science and the organization of enormous and well disciplined armies has not decreased the value of a skilful general; on the contrary, the rank and file are still more in need than they used to be of the guiding power of an ingenious and far-seeing intellect. The swift destruction of the French military power was not due alone to the perfection of the German army, nor to the genius of Moltke; it was due to the combination of a well-disciplined multitude, with a leader of the highest intellectual powers. So in every branch of human affairs the influence of the individual is not withering, but is growing with the extent of the material resources which are at his command. Nature of Genius. Turning to our own particular subject, it is a work of undiminished interest to reflect upon those qualities of mind which lead to great advances in natural knowledge. Nothing, indeed, is less amenable than genius to scientific analysis and explanation. Even precise definition is out of the question. Buffon said that' Buffon said that genius is patience,' and certainly patience is one of its most constant and requisite components. But no one can suppose that patient labour alone will invariably lead to those conspicuous results which we attribute to genius. In every branch of science, literature, art, or industry, there are thousands of men and women who work with unceasing patience, and thereby ensure at least a moderate success; but it would be absurd to assent for a moment to crude notions of human equality, and to allow that equal amounts of intellectual labour yield equal results. A Newton may modestly and sincerely attribute his discoveries to industry and patient thought, and there is much reason to believe that genius is essentially unconscious and unable to account for its own peculiar powers. If genius, indeed, be that by which intellect diverges from what is common, it must necessarily be a phenomenon beyond the domain of the ordinary laws of nature. Nevertheless, it is always an interesting and instructive work to trace out, as far as possible, the characteristics of mind by which great discoveries have been achieved, and we shall find in the analysis much to illustrate the principles of scientific method. Error of the Baconian Method. Hundreds of investigators may be constantly engaged in experimental inquiry; they may compile numberless notebooks full of scientific facts, and may frame endless tables full of numerical results; but if the views of the nature of induction here maintained be true they can never by such work alone rise to new and great discoveries. By an organized system of research they may work out deductively the detailed results of a previous discovery, but to arrive at a new principle of nature is another matter. Francis Bacon contributed to spread abroad the hurtful notion that to advance science we must begin by accumulating facts, and then draw from them, by a process of patient digestion, successive laws of higher and higher generality. In protesting against the false method of the scholastic logicians, he exaggerated a partially true philosophy, until it became almost as false as that which preceded it. His notion of scientific method was that of a kind of scientific bookkeeping. Facts were to be indiscriminately gathered from every source, and posted in a kind of ledger, from which would emerge in time a clear balance of truth. It is difficult to imagine a less likely way of arriving at great discoveries. The greater the array of facts, the less is the probability that they will by any routine system of classification or research disclose the laws of nature they embody. Exhaustive classification in all possible orders is out of the question, because the possible orders are practically infinite in number. It is before the glance of the philosophic mind that facts must display their meaning, and fall into logical order. The natural philosopher must therefore have, in the first place, a mind of impressionable character, which is readily affected by the slightest exceptional phenomenon. His associating and identifying powers must be great, that is, a single strange fact must suggest to his mind whatever of like nature has previously come within his experience. His imagination must be active, and bring before his mind multitudes of relations in which the unexplained facts may possibly stand with regard to each other, or to more common facts. Sure and vigorous powers of deductive reasoning must then come into play, and enable him to infer what will happen under each supposed condition. Lastly, and above all, there must be the love of certainty leading him diligently and with perfect candour, to compare his speculations with the test of fact and experiment. Freedom of Theorizing. It would be a complete error to suppose that the great discoverer is one who seizes at once unerringly upon the truth, or has any special method of divining it. In all probability the errors of the great mind far exceed in number those of the less vigorous one. Fertility of imagination and abundance of guesses at truth are among the first requisites of discovery; but the erroneous guesses must almost of necessity be many times as numerous as those which prove well founded. The weakest analogies, the most whimsical notions, the most apparently absurd theories, may pass through the teeming brain, and no If genius, indeed, be that by which Error of the Hundreds of investig in experimental inquir notebooks full of scie tables full of numeri nature of inductior never by such wo coveries. By an work out deduc discovery, but another matt abroad the must begir them, by higher false r a pa fal in a less lik We kie we da curious pleasure on, the candour with which in at failure, and the perseverance wre he renewed his attack upon ur . Nople perhaps Faraday is the The worried meters univel, are probably at the me A recording specul Na aflorded us the most importa Faraday himself said- The world little knows how tithe of the fancies which arise in his active brain. A ight into the progress of disc The greater th.. that they will by any rou... search austive disc uestion? nite iz me ›hic mi nto kg fore have I = able charan T.. exception poste powers mus suggest viously must be actres relations is stand with r Sure and T theories which have passed atific investigator, have been sy by his own severe criticism i that in the most successful the suggestions, the hopes, the onclusions have been realized.' "day's researches published either Transactions' or in minor papers, in oks, or in various other materials, wn in his interesting life by Dr. I invaluable lessons for the experiritings are full of speculations which by the light of subsequent discovery. aid that Faraday sometimes committed ress crude ideas which a cautious friend selled him to keep back or suppress. There y even a wildness and vagueness in his in a less careful experimentalist might have the attainment of truth. This is especially a curious paper concerning Ray-vibrations; tely Faraday was fully aware of the shadowy of his speculations, and expressed the feeling which must be quoted. 'I think it likely,' he hat I have made many mistakes in the preceding or even to myself my ideas on this point appear the shadow of a speculation, or as one of those ssions upon the mind, which are allowable for a time aides to thought and research. He who labours in erimental inquiries knows how numerous these are, I how often their apparent fitness and beauty vanish fore the progress and development of real natural ruth.' If, then, the experimentalist has no royal road to the discovery of the truth, it is an interesting matter then oute happen p above hite a Experimental Researches in Chemistry and Physics,' p. 372. Philosophical Magazine, 3rd Series, May 1846, vol. xxviii. p. 350. |