mediate possibility of Lord Moncreiff being asked to exchange his present judicial position for a, still higher one in London, for the very simple reason that no higher office exists there to which he could be appointed. And there was certainly no expectation or intention in any quarter that he should devote himself to the lofty but unremunerated duties of a "law lord."

The news that a painful disease of some duration had necessitated the amputation of Sheriff Glassford Bell's right arm was the cause of very general regret. In the position which he holds as the Sheriff of the most important county in Scotland, a position considerably more important and responsible than that of a Lord Ordinary, Sheriff Bell has won golden opinions from all sorts of men both by his conduct as a judge and his demeanour as a conspicuous public official. It is therefore with some anxiety that his progress towards recovery has been watched; for, if he were unfortunately compelled to resign, his place is one which it will be very difficult to fill.

It is indeed unfortunate that no constitutional means exists, short of an Act of Parliament, by which the temporary or permanent disability of a principal Sheriff can be provided for. During the last illness of Sir Walter Scott, an Act of Parliament had to be passed to enable the Crown to appoint a qualified person to perform the necessary duties of Sheriff of Selkirkshire, he being "incapacitated by disease from performing any of the functions of his office or appointing any substitute for their due performance" (2 & 3 Will. IV. cap. 101). No means has yet been provided for appointing an interim Sheriff for the appeal work which no substitute can perform; and therefore that must of necessity fall into arrear during a long illness. It may seem proper that the Court of Session should make an interim appointment; but it is understood that the Court entertains doubt as to this, and at all events would be unwilling to assume such a power even if asked by the representatives of the Crown.

Some observations in our last number have called forth a letter from an able correspondent on a subject akin to this, the retiring allowances of Judges and Sheriffs. Our correspondent is shocked that a number of frail, but venerable gentlemen should be compelled by the parsimony of their country to continue to toil in the judicial mill at ages when it would be better for the public, if not for themselves, that they should resign. It had not previously occurred to us that retiring allowances were inadequate, and we thought that it was not the general opinion of the profession that Judges generally persisted in cumbering the Bench in Edinburgh, London, or the provinces for the reason assigned by our correspondent. We regret that his communication is too late for insertion in this number; but we shall endeavour, though we shall not promise, to let him speak for himself in our next.

The Question whether a Law-agent can be compelled to disclose his

Client's address, was discussed in the case of Tod's Trustee v. Officer, July 17, 1872, and a decision was given in the negative. But the judgment was rested there on the special terms of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, secs. 90 and 91, which limit the examination of the witnesses specified to questions "relating to the bankrupt's affairs." The general question of confidentiality was argued, but not decided. It was lately however considered by Lord Justice James in Ex parte Campbell, in re Cathcart, L. R. 5 Ch. 703. In his lordship's view, if a solicitor knows where his client is from some source other than the confidential statement of the client himself, made sub sigillo confessionis for the purpose of obtaining the solicitor's professional advice and assistance, the solicitor cannot protect himself on the ground of his client's privilege; and in such a case it is immaterial that he gained his knowledge of his client's residence solely in consequence of being his legal adviser. If, however, the client is in hiding, or is concealing his residence, and the solicitor is in a position to say that he only knows his client's residence, because the client had communicated it to him confidentially as his solicitor for the purpose of being advised by him, then the client's residence is a matter of professional confidence. On commenting on the decision, the Solicitors' Journal says, "The recent case of Heath v. Creelock, L. R., 15 Eq. 257, seems to fall within this latter description. It came before the court on an application by the plaintiffs that the defendant's solicitor should disclose the address of their client. The defendant was a trustee who had acted fraudulently and gone abroad. He was defending the suit; and the plaintiffs, being desirous of serving notice of a subpoena ad testificandum upon him personally, made the present application. The authorities adduced in support of the motion were Ramsbotham v. Senior, L. R., 8 Eq. 566, and Burton v. Earl Darnley, 17 W. R. 1,057, L. R., 8 Eq. 575, in note. In both these cases the whereabouts of wards of court was being concealed for the purpose of keeping them out of the reach of the court, or of the guardian appointed by the court; and it was held by Vice-Chancellor Malins that a solicitor is not at liberty, in consequence of any privilege of the client, to conceal any fact which may enable the court to discover the residence of its wards. It is plain that these cases afforded no support to the present application.'

Warranty and Concealment of Material Facts in Life Insurance. -The case of the Life Association of Scotland v. Foster, January 31, 1873, decided a curious point in the law of life insurance. The insured signed a proposal for an assurance on her own life, with a declaration that she was "in good health, not being afflicted with any disorder internal or external," and agreed that that declaration should be the basis of the contract. She answered in the negative the question of the insurance company's medical officer whether she had rupture; and made a general statement in writing that her answers to the various questions put to her were faithful and true.

The company sought to reduce the policy, after her death, on the grounds of breach of warranty and concealment of material facts; and they proved at the trial that when the policy was entered into the insured had a small swelling on the groin, which is a symptom of rupture, and had not disclosed it. It was proved, however, that she did not know it to be such a symptom, and did not consider it of any importance. With regard to the question of warranty the First Division held that the warranty by the insured of the truth of her statements about her health was not a warranty that she had no disease, but only that she had none so far as she knew. It may also be held that her failure to disclose the fact that she had a swelling on the groin was not a sufficient ground for setting aside the policy, because she did not know it to be material, and persons without medical knowledge could not be expected to know it to be so. The judgments are interesting, though they appear to us to be (except Lord Jervis woode's) unnecessarily long. We give as a pendant the judgment in Schaible v. Washington Life Insurance Company of New York, decided in the District Court of Philadelphia, on July 12, 1873, in which a similar point was decided. In this case, however, the answers to the interrogatories accompanying an application for a life insurance were representations and not warranties; and the question was, whether the answers were made in good faith, or falsely and fraudulently. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff upon competent and satisfactory evidence, and the Court refused a new trial, although it appeared by a post mortem examination that the answers were erroneous in point of fact. The following is the opinion by Thayer, J.:—

"This was an action upon a policy of insurance for $5,000, upon the life of Eureika Randon.

"The defence was alleged fraudulent representations in the application. The assured died suddenly ten days after the application was made, and the weight of the evidence undoubtedly was, that she died of an abscess in the right lung. A post mortem examination made at the request of the defendants revealed the fact that the right lung was much diseased. The left lung and the other vital organs presented a normal appearance. Previous to the insurance the deceased was examined by Dr. Griffith, a regular physician, employed by the company for that purpose, who testified on the trial that he had been an examining physician for the company in at least one hundred cases, and that the deceased appeared at the time of her examination to be in good health. He had given a certificate accordingly to the company.

The insurance agent who brought the application to the company testified that he had previously procured a large number of insurances for the company, and that he saw no evidences of the disease whatever in Eureika Randon at the time her application was made. Nine witnesses, acquaintances and friends of the deceased, some of whom had seen her within three or four days of the time of her death, testified that she was a healthy looking woman, presenting no outward indications whatever of disease, and that they thought her in good health at that time. There was hardly a breath of testimony to contradict or rebut these statements. The husband of the deceased kept an eating-house, and the deceased was engaged almost up to the day of her death in superintending the active duties of the establishment.

"Annexed to the answers of the assured to the usual interrogatories appended

to the application were these words: 'It is hereby declared that the above are fair and true answers to the foregoing questions, and it is acknowledged and agreed by the undersigned, that the above statements shall form the basis of the contract for insurance, and also that any wilfully untrue or fraudulent answers, any suppression of facts in regard to the party's health, or neglect to pay the premium, will render the policy null and void.' It is quite clear that the statements made by the deceased in her answers, were, according to the terms of this insurance, not warranties, but representations. Indeed, they are expressly so called in the policy itself, the preliminary words of which recite that it is made 'in consideration of the representations made in the application, and of the premium paid.' It is obvious, therefore, that the validity of the policy, and the liability of the defendants to make it good, depend entirely upon the good faith of the assured in the representations which she made in regard to her health. If she answered the questions honestly, and did not wilfully and fraudulently suppress any facts in regard to her health, then the defendants are bound to make their insurance good, although Eureika Randon may, at the time of the insurance, have had an organic disease. The case was left to the jury upon that basis. The issue tried by the jury was, were the answers made in good faith and without any suppression of facts, or were they false and fraudulent? Was there concealment and suppression of the truth? These issues the jury have found in favour of the plaintiff upon sufficient and credible proof.

"We are asked to set aside the verdict upon the theory that Eureika Randon must have known that she was diseased, because she died of an abscess in her right lung ten days after her application for insurance. How can we say that of a person, who, according to all the evidence, presented every outward appearance of health almost to the very time of her death?

"Can we say that she ought to have been more wise in surgery than the company's examining physician, who, upon a deliberate corporal examination, declared and certified that she was in good health? Would it be reasonable for us to conclude, as matter of law, that Eureika Randon was wiser than Dr. Griffith, and that she knew she was diseased, although the defendants' physician could not discover it, and although she had no cough, went about her daily duties without inconvenience and without complaint, had no occasion for medicine or doctors, and appeared to the eyes of her friends and neighbours a healthy person? Is it a thing unheard of, or in its nature impossible, that internal organic decay may exist for a time without serious interruption of the functions of life? or, are persons equally quick to detect the presence of disease in their own bodies? Can we certainly say, that the post mortem alone proves the bad faith of Eureika Randon? Can we say that, in anticipation of her own death, she deliberately and knowingly certified a falsehood, because the surgeon's knife has revealed the fact that there was a sufficient cause for her sudden death. It would be very hazardous for us to do so. Perhaps we might commit a great injustice by doing so. If it be argued that the company's physician must have been careless or mistaken, is it necessary that we should help out that theory by a harsh judgment against the deceased? And that in order to relieve the defendants from the consequence of their own negligence, and against the finding of the jury who have deliberately investigated the facts? It does not appear to us to be our duty to do so.

"If the defendants believe that they have suffered from the carelessness or incompetency of their own agents, there will be at least some compensation to those who are interested in the legitimate and successful transaction of their business, if they shall gather from their reflections the useful lesson, that receiving and dividing premiums does not comprise the whole duty of insurers. "The plaintiff, during the trial, produced a photograph of Eureika Randon, which he proved, by several witnesses well acquainted with her, and who had seen her within a week of her decease, to be a truthful representation of her as she appeared at that time. They testified that it was a faithful likeness, and that she appeared at that time as fleshy and as well in all respects as she was repre

sented in the picture. The photograph was then shown to the jury. The defendants objected to this. But we think that the photograph, thus proved and verified by witnesses who saw the original at a period approximating so nearly the date of the contract of insurance, was competent to go to the jury as evidence of her apparent bodily condition at that time.

"If it was competent for witnesses to portray her physical appearance to the jury by words, it is difficult to assign any good reason why the same might not be done by a picture, recognised and proved by her friends to be a truthful and correct representation of her person."

Mr. Beach Lawrence.—Our readers will be pleased to learn that Mr. Beach Lawrence, the well-known editor of Wheaton, has been appointed to the Chair of the Law of Nations, which forms part of the National University now being founded at Washington. Last winter Mr. Lawrence delivered a course of lectures on this subject, which, like Sir James Mackintosh's first course, was attended by the highest officials in the different departments of Government, the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the Foreign Ambassadors resident at Washington. Knowing this fact, and Mr. Lawrence's previous reputation in the branch of Jurisprudence which he is appointed to teach, we are not surprised to hear that his appointment was unanimous. Scientifically viewed, it probably was inevitable. But the scientific point of view is not the only one; and at the present moment we cannot but regard Mr. Lawrence's appointment as creditable to his countrymen, seeing that his latest achievement has consisted in advocating the claims of the British owners and underwriters of the Circassian' before the mixed commission appointed by the 12th Article of the Treaty of Washington, and procuring, in their favour, the reversal of the decrees of the highest American tribunal. Mr. Lawrence has published his argument in a very interesting pamphlet, entitled Belligerent and Sovereign Rights.

J. L.

Appointments.-Mr. CHARLES HALL has been appointed one of the Vice-Chancellors of England in room of the late Sir John Wickens. Sir JOHN DUKE COLERIDGE becomes Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, in place of the late Sir William Bovill.

Mr. JAMES exchanges his recently-acquired office of SolicitorGeneral of England for that of Attorney-General, and is to be succeeded as Solicitor-General by Mr. Vernon Harcourt. Mr. Harcourt's promotion will not be received with much satisfaction by the profession. He has distinguished himself more by using his undeniable talents as a political nuisance and busybody than as a sound and useful lawyer. It will be remembered that he first became. famous by the letters of "Historicus" in the Times, and the flatulence and arrogance displayed in these productions have continued to distinguish his whole career from his unsuccessful contest for the Kirkcaldy Burghs down to his recent virulent attack upon the Ministry, which he was returned to Parliament to support, and which has now meekly rewarded him for his animosity.