High Episcopalians, in 1642 that of the Broad Churchmen, and in 1646 that of the Presbyterians. Arminians like Clarendon, liberal Churchmen like Falkland, and Presbyterians like Baillie, were equally opposed, though on different grounds, to the dictation of a Parliamentary majority in the spiritual sphere. Yet none were prepared for, perhaps none perceived, the only logical alternative.

CHAPTER IV

THE GRAND REMONSTRANCE-FALKLAND AND PYM

N order to present a clear and connected view of the

land's relation thereto, chronological narrative has been abandoned. It is necessary, therefore, briefly to recall the sequence of events.

On 9th September, 1641, Parliament, after ten months of continuous sittings, adjourned for a brief recess. A month earlier, on 10th August, the King, despite the urgent entreaty of Parliament, had set out for his northern kingdom. In this journey Parliament found fresh ground for the suspicions which for the last six months at least had never been long absent from their minds. Throughout that period their debates had been conducted under the constant dread that the King would throw himself upon the army and effect a coup d'état. The precise truth as to successive "Army Plots," with reports of which Pym periodically terrified the House, is still a matter for conjecture. Fortunately it is not essential to the immediate purpose to attempt a disentanglement of the confusion. All that need be said is, that as the archives are being gradually compelled to reveal the secrets of all hearts, it becomes increasingly clear that Pym's information though rarely precise was in the main substantially accurate. We may indeed take it for granted that had the King and Queen seen a favourable oppor

L

tunity for the employment of force against Parliament they would not have scrupled to use it. What is more difficult to appreciate is the moral guilt which such action would have involved. That it would have been politically suicidal is indisputable: but why it should be more morally reprehensible for the King to employ the English army to coerce Parliament, than for Parliament to employ the Scotch army to coerce the King, is one of the many questions in which the orthodox historians have confused simple issues. It is, however, none the less important to remember that most of the work of the Long Parliament was done under the shadow of this fear.

Among those who pressed upon the King the advisability of postponing the journey to Scotland no one appears to have been more insistent than Falkland.

Throughout the summer he was untiring in the discharge of his Parliamentary duties, and it is plain that the confidence reposed by his fellow-members in his moderation, judgment and good sense was equal to his own conscientious zeal. His name was included in nearly all the more important of the innumerable committees appointed by the House, and he was frequently selected to manage and report on the conferences with the Lords. Nor did his duties cease with the adjournment, as he was called upon to serve on a committee appointed by the Commons to watch the progress of events-more particularly in Scotland—during the recess.

Parliament reassembled on 20th October, and it became immediately apparent that Pym and his friends of the extreme left had made up their minds to provoke an open rupture with the King.

Nor is it difficult to appreciate their reasons. The recess had witnessed a distinct and increasing reaction in the King's favour. Such reactions are common phenomena in the

history of popular movements, and we need be at no special

None the less it is important Among these the most potent

pains to account for this one. to understand the reasons. was probably the violence of the Parliamentary attack upon the Church. Even the Puritan May admits that "if Parliament had not so far drawn religion into their cause it might have sped better". The people had no love for the Arminian bishops, and had a wholesome dread of the jurisdiction of their courts; but there is no evidence that they desired a radical change of system. Still less is it clear that they were ready to embrace Presbyterianism. The bitter Presbyterianism of London gave it an entirely disproportionate influence upon the proceedings in Parliament; but outside London there was no enthusiasm for the Genevan system, except perhaps in Lancashire. On the other hand, there was a growing disgust at the outrages which were perpetrated in the churches. Clarendon declares that these outrages were actually instigated by the Parliamentary majority, and even May admits that Parliament did nothing to restrain them, being "either too much busied in variety of affairs, or perchance too much fearing the loss of a considerable party, whom they might have need of against a real and potent enemy". Another powerful reason for reaction was the pressure of Parliamentary taxation-imposed largely for the support of their Scotch allies. For eleven years the mass of the people had been virtually ignorant of taxation; individuals suffered, but the country at large escaped. The revival of Parliamentary sessions of course brought a renewal of regular taxation, a species of "constitutionalism" which could not be expected to enhance the value of popular institutions in the eyes of the taxpayers. Finally, things looked hopeful for peace. The King, contrary to expectation, had passed through the armies encamped in the North without an attempt to tamper with their loyalty. Those

armies were now happily disbanded; the Scots had recrossed the Tweed before the end of September, and the English troops had dispersed. Was there not a reasonable chance that the quarrel might still be composed and that the King might be induced loyally to accept the position of a constitutional sovereign? So far as the country knew, his conduct, since Parliament met, had been unexceptionable. He had refused nothing that Parliament asked. He had assented to the revolutionary proposal that the existing Parliament should not be dissolved without its own consent; he had not withheld the sacrifice of his ablest and most devoted counsellor. More than that, he had been anxious to call to his counsels the leaders of the party which was predominant in Parliament. Something in the nature of a modern “ministry" might have been formed, including Lord Say, Lord Essex, Denzil Holles and Lord Bedford, with Pym himself as Chancellor of the Exchequer. No stronger proof of good faith could have been given by the King, and but for the death-ever to be lamented-of Lord Bedford, such a ministry would probably have been formed in the spring of 1641. Is it wonderful, in view of such considerations, that the country should, in the early autumn, have begun to settle down, or that men should have turned hopeful eyes towards the dawn of a brighter day?

It was this growing confidence in the King's good faith which Pym set himself steadfastly to combat. In this endeavour he was powerfully assisted by the current of events in Scotland and Ireland. Parliament had no sooner reassembled after the recess than Pym laid before it information as to the existence of a widespread conspiracy in the reactionary interest. In the midst of the debate letters arrived from Hampden, who was still in attendance on the King in Edinburgh, containing news of the "Incident". This was a plot, disclosed on 11th October, for the assassina