MY LORD, Paris, Dec. 20, 1796. Mr. Ellis returned here from London on Thursday last, the 15th inftant, at fire P. M. and delivered to me the dispatches No. 11 and 12, with which he was charged by your Lordship.

Although nothing can be clearer, more ably drawn up, or more fatiffactory, than the inftructions they cntain, yet as it was of the laft importance that I fhould be completely mafter of the fubje&t before I faw the French Minifter, I delayed afking for a cnference till late on Friday evening, with a view that it fhould not take place till Saturday morning.

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He appointed the hour of eleven A. on that day, and it was near one before we parted. Although what is faid by M. Delacroix before he has communicated with the Directory cannot be confidered as officially binding, and probably may, in the event, be very different from what I thall hear when he fpeaks to me in their name, yet as it is impoffible they fhould not nearly conjecture the nature of the overtures I thould make, and of courfe be prepared in fome degree for them, it is material that your Lordship fhould be accurately acquainted with the firft impreffions they appear to make on M.. Delacroix.

I prefaced what I had to communicate with laying, that I now came authorifed to enter with him into deliberation upon one of the most important fubjects that perhaps was ever brought into difcuffion-that its magnitude forbade all fe, excluded all prevarication, fufpended all prejudices, and that as I had in command to fpeak and act with freedom and truth, I expected that he, on his part, would confider thefe as the only means which could or ought to be employed if he wished to fee a Negocia tion, in which the happiness of millions was involved, terminate fuccefsfully, That, for greater precifion, and with a view to be clearly understood in what I was about to propofe, I would give bim a Confidential Memorial, accompanied by an Official Note, both of which, when he had perufed them, would fpeak for themselves. The Memorial contained the conditions, on the accomplishment of which His Majefty confidered the restoration of Peace to depend. The Note was expreffive of his Majefty's readiness to enter into any explanation required by the Directory

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on' the fubject, or to receive any ContreProjet, refting on the fame bafis, which the Directory might be difpofed to give in. That, moreover, I did not hefitate declaring to him, in conformity to the principles which I had laid down, and from which I certainly never fhould depart at any period of the Negocia tion, that I was prepared to answer any qucftions, explain and elucidate any points, on which it was poffible to forcfee that doubts or mifconceptions could arife on the confideration of thefe Papers." "And having faid thus much, I had only to remark, that I believed, in no fimilar Negociation which had ever taken place, any Minifter was authorised, in the first inftance, to go fo fully into the difcuffion as I now was-That I was fure neither the truth of this re'mark, nor the manifeft conclufion to be drawn from it, would escape M. Delacroix's obfervation.

I then put the two Papers into his hands. He began by reading the Note, on which of courfe he could only exprefs fatisfaction. After perufing the Confidential Memorial with all the attention it deferved, he, after a fhort paufe, faid, that it appeared to him to be liable to infurmountable objections; that it feemed to him to require much more than it conceded, and, in the event, not to leave France in a fituation of proportional greatnefs to the Powers of Europe. He faid, the Act of their Conftitution, according to the manner in which it was interpreted by the beft Publicifts (and this phrafe is worthy remark), made it impoffible for the Republic to do what we required. The Auftrian Netherlands were annexed to it; they could not be difpofed of without flinging the nation into all the confufion which muft follow a convocation of the Primary Affemblies; and he faid, he was rather furprised that Great Bri tain fhould bring this forward as the governing condition of the Treaty, fince he thought he had, in fome of our late converfations, fully explained the nature of their Conftitution to me. I replied, that every thing I had heard from him on this point was perfectly in my recollection, as it probably was in his; that though I had likened to him with. that attention I always afforded to every thing he faid, yet I had never made him any fort of reply, and had neither admitted nor controverted his opinion; that although I believed I could easily difprove this opinion from

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the fpirit of the French Conftitution itfelf; yet the difcuffion of that Con ftitution was perfectly foreign to the bject of my miffion; fince, even allow ing his two pofitions, viz. that the re troceffion of the Auftrian Netherlands was incompatible with their Laws, and that we ought to have known that beforehand; yet that there exifted a Droit public in Europe, paramount to any Droit public they might think proper to eftablish within their own dominions; and that if their Constitution was publickly known, the Treaties exifting between his Majefty and the Emperor were at leaft equally public, and in thefe it was clearly and diftinctly enounced, that the Two Contracting Parties reciprocally promife not to lay down their arms without the restitution of all the dominions, territories, &c. which may have belonged to either of them before the War. That the date of this ftipulation was previous to their annexing the Auftrian Netherlands to France; and the notoriety of this ought, at the very moment when they had paffed that Law, to have convinced them, that, if adhered to, it must prove an infurmountable obftacle to Peace. I applied his maxim to the Weft India Inlands, and to the fettlements in the Eaft Indies; and asked him, Whether it was expected that we were to wave our right of poffeffion, and be required ftill to confider them as integral parts of the French Republic which must be reftored, and on which no value was to be fet in the balance of compenfa tion I alfo ftated the poffible cafe of France having lost part of what the deemed her integral dominions, instead of having added to them in the courfe of the War, and whether then, under the apprehenfion of ftill greater loffes, the Government, as it was now compofed, fhould confider itself as not vefted with powers fufficient to fave their country from the impending danger, by making Peace on the conditions of facrificing a portion of their dominions to five the remainder? M. Delacroix faid, this was ftating a cafe of neceffity, and fuch a mode of reafoning did not attach to the prefent circumftances. I readily admitted the first part of this propofition, but contended, that if the power exifted in a cafe of neceffity, it equally exifted in all others, and particularly in the cafe before us, fince he himself had repeatedly told me that Peace was what this Country and its

Government wished for, and even wanted.

M. Delacroix, in reply, shifted his ground, and by a string of arguments founded on premifes calculated for this purpofe, attempted to prove, that from the relative fituation of the adjacent Countries, the prefent Government of France would be reprehenfible in the extreme, and deferve impeachment, if they ever fuffered the Netherlands to be feparated from their dominions; that by the partition of Poland, Ruffia, Auftria, and Pruffia, had increased their power to a moft formidable degree; that England, by its conquefts, and by the activity and judgment with which it governed its Colonies, had doubled its ftrength.-Your Indian Empire alone, said M. Delacroix with vehemence, has enabled you to fubfidize all the Powers of Europe against us, and your mo nopoly of trade has put you in poffeffion of a fund of inexhaustible wealth. His words were: "Votre Empire dans l'Inde vous a fourni les Moyens de falary toutes les Puiffances contre nous, et vous avez accapace le Commerce de Maniere que toutes les Richefes du Monde fe verfent dans vos Coffres."

From the neceffity that France fhould keep the Netherlands and the Left Bank of the Rhine for the purpose of preferving its relative fituation in Europe, he paffed to the advantages which he contended would refult to the other Powers by fuch an addition to the French dominions. Belgium (to use his word) by belonging to France, would remove what had been the fource of all Wars for two centuries paft, and the Rhine, being the natural boundary of France, would enfure e the tranquillity of Europe for two centuries to come. I did not feel it necessary to combat this prepofterous doctrine; I contented myfelf with reminding him of what he had faid to me in one of our laft conferences, when he made a comparifon of the weak nefs of France under its Monarchs, and its strength and vigour under its Republican Form of Government. "Nous ne jommes plus dans la Decrepitude de la France Monar❤ chique, mais dans toute la Force d'une Republique adolefcente," was his expreflion; and I inferred from this, according to his own reafoning, that the force and power France had acquired by its change of Government was much greater than it could derive from any acquifition of territory; and that

it followed, if France, when under a regal form of Government, was a very just and conftant object of attention, not to fay of jealoufy, to the other Powers of Europe, France (admitting his axiom) was a much more reasonable object of jealoufy and attention under its prefent Conftitution than it ever had yet been, and that no addition to its dominions could be feen by its neighbours but under impreffions of alarm for their own future fafety and for the general tranquillity of Europe. M. Delacroix's anfwer to this was fo remarkable, that I muft beg leave te infert it in what I believe to be nearly his own words. "Dans le Tems Revolutionaire tout ce que vous dites, my Lord, etcit vrai-rien negaloit notre Puiffance; mais ce tems n'existe plus. Nous ne pouvons plus lever la Nation en Maffe pour voler au Secours de la Patrie en danger. Nous ne pouvons plus engager nos Concitoyens d'ouvrir leurs Bourfes pour les verfer dans le Trefor National, et de fe priver meme du néceffaire pour le Bien de la Chofe Publique." And he ended by faying, that the French Republic, when at Peace, neceffarily must become the moft quiet and pacific Power in Europe. I only obferved, that in this cafe the paffage of the Republic from youth to decrepitude had been very fudden; but that ftill I never could admit that it could be a matter of indifference to its neighbours, much lefs one neceffary fecurity to itfelf, to acquire fuch a very extenfire addition to its Frontiers as that he had hinted at.

This led Monf. Delacroix to talk of offering an equivalent to the Emperor for the Auftrian Netherlands, and it was to be found, according to his plan, in the fecularization of the Three Ecclefiaftical Electorates, and feveral Bishopricks in Germany and in Italy.

He talked upon this fubject as one very familiar to him, and on which his thoughts had been frequently employed. He spoke of making new Electors, and named, probably with a view to render his scheme more palatable, the Stadtholder and the Dukes of Brunfwick and Wurtemberg as perfons proper to replace the three Ecclefiafti, cal Electors who were to be re-formed. It would be making an ill use of your Lordship's time to endeavour to repeat to you all he faid on this fub ject; it went in fubftance (as he himself confeffed) to the total fubverfion of the prefent Confiitution of the Germanic

Body; and as it militated directly against the principle which both his Majesty. and the Emperor laid down fo diftinctly as the bafis of the peace to be made. for the Empire, I contented myself with reminding him of this circumstance, particularly as it is impoffible to difcufs this point with any propriety till his Imperial Majefty becomes a party to the negociation. I took this opportunity of hinting, that if on all the other points France agreed to the propofals now made, it would not be impoffible that fome increase of terri tory might be ceded to her on the Germanic fide of her frontiers, and that this, in addition to the Duchy of Savoy, Nice, and Avignon, would be a very great acquifition of ftrength and power. Monfieur Delacroix here again reverted to the Conftitution,and said,that thefe countries were already conftitutionally annexed to France. I replied, that it was impoffible, in the negociation which we were beginning, for the other Powers to take it up from any period but that which immediately preceded the war, and that any acquifition or diminution of territory which had taken place among the Belligerent Powers fince it firft broke out, muft neceffarily become fubject-matter for negociation, and be balanced against each other in the final arrangenient of a general peace. "You then perfifi," faid M. Delacroix, "in applying this principle to Belgium" Fanfwered, "Moft cer tainly; and I should not deal fairly with you if I hefitated to declare, in the outfet of our Negociation, that on this point you must entertain no expectation that his Majefty will relax or ever confent to fee the Netherlands remain a part of France."

M. Delacroix replied, he faw no prof. pect in this cafe of our ideas ever meeting, and he defpaired of the fuccefs of our Negociation. He returned again, however, to his idea of a polible equivalent to be found for the Enperor; but as all he propofed was the alienation or dismemberment of coun tries not belonging to France, even by conqueft, I did not confider it as deferving attention, and it is certainly not worth repeating to your Lohip.

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I need not obferve that all the equi valents propofed, however inadequate to the exchange, were offered s return for our confent hat the Neil. rlauds fhould remain part of France; of course the admitting them in try

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tive Allies.

On the articles referving a right to the Court of St. Petersburgh, and to that of Lisbon, to accede to the Treaty of Peace on the ftrict Status ante Bel lum, the French Minifter made no other remark than by mentioning the Allies of the Republic, and by enquiring whether I was prepared to fay any thing relative to their interefts, which certainly the Republic could never abandon. This afforded me the opportanity of giving in the Confidential Memorial B. relative to Spain and Holland, and I prefaced it by repeating to him the fubftance of the first part of your Lordthip's No. 12.

Although I had touched upon the fubject of the Spanith part of Sr. Domingo, when I had been speaking to M. Delacroix on the Peace with France, yet, as it did not become a matter of difcuffion between us till I came to mention the Peace with Spain, I thought it better to place all that pased on the fubject in this part of my

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difpatch; it was the only point on which he entered, but I by no means infer from his not bringing forward fome claims for Spain, that we are not to hear of any in the courfe of the Negociation; on the contrary, I have little doubt that many, and most of them inadmiffible, will be made before it can end. He, however, was filent on them at this moment, and confined all he had to fay to combating the idea that Spain was bound by the Treaty of Utrecht not to alienate her poffeffions in America. I had the Article copied in my pocket, and I read it to him. He confeffed it was clear and explicit, but that circumstances had fo materially altered fince the year 1713, that engageinents made then ought not to be confidered as in force now. 1 faid that the fpirit of the Article itself went to provide for diftant contingencies, not for what was expected to happen at or near the time when the Treaty was made, and that it was becaufe the alteration of circumftances he alluded to was forefeen as poffible, that the claufe was inferted; and that if Spain paid any regard to the faith of Treaties, the muft confider herself as no lefs ftri&tly bound by this claufe now, than at the moment when it was drawn up. I went on by saying, that it did not, however, appear quite impollible that this point might be fettled without much difficulty; and that means might be devised that his Catholic Majefty fhould not break his faith, and both England and France be equally fatisfied. I then held out to him, but in general terms, that either Spain might regain her part of St. Do mingo, by making fome confiderable ceflion to Great Britain and France, as the price of Peace, or that, in return for leaving the whole of St. Domingo to France, we should retain either Marti-.. nico cr St. Lucia and Tobago. M. Delacroix liftened with a degree of attention to thefe propofals, but he was fearful of committing himself by any expreffion of approbation, and he dif miffed the fubject of the Court of Madrid, by obferving, that France never would forfake the interefts of its Allies.

Our converfation on thofe of its other Ally, Holland, was much longer, as the wording of the Memorial inevitably led at once deep into the subject.

M. Delacroix affected to treat any deviation from the Treaty of Peace

concluded

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