trenched camp. Charles could scarcely be persuaded that the Swiss would have hazaided so perilous an attempt; he hastened to bring up his men at arms to the place where the chief assault was made, and at the same time opened a heavy fire from his batteries on the advancing columns. His best artillerymen however had fallen at Granson; his cannon being ill-served did but little execution, while Hallwyll under cover of the smoke led a body of troops along the Burgundian lines and suddenly falling on their exposed flank, forced his way into the midst of the camp before the manœuvre was discovered. On the other extreme the Burgundians were equally surprised by an unexpected sally from the garrison of Morat; they fell into remediless confusion, the battle was no longer a fight but a carnage, for the Swiss sternly refused quarter, so that "cruel as at Morat," long continued to be a proverb in their mountains.

The states of Burgundy, Flanders, and Brabant, refused to grant the duke the enormous sums which he demanded to raise a third army, and while he was engaged in threatening them with his wrath, and collecting as many soldiers as he could procure from his own resources, he learned that Lorraine was nearly recovered by its young duke Renè, who, after making himself master of several towns, with little or no opposition, had laid siege to Nancy. The city was taken before Charles was ready to march, and Renè having secured it with a faithful garrison, proceeded to the Swiss cantons to solicit aid against their common enemy. Sieges were always unfavorable to the duke of Burgundy; he was unable to reduce Nancy, but he obstinately persisted in remaining before the walls, while his army suffered severely from an inclement winter and the increasing want of pay and provisions. In fact the unfortunate duke was now sold to his enemies by his favorite Campo-Basso, and his rash cruelty had led him to precipitate the execution of the chief agent of the plot, whom he had by chance made prisoner.

On the 4th of January, 1477, Renè of Lorraine, at the head of the Swiss confederates, was seen from the Burgundian camp advancing to the relief of Nancy. In the very beginning of the battle the desertion of the traitor Campo-Basso decided the fate of the day, but the brave chivalry of Burgundy in this, the last of their fields, maintained a desperate resistance until night put an end to the combat. The fate of the duke of Burgundy was for a long time uncertain, but after a tedious search his body was found covered with wounds, some of which had every appearance of being inflicted by assassins. Renè paid every possible respect to the remains of the unfortunate Charles, and he liberated all his Burgundian prisoners that they might attend the funeral.

The history of Mary of Burgundy, the daughter and successor of Charles the Bold, must be related briefly. No sooner was the news of her father's death known, than the king of France prepared to seize on her dominions in Burgundy, and the Flemings rose in insurrection against her authority. Louis at first was disposed to force her to marry the dauphin, and thus reunite Burgundy to France, but the tortuous course of policy which he pursued defeated his object. The Flemings discovred the intrigue; they seized on the favorite counsellors of the unhap ›y princess, and beheaded them before her eyes in the market-place of

Ghent. Mary was subsequently married to Duke Maximilian of Austria, but he only obtained possession of her dominions in the Netherlands; Burgundy was conquered by the French, and Maximilian had neither the energy nor the wisdom to recover it from Louis. This was the origin of the bitter hostility between the sovereigns of France and Austria, which for a long series of years kept the continent of Europe in almost perpetual war.

SECTION VII.-The Age of Charles V.

THE political idea of maintaining a balance of power, which was first formed in Italy, began to spread north of the Alps, in consequence of the rapid and overwhelming increase of the Austrian power. Maximilian of Austria, son of the emperor Frederic III., married Mary of Burgundy, daughter and heiress of Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy (A. D. 1477), as has been already related, and in her right obtained possession of the fertile and wealthy provinces of the Netherlands. His son, Philip the Fair, was united to Joanna, infanta of Spain, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, whose union had joined the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile. The fruit of Philip's marriage with Joanna was two sons, Charles and Ferdinand; and the elder of these, at the age of sixteen, inherited the crown of Spain and its colonies, in addition to his paternal dominions in the Netherlands (A. D. 1516). The death of his grandfather Maximilian transmitted to him the Austrian territories, and the other domains of the house of Hapsburgh, and the electors chose him to fill the vacant throne of the empire. Thus Charles, the first of Spain, and the fifth of the empire, possessed greater power than any sovereign that had flourished in Europe since the days of Charlemagne. In the beginning of his reign, he resigned his hereditary dominions in Germany to his brother Ferdinand, who afterward succeeded him in the empire, and became the founder of the second Austrian line of emperors, which ended with Charles VI. (A. D. 1740). From the emperor Charles descended the Austrian family of Spanish kings, which was terminated by the death of Charles II. (A. D. 1700).

These two branches of the Austrian house, the German and the Spanish, long acted in concert, to procure reciprocal advantages, and were fortunate in strengthening their power by new alliances. Ferdinand married Anne, sister of Louis, king of Hungary and Bohemia ; and when that monarch fell in war against the Turks, added both these kingdoms to the hereditary dominions of Austria. Charles V., by his marriage with Isabella, daughter of Emmanuel, king of Portugal, prepared the way for his son Philip's annexation of that country to Spain.

Two monarchs, contemporary with Charles, were almost equally bound by their interests to check the preponderance of the house of Austria-Henry VIII. of England, and Francis I. of France. Henry VII., after the victory of Bosworth-field had given him undisputed possession of the crown, labored diligently and successfully to extend the royal authority, and to raise the commercial prosperity of the nation. On his death (A. D. 1509), he bequeathed to his son a rich treasury and a flourishing kingdom. "Possessing such advantages, Henry VIII. might

have been the arbitrator of Europe; but his naturally fine talents were perverted by flattery; he allowed free scope to all his passions, and his actions were consequently the result of caprice, vanity, or resentment— rarely, if ever, of enlightened policy. Many of the defects in his administration must, however, be ascribed to the pride and ambition of his prime minister, Cardinal Wolsey, who sacrificed the welfare of England and the honor of his sovereign to further his private ends or gratify his idle vanity.

Francis I. was a prince of higher character; he had many of the noble qualities, and not a few of the faults, usually ascribed to the spirit of chivalry; bold, enterprising, and personally brave he did not always regulate his actions by prudence, and his rashness lost what his valor had won. Soon after coming to the crown, he undertook to recover Milan, and overthrew Sforza and the imperialists at Marignano. The defeated duke resigned his country for a pension; the pope and the northern Italian states assented to the arrangement, and the possession of the contested dutchy seemed secured to France by the conclusion of a treaty with the Swiss cantons (A. D. 1516). Nearly at the same time a treaty was made with Charles, who had not yet succeeded to the empire, which seemed to establish peace, but only rendered wa› more certain.

Henry and Francis were both candidates with Charles for the em pire; the former, however, had no rational hopes of success, while Francis could not hide his anticipations of success, no more than his mortification when he failed. The mutual jealousies of the French and Spanish monarchs were aggravated by hostile claims; Charles, by right of descent, could demand the ancient possessions of the duke of Burgundy, and he was feudal sovereign, as emperor, over the northern Italian states, the chief dutchy of which had been recently annexed to France. On the other hand, Francis had claims to the thrones of Navarre and Naples, which he was very unwilling to resign. Peace could not long subsist between these potentates, neither were their forces so unequally matched as might at first be supposed. The extensive dominions of Charles were governed by different constitutions; in none, not even in Spain, was he wholly unfettered, while in Germany, where the Reformation was constantly raising embarrassing questions, and the princes ever anxious to circumscribe the imperial authority, added more to his nominal than to his real strength. His finances were also embarrassed, and he often found it an almost insuperable difficulty to provide for the payment of his troops, most of whom were necessarily mercenaries. On the other hand, Francis inherited almost despotic authority; his power concentrated, his own subjects were enrolled as his soldiers, and the regular organization of the French government freed him from the financial embarrassments of his rival. Both strengthened themselves by alliances: Charles gained the aid of the pope, and won Henry VIII. to his side by duping the egregious vanity of Wolsey; Francis, on the other hand, was supported by the Swiss and the Venetians. The war began nearly at the same moment in Navarre, the Netherlands, and Lombardy. The treachery of the queen-mother, who withheld from the French commander, Lautrec, the money necessary to pay the troops employed in Italy, led to the loss of Milan and the

greater part of the dutchy. An effort made to recover the lost ground led to the battle of Bicocca (A. D. 1522), in which the French were totally defeated, and finally expelled from Italy; and Genoa, their most faithful ally, was subjected to the power of their enemies. An event of scarcely less importance was the death of Leo, and the elevation, of Adrian, a devoted adherent of Charles, to the papal chair; and thin was soon followed by the desertion of the Venetians to the imperia. side.

Francis might have still recovered the Milanese, where the emperor's troops had been disbanded for want of pay, had not the queen-mother, blinded by passion, induced him to treat the constable of Bourbon with such gross injustice, that this powerful noble entered into a secret intrigue with the emperor, and agreed to raise the standard of revolt. The discovery of the plot delayed the French king's march into Italy; and though he protected his own territories, the Milanese was irrecoverably lost. Encouraged by this success, Charles commanded the imperial generals to invade France on the side of Provence, while the king of England promised to attack it on the north. Had this plan been executed, Francis must have been ruined; but Wolsey, provoked by the elevation of Clement VII. to the papacy, on the death of Adrian, avenged himself for the broken promises of the emperor, abated Henry's ardor for the enterprise, and persuaded him to keep his forces at home, under pretence of resisting the Scots, who had embraced the side of the French king. Charles, unable to command money, could not make a diversion on the side of Spain or the Netherlands; and the imperialists, having uselessly wasted the country, were compelled to retire from Provence.

Elated by his success, Francis hastened to invade Italy; but instead of pressing the pursuit of the shattered imperialists, he laid siege to Pavia, and thus gave his adversaries time to strengthen and recruit their forces. With similar imprudence, he sent a large detachment to invade Naples, hoping that the viceroy of that kingdom would withdraw a large portion of the imperialists from the Milanese for its defence; but Charles's generals, having received a strong reinforcement raised in Germany by the constable of Bourbon, attacked the French in their intrenchments, and gained a decisive victory, in which Francis himself was made prisoner.

This great calamity was principally owing to the romantic notions of honor entertained by the French king: he had vowed that he would take Pavia or perish in the attempt; and rather than expose himself to the imputation of breaking a promise of chivalry, he remained in his intrenchments, though the means of safe retreat were open to him. Never did armies engage with greater ardor than the French and imperialists before the walls of Pavia (February 24, 1525). On the one hand, a gallant young monarch, seconded by a generous nobility, and followed by subjects to whose natural impetuosity indignation at the opposition which they had encountered added new force, contended for victory and honor. On the other side, troops more completely disciplined, and conducted by generals of greater abilities, fought, from necessity, with courage heightened by despair. The imperialists, however, were una ble to resist the first efforts of the French valor, and their firmest battal

ions began to give way. But the fortune of the day was quickly changed. The Swiss in the service of France, unmindful of the reputation of their country for fidelity and martial glory, abandoned their post in a cowardly manner. The garrison of Pavia sallied out and attacked the rear of the French during the heat of the action with such fury as threw it into confusion; and Pescara, falling on their cavalry with the imperial horse, among whom he had prudently intermingled a consider ble number of Spanish foot, armed with the heavy muskets then in use, broke this formidable body by an unusual method of attack, against which they were totally unprovided. The rout became universal, and resistance ceased in almost every part but where the king was in person, who fought now, not for fame or victory, but for safety. Though wounded in several places, and thrown from his horse, which was killed under him, Francis defended himself on foot with an heroic courage; many of his bravest officers, gathering round him, and endeavoring to save his life, at the expense of their own, fell at his feet. The king, exhausted with fatigue and scarcely capable of further resistance, was left almost alone, exposed to the fury of some Spanish soldiers, strangers to his rank, and enraged at his obstinacy. At that moment came up Pomperant, a French gentleman who had entered, together with Bourbon, into the emperor's service, and placing himself by the side of the monarch against whom he had rebelled, assisted in protecting him from the violence of the soldiers; at the same time beseeching him to surrender to Bourbon, who was not far distant. Imminent as the danger was which now surrounded Francis, he rejected with indignation the thoughts of an action which would have afforded such triumph to his traitorous subject; and calling for Launoy, who also happened to be near at hand, gave up his sword to him; which he kneeling to kiss the king's hand, received with profound respect; and taking his own sword from his side, presented it to him, saying that "it did not become so great a monarch to remain disarmed in the presence of one of the emperor's subjects."

Although Launoy treated his royal captive with all the marks of respect due to his rank and character, he nevertheless guarded him with the utmost precaution. He was solicitous, not only to prevent any possibility of his escaping, but afraid that his own troops might seize his person, and detain it as the best security for the payment of their arrears. In order to provide against both these dangers, he conducted Francis, the day after the battle, to a strong castle, and committed him to the custody of an officer remarkable for the strict vigilance which sucn a trust required. Francis, who formed a judgment of the emperor's disposition by his own, was extremely desirous that Charles should be informed of his situation, fondly hoping that, from his generosity or sympathy, he should obtain speedy relief. He therefore gave a passport to an imperial officer to carry the intelligence of the battle of Pavia and his own capture through France, as the communication with Spain by land was the most safe and certain at this season of the year.

Charles received the account of this signal success with affected moderation, but at the same time deliberated with the utmost solicitude how he might derive the greatest advantages from the misfortunes of his