past, and with no unkindly feeling-as our remarks testify-to Lord Melbourne's administration. We might have our surmises, but we did not think it just to give them utterance. We were willing to exercise a generous, though not an unlimited confidence, and had our hopes-faint it may be, yet not wholly to be abandoned,—that the advocacy of religious liberty, so long the glory and the strength of the Whig party, would yet be adhered to, and be steadily followed up. We regret to say, and truth wrings from us the acknowledgment, that recent events have gone far to revolutionize our feelings, and to give a substantive form to the suspicions which had previously been floating in our minds. We do not, as Dissenters, regret the occurrence. It was just the lesson we needed, and it will not be without its benefits. It is painful to generous minds to have confidence in old friends shaken, but it is a thousand-fold better that this should occur, than that false hopes should be entertained, and our position be misunderstood.

We refer, as our readers will anticipate, to the debate which has recently taken place in the lower house, and more especially to the speech of Lord John Russell, the ministerial leader. To that debate we must now briefly direct attention, as its bearing on our interests as Dissenters--on our actual position and prospects-is more direct and important than any thing else which has occurred for some time past. It is not to the merits of the particular question mooted by Mr. Duncombe, that we now specifically refer, but to the whole tone and spirit of the opposition by which his motion was met by the ministerial leader; the cold-heartedness and want of all generous sympathy with suffering conscience, however erroneous that conscience might be deemed, which his lordship's speech evinced; the obvious effort to conciliate opponents, even at the expense of common courtesy to a body once professedly respected, and certainly much relied on in times of need; the new-born zeal rising to a flame under the stimulating influence of Tory cheers; the hauteur of the aristocrat mingling itself with the prejudices of the churchman, and, in combination, seeking an excuse for the abandonment of an effort deemed no longer needful for the retention of office, and the success of party warfare; the contempt, scarcely suppressed, yet never distinctly and honestly embodied in words; these are the matters to which we refer, when expressing our conviction of the importance which attaches to the debate in question. It is as though his lordship were supremely concerned to disencumber himself of the confidence of the Dissenting body, yet was restrained by the mannerism of his rank from plainly telling them to be gone. Their intellects, if we mistake not, are sufficiently clear to understand his meaning, and he may yet find that they have complied with his desire.

Before proceeding to notice the prominent features of the debate, we wish to guard ourselves against a misconstruction, to which some of our remarks may possibly be liable. We find no fault with Lord John Russell for speaking as a churchman; it was natural that he should do so; we should not have respected him had he done otherwise. His views on this matter are well known, and have been often expressed, and we had no other expectation than to find him, on every befitting occasion, the advocate and zealous upholder of the endowed church. It would have been more than Utopian-the very height, in fact, of absurdity-to entertain any other expectation; and the Eclectic, at least, is free from the suspicion of having done so. So long since as August, 1837, we stated our conviction, that it was idle for Dissenters to expect the admi'nistration should commit itself to the advocacy of their principles. Lord Melbourne and his colleagues,' we then remarked, are 'members of the dominant church, and their propositions will, 'doubtless, respect its welfare, and be designed to strengthen its hold on the popular mind. We have no right to censure them on this account. With their principles and views such a pro'cedure is perfectly befitting. It is honest in them to make the 'attempt, though we are satisfied that it will prove an utter fail'ure.'* Such are our recorded sentiments, and we adduce them on the present occasion, to guard ourselves from the suspicion of being influenced by the disappointment of unreasonable hopes, and the chagrin consequent thereon. What we complain of is, not that Lord John avowed himself a churchman, and showed himself to be but little acquainted with our principles; but that his opposition to a measure for our relief was conducted in the worst spirit of a Tory opponent; that the matter was not allowed a hearing, but was at once and heartily opposed, upon grounds and with professions which, if admitted, must rivet for ever an unrighteous and tyrannical impost, by which conscience is outraged, and the decencies of social life impaired. Gloss the matter as he may, the animus of his lordship's speech was indicative of the abandonment of former pledges, and of a settled determination, on the part of himself and his colleagues, to encumber themselves no more with the advocacy of our rights. Well, let it be so. The friends of religious liberty have never suffered by being thrown on their own resources; and should his lordship's policy but have the effect of driving us to a more thorough investigation and hearty confidence in our principles, and such we believe will be its result--we shall have no cause for regret.

The bill which Mr. Duncombe asked permission to introduce, was entitled, A bill to relieve from the payment of Church

* New Series, II., 213.

'rates that portion of her Majesty's subjects who conscientiously 'dissent from the rites or doctrines of the Established Church.' The first clause of the bill enacts that John Thorogood, and all other persons now imprisoned for non-payment of Church-rates, 'shall be immediately discharged.' The second prohibits the future incarceration of persons like-minded; and the third exempts from the payment of Church-rates, all persons who shall make before one or more of her Majesty's justices of the peace' the following declaration:

'I A. B., do solemnly declare that I am not of the Communion of the Church of England as by law established, and that in my conscience I do dissent therefrom; and do also 'solemnly declare that in objecting to pay Church-rates, I do so 'from no pecuniary motives, but solely and sincerely for con'science sake.' It being however expressly enacted, that any 'person who shall have made the aforesaid declaration, and shall thereby have relieved himself from the payment of Church'rates, such person should be disqualified from voting or taking 'any part whatsoever in the proceeding of any vestry convened for the purpose of making or considering the propriety of making a Church-rate, or for any other matter or question connected 'with the support or maintenance of the Established Church.'

Such were the main features of the measure which the honorable member for Finsbury sought to introduce. Let us now look at the manner in which it was received. Immediately after the proposition had been seconded by Mr. Gillon, Lord John arose, and in what the Times calls a 'smart and sensible speech,' announced his opposition to it, as not founded on sound principles, and calculated to lead to dangerous consequences.' Many parts of his lordship's speech would have well befitted Sir Robert Inglis, or Lord Roden, but they sound strange from the lips of the noble member for Stroud. We pass by the coldheartedness with which the case of John Thorogood is treated, and the sneer-so truly aristocratic and churchman-like-with which the poor man's assessment is referred to, and come to such parts of his lordship's oration, as assumed the character of reasoning. The mere fact of law is, of course, adduced as settling the question, so far as the prisoner is concerned; but we take leave to differ from his lordship, nor can we see how the following language is more conclusive, as used by Lord John in 1839, than it was in Queen Mary's time, when employed by Gardiner and Bonner, or in Charles II., when urged by Lord Chancellor Clarendon, and other advocates of a State Church. But let his lordship exhibit his own-or rather his adopted-argument.

Much, therefore, as he (Lord J. Russell) thought of the hardship of John Thorogood's case, and believing as he did that he was a very

sincere person, and anxious only to do what his conscience dictated to him, he nevertheless did not think that there was sufficient in his case to justify the character given of it by the hon. gentleman. No doubt. he was led by conscientious motives to support the voluntary principle. In his petition he declared that he believed the existence of a state church to be repugnant to the principles of the Holy Scriptures, and detrimental to the cause of religion; that he thought he ought not to contribute to its support; and that he, therefore, refused voluntarily to pay Church-rates. Now this might be a very conscientious opinion on the part of John Thorogood, but as long as that house recognized the laws by which a state religion was established in this country, and so long as such was the law, no individual was at liberty to dis obey it.'

If this reasoning be conclusive, on behalf of a protestant establishment, by what dialectic skill shall we evade its force when employed by a papist on behalf of his church, or by a Mahomedan on behalf of the mosque. It will not do to have one law for ourselves and another for an opponent. Our principles, to be conclusive, must hold in all analogous cases, and must be equally valid, however various the circumstances to which their application is required. Tried by this test, the argument of law is evidently untenable, and has consequently been abandoned by every party in its turn. There is, in truth, a primary question on which the whole turns, and on the settlement of which the decision of this controversy mainly hinges. That question respects the sacredness of conscience, the high obligations of religious duty, the responsibility under which we are held to consult the divine will in preference to the human, and to measure our obedience to the latter by the consistency of its requirements with the laws of the former.

We are well aware of the reply which will be made to this reasoning, nor are we ignorant of the fact that, it is held to be conclusive by many of our friends. If we admit, it will be urged, the right of an individual to refuse obedience on the ground of conscience, to any particular law; we open the door to all possible anarchy and confusion. Each one, according to the dictates of caprice, or the suggestions of self-interest, will be urging the same plea, and be demanding a similar exemption. One will except to one impost, and another to another, and thus all order will be destroyed, and the whole body politic be subverted. There is much seeming force in this objection, nor are we disposed to treat it lightly. On the contrary, we would give it the gravest consideration, and if it cannot be fairly met, we will honestly admit the untenableness of our position.

But we take leave to remark, that there is one simple principle capable of application to this case, which seems to us to settle the

moral of the question, and at the same time to guard effectually against the political evils which are apprehended from the admission of our views. That principle is based on the inherent and essential distinction between political and ecclesiastical legislation, between the laws of any human government,—whether monarchical, aristocratical, or democratic,-affecting the civil rights of its subjects, and those which assume to regulate their ecclesiastical affairs. In the former case government is absolute, its decision is final, and the duty of the subject is obedience,—in the latter case legislation is invalid ab initio, and has no other title to obedience than that which force supplies. In the one case, a rightful authority is exercised over a legitimate and recognized province, in the other an authority is usurped to the detriment of religion, and in defiance of the paramount claims of the God of truth. The beautiful axiom of our divine Master-so simple and at the same time so comprehensive-to render unto Cæsar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things which are God's, is equally applicable to both these cases: enforcing a prompt compliance with the laws of the one, and a conscientious and high-minded refusal of subjection to the other. In civil matters the only question which an individual has to determine respects the fact of law. This being ascertained, his obedience must follow, not through fear, but for conscience sake.' But it is different in religion. He owes supreme subjection to God, and must regulate his conduct towards other and subordinate authorities, by the harmony of their requirements with his revealed will. To recognize an authority incompatible with the divine supremacy, is to fail in discharging the first duty of Christian faithfulness, and to encourage the encroachments of an antichristian power, which opposeth and exalteth himself above all 'that is called God, sitting in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God.'

Such unhappily has been the conduct of the majority even of religious reformers in past times, and we need not say what perplexities and discords, what inconsistencies and wastings of strength, have followed in consequence. The enemy which ought to have been met on the frontier, has been permitted to establish himself in the very heart of the country, and the character of the struggle has thus been changed; its nobler features have been merged; and the vindication of truth, the assertion of heaven's high rights have been lost sight of, in the maintenance of a party warfare, and the defence of some isolated and unimportant posts. Let the validity of the plea urged by Lord John be once conceded, and the advocates of religious liberty are in a false position. There is no medium course. It is vain to inquire after, or to endeavour to discover one. We must take our stand on the cardinal principle we advocate, and refuse to admit the