Oldalképek
PDF
ePub

Coke observes) they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm. For, though the making of laws is entirely the work of a distinct part, the legislative branch, of the sovereign' power, yet the manner, time, and circumstances of putting those laws in execution must frequently be left to the discretion of the executive magistrate. And therefore his constitutions or edicts concerning these points, which we call proclamations, are binding upon the subject, where they do not either contradict the old laws or tend to establish new ones; but only enforce the execution of such laws as are already in being, in such manner as the king shall judge necessary. Thus the established law is, that the king may prohibit any of his subjects from leaving the realm: a proclamation therefore forbidding this in general for three weeks, by

laying an embargo upon all shipping in time of ward, [271] will be equally binding as an act of parliament, because founded upon a prior law. But a proclamation to lay an embargo in time of peace upon all vessels laden with wheat (though in the time of a public scarcity) being contrary to law, and particularly to statute 22 Car. II. c. 13. the advisers of such a proclamation, and all persons acting under it, found it necessary to be indemnified by a special act of parliament, 7 Geo. III. c. 7. A proclamation for disarming papists is also binding, being only in execution of what the legislature has first ordained: but a proclamation for allowing arms to papists, or for disarming any protestant subjects, will not bind; because the first would be to assume a dispensing power, the latter a legislative one; to the vesting of either of which in any single person the laws of England are absolutely strangers. Indeed by the statute 31 Hen. VIII. c. 8. it was enacted, that the king's proclamations should have the force of acts of parliament: a statute, which was calculated to introduce the most despotic tyranny; and which must have proved fatal to the liberties of this kingdom, had it not been luckily repealed in the minority of his successor, about five years aftere.

3 Inst. 162.

d 4 Mod. 177. 179.

e Stat. 1 Edw. VI. c. 12.

IV. THE king is likewise the fountain of honor, of office, and of privilege: and this in a different sense from that wherein he is styled the fountain of justice; for here he is really the parent of them. It is impossible that government can be maintained without a due subordination of rank; that the people may know and distinguish such as are set over them, in order to yield them their due respect and obedience; and also that the officers themselves, being encouraged by emuJation and the hopes of superiority, may the better discharge their functions: and the law supposes, that no one can be so good a judge of their several merits and services, as the king himself who employs them. It has therefore intrusted with him the sole power of conferring dignities and honors, in confidence that he will bestow them upon none, but such as deserve them. And therefore all degrees of nobility, [272] of knighthood, and other titles, are received by immediate grant from the crown: either expressed in writing, by writs or letters patent, as in the creations of peers and baronets; or by corporeal investiture, as in the creation of a simple knight.

FROM the same principle also arises the prerogative of erecting and disposing of offices: for honors and offices are in their nature convertible and synonymous. All offices under the crown carry in the eye of the law an honor along with them; because they imply a superiority of parts and abilities, being supposed to be always filled with those that are most able to execute them. And, on the other hand, all honors in their original had duties or offices annexed to them an earl, comes, was the conservator or governor of a county; and a knight, miles, was bound to attend the king in his wars. For the same reason therefore that honors are in the disposal of the king, offices ought to be so likewise; and as the king may create new titles, so may he create new offices; but with this restriction, that he cannot create new offices with new fees annexed to them, nor annex new fees to old offices; for this would be a tax upon the subject, which

F

cannot be imposed but by act of parliament. Wherefore, in 13 Hen. IV, a new office being created by the king's letters patent for measuring cloths, with a new fee for the same, the letters patent were, on account of the new fee, revoked and declared void in parliament.

UPON the same, or a like reason, the king has also the prerogative of conferring privileges upon private persons. Such as granting place or precedence to any of his subjects (15), as shall seem good to his royal wisdoms: or such as converting aliens, or persons born out of the king's dominions, into denizens; whereby some very considerable privileges of natural-born subjects are conferred upon them. Such also is the prerogative of erecting corporations; whereby a number of private persons are united and knit together, and enjoy many liberties, powers, and immunities in their politic capacity, which they were utterly incapable of in their natural. Of aliens, denizens, [273] natural-born, and naturalized subjects, I shall speak

more largely in a subsequent chapter; as also of corporations at the close of this book of our commentaries. I now only mention them incidentally, in order to remark the king's prerogative of making them; which is grounded upon this foundation, that the king, having the sole administration of the government in his hands, is the best and the only judge, in what capacities, with what privileges, and under what distinctions, his people are the best qualified to serve, and to act under him. A principle, which was carried so far by the imperial law, that it was determined to be the crime of

f 2 Inst. 533.

g4 Inst. 361.

(15) The king by the common law could have created a duke, earl, &c. and could have given him precedence before all others of the same rank, a prerogative not unfrequently exercised in ancient times; but it was restrained by the 31 Hen. VIII. c. 10. which settles the place or precedence of all the nobility and great officers of state. This statute does not extend to Ireland, where the king still retains his prerogative without any restriction, except the dread of the unpopularity which would now result from the exertion of it.

sacrilege, even to doubt whether the prince had appointed officers in the state 1.

proper

V. ANOTHER light, in which the laws of England considered the king with regard to domestic concerns, is as the arbiter of commerce. By commerce, I at present mean domestic commerce only. It would lead me into too large a field, if I were to attempt to enter upon the nature of foreign trade, its privileges, regulations, and restrictions; and would be also quite beside the purpose of these commentaries, which are confined to the laws of England: whereas no municipal laws can be sufficient to order and determine the very extensive and complicated affairs of traffic and merchandise; neither can they have a proper authority for this purpose. For, as these are transactions carried on between subjects of independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the other. For which reason the affairs of commerce are regulated by a law of their own, called the law merchant or lex mercatoria, which all nations agree in and take notice of. And in particular it is held to be part of the law of England, which decides the causes of merchants by the general rules which obtain in all commercial countries; and that often even in matters relating to domestic trade, as for instance with regard to the drawing, the acceptance, and the transfer, of inland bills of exchange i.

[274]

WITH us in England, the king's prerogative, so far as it relates to mere domestic commerce, will fall principally under the following articles :

FIRST, the establishment of public marts, or places of buying and selling, such as markets and fairs, with the tolls thereunto belonging. These can only be set up by virtue of the king's grant, or by long and immemorial usage and prescription, which presupposes such a grant *. The limitation of these public resorts, to such time and such place as

h Disputare de principali judicio non oportet; sacrilegii enim instar est, dubitare an is dignus sit, quem elegerit imperator. C. 9.

29. 3.

i Co. Litt. 172. Ld. Raym. 181. 1542.
k 2 Hist. 220.

may be most convenient for the neighbourhood, forms a part of economics, or domestic polity; which, considering the kingdom as a large family, and the king as the master of it, he clearly has a right to dispose and order as he pleases.

SECONDLY, the regulation of weights and measures. These, for the advantage of the public, ought to be universally the same throughout the kingdom; being the general criterions which reduce all things to the same or an equivalent value. But, as weight and measure are things in their nature arbitrary and uncertain, it is therefore expedient that they be reduced to some fixed rule or standard: which standard it is impossible to fix by any written law or oral proclamation; for no man can, by words only, give another an adequate idea of a foot-rule, or a pound-weight. It is therefore necessary to have recourse to some visible, palpable, material standard; by forming a comparison with which, all weights and measures may be reduced to one uniform size : and the prerogative of fixing this standard our ancient law vested in the crown, as in Normandy it belonged to the duke1. This standard was originally kept at Winchester: and we find in the laws of king Edgarm, near a century before the conquest, an injunction that the one measure, which was kept at Winchester, should be observed throughout the realm. Most nations have regulated the standard of measures of length by comparison with the parts of the human body; as the [275] palm, the hand, the span, the foot, the cubit, the ell, (ulna, or arm,) the pace, and the fathom. But, as these are of different dimensions in men of different proportions, our ancient historians" inform us, that a new standard of longitudinal mea sure was ascertained by king Henry the first; who commanded that the ulna or ancient ell, which answers to the modern yard, should be made of the exact length of his own arm. And, one standard of measures of length being gained, all others are easily derived from thence; those of greater length by multiplying, those of less by subdividing, that original standard.

1 Gr. Coustum, c. 16.

m cap. 8.

VOL. I.

46

n Will. Malmsb. in vita Hen. L. Spelm. Hen. L. apud Wilkins, 299.

« ElőzőTovább »