Attorneys to be Admitted.-Classical Examination. Myers, Richards, 10, Euston Square; and Leeds , Ayrton Gatliff, Leeds. Thomas Randall, Castle Street, Holborn. Daniel Calver, Kenninghall. 141 Henry Robert Burfoot, 2, King's Bench Walk, Richard Raven, 2, King's Bench Walk, George Matthew P. Kitchen, Warwick. William Pain Beecham, Hawkhurst. Messrs. Walker, Spilsby. William Palmer, Leicester. Robert Oldershaw, Islington. Messrs. Attree and M'Whinnie, Brighton. John Biggenden, Walbrook. Henry Godwin, Newbury. Edward Smith Bigg, Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane. Thomas Williams, Carmarthen. [This List will be concluded in our next number.] CLASSICAL EXAMINATIONS. To the Editor of the Legal Observer. SIR,-If the examination of articled clerks in the Latin and Greek of the classics, and Greek of the New Testament, be advocated as a test of character, I think that end may be obtained by a course less oppressive and objectionable. It seems to be taken for granted, by those who recommend this alteration, that men educated in the classics are more likely to be honest than those unskilled in that lore. I know not on what statistics that notion is founded, nor how to enter into the detail of proofs necessary on such a topic. I fear there will be plenty of assertion and little evidence. country, admit him without calling for an acquaintance with the authors of Greece and Rome, who frequently teach vice, and whose very best morality is at variance with the Gospel of Christ. If you suppose that I am unacquainted with these writers, or know them only through the medium of a translation, you are mistaken. My school education indeed was, owing to circumstances, very irregular. I possessed but little Latin and no Greek, yet during my clerkship, and since admission, from a partiality which I then entertained for classical learning, I improved my knowledge of the firstmentioned language, by reading Livy, Tacitus, Virgil, Juvenal, Horace, and other authors, and I taught myself Greek so as to be able to read But if you want a test of moral character, any part of the New Testament; and I have take the Bible, particularly the English New perused to some extent Homer, Thucydides, Testament-there is no occasion for the Greek Xenophon, Herodotus, and some other writers. original, as the authorised translation will It is on the knowledge that I possess of these answer every purpose and ascertain if the aspirant to an office which will place in his hands the property and best worldly interests of his fellow subjects be a Christian, as far at least as knowledge of God's will can make him, and if he acknowledge the laws and precepts of that foundation of all human true learning, wisdom, legislation, and duty - the Old and New Testament. And if the party examined shall be found to possess a competent acquaintance with the law of God and his and such as these in the original, and, I must admit, in translations which I have read more at large, that while I continue to admire their excellencies, and do justice to their proper use, I consider the knowledge of them worse than useless as furnishing any test of character,— as vain wisdom all and false philosophy. Nothing, in my opinion, can justify the calling on a young man to be acquainted with Greek and Latin before you admit him an attorney, but that strict necessity, which does 142 Selections from Correspondence.-New Rule of the Common Law Courts. A.' DEVISE OF TRUST ESTATES. not exist. If any test of character be necessary, covered back, and fear the only remedy would that which I propose will be far more effectual; be an action at law. and from the very little knowledge of the Bible possessed by the generality of mankind, and the extreme neglect into which the Book has fallen, I am inclined to think that even among the heads of the profession it would be found much easier to get up a board of examiners versed in the classics, than possessing even a moderate acqaintance with that which is far more important to men, even in this life, the law of God. Many young men, or their parents, may entertain a conscientious dislike to Homer and Chancellor of England, (whose name is associated with everything that is eminent in the of so serious a character, that it is to be conveyancing department of the profession,) is hoped the matter will receive that consideration from the Incorporated Law Society, or some other quarter, which its importance demands. I am authoritatively told that it will be imVirgil, and heathen authors. Many may be proper to devise estates vested in me by way of trust, and that they ought to descend to my persons of excellent character, and even Christians, without the turn of mind or talent heir under penalty, that my estate may hereafter be mulcted in the costs of a Chancery suit necessary to acquire a sufficient knowledge of Greek and Latin, though they may be quite arising from my desire to prevent such legal able to master the laws of their own country; estates decending to my heir-at-law. Surely and are all these to be excluded from the pro- not the devise be permitted in all cases where limitation ought to be given here,-might fession? I hope the judges have no power to the heir is abroad, or an infant, or under any order such an examination; and if they have, and are disposed to exercise it, I hope the legislature will interfere and prevent the carrying out a scheme so unjust and unnecessary. P. R. A. SELECTIONS FROM CORRESPON- CLANDESTINE REMOVAL OF GOODS. SIR,-The loss annually sustained by landlords in and near the metropolis, by tenants flitting by moonlight, leaving their rents unpaid, is immense. A tenant of mine lately removed by five in the morning, before sunrise, and notwithstanding the laden waggon in its passage from the parish of Lambeth to the Lower Road Islington, must have passed through several turnpikes, and doub:less have met several policemen, yet neither the gatekeepers or the policemen could give any account of the number of the waggon or the owner. Some more stringent regulations are therefore desirable, and the owner of carts removing goods by night should be held responsible for the rent due, and the debtor prevented from taking the benefit of any act for the relief of insolvent debtors until such rent is paid. POUNDING CATTLE. L. Considering the arbitrary manner in which damages are demanded by the occupation of ground for injuries sustained by cattle trespassing, and which is assessed by the occupier himself, it seems desirable that power should be given to a magistrate to settle the amount of compensation. some legal disability? In my own case, vast numheir-at-law is in Australia, and in the event of bers of legal estates are vested in myself; my his death, my heir will be an infant under two years of age; and it strikes me that the evil and expenses attending such a descent would be very great. A SOLICITOR OF 47 YEARS' STANDING. J. S., a correspondent, notices in our number of the 3rd instant the protest reported to have been made by the Vice-Chancellor of England against devises by a testator trustee of trust estates vested in him; and observes that it would not be difficult to give reasons in favour of the clause in question, and to show that the power to devise has proved, in general practice, eminently beneficial to the trust estate. He suggests that in the amendment of the 7 & 8 Vict. c, 76, it would be desirable, (so far at all events as regards trust estates, the trusts of which are satisfied,) to give to the executors or administrators the same power, as to the legal estate, as the 9th section of the act referred to gives to executors, &c. of deceased mortgagees in fee, in cases where the mortgages are satisfied. He also contends that it is better that a trustee should by his will select competent persons to continue the administration of the trust estate, than that the chance should be left of such administration devolving, in course of law, on persons who may be infants, may be untrustworthy, or may be abroad. NEW RULE OF THE COMMON LAW JUDGES' ORDERS FOR SIGNING JUDGMENT. In too many cases the trespass arises from the improper state of the fences of the occupying tenant, and yet the owner of the cattle is bound to pay the amount, however exorbitant, "We have considered the means best calcuclaimed by the occupier. I am by no means certain whether, if the amount was paid to the lated to prevent parties from fraudulently obpound-keeper under protest, it could be re- taining judges' orders for signing judgment, 1 Mr. Pyke's Case.-Superior Courts: Vice-Chancellor. and recommend that the following precautions be adopted : That all written consents upon which such orders are obtained shall be preserved in the chambers of the respective courts. That in actions where the defendant has appeared by attorney, no such order be made unless the consent of the defendant be given by his attorney or agent. 143 The first and main ground relied on by the appellant, Mr. Pyke, was, that the Inns of Court had no inherent or judicial right, by law or custom, to disbar, degrade, or expel; and after tracing the origin of the Inns of Court, and the dealings of the crown with this once juridical university, shown to be so by all the early text writers, the appellant finally produced John Dodson, with the authorities there cited the opinions of Mr. Bethell, Q. C., and Sir by those learned counsel in the case of Mr. That where the defendant has not appeared, Ward and the University of Oxford, (against or has appeared in person, no such order be the proposed degradation of that reverend made, unless the defendant attends the judge rour of Justices, gentleman,) and finally quoted Horne's Mir66 Abuses of the Common and gives his consent in person, or unless his Law," chapter 5, page 230, No. 42, in which written consent be attested by an attorney it is expressly laid down that it is abuse to susacting on his behalf; but we think that these pend a pleader if he be not attaint of trespass, precautions are unnecessary where the defen- for which he is condemnable to corporal punish dant is a barrister, conveyancer, special pleader, or attorney." [It is suggested that these judges' orders should be drawn up and served within 14 days or become void.-ED.] ment; thus showing that suspension is the only punishment: and Mr. Pyke urged even in that case the Inns of Court had no power, that it was alone the privilege of their lordships to exercise, in the shape of silencing a barrister, if his acts provoked it, and that their lordships were agents of the crown, who is alone the visitor of the Inns of Court. Their lordships repeatedly deliberated, and intimated the matter of the petition of appeal by the benchers; but finally the case went over should then at once go back to be reconsidered to Easter Term for judgment. Easter Term. Kelly, Q. C., and Baddeley having this term MR. PYKE'S CASE AND THE INNS obtained a rule nisi for a mandamus to the OF COURT. At the Judges' Council Chamber, Serjeant's Inn, Hilary, Easter, and Trinity Terms, 1845. In the matter of H. H. Pyke, Esq., of the Home Circuit, barrister at law, Appellant; and The Treasurer and Masters of the Bench of the Honourable Society of Gray's Inn, Respondents. This petition of appeal came on to be heard at the end of last Hilary Term, before the fifteen judges of England, when twelve of their lordships presided, including the Right Honourables the three chiefs, Lord Denman, Sir N. C. Tindal, Knight, and the Lord Chief Baron. authorities of the University of Oxford to Council Chamber, Trinity Term, Monday, 26th Mr. Pyke further heard against the alleged right and power of the Inns of Court to disbar and suspend, and, inter alia, in the case of solicitors who may quit their profession for the bar, and the gross injustice of the sentence upon him. The appellant, Mr. Pyke, conducted his own case, attended by his solicitor, and (inter alia) Council Chamber, Monday, 9th June, before urged upon their lordships that the principles involved not only deeply affected his own, but eleven judges. Their lordships affirmed the judgment of the the rights of 3,000 of the bar of England, and benchers. in fact both branches of the profession, also those gentlemen now or hereafter preparing to RECENT DECISIONS IN THE SUPE enter it, and that there was not the slightest ground to warrant so severe and ruinous a sentence passed upon him by the benchers of Gray's Inn, -disbarral, degradation, and expulsion, independent of their utter want of power to do so. The benchers were represented by four of their body, headed by Francis Whitmarsh, Esq., Q. C., and Mr. Ryland, the City Pleader, in support of their sentence for an alleged breach of etiquette, but denied to be so by the appel lant. RIOR COURTS. Vice-Chancellor of England. [Reported by SAMUEL MILLER, Esq., Barrister-atLaw.] PRACTICE. INJUNCTION.-JUDGMENT. The court will grant an injunction to stay proceedings at law for setting aside a judg 144 Superior Courts: Vice-Chancellor. THIS case came before the court upon exceptions to the master's report, finding that the defendant's answer was insufficient. The bill was filed by the plaintiff and his wife, claiming to be entitled to a legacy of 300l., bequeathed to the wife under the will of John James ment, if a good equitable charge have been created, and the judgment is founded upon such charge, although the warrant of attorney upon which the judgment was signed may have been set aside for irregularity. THIS was a motion for a special injunction Curwen. The defendants were John Curwen, to restrain proceedings at law for setting aside the executor of J. J. Curwen, and a Mr. Hala judgment and execution that had been obtained against the defendant under the follow-ford. The testator died in 1838. The execuing circumstances: - In the year 1841, the tor had paid all the legacies except the plaindefendant was indebted to his daughter in a defendant Curwen and Halford, and the latter tiff's. There had been accounts between the considerable sum of money, for advances made by her previously to her marriage, and her had actively interfered in the collection and husband having commenced proceedings for administration of the testator's personal estate, recovery of the amount, it was proposed and and in the payment of his legacies, and had agreed by the defendant that the amount due accounted, as was alleged, to the executor, from him should be settled for the benefit of John Curwen. The bill charged that Halford the daughter; and a deed was accordingly estate to his own use. had retained and applied part of the testator's The executor had drawn up and executed, by which the defendant covenanted with certain trustees to pay fraud or collusion between him and Halford. become insolvent; but there was no charge of the debt by instalments for the separate use of The latter answered two of the interrogatories, the daughter, and to give a warrant of attorney but declined answering the rest, in the followfor securing the same. The warrant of attorney was accordingly given, upon which judging terms: ment was afterwards entered up, and several interrogatories contained in the said bill of payments were made in pursuance of the complaint, further or otherwise than is hereinarrangement; but default having been made, before answered, and this defendant claims the benefit of this his answer in like manner as if execution was issued against the defendant upon the judgment in October 1844. A sum- said bill, and to the discovery sought by such he had demurred to the relief sought by the mons was taken out by the defendant to set of the interrogatories contained in the said bill aside the warrant of attorney on account of a defect in the attestation, and the objection as are not herein before answered." being deemed valid, an order was made for setting the warrant of attorney aside, but not the judgment or execution. Sequestration had also issued upon the judgment against the defendant's living, and the writ had been returned. During the present term, the defendant had obtained a rule nisi to show cause why the judgment and execution should not be set aside, whereupon the trustees of the settlement filed their bill for an injunction to restrain the defendant from taking any further proceedings for the purpose of setting aside the judgment and execution. Mr. Martindale for the motion. The Vice-Chancellor said, he thought a sufficient case had been shown to induce the court to interfere, and granted the application. Evans v. Wetherell, April 25th, 1845. "Declines to answer any of the Mr. Wigram and Mr. Metcalfe, in support demurrable, upon the ground that there was of the exceptions, argued that the bill was no privity between the executor and Halford which could entitle the plaintiff to make the latter a party. The question was, whether the which might be considered as merely a fishing defendant was to be put to answer such a bill, bill. The object and effect of the order in question was, to enlarge the defendant's means of protecting himself. Before this order, if a defendant answered part of a bill, he was com pellable to answer the whole. The 38th order says that now he need not do so, but may excuse himself from answering anything against which he might have protected himself by cellor's exposition and construction of the order demurrer. They relied upon the Vice-Chanin Drake v. Drake, 2 Hare, 647; Tipping v. Clarke, 2 Hare, 383; Fairthorne v. Weston, 3 Hare, 387; Kay v. Wall, 9 Jur. 128. the bill being demurrable, cited Redesdale's Pleadings, 307, 370; Lancaster v. Evors, 1 Phillips, 349. There was nothing in the 38th order which entitled the defendant to demur to Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield, 11 Mr. Russell and Mr. Cameron contrà, as to the relief. Sir J. L. Knight Bruce." I have already intimated my opinion to be, that this bill is so insufficient in its allegations, that as far as Mr. Halford is concerned, if he had originally Drake v. Drake, Tipping v. Clarke, and Fairthorne v. Weston, decided by Vice-Chancellor Wigram, and reported 2 & 3 Hare. Superior Courts: Queen's Bench.-Q. B. Practice Courts. 145 in the transaction. When these circumstances became known to the examiners, they refused to allow him to be examined, unless they were authorised to do so by this court. and in proper time filed a general demurrer to be allowed to go before the examiners for the it, that demurrer must have been sustained. purpose of being examined, in order that he He did not, however, take that course; and might be admitted an attorney. The applicathe question now is, whether, because he might tion was made on the affidavit of the applicant, have taken that course and did not do so, he who stated that he had served under articles of is to be excused from answering the bill. clerkship for five years, and that all the proper That depends upon the true construction of notices had been given to entitle him to be the 38th order. Whether the construction of admitted. That in the month of December that order, for which Mr. Halford's counsel | 1844, he was, along with another person, tried contends, is or is not one substantially incon- and found guilty of a conspiracy; that in sistent with other subsisting orders as to the reality he had not done anything to justify such construction of which there is neither doubt a verdict, and that no sentence had ever been nor difficulty, (a point which I do not decide,) passed on him for the offence, although the or is in my opinion a construction of so in-person with whom he had been indicted had convenient a nature as to be unfit for adoption, received a severe sentence. That as soon as I do not decide; I think there is no necessity, the indictment was preferred he disclosed all but I think that according to its true interpre- he knew of the circumstances, in order that tation, it does not extend to a case where the transaction might be fully investigated; and interrogatories are objected to only on the that he deeply regretted the part he had taken ground that a demurrer to the whole bill, if filed in time, would have been sustainable. According to the defendant's construction, the order might and ought to have ended with the word bill.' The subsequent words, however, do not form the only reason upon which I am of opinion (assuming the bill to have been originally open to general demurrer) the answer is insufficient, and must be so treated. I may observe, that the argument to which the 36th Lord Denman, C. J.-After this person has order refers is an argument before the court, been found guilty of a conspiracy, it is not and not before the master, and so it appears by possible that we can admit him to act as an the 37th order. But the defendant's construc-officer of this court. We should not be dealtion of the 38th order seems to throw upon the master the obligation of deciding whether a bill is or is not open to a general demurrer; an obligation which, as it seems to me, ought not to belong to his office. Therefore let the defendants answer the bill. I do not think that he is bound to answer every question, and every part of every question. I do not mean to decide that. I only decide that you must answer the questions, or some of the questions, which hitherto you have not answered. It is an exceedingly difficult question; I wish you would take it to the Lord Chancellor.” Baddeley v. Curwen, Trin. T. 1845. Queen's Bench. (Before the Four Judges.) [Reported by JOHN HAMMERTON, ESQ., Barrister at Law.] ADMISSION OF AN ATTORNEY. Mr. Robinson appeared for the Incorporated Law Society to show cause in the first instance, but he did not deem it necessary to make any comment on the facts disclosed by the affidavit of the applicant which were before the court. ing fairly with society if we granted this application and allowed the applicant to practise as an attorney. He has gained all he can expect in not being brought up to receive the sentence of the court, but I think he cannot expect to be admitted. Patteson, Williams, and Coleridge, J.'s, concurred. Application refused. In re Holt, Trinity Term, 1845. Queen's Bench Practice Court. [Reported by E. H. WOOLRYCH, Esq., Barrister at Law.] On a motion to set aside an award, the copy of the award is sufficiently verified by the affidavit of the clerk to the plaintiff's agent, describing it as a true copy according to his information and belief, and stating that he had received it from the plaintiff's attorney. THIS was a rule to set aside an award for The court refused an application for a person who had served his articles of clerkship to go before the examiners for the purpose of being examined, in order to be admitted an defects on the face of it. The affidavit of W. attorney, who had been convicted of a con- Dickson, clerk to the plaintiff's agent, stated, spiracy in the year 1842, but who denies on that the paper writing hereunto annexed, oath that he is guilty of the offence, and marked D, is a true copy of the award of who was never brought up for judgment, G. L., of &c., to whom the said cause and all and expresses his deep regret in being matters, &c. were referred, as this deponent mixed up with a transaction for which has been informed and believes, and that this another person was severely punished. deponent received the said paper writing from MR. Watson applied to the court on behalf G. H. of &c., the attorney for the said plainof a person by the name of Holt, that he might tiff." Addison, who showed cause, objected, |