Law of Comparison of disputed dispute, the parties ought not to be limited to any particular witness to prove the execution. When the genuineness is in dispute, the party producing it will be sure to call the attesting witness, as his absence would tend to throw the greatest discredit on the instrument. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to prove by the attesting witness any instrument to the validity of which attestation is not requisite. Such instrument may be proved by admission, or otherwise, as if there had been no attesting witness thereto (s. 26). In giving documentary evidence, the genuinehandwriting. ness of handwriting frequently comes in dispute. Hitherto handwriting might have been proved by a witness who had acquired a knowledge of it, by having seen the party write even in a single instance; or by one who had never seen the party write at all, but who, by correspondence which had been acted upon, had acquired a knowledge of his writing. The law, however, did not allow a witness to institute a comparison between the handwriting in dispute and documents the genuineness of which was not disputed, and it prevented even the jury from doing so, unless such documents were in evidence in the cause. This rule of Law, and a doubt which has arisen as to the extent to which it ought to be carried, are well illustrated in two cases referred to by the Commissioners in their Report. In Doed. Mudd v. Suckermore 5, Ad. and El. 703, which was an action of ejectment, a will was produced for the defendant; and on one day of the trial an attesting witness was called, who swore that the attestation was his. On crossexamination, eighteen other signatures were shown the witness (none of which were in evidence), and he acknowledged them to be his. On a subsequent day a witness was tendered for the plaintiff to prove the attestation not to be Evidence. genuine. This witness was an inspector at the Law of Bank of England. It was his business to compare the signatures to powers of attorney with the former signatures of the parties, to ascertain their genuineness; but he had no knowledge of the handwriting of the supposed attesting witness, except from having, previously to the trial, and again since he had been called as a witness, examined the signatures admitted by him to be his. His evidence was rejected; and on motion for a new trial, on the ground of the improper rejection of evidence, the question was, whether the witness, who had, by seeing the signatures of the writings admitted to be genuine, acquired, as he affirmed, a knowledge of the handwriting, might be asked whether he believed the signature of the attesting witness to be the handwriting of the person who wrote the other signatures. Two judges were of opinion that the evidence ought to have been received; the others that it ought not. It would seem that the evidence was properly rejected. In the Fitzwalter Peerage Case, 10 Cl. and Fin. 193, it was necessary to show that a pedigree, purporting to have been made ninety years before, by an ancestor of the claimant, was, in point of fact, written by him. In order to do so an inspector of franks and official correspondence was called, who stated that he had examined the signatures to other documents admitted to have been executed by the ancestor, that they were written in a remarkable character, and that his mind was so impressed with that character as to enable him, without immediate comparison, to say whether any other document was or was not in the handwriting of the same person. This evidence was rejected by the Committee. The family solicitor was then called. He stated that he had acquired a knowledge of the ancestor's handwriting from having had occasion, at different times, and in the course of business, to examine many instruments E Law of purporting to have been written or signed by him, and which instruments came to the claimant of the peerage, with property formerly belonging to hat ancestor. This witness was held competent to prove the ancestor's handwriting. There has been a difference of opinion on another point, viz., whether writings not admissible as evidence in the cause, though purporting to be written by the party whose handwriting is disputed, may be put into the witness's hand, to be used for testing his knowledge of that handwriting. In Griffits v. Ivery,* the issue being whether the acceptance on a bill of exchange was signed by the defendant, witnesses acquainted with his writing being called to prove the negative, it was proposed, in cross-examination, to lay before each witness a paper purporting to bear the defendant's signature, and to inquire of each his opinion whether this was the defendant's signature. This was proposed for the purpose of testing their knowledge of the defendant's handwriting. The evidence was rejected, and the Court of Queen's Bench decided that, as the proposed paper was no part of the proofs in the cause, the inquiry was not allowable. In the subsequent case of Young v. Honner,† an action against the defendant as acceptor of a bill, a witness called on his behalf stated that he believed the signature not to be the handwriting of the defendant-giving, as his reason, that the defendant always signed his name with certain initials, the signature to the bill being at full length. In cross-examination a paper, not in any way relevant to the issue, being put into his hand, he stated that he believed it to bear the genuine signature of the defendant. It was then proposed to ask him whether the signature was not in the same form as that upon the bill, namely, * 11 Ad. and El., 322. † 2 M. and R. 536. Evidence. at full length. Upon this being objected to, Law of Baron Alderson, after consulting the Court of Exchequer, stated that they were unanimously of opinion that the cross-examination was regular, and that the question objected to might be put. The Court of Exchequer could not concur in the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench in Griffits v. Ivery, already referred to. The reasons for the exclusion of other writings as a medium of comparison are fully discussed in the Report of the Commissioners, who were of opinion, moreover, that it was "indefensible in 66 principle to allow a witness to institute a com66 parison with the recollection of writings which " he may have seen long ago, and of which but a "faint trace may remain on his mind, and yet to "prohibit a fresh comparison with genuine "writings, more especially when, for the purpose "of trying the accuracy of the witness, it is pro"posed to apply the test of requiring his judg"ment on writing which is not disputed. Still "less defensible did it appear to leave the jury to "act on the judgment of a witness who, after all, can only form that judgment on a comparison "of the disputed writing with others, and yet to "deny the jury the opportunity of forming their own judgment on the same materials."-(Second Report, p. 26). 66 66 The Commissioners accordingly suggested an alteration in the rule of law, and their recommendation has been adopted. Comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, may now be made by witnesses; and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness, or otherwise, of the writing in dispute (s. 27). The exclusion of documents as evidence, occa Law of Stamp duty may be paid at the trial. The sioned by the operation of the stamp laws, forms Accordingly, upon the production of any document as evidence at a trial, it is now the duty of the officer of the court, whose business it is to read such document, to call the attention of the judge to any omission or insufficiency of the stamp ; and the document, if unstamped, or not suffi |