PREFERMENTS AND MEMORANDA. IN Hilary Term, 1863, JOHN OSBORNE, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, and JAMES ST. GEORGE BURKE, Esq., of the Middle Temple, were appointed Her Majesty's Counsel learned in the law. In the vacation after Hilary Term, GEORGE STOVIN VENABLES, Esq., of the Inner Temple, was appointed one of Her Majesty's Counsel learned in the law. In the vacation after Trinity Term, Sir CRESSWELL CRESSWELL, Judge of the Court of Probate and of the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, died in consequence of injuries received by the falling of his horse. He was succeeded by Sir JAMES PLAISTED WILDE, one of the Barons of the Court of Exchequer. In the same vacation, GILLERY PIGOTT, Esq., Serjeant-at-Law, was appointed to succeed Sir JAMES PLAISTED WILDE in the Court of Exchequer, and received the honour of knighthood. Sir WILLIAM ATHERTON retired from the office of Attorney General in consequence of ill health. Sir ROUNDELL PALMER, Her Majesty's Solicitor General, was appointed Her Majesty's Attorney General, and ROBERT PORRETT COLLIER, Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, was appointed Her Majesty's Solicitor General. He received the honour of knighthood. In the same vacation, WILLIAM HENRY COOKE, Esq., of the Inner Temple, JoHN GRAY, Esq., of the Middle Temple, JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, Esq., of the Middle Temple, and GEORGE LOCH, Esq., of the Middle Temple, were appointed Her Majesty's Counsel learned in the law. REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED In the House of Lords, BY WILLIAM WARREN STREETEN, Esq. BARRISTER-AT-LAW. AND IN THE Courts of Chancery, BY CHARLES EDWARD HAWKINS, Esq. SAMUEL VALLIS BONE, Esq., THOMAS PARKER, Esq. THOMAS WYATT GUNNING, Esq. GEORGE FRENCH, Esq. AND THOMAS NOTTIDGE, Esq. BARRISTERS-AT-LAW. DURING FOUR TERMS, VIZ. MICHAELMAS 1862, HILARY, EASTER AND TRINITY, 1863. 26 & 27 VICTORIA. CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE Courts of Chancery, AND ON APPEAL TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS. COMMENCING WITH MICHAELMAS TERM, 26 VICTORIÆ. Legacy-Annuity-Charge on Corpus. A testator gave leaseholds to trustees upon trust to receive the rents and profits and to pay the annual sum of 60l. to H. for life, and after the death of H. to raise by sale or mortgage the sum of 4001. for the children of H., and after the death of H. and the raising and payment of the 400l., to assign the said leaseholds, or such part thereof as should remain undisposed of, unto T. absolutely. The income proving insufficient to satisfy the annuity, it was held that it was chargeable upon the corpus. In this, which was a creditors' suit, the question whether an annuity was to be paid out of corpus or out of income alone, was decided by Stuart, V.C., on further consideration, in favour of the annuitant. From this decision the plaintiffs appealed. James Gutteridge, the testator in the cause, by his will, dated in 1827, gave to William Probert certain leasehold land and groundrents "upon trust to receive and take the rents, issues and profits thereof, and after payment of the groundrent, &c. and the interest of any money secured or to be secured thereon, to pay the annual sum of 60l. to my daughter Harriet for her life, &c.; and in NEW SERIES, 32.-CHANC. case of the death of my said daughter, leaving any child, then upon trust to continue the payment of the said annual sum of 607. for the benefit of such child; and upon further trust in case of the death of my said daughter leaving any child or children, when and so soon as the youngest of such child or children shall attain the age of twenty-one years, to raise out of the land, groundrents and premises, by sale or mortgage, the sum of 400l., and divide the said sum, &c.; and upon further trust, during the lifetime of my said daughter, and until the youngest child (if any) shall attain the age of twenty-one years, to pay the residue of the said rents, issues and profits (after payment thereout of the said groundrents, interest, &c. and the said annual sum of 607.) unto my son, Thomas Gutteridge; and upon further trust, after the decease of my said daughter, in case she shall die without leaving any child, &c., or in case she shall leave any child or children, after the attainment by the youngest of such child or children of the age of twenty-one, and the raising and payment of the said sum of 400%., and after the performance of all the before-mentioned trusts, upon trust that the said William Probert shall assign the said land, groundrents and premises, or such part thereof as shall remain undisposed of, unto my said son absolutely." The plaintiffs held a mortgage on the testator's lease B hold property; which after the testator's will had been transferred to them on their making a further advance. The property had been sold, and after paying off the original mortgage a sum of 700l. remained; and the income being insufficient to keep down the annuity, the Vice Chancellor declared that the annuitant was entitled to resort to the corpus. Mr. Malins and Mr. W. Rudall, for the appellants, contended that the annuitant here could not be in a better position than a tenant for life-Foster v. Smith (1). The LORD CHANCELLOR.-There the testator contemplated the property remaining in its entirety. Here the direction for payment of the residue contemplates the full satisfaction of the annuity. Mr. Malins.-The words " undisposed of" referred to the sum of 400l. and the raising of that sum. The testator had as much an intention to benefit the children as his daughter. The LORD CHANCELLOR.-If the daughter received less than the 601. during her life, would not her representatives be entitled after her death to continue the receipt of the dividends until the deficiency was made up? Mr. Malins and Mr. Rudall referred to Earle v. Bellingham, 24 Beav. 445; s. c. 27 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 545, Mills v. Drewitt, 20 Ibid. 632. Mr. Greene and Mr. Beavan, for the annuitant, were not called upon. The LORD CHANCELLOR said that the decree was right. The general rule was, that an unlimited indefinite charge upon "rents and profits was a charge upon the corpus. Here the charge was out of the rents and profits" to pay the annuity to his daughter for her life; it was not out of the rents and profits during her life. The right of the trustees was general and indefinite. The charge, therefore, on the rents and profits continued until the annuity was satisfied. The decision in Foster v. Smith went upon this, that the effect of the (1) 1 Ph. 629; s. c. 2 You. & C. C.C. 213. gift over was to reduce the charge on the rents and profits to a charge during the life of the annuitant; but on the death of the annuitant, the trustees were to convey over the estate to the testator's sisters; and the right, therefore, to receive the rents and profits ceased on the death of the annuitant. Of necessity, therefore, in Foster v. Smith the trust to receive the rents and profits was construed to be a right to receive them during the life of the annuitant. In Earle v. Bellingham the Master of the Rolls followed Foster v. Smith, and there the trust was, after the death of the annuitant, to transfer a specified sum; and there was, therefore, an intention to have the corpus kept in its entirety for the benefit of those who came afterwards, and who were intended to have the corpus in its integrity. But here there were no such words; but the gift over was in terms made subject to what was necessary for the legal operation of the antecedent gift, and the party claiming the residue could only claim what remained after the effect of the antecedent gift was exhausted. Did, then, this charge upon the rents and profits constitute a charge upon corpus? and his Lordship was of opinion that it did, and he found nothing to rebut that in the terms of this will. He could not, therefore, alter the decree, as he considered that the Vice Chancellor had put a proper interpretation upon the will; and the annuitant must, therefore, continue to receive the annuity out of the corpus. Practice-Petition of Re-hearing. Semble that a person brought before the Court by service of notice of the decree under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86. s. 42. is entitled to present a petition of re-hearing. Mr. Graham Hastings, on behalf of a person who had been served with notice of the decree, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86. s. 42. rule 8, applied to have a petition of re-hearing received by his Lordship's secretary. An objection had been made that the petition was not presented by a party to |