at a distance of 1400 yards; the sailors-battery, on the extreme right, was 1800 yards from the Malakoff; a Lancaster gun, in the rear of the space between the right and left attacks, pointed down the Woronzow ravine to the harbour, where the Twelve Apostles, Russian ship of 120 guns, had been careened over to give her enormous guns a power of bearing upon the Allied camps and works. Lieutenant-colonel Dickson commanded the right attack, and Major Irving the left; the general command of the siege-train being intrusted to Lieutenant-colonel Gambier. These appointments, applicable to the day when the cannonade commenced, were speedily modified, by deaths, by promotions, or by changes of service. The great day arrived-the day on which many hopes were entertained that Sebastopol might fall. Instructions were issued by Lord Raglan on the previous evening for the guidance of the siegetrain and the army divisions. The principal points dwelt upon were the following:-That the cannonade would commence at half-past six in the morning, indicated by a discharge of three mortars; that all troops off duty would be ready for any immediate service in their respective camps, without knapsacks, greatcoats, or blankets; that horses would be attached to the field-batteries, to move the field-guns, if required; that each division would be provided with a body of sappers, supplied with picks, shovels, crow-bars, sledgehammers, felling axes, scaling-ladders, and bags of powder, in the event of any assault being attempted; that each division would also have a corps of engineers provided with rockets and gun-spikes; that reserve musket - ammunition would be placed at ready disposal of the infantry divisions; and that the cavalry, together with all the regiments placed near Balaklava, would be held ready for action in any immediate need.

At the appointed hour on the morning of the 17th, the bombardment began-such a bombardment as the annals of war had seldom equalled. The troops of all the nations-British, French, Turkish, Russians-and non-combatants who were within sight and hearing—all appear to have been vividly impressed with the tremendous outburst. Lieutenant-colonel Hamley says: The silence was broken by such a peal of artillery as has scarcely ever before, in the most famous battles or sieges, shaken the earth around the combatants. One hundred and twenty-six pieces, many of them of the largest calibre, opened at once upon the Russian defences, and were answered by a still larger number, of equal range and power. The din was incessant, and the smoke in the batteries so dense, that after a few rounds the gunners laid their pieces rather by the line on the platform than by view of the object aimed at.' Lieutenant Peard, who had been ordered into the trenches at four o'clock on that morning, to unmask the guns by opening the embrasures, speaks thus: 'At daylight, the guns in the British batteries, and in the French presented

their muzzles to the enemy. At 6.30 A. M., our batteries opened a tremendous fire, which was as sharply responded to by the Russians. It was now three weeks since we had been before Sebastopol, and it is impossible to say how relieved we were to be able to answer their fire. Our guns were loaded and fired as fast as it was possible to do it. The fire from the enemy was beyond all conception; and their shell and shot were accompanied with canister-shot, which, skimming the parapet, and coming through the embrasures, made a most unpleasant whizzing.'

It may be convenient to transcribe portions of the dispatches of the two commanders, giving an outline of the day's proceedings; noticing subsequently, somewhat more in detail, the chief particulars. Lord Raglan, in his brief outline, said: 'On this occasion, we employed about sixty guns of different calibres, the lightest being 24-pounders. It may here be proper to observe, that the character of the position which the enemy occupy on the south side of Sebastopol is not that of a fortress, but rather that of an army in an intrenched camp on very strong ground, where an apparently unlimited number of heavy guns, amply provided with gunners and ammunition, are mounted. The guns having opened as above stated (about a quarter before seven), a continuous and well-directed fire was carried on from the works of the two armies until about ten o'clock A. M., when, unfortunately, a magazine in the midst of one of the French batteries exploded, and occasioned considerable damage to the works, and, I fear, many casualties, and almost paralysed the efforts of the French artillery for the day. The British batteries, however, manned by sailors from the fleet, under the command of Captain Lushington and Captain Peel, and by the Royal Artillery, under the superintendence of Lieutenant-colonel Gambier, kept up their fire with unremitting energy throughout the day, to my own and the general satisfaction, as well as to the admiration of the French army, who were witnesses of their gallant and persevering exertions: materially injuring the enemy's works, and silencing the heavy guns on the top of the loophole (Malakoff) tower, and many of the guns at its base, and causing an extensive explosion in the rear of a strong redoubt in our immediate front. The enemy, notwithstanding, answered to the last from a number of guns along their more extended line.'

The more important part of General Canrobert's dispatch is comprised in the following words :'Matters were proceeding favourably, when the explosion of the powder-magazine of a battery, which unfortunately was of a serious character, threw our attack into disorder. This explosion produced greater effect from the fact, that our batteries were accumulated round the point where it took place. The enemy profited by it to increase his fire; and, in accordance with the general commanding the artillery, I was of opinion that it was necessary for us to suspend ours, in order

distance of nearly three miles! The sharp crack of their explosion bears to the roar of ordinary guns some such relation as that of the rifle to the musket; the ball rushes through the air with a noise and a regular beat bearing some resemblance to that of a locomotive engine, insomuch that the men speedily applied the name of the express train' to these missiles. Yet, although the effects of the Lancaster shot were more destructive than those of ordinary guns when actual collision occurred, there were deficiencies, in accuracy of flight, that rendered these missiles less serviceable than had been expected.

When night closed in, and the gunners retired wearily from their work, the Allies could not conceal from themselves that the results were unsatisfactory. Hopes had mounted high during many days. Some authorities had pronounced that the Russian batteries would be silenced in three days; while others limited the time for such an achievement to a few hours. Many parts of the Russian works, it is true, were injured; the Malakoff Tower was deeply scarred by the heavy 68-pounder shot, and many of its guns dismounted, although at a range of more than 2000 yards; a magazine in the rear of the Redan was fired by a shell, and many guns silenced thereby; and all the defence-works were shaken and scarred by the tremendous force brought against them. Still, the damage was of small amount, considering that the works were mostly of earth, and that Sebastopol contained a large number of men wholly at the disposal of Menchikoff. Those Russians who, whether soldiers or civilians, had not worked severely during the day, were set to repair the parapets and embrasures at night; insomuch, that when morning next dawned, the Allies had the mortification of finding that the battering of the preceding day had left the Russians little the worse. Prince Menchikoff, in his dispatch to the czar, stated that in one of his forts nearly all the guns, thirty-three in number, had been dismounted; that Fort Constantine had been much damaged by the ships; but that most of the other works had suffered slightly. He estimated his loss at about 500 killed and wounded, among whom General Kornileff was killed, and Admiral Nachimoff and Captain Yerganyscheff wounded. As a new bombardment was expected to-day,' he wrote on the 18th, 'the whole night was passed at Sebastopol in repairing the damage, and all the dismantled pieces were replaced.' Everything conspired to render this remarkable fact evident that the defenders strengthened themselves more rapidly than the besiegers. Raglan and Canrobert were scarcely in a condition to commence the bombardment on the 17th, so many of their heavy guns and mortars not yet being in a position to render full service; but, nevertheless, they saw that every day's delay would be more advantageous to the enemy than to themselves: the works of the defence advancing more rapidly than those of the attack. As it was,

the Russian guns were more numerous than those of the Allies; and if the cannonade had been deferred for a week, the chances amount almost to certainty that the ratio would have become still more favourable to the Russians. The total loss by land and sea, English and French, appears to have been about 250 killed, and 860 wounded. Of the Russian loss no definite account has been given.

The progress of the siege, from that day onward, was governed by the circumstance that Sebastopol was never invested. In ordinary sieges, the town or fortified post is completely surrounded by the besiegers, to prevent alike any exit by the garrison or the reception of any succours from without: in siege-language, it is invested. The trenches are then dug, the parallels and zigzags made, the parapets built, the guns planted on the earthen batteries, and the siege commences; and if the relative strength of the two forces permit, the place falls. At Sebastopol, however, the place was not invested, and this imparted a new character to the siege. The assailing force being insufficient to enclose the whole place and its works, the southern side of the harbour only was invested, leaving the formidable forts on the north unassailed, and the roads from Simferopol and Eupatoria free for the passage of supplies. Even had the Russian batteries been totally silenced, and the south side taken by assault, the great harbour, acting as a huge wet-ditch, would have presented a fresh obstacle, backed by a fresh line of batteries that would have required a new siege. The possession by the Allies of a powerful fleet did not much mend the matter; for as this fleet could not enter the harbour on account of the sinking of the Russian ships-a manœuvre which, judged by its results, must be regarded as masterly, however adverse to the ordinary ideas of war-it could not cannonade the batteries on the north side that commanded the south. Not only was the siege rendered a work of enormous difficulty by this non-investment, but many authorities contend that the Allies had not on the 17th force sufficient to warrant a bombardment even of the southern portion. 'We had brought with us a siege-train of sixty guns, including mortars, nearly all of a calibre inferior to those of the enemy. The French had a larger number, but they were of brass, and consequently inferior for all purposes to those of the besieged. In order to arm even three batteries, we were compelled to dismantle our ships and to employ our seamen. More than 800 rounds can rarely be discharged from one gun, on account of its liability to burst and the enlargement of the vent. Few guns, indeed, will bear much above 600 rounds. As during the first day we had fired above 100 rounds from each gun, if we had continued at this rate, in less than six days our batteries would have been disabled. The amount of ammunition available was so small, that it would have been completely expended in about five days. Some of the

most useful guns had been supplied with only 120 rounds each. The number of our artillerymen was so inadequate to the working of the siege-guns, that we were compelled to cease our fire during the night; and thus the enemy was able to repair unmolested the damage done to his earthworks during the day. Even to keep up a moderate fire from sunrise to sunset, and to leave the proper reliefs for night-work, the officers and gunners were only every alternate eight hours off duty, which, deducting nearly an hour, the time required to go from the camp to the trenches, left but six for food and repose-an amount of labour which human strength could not long endure.'* These strictures, so far as they are just, apply to the governments, who failed to send out sufficient force, and not to the generals, who effected their best with the means placed at their disposal.

The character of the siege, in the days following the 17th, is foreshadowed by the above facts and comments. On the 18th, after repairing much of the injury during the night, the Russians continued to meet boldly the fire of the Allies. They provided, too, incessant occupation for the troops left in camp; for Menchikoff sent a fieldarmy into the valley on the east of the Allied position, to distract attention, and call away as many troops as possible from the trenches: the manœuvre so far succeeded as to render the Allies conscious that they were themselves liable to attack, and to compel them to keep up an exhausting system of vigilance. The French batteries, not having yet recovered from the effects of the explosion, were not in a condition to resume the bombardment on the 18th; and thus the Russians were free to direct all their force against the British, effecting quite as much mischief to the British batteries as the latter had wrought upon the former, chiefly the Malakoff, on the previous day. General Canrobert felt seriously the embarrassment of his work, although scarcely so great as those against which Lord Raglan had to contend. The difficulties with which we are met,' he said in a dispatch to his government, 'are of two kinds-those resulting from the nature of the soil, the solid stratum of which, although insufficient, diminishes in proportion as we approach the place; and those resulting from the number and calibre of the pieces of artillery the enemy plants against us, almost in a right and very extended line. In this respect, the resources he draws from his vessels stationed in the port, men as well as materials, are almost inexhaustible.'

One day was very like another at the camp, except that the firing of the Allies gradually lessened in vigour, while the work in the trenches became more and more severe to the soldiers, who were called upon to effect more work while their numbers were diminishing. On the morning of the 19th, shortly after daylight, Canrobert was

* Quarterly Review, No. CXCI.

enabled to resume his fire from the injured batteries, as well as from others he had constructed on the preceding day; and with these he was enabled to maintain a steady cannonade against the south-west part of the town. Lieutenantcolonel Hamley, who himself shared in the artillery duties at that time, sufficiently characterises the labour of the British on the 19th and following days in these words: The interest excited by a contest of artillery, without decided advantage on either side, soon languishes; and in a few days the thunder of the bombardment was almost unheeded. But the troops in the trenches and batteries were hardly worked, and exposed by day incessantly to a tremendous fire. The space in the magazines in our batteries was at first insufficient to hold ammunition for the day's consumption; and to take in fresh supplies formed one of the most trying duties which artillerymen can be called on to perform. Wagons filled with powder, drawn by horses of the field-batteries, were driven down the face of the hill for upwards of half a mile, in full view, and quite within range of the enemy's guns. A shell bursting in the wagons would have blown horses and men into the air; and to the risk of this were added the usual chances of being struck by shot or splinters; yet neither the officers-often mere boys-nor the drivers ever shewed the slightest hesitation in proceeding on their perilous errand. Several horses were killed by cannon-shot; and on one occasion a shell, lodging between the spokes of a wheel, exploded there, blowing off three wheels and the side of the wagon, and blackening the cases of powder without igniting their contents.'

Now would a day pass on which the Allies appeared to gain a little advantage; now one that was clearly favourable to the Russians: they varied in character, but the general result was a diminution in the intensity of the fire on both sides. When it was found, as frequently occurred, that the enemy fired three shots for every two on the part of the Allies, and that the guns in the garrison possessed enormous calibre and power, the anxieties of the Allied generals increased as the prospect of a speedy conquest became more and more doubtful. The cannonading was, on most days, diversified with smart skirmishes on the part of the troops, the riflemen on both sides approaching sufficiently near to be within range. On one occasion, these light troops nearly met at some quarries situated in front of the Redan; and when the British riflemen had exhausted their store of ammunition, nothing daunted, they picked up stones and hurled them at the enemy; the Russians, surprised at such a mode of fighting, resolved to imitate it, and then ensued a battery and counter-battery of these missiles; but the British proved more skilful, or at least more successful, than the Russians in the art of stone-throwing, and the latter retired. The danger attending the conveyance of ammunition