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"Some," says

all," re-echoed from all sides of the House. D'Ewes,1 "waved their hats over their heads, and others took their swords in their scabbards out of their belts, and held them by the pummels in their hands, setting the lower part on the ground; so, as if God had not prevented it there was very great danger that mischief might have been done." Sir Philip Warwick recalls with even more picturesque imagery his recollection of the famous scene: "I thought we had all sat in the valley of the shadow of death, for we, like Joab's and Abner's young men, had catcht at each others locks, and sheathed our swords in each others bowels, had not the sagacity and great calmness of Mr. Hambden by a short speech prevented it".2

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The House rose "just when the clock struck two the ensuing morning," after deciding by 124 to 101 that the Declaration should "not be printed without the particular order of the House". As the members hurried out of the House Falkland paused to inquire sarcastically of Cromwell "whether there had been a debate?" To which Cromwell answered "that he would take his word another time" and whispered him in the ear with some asseveration "that if the remonstrance had been rejected he would have sold all he had the next morning, and never have seen England more; and he knew there were many other honest men of the same resolution". "So near," adds Clarendon in relating the story, "was the poor kingdom at that time to its deliverance."

No apology is needed for having described in considerable detail the circumstances attendant upon the passing of the Grand Remonstrance. Alike in the political life of Falkland and in the history of the rebellion it marks the parting of the ways. At this point every student of the period is compelled to pause and ask, "Should I have voted 1 Ap. Forster, p. 324. 2 Memoirs, p. 202.

Aye or No; should I have stood with Falkland or with Pym?" No attempt can be made to answer the question here; but whatever the answer of individuals may be, no one will deny that the Remonstrance is a document of the first importance. Consisting in part of an historical retrospect recounting all the grievances which had accumulated since the accession of the King; in part of an outlined scheme of constructive reform, the Remonstrance was primarily intended to excite popular feeling against the reigning sovereign, to reanimate, as Hallam puts it, "discontents almost appeased," and to guard the people "against the confidence they were beginning to place in the King's sincerity". Two questions, therefore, may fairly be asked, (i) Was the appeal to the people against the Crown a political necessity? And (ii) Was the scheme of reform statesmanlike and sound? That nothing but necessity can justify a step which led inevitably to civil war needs no arguing. Lord Lytton, writing in 1860, regarded the Remonstrance as either a great blunder or a great crime—a blunder if Pym was sincere in his desire to retain the monarchy, a crime if he was not. Hallam, a generation earlier, held much the same view. Gardiner's guarded but decided approbation rests mainly upon the documents which in recent years have come to light, and which in the main tend to confirm Pym's deep-rooted conviction of the King's duplicity. If Charles I. was really sincere in the concessions which in the last twelve months he had made; if he was minded to play with straightforward honesty the part of a constitutional sovereign, the work of Hampden and Pym was both a blunder and a crime. The difficulty of the popular leaders was this. They were, as we now know, in possession of information sufficient to satisfy their own minds as to the intrigues of the Court, but not circumstantial or precise enough to convince others. Could they, in view of their own knowledge,

take the responsibility of allowing the country at large to bestow upon the King a renewal of confidence? But for the Scotch" Incident" and the Irish Rebellion they would probably have been compelled to run the risk. Puritans as they were they could hardly fail to discern in those opportune events the hand of the Lord pointing in the direction in which they were already fain to go.

The

To Falkland, on the other hand, the balance of argument seemed decidedly against a step which was admittedly revolutionary, and which could hardly fail to embroil the country in a fratricidal war. The danger of a coup d'état was not present to his mind, as it was to Pym's. Events in Scotland and Ireland would naturally wear a different aspect to one who was not yet convinced of the duplicity of the King, and who was entirely ignorant of the intrigues of the Queen. Moreover, he was not prepared to face the risks involved in the overthrow of the Monarchy and the Church. Church of England, with all its defects, stood in his eyes for intellectual freedom and for moral order against the narrow intolerance, not to say the social anarchy, threatened by a Puritan ascendancy. The Crown stood for ordered political progress against the encroachments of a usurping assembly. And who shall say that Falkland was wrong? True it is that clause 1971 of the Grand Remonstrance is the protoplasm of constitutional evolution as we in this country have conceived it. But that clause had no immediate results. The written Constitutions of the Commonwealth and Protectorate make no attempt to develope the idea of a Parliamentary executive, and the Cabinet system might, in its entirety, have been long deferred but for the accident that George I. had no English and Walpole no German. For all that, the secret of the future was with Pym; and Pym-as a Constitution maker-is entitled to

1 Cf. chap. ii., p. 24, supra.

all the credit which properly belongs to one who is ahead of his time. But it must be remembered that England had to wade through a sea of blood to the realisation of Pym's ideal. Falkland and his friends may have seen less clearly the ultimate solution, or may have been less unwilling to postpone it, but they were more keenly alive to the immediate risks.

CHAPTER V

FALKLAND AS SECRETARY OF STATE

ALKLAND did not attempt to evade the obligations imposed upon him by his vote on the Grand Remonstrance. If he was not prepared to adhere to the programme of the popular leaders, he was bound to accept responsibility for the policy of the Crown. Three days after the passing of the Remonstrance, the King entered London in semitriumph on his return from Scotland (25th November). On 1st December the Remonstrance was presented to him. Precisely a month later Falkland accepted office as Secretary of State and was sworn of the Privy Council.1 Sir John Culpepper took office at the same time as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Hyde only declined the SolicitorGeneralship on the ground, as he assured the King, "that he should be able to do much more service in the condition he was in, than he should be if that were improved by any preferment that could be conferred upon him at that time"; and he added: "that he had the honour to have much friendship with the two persons who were very seasonably advanced by his Majesty, when his

11st January, 1641-42.-" This day Lucius Viscount Falkland was sworne of his Mats most Honble Privy Counsell, by his Mats command sitting in Counsell, took his place and signed with the other Lords."

8th January.-"This day his Matie present in Counsell and by his Royal Command the Lord Vt Falkland was sworne one of his Mats Principall Secretaries of State" (Privy Council Register).

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