited to take the initiative, to propose some method by which they thought the principle already provisionally assented to by Russia could be attained. Gortchakoff and

Titoff, much to the surprise of the other diplo matists, announced that they were without powers to adopt any such step, and that it would be necessary to send to St Petersburg to obtain these powers. Herein was at once a cause for great delay, which appears to have been part of the Russian diplomatic tactics at the time. While messages were being transmitted to and fro between Vienna and St Petersburg, the Russian and Austrian plenipotentiaries were willing to enter upon the consideration of the Fourth Point ; but as England and France attached most importance to the Third, and were determined that unless that were settled the others should be regarded as non-effective, the Fourth was postponed until the czar had expressed his views. And when, at last, these views were made knowir to his representatives, it was found that the whole transaction had involved so much lost time; as the Russian plenipotentiaries had no proposals to make-that is, the czar, willing to take advantage of any concessions made by his opponents, would not commit himself by making any proposals of

his own.

The conferences were at once thrown into disorder. The plenipotentiaries had already agreed upon the First and Second Points, at the especial and earnest desire of Austria. For it must be remembered that, as this power had bound herself to go to war with Russia in a certain contingency, she was anxious to discover whether that contingency might by any means be obviated in other words, Austria said: 'It must first be ascertained that Russia is not willing to make peace on terms that we may think sufficient, before we carry out the treaty into which we have entered.' It was Austria that urged most strenuously the holding of the conferences, and that most earnestly strove to frame propositions acceptable to all. One omen was unfavourable. Lord John Russell, as he stated in the House of Commons several weeks afterwards, went to the conferences with a strong doubt in the probability of success, and expressed this doubt to Count Buol; he thought the Allies had so far been successful in the war as to justify them in making important claims upon Russia; but he did not see that Russia had yet become so weakened as to render probable any great amount of concession on her part. England and France would probably have preferred to postpone negotiation until further success had attended their arms; but, in acquiescence to Austria, they consented to hear what Russia had to say; and so the conferences were held. The spirit in which Russia yielded the First and Second Points enabled the plenipotentiaries to make some progress, although the difficulties were speedily found to be considerable. As concerns the principalities, Russia consented to the complete and permanent abrogation of the former treaties on that subject; she agreed that the sultan should provide, by a solemn act, for the maintenance of

all the privileges and liberties of those provinces ; and that Russia should take no part in the matter other than as one of the great powers. Doubts were, however, felt how so to frame the new laws or constitution as to keep the provinces at peace with their three imperial neighbours; MoldoWallachia might become a focus of intrigue, in which partisans of Turkey, Russia, and Austria would alternately have the advantage; and the country might become distracted by contentions thence arising. No immediate mode of solving the difficulty being apparent, it was agreed that a commission should subsequently be formed at Constantinople, to frame the details of this Moldo

Wallachian constitution. So much for the First Point. As to the second, the embarrassments were fewer; Austria easily shewed that, in accordance with existing treaties, Russia had no right whatever to obstruct the free commercial navigation of the Danube: Russia yielded all that was necessary; and it was agreed that a commission or syndicate from all the great powers should superintend the carrying out of this decision. Thus, although the First and Second Points were agreed to, they would have involved the subsequent establishment of two bodies of commissioners, one to manage the details of the Moldo-Wallachian question, and the other those

of the Sulina-Danube question. Next came on the Third Point; and here at once was presented a check to the progress of the plenipotentiaries. The check involved a delay of no less than three weeks; for the diplomatists, wanting further instructions for their guidance, were enforced to maintain a busy correspondence with their respective governments at London, Paris, Constantinople, and St Petersburg.

The courts of France and England were much annoyed at this interruption, as it left in total uncertainty the great question of peace or war, and strengthened an opinion already entertained, that Russia must meet with more defeat and humiliation before she would be likely to assent to satisfactory terms. Nevertheless, being desirous of neglecting no reasonable measures, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, drew up a new schedule of means for fulfilling the implied conditions of the Third Point; and,

as a mode of strengthening the French plenipotentiary at Vienna, went himself to that city. In order to concert measures with the English government, however, he first visited London, and had a long interview on the 30th of March with the Earl of Clarendon, Lord Palmerston, the Marquis of Lansdowne, and M. Walewskithe last named being at the time French ambassador to the court of St James's. Two projects were agreed upon, with a provision that Austria should have the privilege of deciding which to support, as a sine quâ non to the continuance of peace between that state and Russia.

When, after an active transmission of couriers and dispatches, the plenipotentiaries had supplied themselves with instructions from their respective governments affecting the Third Point, the representatives of the Allied powers discussed among themselves the terms of the proposal fashioned

by M. Drouyn de Lhuys-who had by that time reached Vienna-and agreed as to the reception they would give to any probable scheme proposed by the Russian diplomatists. It was, however, the 17th of April before the latter had received their full instructions from St Petersburg; when, to the unmingled astonishment of the others present at the conference, these credentials were found to be valueless, so far as concerned an immediate advancement of peaceful negotiations. Prince Gortchakoff announced, as the result of his instructions just received, that Russia declined to initiate any proposals respecting the Third Point, while at the same time she would be willing to assent to reasonable terms proposed by the other powers. The prince took advantage of an expression used, perhaps inadvertently, by Lord John Russell at a former meeting, 'that the best and only admissible conditions of peace would be those which, whilst consistent with the honour of Russia, should at the same time suffice for the security of Europe, and for preventing the recurrence of the existing complications.' The expression was exactly suitable to Russian objects -indefinite, elastic, susceptible of interpretation in any way most pleasing to the interpreters. The representatives of the other powers were startled by this announcement; they had fully prepared themselves to discuss a Russian proposition; they felt that Russia was playing a double game; and they saw their chances of success vanish before them. M. Drouyn de Lhuys spoke strongly, and demanded in what sense the 'honour' of Russia would interpret the limitation of ships-of-war in the Black Sea; to which Gortchakoff replied that Russia would not consent to the strength of her navy being restricted to any fixed number, either by treaty or in any other manner. The English, French, Austrian, and Turkish representatives, with little difference of intensity, expressed their astonishment and regret at the refusal of Russia to take the initiative-a course suggested by Austria, out of courtesy to the czar; and announced their intention to deliberate separately, before conferring again with the Russian plenipotentiaries. Thus unsatisfactorily ended the conference of the 17th. They met again on the 19th; when Aali Pacha, representing Turkey, presented a formal proposition concerning the Third Point, founded on the agreement made in London three weeks before this proposition was warmly supported by the eight representatives of the four powers. Gortchakoff and Titoff argued the subject in various ways; viewed distrustfully any proposal for limiting the number of Russian ships in the Black Sea; threw out a hint, repelled at once by the Allies, that Russia and Turkey might perhaps be able to settle the matter by themselves; and asked a little time for further consideration. The next meeting was on the 21st, when Gortchakoff and Titoff undertook to give a specific reply to the plan proposed for the settlement of the

Third Point. This plan comprised the following items that Russia and Turkey should each limit her Black Sea fleet to four ships-of-the-line, four frigates, and a proportionate number of smaller vessels, to act simply as a maritime police for the protection of commerce; that each of the other contracting powers should be allowed at any time to send half this number of ships into the Black Sea, also as a mere commercial protection; that the sultan should be empowered to ask the aid of any amount of naval service from his Western Allies, if at any time threatened by the czar; that Russia and Turkey should admit consuls from all the other contracting powers to all the commercial ports in the Black Sea; that Sardinia should be admitted as one of the contracting powers to the treaty; and that Russia should grant a general amnesty to any or all of her subjects who might have been compromised by the war. Prince Gortchakoff placed before the conference a lengthened document, explanatory of the reasons for rejecting the plan of the Allies; and he also detailed a plan which Russia proposed in substitution. In this document the czar's representative made a singular attempt to depreciate the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, as if to shew that Turkey had no cause for alarm: the Allies, however, were not easily to be deceived on that point-they remembered Sinope. Prince Gortchakoff then brought forward his proposition-that the Black Sea should be open to the navies of all nations without distinction; leaving to Russia and Turkey the building and maintenance of any amount of war-ships they might individually choose.

This meeting of the 21st of April was, in one sense, the closing of the conferences; for, although other meetings were afterwards held, Lord John Russell did not attend them. In truth, Gortchakoff's propositions were entirely alien to the views of the Allies; he would have made the Black Sea open to all war-ships, probably on the supposition that Russia could always under such circumstances, having her own ports and arsenals at hand, maintain a preponderance; whereas the Allies wished that the war-ships should be so few in number as to leave the Black Sea virtually a commercial sea, freed from the threats and dangers of war. The plenipotentiaries of England, France, Austria, and Turkey, expressed themselves so decidedly against the plan proposed by Russia, that little more could be done or said; yet another meeting was convened by Count Buol on the 26th, to hear a new proposition the Russians stated they had to make. All attended except Lord John Russell, who announced that his instructions from England did not permit him to discuss in any sense the new Russian proposal. This proposal was little more than a maintenance of the status quo: a declaration that the Black Sea should be closed against all war-ships except those of Turkey and Russia, unless the sultan, in a time of apprehended danger,

should invite other powers to send fleets inwards through the Dardanelles, or that of Russia outwards through the same straits. It would, indeed, have rendered matters worse than before; for it would have enabled Russia, by a well-managed system of intrigue, to obtain from the Porte, at some critical moment, permission to send her Black Sea fleet out into the Mediterranean, thereby enlarging the field for ambitious extensions of influence. Count Buol wished the plenipotentiaries to declare that this proposition, though inadmissible, nevertheless contained a slight clue to a practicable arrangement; but the representatives of England, France, and Turkey refused to discuss it further, or even to ask for further instructions from their respective governments concerning it they rejected it in toto, as utterly irreconcilable with their instructions.

Thus did the 26th of April witness the failure of this attempt to bring about peace between the belligerent powers. Russia, it will be seen, rejected every proposal for limiting her naval power in the Black Sea, although she brought forward no satisfactory proof or evidence that a powerful fleet in that region was necessary to her safety. There was another suspicious circumstance. The eight representatives of the Allies proposed, as part of the Third Point, that all the great powers should mutually respect and guarantee the independence and territorial inviolability of the Ottoman Empire-that is, that any one of them would join Turkey in a war against any of the others who might tamper with this inviolability. No arguments could induce Gortchakoff and Titoff to consent to this; they would not consent to place Russia on a level with the other powers in this particular; they used the word 'respect' and the word 'independence,' but they eluded anything that would, in its ultimate effect, shut the door against further aggression by Russia on Turkey. This fact made a deep impression on the other diplomatists, shewing how ingrained was the Muscovite tendency to regard as a possible future prey some of the many provinces constituting the territories of the sultan. The Fourth Point did not come under discussion at all; Russia and Austria wished that it might, as it affected them more than the Western Powers, relating, as it did, to the various Christian nations, Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic, under the suzerainty of the sultan; but England and France resolutely refused to touch this matter until the Third Point had been settled, seeing that this was the more important for the general peace of Europe. One of the two propositions by Russia concerning the Black Sea, for allowing her fleets ingress and

egress by way of the Dardanelles, as part of the plan for rendering the sea open to the war-ships of all nations, was thus commented on in the House of Commons a few weeks afterwards by Lord John Russell: 'It is obvious that, if we had agreed to these terms, we should thus have increased to a large amount the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and have allowed that fleet to come out from time to time, passing close to the sultan's palace, and parading the waters of Greece to raise discontent and disaffection among his subjects; and thus the facility of menace would have been increased whenever the czar of Russia might think proper to send a fleet to enforce unjust demands;' while the second proposition, emanating from the same quarter, to the effect that, if menaced by Russia, Turkey might call up the fleets of her allies to her aid, was characterised by Count Buol at the conferences as likely to lead to perpetual misunderstandings, whereby the sultan would be bewildered in the attempt to determine who were his friends or who his enemies. Count Nesselrode issued an elaborate document from St Petersburg early in May, giving a Russian version of the conferences, and claiming for the czar the credit of having made all possible concessions for the peace of Europe consistent with the honour' of Russia

again referring, as to a great point obtained, to Lord John Russell's declaration concerning that same honour' on the 26th of March. This document was addressed to the Russian ministers at foreign courts generally.

The present Chapter suitably closes here. Meetings continued to be held at Vienna by the diplomatists there assembled, and the statesmen of London, Paris, Turin, Berlin, St Petersburg, Vienna, and Constantinople continued to pour forth 'notes' and dispatches affecting the probable or possible modes of solving the great European problem; but the 26th of April marked a decisive moment in the progress of the diplomacy. Now, more than ever, did England and France become convinced that Russia must suffer more by the sword before she would yield to the pen; and they resolutely proceeded with their warlike plans in the Crimea and elsewhere. The strange revelations afterwards made concerning the details of the conferences, leading to the retirement of Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys from their respective governments, belong to a later period in the diplomatic history. The immediate result was simply this, that England, France, and Sardinia proceeded with the war against Russia as allies of Turkey; while Austria and Prussia still held aloof.

HE war with Russia was carried on under remarkable circumstances, so far as concerned one at least of the belligerent powers. England, after forty years of European peace, found nearly all departments of her army in a defective state: the organisation confused; the expenditure too great in some particulars and too small in others; some departments overworked or underhanded, others a mere booty for favouritism; the encouragement of merit checked by the mode of disposing of commissions; and skill in the art of warfare being deficient simply because there had been none with whom to fight. One of the staff-officers of Lord Raglan's army, during the discussions springing out of the Crimean Commissioners' Report, made the following significant assertion:The War-office regulations are not adapted to a state of war'-an evidence of unfitness scarcely less glaring than would be that of a locomotive not adapted for running upon railways, or of a steam-ship not adapted for progression through the water. Mr Sidney Herbert, after many months' experience as Secretary at War, pictured the British army itself as being fully as disorganised as the War-office. He discussed the various circumstances that had led to this result, and added: "I am not now speaking merely of reductions effected in men or in votes of money, but of the destruction of the very sources of our military power during the forty years' peace following 1815; and I think I can satisfy you in a very few words that we have had virtually no army during that time-that we have kept our troops for the purposes of police at home and in our colonies rather than for the purposes of defence abroad. What, I ask, is your English army? It is only a collection of regiments. The internal discipline of those regiments is certainly complete-you have in every company and in every regiment a most perfect regimental system; and, if you observe, you will find that in the actions that have lately taken place, and in the whole of the campaign during which they have occurred, there has not been the slightest sign of regimental

disorganisation. . . . . There has been wanting that control over the whole army which you can get only by practice-and you have had no such practice. I venture to say that there have been fieldofficers in command of regiments in the Crimea who, until they went there-unless they had been in India or been quartered in Dublin-never in their lives saw a brigade. What, then, I ask, can you expect from such an army? Can you expect men who have never seen an army in the field, and are utterly unacquainted with the movements of such a force, and with the regulations required for its supplies and its security-can you expect such persons to be Heaven-born administrators, who can do not only what they have never practised, but what they never even saw done? This is a very important element in the consideration of the causes of the misfortunes which have occurred to our army.'*

To reform an army during a war in which that army is to be engaged must obviously be a difficult task; nor can it be said that such a great work was effected during the war with Russia. Nevertheless, so many important improvements were wrought, that the spring and summer of 1855 witnessed, in the British army engaged in the Crimea, a state of completeness far in advance of that in 1854. There were also many arrangements planned, and partially enforced, for obtaining aid through sources extraneous to the British army itself; and there were many remarkable applications to the art of war, of recent scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions. A few sections devoted to these instalments of improvement-improvement in the personnel and the matériel of the army (to use two convenient French words, to which there are no equally convenient English synonymes)-will render more intelligible the progress of the great siege of Sebastopol during the year 1855.

MILITIA, CAMPS, AND FOREIGN

LEGIONS.

The British army has no existence unless parliament annually votes the necessary supplies.

*Speech in the House of Commons, January 26, 1855.