practice. Consequently, they will be warned to resort either to the Black Sea, or to the Mediterranean Sea, as they shall see fit, within a term which shall hereafter be fixed. Moreover, the Ottoman government, being unwilling to place hinderances in the way of commercial intercourse between the subjects of friendly powers, will, during the war, leave the straits open to their mercantile marine.'

No sooner was war thus declared, than Constantinople became wild with excitement. The declaration or manifesto was read in all the mosques, and was received with great enthusiasm. Wealthy Turks at once made large contributions to the national treasury, to enable the sultan to bear the expenses of the war; and some offered to clothe and equip bodies of troops. The Bosphorus was alive with caïques, or boats, bringing over Turcomans and Bashi-Bazouks from Asia-picturesque ragged rascals, who would certainly fight for Islam, but who had a keen eye for plunder whenever opportunity should offer. It was a strange sight at Constantinople in October; Turcomans, Koords, Arabs, armed with scimitars, bows and arrows, and lances, roamed about the streets, bringing back the past scenes of the fifteenth century, when the Osmanli* conquered Constantinople; and these contrasted with the picturesque Albanian, and the Europeanised Nizam, or regular troops.

It now becomes necessary to notice the Turkish army, its numbers and its organisation. Russia, as has been seen, has at command an armed force of vast amount, even if we take the lowest of many different estimates; and it is interesting to know how far Turkey is capable of meeting her formidable neighbour in the field. Turkey, besides difficulties of other kinds, has had to contend with that of substituting a European for an Asiatic organisation of her armies.

The modern reforms, or attempts at reform, in Turkey, are closely associated with the terrible massacre of the Janissaries in bygone years-that coup d'état which, like some other coups d'état, has been often regarded as a necessary though violent cure for a social malady. The Janissaries were, for the most part, chosen from the robust Moslems of Bosnia and Albania; and they gradually acquired, through the favour of successive sultans, such an enormous military power, as virtually to rule the whole empire; for the Janissaries had more concern than any other persons in the setting up and pulling down of sultans. The existence of this troop of body-guards rendered the Turkish government unfitted for any amalgamation with the powers of Christian nations. The Divan could promise nothing with certainty, for the Janissaries could revoke its decisions; and it could accomplish no reforms which interfered with the immunities, or offended the prejudices, of this powerful body. They usurped the chief appointments of the

* Osmanli and Ottoman are nearly equivalent terms, derived from Osman or Othman, who founded the present Turkish dynasty about a century before the Turks captured Constantinople.

government, holding or conferring them nearly as they pleased; and they inspired much terror in the population by their lawlessness and cruelty. When, therefore, the late Sultan Mahmoud began to play the part of an Osmanli Peter the. Great, reforming and civilising his subjects whether they would or not, he found the Janissaries the first great bar to his progress. These men were medieval rather than modern soldiers, and they gradually found themselves eclipsed in strategy and tactics by soldiers who had studied the modern art of war. The sultan resolved on the re-organisation of his army on the European model; the Janissaries refused to submit; and hence arose a choice between two evils-either to see the state crumble to pieces, or to crush this unmanageable body. The sultan chose the latter alternative, and achieved his work in a tragical way: he caused nearly the whole of the Janissaries, 25,000 in number, to be massacred in June 1825; and thus ended a military corps which had existed during four centuries and a half. The Nizam Djedid, or Europeanised troops, triumphed over the Janissaries, who refused to be Europeanised.

Most writers agree in opinion that this destruction, terrible though it was, has been salutary to Turkey. The road was cleared for the introduction of measures which could alone secure the existence of a tottering empire. Since this change, the Turkish troops, if well commanded, have shewn that they can adapt themselves to European discipline without losing their old bravery. The Divan regained the power, which it had so long virtually lost by the arrogant assumption of the Janissaries, of guiding its own councils, and organising its own army. But Turkey has, nevertheless, suffered in many ways by this sudden and startling act. As soon as the Janissaries were despatched, Sultan Mahmoud resolved to carry out his schemes of reform in costume, usages, tactics, and conscription. These reforms were repugnant to Moslem feeling. The Osmanli saw no reason why he should not continue to fight the infidel in the same manner as before, and he long and stubbornly resisted the sultan's European tendency. The new regulations were often enforced at the point of the bayonet, and many a bloody scene was the consequence. It is, moreover, to be observed that, after the massacre of the Janissaries, there was scarcely a Mussulman family in Bosnia and Albania who had not to deplore the loss of some relative; and there thence arose a deadly hatred against the government in those pachaliks. How that hatred shewed itself, may be easily explained. Whatever may have been the despotic arrogance of the Janissaries, they were always ready to defend the Ottoman Empire from enemies, whether Russian or any other. When, however, the tragedy had been fulfilled, the state of things became changed. The few who fled, and saved their lives, raised to a greater pitch of fury the relatives of those who had fallen; while a host of fanatic Mussulman priests went about everywhere exciting the people to vengeance

against the reforming sultan. When the Russians invaded Turkey in 1828-9, the fruit of these discontents shewed itself plainly; for the sultan in vain endeavoured to persuade the Mussulmans of Bosnia and Albania to take up arms against the giaour-the Czar of Russia; for they deemed the sultan himself little better than a giaour-an enemy to the true faith. Much of Omar Pacha's military skill has been exerted in quelling disturbances among these people; and Turkey yet feels the opposition of those Moslems who, being what we might term Tories in their creed, have never relished the Radical or reforming tendencies of Sultan Mahmoud. It is one of the many strange things in Turkey, that the Slavon Moslems of Bosnia-those who were Slavonic Christians a few centuries ago-are more bigoted in their faith and usages than even the regular Turks themselves -the Moslems of the race of Osman.

The old or unreformed Turkish army comprised the Spahis and the Janissaries, highly favoured cavalry and infantry bodies; together with a larger number of troops of inferior grade. The campaigning tactics were based on the plan of sending forth the humbler troops to bear the burden and bloodshed of the contest, and then winning the day by a terrible onslaught with the Spahis and Janissaries, who came fresh upon an exhausted enemy. It was this impetuous mode of attack with the choice reserve corps which gained so many victories for the Osmanlis in past ages. When the modern European infantry system became perfected, and a line of troops steadily met with the bayonet the fierce attack of any horse-troops whatever, then did the Oriental system of the Turks cease to produce its wonted and wonderful results.

The

Under the influence of the reforms wrought by Sultans Mahmoud and Abdul-Medjid, the Turkish army has assumed a state partaking both of the European and the Oriental. In the first place, the bulk of the active army is grouped in six ordus, or divisions, each of which constitutes a kind of small army in itself. In a state of peace, these six divisions are located in as many different parts of the wide-spreading empire-from the Hungarian frontier in the north-west, to Mesopotamia in the south-east; but, in a state of war, these locations would of course be modified. division stationed at or near Constantinople is treated as a kind of Imperial Guard, and is better trained, clothed, and armed than the rest. organisation into six camps, army corps, or divisions, was completed in 1843; and the six armies so formed constitute the Nizam, or regular troops. The men are engaged for five years, after which they may retire to their homes; but at any time during the next seven years, they are liable to be called out to active duty as a reserve corps, under the name of the Rédif. It will be useful to bear in mind this relation between the Nizam and the Rédif. The government provides directly for all the wants of the soldiers; and, according to

This

Each ordu, or army, is commanded by a mushir (field-marshal); it has two corps, each under a ferik (general of division); each corps has three brigades, under as many livas (generals of brigade). The seraskier pacha is commander-in-chief of the whole six ordus collectively. Each ordu comprises 6 regiments of infantry, 4 of cavalry, and 1 of artillery; and amounts, when complete, to about 21,000 men. Each infantry regiment has 4 battalions, of 8 companies each; the colonel of each regiment is a mir alai, while the commandant of each battalion is called a bin-bashi. The cavalry regiments consist of 6 squadrons each. The artillery regiments each comprise 70 guns.

So far as the theory of this organisation is concerned, it seems to be well conceived. Each ordu, or complete army, has its own distinct store of matériel; besides its tents and stores, it has a triple supply of ammunition. The Rédif is divided into ordus as well as the Nizam; each army corps of active troops having its own reserve or rédif, marshalled into regiments, battalions, squadrons, and companies, and commanded by a staff of officers. The redif assembles once a month at the head-quarters of its ordu; and its officers are under the direct control of the mushir of the ordu. Hence it follows, that the rédif is nearly equivalent to another army, and raises the total force of each ordu or army to something like 40,000 men.

But the nizam and the rédif do not constitute the whole force of the Turkish army. There are four central corps of artillery, together about 5200 strong; there is a brigade of engineers, about 1600; there are detached corps at Crete, Tripoli, and Tunis, 16,000; there are the Auxiliary troops, which vary in amount according to the willingness of the pachas of the respective provinces to assist their sultan in times of difficulty; there are the Irregular troops, consisting of the semi-barbarous Bashi-Bazouks and other wild adventurers, who are with difficulty brought under subjection to European discipline. It is a remarkable element in the recent reforms, too, that a very efficient Turkish constabulary or police has been formed. They serve as a permanent guard whenever the ordu has to leave its appointed location. whole constabulary is divided into brigades; each brigade into companies, officered by captains; and each company into detachments, under sergeants. The territorial arrangement is such, that every eyalet, or great division of the empire, has a constabulary brigade; every province in each eyalet has a constabulary company; and every

The

But this, like many other armies on paper, differs widely from the number which the sultan could actually make available at any given time. The sultan would have as much difficulty in raising and maintaining 300,000 as the czar in raising and maintaining 1,000,000-perhaps more. The Ottoman government made two levies during the course of the summer and autumn of 1853, and called upon its various tributary pachas to come forth in defence of Islam. Troops gradually concentrated towards the Danube, as the line of operation most threatened by Russia; and an endeavour was made to mark out a course of strategy for the defence of the principal towns in Bulgaria. What attitude England and France assumed at this time, with their powerful fleets near at hand but doing nothing, will come for consideration in a future chapter. All we have at present to bear in mind is, that Turkey entered upon the contest single-handed.

Who was the general selected by the czar to manage the Danubian campaign, has been stated; and it now becomes desirable to glance similarly at Gortchakoff's antagonist, Omar Pacha, a much more remarkable man-remarkable for his change of nationality, his change of religion, his cool bravery, his unquestioned skill as a military leader, and the success which has almost uniformly attended his movements in the field.

Omar Pacha's career has indeed been a strange one. Born at the village of Vlaski, in Croatia, in 1801, he was an Austrian subject. His name was Lattas, and his father was administrator-general of the circle of Ogulini. He studied while a youth in the school of mathematics at Thurm, in Transylvania; and then entered the Austrian military corps of Ponts et Chaussées. The young man, Michael Lattas, wrote well and quickly, and had a competent knowledge of mathematics; but after filling a clerkship in two government offices, he quarrelled with his rulers and his religion; passed over the frontier into Turkey in 1830, and became a Mohammedan. The reasons for these changes do not appear to be well known. He became clerk to a Turkish trader at Widdin; and under the Oriental name of Omar, he next became tutor in a wealthy family-his knowledge of the Servian, Italian, and German languages being of

great service to him. When his patron removed to Constantinople, Omar gradually learned the Turkish language, and by degrees became acquainted with military men. He obtained a situation in one of the military schools established by the late Sultan Mahmoud; and in this situation he attracted the attention of Khosrou Pacha, the sultan's right-hand man in the military reforms then in progress. The old pacha admitted him into the army, made him his aid-de-camp, and got him the appointment of writing-master to the future sultan, Abdul-Medjid, then a boy. Omar soon afterwards married Khosrou's ward-a daughter of one of the last of the Janissaries. He threw himself energetically into the army reforms planned by the sultan, first as chief of battalion, and then as aid-de-camp and interpreter to General Chzanowski, who instructed the Turkish troops in European tactics at Constantinople. Ever active, he was next employed in superintending a topographical survey in Bulgaria and Wallachia-an apprenticeship which proved to be of immense service to him when he had to manage a Danubian campaign in later years. He was a lieutenantcolonel when Abdul-Medjid came to the throne in 1839; but he was rapidly promoted to the offices of colonel and major-general. Up to this time he had seen no service in the field; but between 1840 and 1847, he was employed in quelling insurrections in Syria, Albania, and Bosnia-insurrections from which Turkey is seldom free more than a few months at a time. His services in this way brought him the honours of lieutenant-general and pacha. In 1848, he had a delicate mission, partly military and partly diplomatic, in the Principalities; and his imperial master signified his approval of his services, by conferring on him the dignity of mushir. In 1851, when the Moslem inhabitants of Bosnia refused to bend to the reforming tendencies of the sultan, Omar-now Omar Pacha-was sent against them; and both in Bosnia and Montenegro he displayed great military abilities. When the troubles broke out with Russia in 1853, Omar was appointed generalissimo of the Turkish army; and worthy did he afterwards prove himself of the choice. There is a remarkable mixture of the Oriental and the cultivated European in Omar. The author of the Frontier Lands of the Christian and the Turk thus speaks of Omar and his family, whom he met during the Bosnian campaign of 1851: 'I stayed the whole day at the camp with his officers, who shewed me every possible attention in their tents. When the retreat was beat, the whole troops turned out, and gave three cheers of, "Padishah chok yasha!" and I then returned to town. On my way, I met Omar Pacha in a small open carriage, drawn by four very handsome Hungarian horses, with his little daughter Eminé on his knee, and a brilliant staff following him on horseback. His wife and her mother occupied a chariot-and-four; and a calèche came next, with the daughter's French governess, the wife's German lady's-maid,

HE campaign on the Danube in 1853-4 will ever remain an honourable memento for the Turks. Theirs were the efforts; theirs the strategy; theirs the danger; theirs the success; and theirs also should be the praise. The English and French -the one powerful by sea, and the other by land-were dancing attendance on the diplomatists, striving to stem the torrent of Russian aggression by paper missives. How this was manifested, and by what steps English and French troops were drawn upon Turkish soil, will be explained in the next chapter. The present is of right devoted to the Turks, who fought well before any allies came to their aid.

Omar Pacha, as has already been stated, was commissioned by his sultan to manage the important strategetical operations necessary in a contest with so formidable an opponent as Russia. The formation of a plan partly preceded, partly followed, the actual termination of peace. The formal declaration of war by Turkey on the 5th of October, was a document of considerable length; for it entered into various particulars and reasonings, intended to justify the course which the Porte felt compelled to pursue. The Russian declaration in reply to it, given in the Gazette de St Petersburg, was more brief, and was couched as follows:- By the grace of God, we, Nicholas I., Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russians, &c., make known as follows: By our manifesto of the 4 of June, in the present year, we made known to our faithful and dearly beloved subjects the motives which had placed us under the obligation of demanding from the Ottoman Porte inviolable guarantees in favour of the sacred right of the orthodox church. We also announced to them, that all our efforts to recall the Porte, by means of amicable persuasion, to sentiments of equity, and to the faithful observance of treaties, had remained unfruitful, and that we had consequently deemed it indispensable to cause our troops to advance into the Danubian Principalities; but in taking this step, we still entertained the hope that the Porte would acknowledge its wrong-doings, and would decide on acceding to our just demands. Our expectation has been frustrated. Even the chief powers of Europe have sought in vain, by

their exhortations, to shake the blind obstinacy of the Ottoman government. It is by a declaration of war, by a proclamation filled with lying accusations against Russia, that it has responded to the pacific efforts of Europe, as well as to our spirit of long-suffering. At last, enrolling in the ranks of its army revolutionary exiles from all countries, the Porte has just commenced hostilities on the Danube. Russia is challenged to the combat; and she has no other course left her than, putting her trust in God, to have recourse to force of arms, and so compel the Ottoman government to respect treaties, and to obtain reparation for the insults with which it has responded to our most moderate demands, and to our most legitimate solicitude for the defence of the orthodox faith in the East, professed also by the people of Russia. We are firmly convinced that our faithful subjects will join their prayers to those which we address to the Almighty, beseeching Him to bless with His hand our arms in this just and holy cause, which has always found ardent defenders in our ancestors. -Done at Czarskoe-Selo, the 20th day of October (1st of November), in the year of grace 1853, and the twenty-eighth of our reign.-NICHOLAS.'

Russia thus stated that to be white which Turkey had designated black, and vice versa; but such is almost necessarily the case in declarations and counter-declarations of war. Czarskoe-Selo, it may here be mentioned, is the name of one of the czar's residences, a few miles south of St Petersburg.

In tracing the events of the campaign which followed these two declarations, it may be well to describe, first, the materials with which Omar Pacha had to work, and the field whereon his operations had to be conducted.