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maintain a firm front against the enemy; and if, on returning to camp, they found perchance that a supply of boots had arrived, it was quite in accordance with the confused state of affairs at the time that nearly all the boots would be too small for the men. Thus, bootless, supperless, houseless, bedless, it was adding hardship to hardship when the troops were hastily called forth on these duties. Even at this very time, three weeks after Christmas, the soldiers adverted in their letters to the plum-puddings' said to be on their way from the ladies of England, and

mourned over the non-arrival of those desiderata. Lord Raglan, in his dispatches, dwelt frequently on the state of the weather, and on his endeavours to bring siege-material up to the front; but he did not enlarge on the sufferings of the troopsat least no such dispatches were made public by the government.

General Canrobert, having the advantage of a much better system of organisation in the military departments, was enabled to shield his troops from suffering during the winter far more effectively than Lord Raglan; and the French reserve force

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at home being large, his reinforcements were frequent and important. The English general, too, received reinforcements; but, as has already been stated, the new troops were mostly young, raw, and inexperienced, and were stricken down by privations almost as rapidly as they arrived. Considering the immense difficulties which beset Raglan, it was an achievement of no small character to bring up to the plateau fifty fine new 32-pounder guns, thirteen large mortars, and several heavy siege-guns, by the middle of January. It was useless to attempt a second bombardment, unless the siege-works were much more powerful than they had been in October; and this increase of power could only be obtained by a large accession of guns, mortars, and ammunition. At the period now under notice, nearly

15,000 large shot and shell had been accumulated in various parts of the British camp; few of these having been expended in repelling the sorties of the Russians. The French, too, had largely increased their siege-material; while the arrival of the eighth and ninth divisions from France raised their army to nearly 70,000 men.

As the end of January approached, the Allies could see that the defences of Sebastopol had advanced quite as rapidly as the works of the besiegers. Beginning from the west, or the shores of Quarantine Harbour, the line of defence between the plateau and the town displayed an amazing series of covered-ways traverses, zigzags, and parallels, bristling with cannon, and well armed by musketeers and riflemen. The houses in the principal parts of the town, in streets sloping

mostly towards the north, had not suffered much during the October bombardment; but those nearer the plateau had been partly destroyed by the Allies, and partly by the Russians themselves, leaving fragments of roof and wall to shelter numerous parties of riflemen. The Flagstaff Battery had been nearly shattered to pieces during the bombardment; but new works of great strength had been constructed immediately behind it, a little further distant from the French lines. The Redan and Garden Batteries, and the crenellated wall connecting them, had been strengthened. The Malakoff, a small round tower, had been nearly rent to pieces during the bombardment, but around it had arisen works of prodigious extent and strength; the slope of the hill whereon the tower stood had been shaped into earthworks, tier above tier, armed with cannon of enormous power, commanding an extensive sweep of open country towards the works of the Allies. While the utmost difficulty was experienced by the Allies in fathoming the movements and plans of the Russians, the Russian spies traversed the Allied camps with inconceivable audacity-now disguised as French Zouaves, now as British riflemenpeering about at everything, and then stealing off into the town, carrying with them a large budget of useful items of knowledge concerning the camps and siege-works of the Allies. Undoubted evidence was indeed obtained, throughout the war, that the system of espionage enabled the Russians to foresee and frustrate many plans formed by the Allies.

Setting apart various collisions of smaller import, involving little either of advantage or of loss, the operations during the month of February may be grouped around four centres, or associated with four dates. Two of those operations bore reference to the plain of the Tchernaya, and two to the plateau outside Sebastopol.

After a long interval of quiet, news, or, if not news, rumours, spread around, on the 7th of February, that the Russians had again made their appearance in the plain, in rear of the Allied camps, and in threatening proximity to Balaklava. Throughout the war, as just observed, spies were generally more successful in the service of the Russians than in that of the Allies; but in this instance a Tatar, arriving at the Highland camp near Kadikoï, announced that the Russians had several small bodies of men in Kamara, Tchorgouna, and other villages eastward or northeastward of Balaklava; while an army of 35,000 men was making a detour by way of Baidar, further to the south-east, in order, apparently, to approach the heights immediately commanding the harbour. Evening was far advanced when this information was received; but Sir Colin Campbell, who throughout the winter held the chief command in this quarter, lost not a moment in making preparations: he ranged his batteries and troops in order, sent a newly arrived regiment up to the intrenchments on the heights, and brought all the land-defences into an efficient state.

Meanwhile, the harbour became a scene of intense activity. Admiral Boxer, who had sometime previously been placed in naval command there, and Captain Christie, who had not at that time been superseded, made such arrangements as seemed likely to be most appropriate among the war-ships and transports; the crew of the Vesuvius steam-sloop was landed, as a corps for the defence of the town and stores; the Wasp and Diamond were cleared for action, and were moored so as to form a floating-battery commanding the land-approach to the harbour; while the crews of all the other ships were ordered under arms, ready to land and render active service if exigencies required it. During the whole night were these preparations, on land and in the harbour, progressing. Mrs Duberly, who was sleeping on shipboard in the harbour at the time, thus summarily dismisses the whole affair, in her Diary: Roused in the middle of the night by a report that the Russians were coming down in force, and that the crews of the transports must all turn out armed. What an order! what could such a disorganised rabble do in the midst of regular troops? They would most probably fire away at whatever came first, and cause endless worry and confusion.' Whether or not the naval criticisms of this military lady were likely to be justified, great excitement prevailed among all at Balaklava, for it was believed that a tough contest with the Russians was at hand.

Full of expectation, energy, hope-anything but fear the gallant Sir Colin, having ascertained that all was in proper defence in the harbour, mounted his horse at four in the morning on the 8th, and rode up to the heights, where he and his officers peered through the darkness for any indications of the expected enemy, ready to render a good account of himself and his Highlanders. The expectation turned out to be incorrect; no encounter took place-simply because the British had well prepared themselves for it. The Russians made no attack; yet were the precautions shewn to have been prudent and even necessary; for as the day advanced, the enemy appeared in great force on the left or west of the Tchernaya, and reoccupied the hillocks whence they had driven the Turks in October, on the day of the battle of Balaklava. They prepared to drag up a few guns to Canrobert's Hill, as if to open an attack on the defenders of Balaklava. Here, however, they were so struck with astonishment at the preparations evidently made by the British, that they checked their operations. Not a shot was fired on either side; the Russians remained watching during two or three days, and then were observed to march off towards the north. Events of subsequent date tended to shew that this was a part or the whole of Liprandi's corps, which, frustrated in a designed attack on Balaklava, marched off straight to Eupatoria, and there received a defeat from the Turks under Omar Pacha, as narrated in the last section. The Allies,

of course, did not know, until the departure had actually occurred, what plans might be in agitation; but as they saw numerous bodies of Russians manoeuvring among the hills beyond the Tchernaya, on the 8th and two following days, they were kept in a state of watchful attention and some anxiety, doubtful whether any renewed attack were intended. Omar Pacha arrived in a steamer at Kamiesch on the 8th from Eupatoria, to hold a council of war with Raglan and Canrobert; but he returned in a day or two, as soon as it became suspected that Liprandi had designs on Eupatoria. The departure of the Russian general relieved Sir Colin Campbell from immediate anxiety; but the necessity for watchful attention on the movements of the Russians remained sufficiently apparent.

The second of the dates around which the February occurrences are proposed to be grouped was on the 13th. There occurred on this day a sortie of the garrison from Sebastopol, one among many, but somewhat distinguished from the rest in importance. In the dead of the night a body of Russians emerged from the place, under the command of a fine young officer who displayed great intrepidity. The sortie was preceded by a heavy firing from one of the Russian batteries, which blew up one of the French magazines; the Russians, cheering vociferously at this achievement, sallied forth, headed by their young commander, who was speedily wounded in several places, and taken prisoner. The sortie was soon checked, like most of the others; but there was something in the manner of the young officer which much excited the attention of the French, against whose position this attack had been made: he had exhibited daring courage, and had many marks of distinction about him. The Russians, on the following day, sent a flag of truce, requesting to know his fate; the French replied that he had died of his wounds, and that the body would be returned if his name and rank were announced. After some delay and hesitation, the Russians stated that the officer was an aid-de-camp and protégé of the Emperor Nicholas, and that he had arrived at Sebastopol only the night before with dispatches from St Petersburg. His dead body was given up. Many French officers, who attentively watched his features, formed an opinion that he was a natural son of the czar.

The third week in February presented to the Allies one among many proofs, afforded during the winter, of the almost insupportable cold occasionally experienced in those regions. Tatar spies, employed to set a watch on the movements of the Russians in or near the plain, came in and announced that, although the main body of Liprandi's army had gone off towards Eupatoria, about 6000 infantry and a few guns had been left near the Tchernaya. The Allied commanders at once resolved on an attempt to capture this force. The first brigade of the first French division, the whole of the light division under General Bosquet, one regiment of Zouaves, Sir Colin Campbell's

Highland brigade, a body of French cavalry under General d'Allonville, a small force of English cavalry, and a few batteries of English and French artillery-forming in the aggregate an army of respectable magnitude-were told off for this service. The plan was that Sir Colin, with his Highlanders, should advance cautiously upon the front of the enemy; while the French, winding round to the south and east, would suddenly appear upon their left flank, and cut off their retreat by the Traktir Bridge over the Tchernaya. The plan might have been good, but 'General February' defeated it-a general on whom the Russians have much relied in all their winter campaigns in their own country. As the night of the 19th arrived, and preparations were completed for the set-out at two o'clock on the following morning, a sudden and most unpropitious change in the weather took place; a heavy gale, accompanied by torrents of rain, set in, and lasted two hours, rending and soaking everything about the camp; then the wind veered round to the north, the rain ceased, and a piercing blast of almost arctic severity began, accompanied by snow so thick that the men were nearly blinded by it. This visitation conquered the resolution of General Canrobert; he hesitated to bear the responsibility of sending out his men in such weather, and at about two in the morning he announced this fact to Lord Raglan. His lordship, seeing the plans thus broken, immediately sent an officer to Sir Colin to countermand the expedition; but unfortunately this officer lost his way during the blinding snow-storm, and did not arrive at the Highlanders' camp until two hours after the time appointed for Sir Colin's departure. This general, true to his orders, started at the pre-arranged hour, despite the snow and cold, trusting that the French force would effect its flank-movement in support.

What a night's march was that! The cold was so intense that the men could scarcely grasp their muskets and rifles; while the snow was falling so thickly, as to render next to impossible any observation of the enemy's movements. Mr Woods asserts, though without mentioning any reasons for such a strange proceeding, that the Highlanders, by special order, wore their open feather-bonnets instead of their warm fur-caps; it necessarily followed that such bonnets, while retaining the snow, were utterly useless in shielding the face from the wind. The 42d, 71st, 79th, and 93d regiments, with a battery of guns, and the remnants of the half-starved cavalry, sallied forth in this inclement night. Blinded by the snow, the leaders of the expedition mistook their way; and a wearisome circuit had to be traversed before the right track was gained. After a brave struggle against the elements, Sir Colin and his hardy men reached the spot where they were to wait until Bosquet had effected his flank-movement. But no Bosquet appeared, and, two hours of marching having been endured, the

troops lay down on the snow for a while, to wait; after half an hour's stoppage, no French appearing, they advanced towards Tchorgouna, having already passed by Kamara. Here they again rested; but matters had now become serious; the troops were frostbitten, benumbed, unable to fix bayonets, and many of them unable to move their hands at all. Sir Colin saw that any contest with the enemy was out of the question under such circumstances, and he ordered a retreat wondering, nevertheless, why the French did not make their appearance. Just at

this moment, the officer sent by Lord Raglan, having been too late at Balaklava and then at Kamara, arrived at Tchorgouna with the message; and about the same time, General Villenois arrived with four French regiments, having determined to afford this succour as soon as he learned of Sir Colin's departure. Day dawned, and then the Russians could be seen, evidently taken by surprise, but soon alert in making an orderly retreat over the heights beyond Tchorgouna. It was physically impossible for Campbell to arrest them; his men had their very heart's warmth almost

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frozen out of them, their limbs were gradually stiffening, and the snow became still more thick and blinding. They returned to camp after an absence of nine hours, and had to place 200 of their number in hospital, afflicted with frostbite. All the circumstances connected with the expedition tended to shew that the plan of attack had been judiciously formed; the secret had been well kept, the Russians were completely off their guard, and the probabilities are many that the whole would have been made prisoners of war. This probability rendered it doubly mortifying to Sir Colin Campbell that he should have been beaten by an enemy proverbially fickle-the weather.

That the snow-storms of that region must be peculiarly intense is forcibly shewn by one of the most striking among Mr Russell's letters. On the morning of the 19th, a few hours before the return of the Highlanders to their camp near Kadikoï, he started off at an early hour to Kamiesch, about nine miles distant in a

straight line, in hurry to post a letter to go by a mail about to start-intending to gallop back and witness some of the expected doings in the Tchernaya plain. He joined a convoy of artillerymen, but presently the snow became so blinding that no horseman could see his neighbour. Thinking his companious were going too much to the right, he went further to the left, and separated from them; but wishing to urge upon them a reconsideration of their route, he diverged with an intention again to join them he lost them completely, however, and then bent his attention seriously to tread a correct path for himself. On he went, dashing against the icy particles that filled the air; but although one hour's good riding would have covered the distance, even on an unfavourable day, he found himself, at the end of two hours, in an unknown spot. He could make out nothing: tents, hillsides, jutting rocks, all seemed to have vanished, leaving nothing but a fleecy white sheet around him. Another hour passed, and yet no living

thing, no camp or tent, to be seen. At last, amid snow yet more terribly dense than ever, the horse suddenly stopped, and resolutely refused to move. What this could mean his rider did not know, but unpleasant surmises began to cross his mind. Presently a dark form, probably of a wolf or a wild-dog, rushed by, and startled the horse into a renewed gallop, plunging above the knees into snow-drifts which were rapidly forming at every alternation of hillock and furrow. The rider became sensitively aware that a deep snow-bed might at such a time prove his grave. Minutes became hours,' he says, 'and my eyes were bleared and sore striving to catch a glimpse of tent or man, and to avoid the new dangers in our path. Suddenly I plunged in among a quantity of brushwood-sure and certain sight that I had gone far astray indeed, and that I was at some place removed from the camp and the woodcutters. The notion flashed across me that the wind might have changed, and that in riding against it I might have shaped my course for the Tchernaya and the Russian lines. The idea of becoming the property of a Cossack picket was by no means a pleasant ingredient in one's thoughts at such a moment. Still, what was to be done? My hands and feet were becoming insensible from the cold, and my face and eyes were exceedingly painful. There was no help for it but to push on, and not to let night come on. That would indeed be a serious evil. At this moment there was a break in the snow-drift for one moment, and I saw to my astonishment a church dome and spire on my right, which vanished again in a moment. My impression was, that I must either be close to Kamara or to Sebastopol, and that the church was in either of those widely separated localities. Either way, the only thing to do was to bear away to the left to regain our lines, though I could not help wondering where on earth the French works were, if it was indeed Sebastopol. I had not ridden very far, when, through the ravings of the wind, a hoarse roar rose up from before me, and I could just make out a great black wall as it were rising up through the snow-drift. I was on the very edge of the tremendous precipices which overhang the sea near Cape Fiolente!' The spot was not invested with the Cossack and Russian dangers he had at first suspected; it was neither Kamara nor Sebastopol; it was the elevated cliff close to the monastery of St George, on the southern coast. Having found out his locality thus far, and thawed his frozen hair and garments by a Zouave's fire, he started anew, but still so blinded and utterly bewildered by the snow, that he did not reach Kamiesch until four o'clock in the afternoon. Glancing at the map,* and noticing the five positions of the camp near Inkermann, Kamiesch, the monastery, Sebastopol, and Kamara, it will afford a striking proof of the bewilderment into which a sharp-witted and experienced man

Portion of the Crimea forming Chief Scene of Warfare.'

must have been thrown by a dense snow-storm, that, in going from the first of these to the second, he arrived unwittingly at the third, while in a painful state of doubt whether he had wildly strayed to the fourth or the fifth. We may thence learn what were the perils and privations to which Sir Colin Campbell and his Highlanders must have been at that very time exposed; and may well understand how imperative became the return of his troops. On that same day, too, Liprandi's army was marching back towards Sebastopol, after having suffered defeat at Eupatoria; and so awful was the snow-storm in parts of the route to be traversed, that 2000 hapless beings were snowed and frozen to death.

Perhaps the most formidable of the movements made in February-although the Allies did not so regard it at the time, or at least did not prepare sufficiently for it-took place on the 22d, two days after the snowy journey into the Tchernaya plain. The scene of activity was south-eastward of the Karabelnaïa suburb of Sebastopol. On looking at the map just referred to, it will be seen that the Malakoff Tower stood on or near the line of defence outside the Karabelnaïa, between the suburb itself and the attack-works of the Allies; and the details of the siege, already given, will have shewn that, by extensively fortifying the hill on which the tower stood, it became a stronghold of the most formidable kind, necessitating greatly increased attack-works on the part of whomsoever might attempt to capture the town. All this the Allies well knew; but they did not know, or did not act as if they knew, that there was another hill fully deserving their attention. Outside the Malakoff, outside the defence-works-indeed, much nearer to the French trenches than to the Russian works -was an elevation subsequently to acquire a world-wide reputation under the name of the MAMELON. This hill, about one-third of a mile in advance of the Malakoff, and somewhat less than a quarter of a mile from the works of the Allies, was about a mile in circumference at the base, gradually narrowing towards an irregularly flat summit; the side next to the Allies, having been quarried for stone, was high and steep, broken and rugged, with large masses of rough stone lying about it; and as the height was very considerably above the level of the most advanced French works, an attack upon such a spot, if defended, would be a serious undertaking, since a noiseless approach would be impossible, over the rough crags and rolling stones.

Now this important position, neglected by the Allies, was cleverly turned to advantage by the Russians. Why the Allies thus permitted the enemy to make so bold and fortunate a stroke, has never been sufficiently explained. Perhaps there was no Todtleben among them, no military engineer of commanding genius, who, seeing a prize neglected by others, skilfully appropriated it to the advantage of the sovereign whom he faithfully served; or perhaps there was discord

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