from the magazines to the batteries, adverted to in the last paragraph, was frequently incurred under circumstances displaying great intrepidity. One of the batteries was so placed that the ammunition could be conveyed to it only along a road wholly exposed to the enemy, and the hazards there encountered led to the appellation of the Valley of the Shadow of Death' to that road. The Sailors' Battery being especially obnoxious to the enemy's shot and shell, the officers and seamen who managed it delighted in displaying their hardihood in that service. On one occasion, the Union Jack being shot away by the Russians from the naval battery, Captain Peel jumped up to the parapet, and waved the ragged fragment high aloft amid a torrent of bullets and balls, until another flag had been brought to replace it. Individual acts such as these, frequent in occurrence, tended greatly to excite enthusiasm among the men, at a time when the course of events generally was not very satisfactory. Sometimes rockets were sent as means of destruction against the ships in the harbour and against the dockyard buildings, but with only partial effect; the houses in the town, by express orders of Lord Raglan, were spared from direct fire, as a wish was felt to draw a line of distinction between the emperor's property and his unoffending subjects. When it became known, however, that an hospital had been fired, and that this hospital contained Russian soldiers who had been wounded at the battle of the Alma, much regret was felt; as there was certainly no desire to limit the few comforts those poor fellows could receive. One peculiarity annoyed the Allies much their fleets could not get at the Russian ships, but a Russian ship managed to assail the British troops; for the Vladimir, anchored in the great harbour, by being heeled over, brought her mortars to bear upon the British siege-works, and killed and wounded several men by a skilful shelling it was an enemy in a new direction, and a necessity for a new battery was speedily seen. But this was of little avail; the Vladimir quietly steamed out of the way of the new battery, and took up another position, where she could completely sweep the hill in front and rear of some of the British works. A storm of 13-inch shells from mortars, swung on the upper-deck, was terribly annoying: the sailors, who defended the battery chiefly assailed, although passing their pleasantries upon 'Whistling Dick'-a name given by them to the enormous shells on account of the peculiar noise made during their flight-were taxed to the utmost in their attempts to get behind shelter before the dread missiles exploded.

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Day after day passed in this desultory struggle, each side labouring to repair injuries and to bring up more force. Two 68-pounders were added to Gordon's Battery, and two to Chapman's; a transport arrived at Balaklava laden with siegeguns and ordnance-stores; new batteries were constructed on the front and left of the left attack;

and more troops were landed from England. But so severe had been the labour and sufferings of six short weeks, that, notwithstanding reinforcements, the British troops fit for service had greatly lessened in number-at a time, too, when the work to be done had largely increased by an extension of the siege-works. The French likewise suffered severely; they had more than one explosion; and the Flagstaff and Garden Batteries cut them up terribly. There was a reason for this not well known till afterwards: the plateau whereon the French works were constructed had been a practice-ground before the war; and hence the Russians well appreciated the range and distances of various points. The horses of the British were even in worse plight than the men, being wholly insufficient, in number and strength, for the enormous exertions required of them in dragging guns and stores from Balaklava up to the plateau. On one occasion, Lord Dunkellin, commanding a trench-party in a dreary misty night, advanced too far, mistook a company of Russians for friends, and was taken prisoner. On another night, a small party of Russians, approaching the French pickets, and hailing out: Ne tirez pas nous sommes Anglais,' succeeded in working much mischief ere the deceit was discovered. Indeed, during the war, circumstances frequently placed the Russians in the character of deceivers, in many cases breaking the conventional rules of honourable warfare, but in others doing no more than the Allies would have done if similarly placed.

For the purposes of the present Chapter, the narrative of the siege need not be traced to a later date than the end of October. The Allied forces, it is true, remained before Sebastopol ; additions to the siege-train continued to arrive; stores of ammunition were dragged up to the plateau; new trenches and parallels were dug around the southern half of the town; additional batteries of guns and mortars were planted; overworked troops continued to spend the dead hours of the night in the harassing duty of the trenches, some to dig, and others to watch. And then, on the other side, the Russians continued to repair by night what had been injured during the day; they formed new lines of defence within the Redan and the Malakoff, to afford further resistance, if those strongholds should fall; they brought more and more guns to their batteries, as if the available store were inexhaustible; they received frequent reinforcements of men, provisions, and ammunition, along the roads of arrival which the Allies could not control; and, armed with these powers and resources, they maintained against the besiegers a fire generally more powerful than the latter could employ. But, from the very nature of such proceedings, there is little left to narrate the enterprise became, for the Allies, most wearying, laborious, and disappointing. A few brief passages from familiar letters, written by officers engaged, and afterwards published, will

suffice to convey a notion of the state of the Russian works at that time, of the picket-duty on the part of the British, and of the trenchduty. After adverting to the supposed disappointment of friends in England at the protracted duration of the siege, one officer thus speaks of the state of the town: We can knock the civilian part of the town to pieces; but the great difficulty is to get at the dockyards, arsenals, &c., which are completely protected from straight shooting by the high cliffs of the harbour; they, therefore, can only be reached by shells and rockets. Thus, in long range, it is very difficult to fire at exactly the right elevation; consequently, we pitch almost as many shells into the harbour as we do into the stores. Again, I suspect all their roofs are bomb-proof, as we have not succeeded in setting them on fire to any great extent, although there have been almost nightly blazes of small huts, &c., in the outskirts. It must ultimately be taken by assault, and, therefore, the sooner that takes place the better. We have had a great many deserters, and they all agree in declaring that the streets are strewed with dead; and they add, that as soon as resistance becomes useless, the troops will all go over to the other side, where they have immensely strong batteries, which, together with Fort Constantine, completely overlook the southern shores, and will, I suspect, prevent us from holding the place long. Next comes the English side of the field of struggle. I am on picket. This is a duty that begins at four in the morning, and ends at four the next morning. Each regiment furnishes two companies of pickets daily; therefore it takes place every fourth day. A picket is an advanced-guard thrown out close to the enemy's lines, in order to protect the camp from a surprise; consequently the sentries can see each other, and we can see large masses of Russians manoeuvring in the hollow all day. We command, from our position, a road which is a short-cut for the enemy into Sebastopol; and, as they often try to dodge past our sentries, hardly a day passes that we have not a brush with the enemy.' A Zouave in a French rifle-pit furnishes another phase of outpost-duty. I am almost like a poacher. I go out every day to shoot Russians. This is the way we do. As early as two o'clock in the morning, our toilet being completed-and that of a Zouave is not long-we leave, carrying with us ammunition and one or two biscuits. Arrived in the intrenchments, we take sand-bags, a spade, and a pickaxe; then, at a given signal, we leap from the parapets with the rapidity of deer, and establish our homes close to the forts. There we dig a hole, a sort of warren, to hide ourselves in. We place our sand-bags to protect us, and our residence is then furnished. We remain in these pits all the day, and it is not until night is rather advanced that we are permitted to leave them. This we often do in the midst of a shower of grape-shot. You will ask me what we do in the pits all day. Very good work, I assure you. We

fire almost as fast as we can, and every discharge demolishes a Russian artilleryman.' The trenchduty had its own peculiar severities: 'We have five batteries, and these require a large armed guard and fatigue-party day and night-a fatigueparty to keep the works in repair after the enemy's fire, and a guard to defend them from sorties. This is the most dangerous of our recreations, and not a day passes that two or three fatal cases do not occur. At night, they shell us incessantly from the forts; but night-shells are not so dangerous as in the day, because we can always track their fiery course for half a minute through the air. . . . . Sometimes, after lying on the wet ground all night, my limbs are all pains, and my teeth quite loose in my gums.' When the same officer congratulates himself on having been 'lucky enough' to purchase two flannel-shirts for £2, and a tooth-brush for 8s., he just touched the beginnings of that terrible winter, the incidents of which will occupy the next Chapter.

BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA.

The siege-operations have been treated continuously to a certain point, that the relative tactics of the besiegers and the besieged may be better understood; but it now becomes necessary to attend to the underplot-an underplot subsidiary to the siege itself, but of tremendous character considered as a series of field-operations. All the available forces of the Allies were applied, directly or indirectly, to the maintenance of the siege; whereas Prince Menchikoff, being soon enabled to measure pretty accurately the nature and strength of the besieging power, felt at liberty to establish an independent army, resting on Sebastopol and Simferopol as a base of operations, and acting against the north-east and east of the Allied camps. The battles and skirmishes that attended these tactics formed a campaign distinct from, but contemporaneous with the great siege; and to understand them, it will be necessary to attend to the configuration of the valleys and undulating ground exterior to the plateau on which the Allies were encamped.

The river Tchernaya, as has already been explained, flows into the upper or eastern end of the great harbour at Sebastopol. From that point to the ruins of Inkermann, a distance of about a mile, the Tchernaya Valley has an average width of three-quarters of a mile, being narrowest just opposite the ruins; but higher up the valley, towards the south-east, the hills or heights on either side separate more and more widely, until at length, where the Simferopol road crosses the river by the Traktir Bridge, the valley has a width of four miles. Near this spot is a ridge, or rather cluster of hills, the Fedukhine heights, dividing the valley into two defiles; and these, meeting again, form a plain several miles in extent from east to west, leading to the gorge

of Balaklava on the south, bounded by the plateau on the west, and traversed by a range of small low hills. These hills were crowned by several small earthen redoubts, constructed by the Allies, and manned by Turks: the position had no reference to the operations of the siege; but, as the road from Balaklava to the interior of the Crimea crosses the hills, the security of the little port might have been endangered by any neglect of this spot. The easternmost hill, called by the Allies Canrobert's Hill, is near the village of Kamara, while the westernmost approaches the plateau above the village of Kadikoï. From the peculiar structure of the Tchernaya Valley, comprising, as it does, plain, dale, and defiles or ravines, an enemy may easily conceal his march from the interior towards Balaklava, until he has passed these hills; but the hills, if well defended, would render further progress difficult.

The Allied generals had full reason to believe that, while they were busily employed in the siege, Prince Menchikoff had been feeling his way round to this plain, if not by a winding road along the Tchernaya from Sebastopol, at least by the Traktir Bridge from the vicinity of Baktchéserai-hoping to attack his opponents in the rear of their camps and siege-works. Sometimes the flashes of the guns at night would render dimly visible a dark battalion of Russian infantry, moving at a distance that portended no immediate danger, but indicating the existence of some plan or scheme. On another occasion, an alarm having been given that the Russians were marching to attack the rear on the Balaklava road, Lord Raglan and his staff, with a body of troops, moved in that direction, and found that the Russians had taken advantage of a fog to creep up to the vicinity of the Turkish redoubts, but that their number had not been so large as to endanger the position occupied by the Turks. On another morning, signals having been given by the vedettes that Russian infantry were approaching, the Scots Greys and other cavalry, with the horse-artillery and the 93d Highlanders, quickly made ready for any encounter; and the Turks fired from their redoubts on small bodies of the enemy within sight: but the Russians, not calculating on so much alertness, retreated for the night. The next day witnessed a similar approach of Russian cavalry, a similar alertness on the part of Sir Colin Campbell and his Highlanders, and a similar retreat of the enemy as evening drew on. A body of cavalry would post itself on the Baktchéserai road, perhaps accompanied by artillery, and would then wind out of sight behind the hills. Thus matters continued day by day; until at length, on the morning of the 25th of October, General Liprandi appeared openly on the plain, having drawn from the defiles and behind the hills an army of 30,000 Russians, ready to meet the Allies in fair fight.

The incidents of this exciting day, varied and often confused as they may appear, resolve themselves into five struggles or contests, forming

collectively the BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA-namely, the capture by Russian infantry of a series of earthen redoubts manned by the Turks; the heroic repulse by the 93d Highlanders of a furious cavalry charge; the defeat, by the British heavy cavalry, of a much larger body of Russian cavalry; the mistaken but wonderful onslaught, by a handful of British light cavalry, against a complete army of artillery, cavalry, and infantry; and a dashing charge of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, which finished the work of the day, and left the Allies victorsalthough with such a modification of defenceworks as afforded Menchikoff a pretext for claiming, in his dispatch to the czar, a dazzling victory.

It was early in the morning, dim and dull, when the Russians began the day's turmoil. The low range of hills extending across the plain of the Tchernaya, north of Balaklava, but east of the plateau occupied by the Allied camps, was, as has been explained, crowned at different points by earthen redoubts, hastily constructed, and mounting only a few guns each. Unfortunate was it that these redoubts were manned by the Turks; for, while the soldiers of that nation are generally remarkable for their bravery in defending earthworks, the defenders in this case were raw recruits, who had not been treated by the Allies with that kind or amount of encouragement which would incite to heroic deeds; they had lately arrived from Tunis, and had never seen fire; and, moreover, the redoubts were too far in the rear of the Allied camps to receive proper support. It may have been that Liprandi was acquainted with these facts. Of the four redoubts, three were provided with a few guns; while on a higher hill, near the village of Kamara, was a work of somewhat more importance. It was the capture of these several redoubts that constituted the opening of the battle. Early in the morning, a Russian force debouched into the plain from behind the Fedukhine heights, and at once attacked three of these redoubts, designated Nos. 1, 2, and 3, in the official dispatches. It was very unequal work; for the three redoubts, each manned by about 200 Turks or Tunisians, contained together only seven 12-pounder guns; while the force brought against them comprised eighteen or twenty battalions of infantry, thirty or forty guns, and a large body of cavalry. Speedily was the capture effected; the positions being too far distant from the plateau to enable the British or French troops to avert this disaster. The Turks in No. 1 redoubt must indeed have had their courage severely taxed, when, at a distance of a mile and a half from the camps, they found themselves attacked by such a force; and if they abandoned their redoubt after a short contest, and this abandonment led to a similar procedure on the part of the troops in the other redoubts, it does not follow that they thereby deserved the storm of indignation with which they were visited by their Christian Allies. One English artilleryman was in

each redoubt, and by these men most of the guns were spiked before the abandonment of the redoubts.

Now commenced the second movement in the battle, the second act of the stirring drama. The 93d Highlanders was the only infantry regiment in the plain at the time; the other forces which were at hand to render aid comprised simply a detachment of invalids, little fitted for active service, a few guns belonging to the 3d division, and a party of marines on the heights near at hand. It was left for Sir Colin Campbell, to whom the command in this quarter had been intrusted, to make the best of these materials in a sudden emergency. Lord Raglan was apprised of the attack as soon as redoubt No. 1 had fallen; but the other redoubts were taken before aid could reach the Turks. The Highlanders, occupying a slightly rising plot of ground in front of redoubt No. 4, were attacked by the enemy's cavalry and artillery in great force immediately after these captures; and if the small band had wavered, disaster would have followed. Sir Colin ordered his men to retire behind the crest of a hill for a short time, while the batteries on the heights, manned by the marines, opened on the approaching Russians. A body of Russian cavalry, seeing the Highlanders without defence by other regiments, dashed forward to charge them; but the 93d, resolved to meet them half-way, rushed forward to the crest of the hill, fired, and checked them. The cavalry then tried to outflank the regiment on the right, so as to separate it from its supports; but the Highlanders instantly wheeled round, presented a new front, fired, and completely discomfited them, forcing them to retire. 'thin red streak topped with a line of steel,' as the gallant regiment was designated-for Sir Colin Campbell, confident in his Highlanders, had ranged them in double rank only, scorning the safer formation of a hollow square-bore the cavalry charge, so far as the Russians ventured to make it, like a wall of rock, and then brought their two ranks of rifles to bear on the enemy with awful effect. The plateau is so much elevated above the plain, that all the manoeuvres could be distinctly seen; and those who watched the bold stand made by the Highlanders were all the more strongly dissatisfied with the proceedings of the unfortunate Turks. At one point could be seen six compact masses of Russian infantry, marching towards the scene of conflict; at another was a strong line of artillery; near the redoubts were Russians advancing, Turks retreating, and clouds of smoke marking the brief encounter; between the artillery and cavalry were other massive bodies of Russian infantry, advancing in two lines, and presenting a formidable appearance; in front, and on the flanks of the enemy's army, were skirmishers and Cossacks, foot and horse. All these, seen from the eastern edge of the plateau, appeared like the forerunners of a great battle. Busy were the head-quarters when the intelligence arrived; orders

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were despatched to the 1st, the 4th, and the cavalry divisions, to prepare for action; and Lord Raglan requested General Canrobert to send him assistance. Sir Colin Campbell, however, felt the necessity of presenting a bold front before instructions from Lord Raglan could arrive: it was he who so disposed the 93d, the invalid detachment, and the marine-battery, as to check the advance of the Russians. Fortunate that he did so; for Liprandi was bent upon reaching Balaklava, if possible, and inflicting injury there before his opponent could bring up defensive forces; although, unless the Russians could have commanded the heights on either side, the little harbour could not have been held by them.

While this small band of Highlanders was thus employed in repelling the enemy, the British heavy cavalry entered the field, to confront the main body of the Russian cavalry, regardless of disparity in numbers. The British troopers turned out at an early hour, as soon as the attack of the Russians was known: indeed, so hasty was the summons, that they had time neither for breakfasting nor to water their horses; but, booted and saddled in a few minutes, off they went. Their first duty was to check, as far as might be, the advance of the Russians upon the redoubts; but these redoubts being taken, the British cavalry prepared to receive an immense body of the enemy's horse. As soon as the Russians were seen descending a hill, the Earl of Lucan ordered Brigadier-general Scarlett to attack them with the Scots Greys and the Enniskillen Dragoons, supported in a second line by the 5th Dragoon Guards, and on the flank by the 4th; all these belonging to the brigade of heavy cavalry. In a most determined manner, these troopers utterly defeated and routed thrice their number of Russian horsemen. Lord Raglan spoke in highly commendatory terms of this achievement: 'The ground was very unfavourable for the attack of our dragoons, but no obstacle was sufficient to check their advance, and they charged into the Russian columns, which soon sought safety in flight, although far superior in numbers. The charge of this brigade was one of the most successful I ever witnessed, and was never for a moment doubtful.' It was, indeed, a fine display of military prowess. Lord Raglan and a number of officers, English and French, were on the heights above, looking down on a scene that passed too rapidly for them to share. An officer in the Enniskillen Dragoons described his sensations in a few words which tell more of the contest than the most lengthened dispatch: Oh, such a charge! Never think of the gallop and trot which you have often witnessed in the Phoenix Park, when you desire to form a notion of a genuine, blood-hot, all-mad charge, such as that I have come out of. From the moment we dashed at the enemy, I knew nothing but that I was impelled by some irresistible force onward, and by some invisible and imperceptible influence to crush every obstacle which stumbled before my

good sword and brave old charger. I never in my life experienced such a sublime sensation as in the moment of the charge. Some fellows speak of it as being "demoniac." I know this, that it was such as made me a match for any two ordinary men, and gave me such an amount of glorious indifference as to life, as I thought it impossible to be master of. Forward-dash-bang-clank-and there we were in the midst of such smoke, cheer, and clatter, as never before stunned a mortal ear. It was glorious! I could not pause. It was all push, wheel, frenzy, strike, and down, down, down

they went!' Now would the Russians try to encircle the much smaller number of British; now would the Scots Greys and the Enniskilleners, undeterred by numbers, charge with such fury as to cut completely through the serried mass, and emerge at the rear ; now would they, without a moment's hesitation, advance to a second mass of the enemy's cavalry, dash into it, and resolve the contest into a series of handto-hand sword-conflicts: when the two masses had been broken by this wonderful charge, then would the other dragoon regiments gallop on,

and convert the retreat of the Russians into a disorderly pell-mell rout; and when all this was achieved, then did the hills echo such a cheer as they had never echoed before. At one time the bugle sounded a rally, but the men heeded it not; on they went, regarding only the enemy before them. One dragoon, when he found that his horse was wounded under him, dismounted, ran up to a Russian horseman, pulled him off by main force, killed him, vaulted into his place, and galloped off again to the fight. Another dragoon, having his horse shot, fell heavily, with his head on the ground, and was being dragged away in that position; a Russian lancer sought to run him through, but he extricated himself from the saddle and stirrups, and, with the aid of a companion, put a speedy end to the lancer's career. The whole enterprise was one that depended on the individual qualities of the men, for the other troops were so placed at the time as to be incapable of affording immediate aid; they could only look on, and admire.

At this point of the day's struggles commenced the fourth stage of the battle-that stage which, under the appellation of the 'Light Cavalry Charge at Balaklava,' became a subject of astonishment to French and Russians, of unpleasant controversy between the British officers, and of admiration to all who admire heroic courage under perilous circumstances. There was a mistake committed, in an order issued, or in the conveyance of that order, or in its interpretation when received; but the light cavalry dashed on brilliantly, without waiting to apportion the blame on whomsoever it ought to rest. The object of the movement, as explained by Lord Raglan in his dispatch after the battle, was this: 'As the enemy withdrew from the ground which they had momentarily occupied, I directed the cavalry, supported by the 4th division, under Lieutenant-general Sir George Cathcart, to move forward, and take advantage of any opportunity to regain the heights; and not having been able to accomplish this immediately, and it appearing that an attempt