To enter actually upon theological discussions would be evidently beyond the scope of this work. It is with the scientific method common to all the sciences, and not with any of the separate sciences, that we are concerned. Theology therefore would be at least as much beyond my scope as chemistry or geology. But I believe that grave misapprehensions exist as regards the very nature of this scientific method. There are scientific men who assert that the interposition of Providence is impossible, and prayer an absurdity, because the laws of nature are inductively proved to be invariable. Inferences are drawn not so much from particular sciences as from the logical foundations of science itself, to negative the impulses and hopes of men. Now I may properly venture to state that my own studies in logic lead me to call in question all such negative inferences. Those so-called laws of nature are uniformities observed to exist in the action of certain material agents, but it is logically impossible to show that all other agents must behave as these do. The too exclusive study of particular branches of physical science seems in some cases to generate an over confident and dogmatic spirit. Rejoicing in the success with which a few groups of facts are brought beneath the apparent sway of laws, the investigator hastily assumes that he is close upon the ultimate springs of being. A particle of gelatinous matter is found to obey the ordinary laws of chemistry; yet it moves and lives. The world is therefore asked to believe that chemistry can resolve the mysteries of existence.

The Meaning of Natural Law.

Pindar speaks of Law as the Ruler of the Mortals and the Immortals, and it seems to be commonly supposed that the so-called Laws of Nature, in like manner, rule

man and his Creator. The course of nature is regarded as being determined by invariable principles of mechanics which have acted since the world began, and will act for infinite ages to come. Even if the origin of all things be attributed to an intelligent creative mind, that Being is regarded as having yielded up arbitrary power, and as being subject like a human legislator to the laws which he has himself enacted. Such notions I should describe as superficial and erroneous, being derived, as I think. from false views of the nature of scientific inference, and the degree of certainty of the knowledge which we acquire by inductive investigation.

A law of nature, as I regard the meaning of the expression, is not a uniformity which must be obeyed by all objects, but merely a uniformity which is as a matter of fact obeyed by those objects which have come beneath our observation. There is nothing whatever incompatible with logic in the discovery of objects which should prove exceptions to any law of nature. Perhaps the best established law is that which asserts an invariable correlation to exist between gravity and inertia, so that all gravitating bodies are found to possess inertia, and all bodies possessing inertia are found to gravitate. But it would be no reproach to our scientific method, if something were ultimately discovered to possess gravity without inertia. Strictly defined and correctly interpreted, the law itself would acknowledge the possibility; for with the statement of every law we ought properly to join an estimate of the number of instances in which it has been observed to hold true, and the probability thence calculated, that it will hold true in the next case. Now as we before found (vol. i. p. 299) no finite number of instances can warrant us in expecting with certainty that the next instance will be of like nature; in the formulas yielded by the inverse method of probabilities a unit always

appears to represent the probability that our inference will be mistaken. I demur to the assumption that there is any necessary truth even in such fundamental laws of nature as the Indestructibility of Matter, the Conservation of Force, or the Laws of Motion. Certain it is that men of science have recognised the conceivability of other laws, or even investigated their mathematical conditions. Sir George Airy investigated the mathematical conditions of a perpetual motion (vol. i. p. 256), and Laplace and Newton discussed various imaginary laws of forces inconsistent with those so far observed to operate in the universe (vol. ii. pp. 304, 392).

The laws of nature, as I venture to regard them, are simply general propositions concerning the correlation of properties which have been observed to hold true of bodies hitherto observed. On the assumption that our experience is of adequate extent, and that no arbitrary interference takes place, we are then able to assign the probability, always less than certainty, that the next object of the same apparent nature will conform to the same law.

Infiniteness of the Universe.

We may safely accept as a satisfactory scientific hypothesis the doctrine so grandly put forth by Laplace, who asserted that a perfect knowledge of the universe, as it existed at any given moment, would give a perfect knowledge of what was to happen thenceforth and for ever after. Scientific inference is impossible, unless we may regard the present as the necessary outcome of what is past, and the necessary cause of what is to come. Το the view of Perfect Intelligence nothing is uncertain. The astronomer can calculate the positions of the heavenly bodies when thousands of generations of men shall have

passed away, and in this fact we have some illustration, as Laplace remarks, of the power which scientific prescience may attain. Doubtless, too, all efforts in the investigation of nature tend to bring us nearer to the possession of that ideally perfect power of intelligence. Nevertheless, as Laplace with profound wisdom addsa, we must ever remain at an infinite distance from the goal of our aspirations.

Let us assume, for a time at least, as a highly probable hypothesis, that whatever is to happen must be the outcome of what is; there then arises the question, What is ? Now our knowledge of what exists must ever remain imperfect and fallible in two respects. Firstly, we do not know all the matter that has been created, nor the exact manner in which it has been distributed through space. Secondly, assuming that we had that knowledge, we should still be wanting in a perfect knowledge of the way in which the particles of matter will act upon each other. The power of scientific prediction extends at the most to the limits of the data employed. Every conclusion is purely hypothetical and conditional upon the non-interference of agencies previously undetected. The law of gravity asserts that every body tends to approach towards every other body, with a certain determinate force, but even supposing the law to hold true, it does not assert that the body will approach. No single law nor science can warrant us in making any one absolute prediction. We must know all the laws of nature and all the existing agents acting according to those laws before we

can say what will occur. To assume, then, that scientific

method can take everything within its cold embrace of uniformity, is to imply that the Creator cannot outstrip the intelligence of his creatures, and that the existing

aThéorie Analytique des Probabilités,' quoted by Babbage, 'Ninth Bridgwater Treatise,' p. 173.

universe is not infinite in extent and complexity, an assumption for which I can see no logical basis whatever.

The Indeterminate Problem of Creation.

A second and very serious misapprehension concerning the import of a law of nature may now be pointed out. It is not uncommonly supposed that a law determines the character of the results which shall take place, as, for instance, that the law of gravity determines what force of gravity shall act upon a given particle. Surely a little reflection must render it plain that a law by itself determines nothing. It is a law plus agents obeying that law which have results, and it is no part of the law to govern or define the number and place of its own agents. Whether a particle of matter shall gravitate, depends not upon the law of Newton only, but upon the distribution of surrounding particles. The theory of gravitation may perhaps be true throughout all time and in all parts of space, and even the Creator may never find occasion to create those possible exceptions to it which I have asserted to be conceivable. Let this be as it may, and our science cannot certainly determine the question, yet the theory of gravitation itself gives no indication of the forces which may be brought to act at any point of space. The force of gravitation acting upon any particle depends, as we have seen, upon the number, mass, distance, and relative position of all the other particles of matter within the bounds of space at the instant in question. Even assuming that all matter when once distributed through space at the Creation, was thenceforth to act in an invariable manner without subsequent interference, yet the actual configuration of matter at any moment, and F f

VOL. II.