Attorneys to be Admitted.-Correspondence.-Notes of the Week.-Court of Chancery. 133 Freeman, Stonehewer Parker, 16, Norfolk-crescent, Hyde-park; and Coleman-street Munby, John Forth, 24, University-street; and Clifton, near York. Parker, Francis, 6, Frederick's-place, Old Jewry; and Worcester Sandys, Edwin, 9, Bedford-place, Russell-square. To whom Articled, Assigned, &c. F. Deacon, Preston T. Brown, Newcastle-upon-Tyne; W. C. Bousfield. T. H. Bothamley, Coleman-street J. Munby, York J. Parker, Worcester J.T. Cookney, 5, Lamb's-Conduit-place Notice of Application for Re-admission on the last day of Hilary Term, 1855. SELECTIONS FROM CORRESPONDENCE. CONFLICTING ENACTMENTS AS TO RECO VERING ARREARS OF RENT. By the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27, s. 42, no arrears of rent shall be recovered by distress or suit, but within six years after the same shall become due. By the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 3, all actions of debt for rent on an indenture of demise must be commenced within ten years after the end of that Session, or 20 years after the cause of action. On these apparently conflicting enactments, it was held, in Paget v. Foley, 2 Bing. N. C. 679, that, as to action for rent on an indenture of demise, the latter Act (having last received the Royal Assent) must prevail. AMICUS. Mr. John Atkinson has been appointed Clerk to the Burial Board of the town of Whitehaven. Mr. W. Corbett, jun., has been elected Auditor for the Shropshire and Montgomery Poor Law Audit Districts, in the room of Mr. Fisher, deceased. Mr. Henry Hough has been elected one of the Coroners for the county of Rutland, in the room of Mr. J. E. Jones, deceased. EXCHEQUER OF PLEAS. We are informed that the Sittings at Nisi Prius in Term in London will be abandoned during next Term, it having been found that the system is one which tends to impede the business in Banco more than it advances that at Nisi Prius. SOLICITORS ELECTED AS MAYORS. Northampton, Mr. William Dennis. Kidderminster, Mr. Henry Saunders, sen. Tynemouth, Mr. John W. Mayson, of North Shields. RECENT DECISIONS IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS. Court of Chancery. (Coram Lord Chancellor and Lords Justices.) In re Pennant and Craigwen Consolidated Lead Mining Company, exparte Mayhew. Dec. 4, 1854. TRANSFEROR'S Power was given, under the deed of settlement transferred by such form to the appellant, but no notice in writing was given to the purser, but the parties went to him with the transfer and he entered it: Held, confirming the decision of Vice-Chancellor Stuart, that the appellant's name was rightly on the list of contributories upon the company being wound up, although at the time of the transfer the company was in an embarrassed state. THIS was an appeal from the decision 'of Vice-Chancellor Stuart, from which it appeared that the appellant's name had been placed by the Master on the list of contributories to 134 Superior Courts: Court of Chancery.—V. C. Kindersley.-V. C. Stuart. plaintiff to enter an appearance for a defendant upon his not appearing within three weeks after being served with a copy bill of revivor. Bromehead in support. The Vice-Chancellor said, that an order might Brian v. Twigg. Nov. 9, 1854. the above company, in respect of 65 shares Malins and Cairns in support; Bacon and W. Hislop Clarke for Mr. Sudbury; Roxburgh for the official manager. The Court said, that there was no doubt whatever but that the appellant had taken the shares from Sudbury, and had placed himself, as far as the company was concerned, in his position. The case could not be distinguished from Fenn's case, 22 Law J., N. S., Ch., 692, which decided that a shareholder transferring his shares had absolved himself from all responsibility under the 24th section of the Winding-up Act, and the observations of Lord St. Leonards in the case of Cape's Executor, 2 De G., M'N. & G. 562, were in principle to the same effect. The deed of partnership provided that a partner should be at liberty to transfer his shares, and this must necessarily mean that the transferee was to be put in the place of the transferor, and this was confirmed by the language of the transfer which conveyed to the transferee everything possessed by the transferor in the company. But independently of this, the mere fact of a partner being empowered to transfer carried with it all the rights and liabilities of the transferring shareholder and substituted the other in his place. The appeal would therefore be dismissed. Vice-Chancellor Kindersley. An order was made under the 29th Order of 1 Which provides, that "if any defendant, not appearing to be an infant or a person of weak or unsound mind, unable of himself to defend the suit, is, when within the jurisdiction DEATH OF COMMITTEE OF LUNATIC DE FENDANT After decrEE, SUBSTITUTION An order was made on motion, substituting cree. stute the name of the new committee of a lunatic order as asked. Vice-Chancellor Stuart. In re Cabell. Nov. 24, 1854. An order was made on petition for payment THIS was a petition for the payment out of Court of two sums of 80l. and 50%. odd, to bill of the Court, duly served with" a copy Superior Courts: V. C. Stuart.-V. C. Wood.-Queen's Bench. 135 but that none of the cestuis que trustent were which two married women were entitled and G. W. Collins in support. The Vice-Chancellor made the order as asked, on the authority of Wadbury v. Yorke, Reg. lib. 1851. Fudge v. Pitt. Dec. 7, 1854. DEATH OF SOLE PLAINTIFF AFTER VOLUN- In a suit seeking a declaration, that an infant THIS was a motion, pursuant to notice, under the 63rd Order of May 8, 1845,' for an order on the legal personal representatives of the plaintiff in this suit to revive the same within 14 days, or that it be dismissed. It appeared that the suit was instituted to obtain a declaration that the defendant, an infant, was trustee for the plaintiff, who had purchased certain stock with her own money in their joint names, and that the defendant had appeared by her guardian and answered voluntarily, but that the plaintiff had died before any subsequent proceedings were taken. G. W. Collins in support. The Vice-Chancellor said, that the order would be made as asked. Vice-Chancellor Wood. Read v. Prest. Nov. 8, 1854. SUIT TO SET ASIDE SETTLEMENT AGAINST In a suit against the trustees to set aside a Which provides, that "in cases where a suit abates by the death of a sole plaintiff, the Court, upon motion of any defendant made on notice served on the legal personal representative of the deceased plaintiff, may order that such representative do revive the suit within a limited time, or that the bill be dismissed." Rolt and Webb, for the plaintiff, referred to the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 42, rule 9.1 Parkinson v. Chambers. Nov. 11, 1854. The plaintiff in a suit to redeem a mortgage UPON the death of the plaintiff in this suit, The Vice-Chancellor made the order as asked, but refused to direct the 17. stamp affixed to the present petition to be returned. Court of Queen's Bench. Regina v. Justices of Walsall. Nov. 23, 1854. LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1854, ON JUSTICES Notice of application for a licence was given 1 Which enacts, that "in all suits concerning real or personal estate which is vested in trustees under a will, settlement, or otherwise, such trustees shall represent the persons beneficially interested under the trust, in the same manner and to the same extent as the executors or administrators in suits concerning personal estate represent the persons beneficially interested in such personal estate; and in such cases it shall not be necessary to make the persons beneficially interested under the trusts parties to the suit; but the Court may, upon consideration of the matter, on the hearing, if it shall so think fit, order such persons or any of them, to be made parties." 2 Which enacts, that "upon application by motion for any writ of mandamus in the Court 136 Superior Courts: Queen's Bench.-Exchequer. Huddleston, in support, objected to its admission, and contended it should have been brought up on certiorari. instance for a mandamus on the defendants, to hear and determine on the application under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, of Joseph Whitehouse for a licence to sell exciseable liquors. It appeared The Court said that the verification by affithat notice of the application had been duly davit was sufficient, but, without deciding the given under section 10, but that on the licens- other objection of the Commissioner not veriing day the defendants had come to a resolu-fying the conviction, said, that the question tion not to entertain any more applications for new licences. Hodgson in support of the rule, against which Huddleston showed cause in the first instance. The Court said, that the justices must hear before they exercised their discretion, as there might be many things material to be known which did not appear on the notices, and a peremptory mandamus must therefore be awarded. Caurt of Exchequer. In re Alison. Nov. 21, 1854. WARRANT OF COMMITMENT BY JUSTICES was, whether the Court of Queen's Bench had laid down an erroneous proposition in presuming a good conviction, and whether the warrant Iwas open to objection against its form. It was clear the justices had adopted the form under the 11 & 12 Vict., which was prescribed in order to extricate justices from these objections, and the rule would be discharged. It was, however, of course open to the defendant, if any defect existed in the conviction, to bring it up by certiorari to quash it. Rogers v. Hunt. Nov. 25, 1854. UNDER 11 & 12 VICT. c. 43.-VERIFICA- SPECIAL INDORSEMENT OF EXPENSES OF TION OF CONVICTION. Upon an objection being taken to a warrant of commitment in the form given by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, the formal conviction was not drawn up, and an application was afterwards made to the Court of Queen's Bench for a habeas corpus on the ground the warrant did not show the conviction took place at a place where the justices usually held petty sessions, but that Court held that a good conviction would be presumed, and refused a rule. On a rule being granted here, a good conviction was produced verified by affidavit: Held, that the verification by affidavit was sufficient without bringing it up by certiorari, and that as the justices had adopted the form in the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, the objection must be overruled. THIS was a rule nisi for a writ of habeas corpus to bring up the body of Joseph Alison, who had been convicted by two justices of an aggravated assault and sentenced to six months' imprisonment with hard labour. It appeared that the warrant of commitment was made out in the form given in the Schedule to the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, but that on an objection being taken on the ground that it did not show the prisoner was convicted at a place where the petty sessions were usually held, no formal conviction was drawn up. An application was then made to the Court of Queen's Bench for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground of the warrant not showing the justices had jurisdiction, but the rule was refused, the Court holding that a good conviction on which the warrant was framed would be presumed. Scotland showed cause, and produced a good conviction verified by affidavit, but it appeared the conviction was not verified by the signature of the Commissioner administering the oath. of Queen's Bench, the rule may in all cases be absolute in the first instance, if the Court shall think fit." NOTING IN ACTION ON BILL OF EXCHANGE, UNDER COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1852. In an action on a bill of exchange, the plaintiff specially indorsed under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 25, for the balance of prin cipal, interest, and expenses of noting due thereon. No appearance was entered until after the time for so doing had expired and earlier in the day than the plaintiff signed judgment: Held, discharging a rule nisi to rescind a Judge's order, setting aside the judgment, that the plaintiff could not specially indorse the expenses of noting, but must declare. In this action on a bill of exchange, it ap peared that the writ of summons was specially indorsed, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 25, for the balance of principal, interest, and expenses of noting due thereon. Judgment was signed in Nov. 4 last, but an appearance had been entered in an earlier part of the day, although the time for entering an appearance expired on the 25th October. An order had been made by Martin, B., at Chambers, setting aside the judgment, and this rule wisi had thereupon been obtained to rescind such order. Dowdeswell showed cause against the rule, which was supported by Doyle. The Court said, that the plaintiff could not recover the expenses of noting the bill as a liquidated demand, but only the interest, and the indorsement was therefore a nullity, and he must declare. The rule would therefore be discharged. 1 Which enacts, that "in all cases where the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of the Court, and the claim is for a debt or liquidated demand in money, with or without interest, arising upon a contract, express or implied, as for instance upon a bill of exchange," &c., the plaintiff shall be at liberty to make upon the writ of summons and copy thereof a special indorsement of the particulars of his claim.” The Legal Observer, AND SOLICITORS' JOURNAL -"Still attorneyed at your service."-Shakespeare. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1854. HONOURS AND EMOLUMENTS OF commenced. It appears by the Roll of THE PROFESSION. COMPARATIVE STATE OF THE TWO BRANCHES. Attorneys kept at the Registry of the Incorporated Law Society, and from the Stamp Office returns, that the stamped certificates issued between 15th November, It has been long assumed that the emo-1843, and 15th November, 1844, were luments of the Legal Profession are very 9,900; and that from 15th November, large, if not enormous, and fully propor- 1852, to 15th November, 1853, the numtioned to the services rendered by its member was 9,896.1 bers to the clients who employ them. It is a matter dependent, not on presumption, but experience, that according to the amount of the emoluments and honours of a Profession will be the competition to enter it; and it may not, therefore, be useless to notice the increasing number of the practitioners in both branches of the Profession during the progress of the various "Reforms" (as they are called) or alterations, -sometimes real amendments, but too often mischievous changes,-which have taken place within the last 24 years. In the year 1830, the number of the members of the Bar was 1,194, being an increase of 30 per cent. during 10 years; and the number of Attorneys and Solicitors 7,508, being an increase of 16 per cent. Since that time down to 1850 the population has increased 27 per cent., and estimating the amount of wealth by the increase of the number of inhabited houses, the increase of wealth was 30 per cent. There are two inferences to be drawn from these facts. 1st. That the attraction to the higher branch of the Profession has increased nearly twofold, whilst the inducement to join the second branch of the Profession has actually declined, more especially in reference to the increase of wealth and population, and consequently that the honours and emoluments of the Bar are believed by the Public to preponderate over the other branch, by little short of a hundred per cent. 2ndly. We may infer that the stationary or declining state of the Attorneys and Solicitors, in point of number, must be ascribed to the conviction by the community in general, that the emoluments of that department of the Profession are largely diminished, and consequently the sons of bankers, merchants, and manufacturers are placed in other more profitable vocations and employments. It may be worthy of consideration, both From the year 1830 to 1840 the Bar had by the public at large and by the governincreased 46 per cent., and from 1840 to ment and judicial authorities, whether part of 1850 no less than 86 per cent. In the this result has not been injuriously produced latter year they numbered 3,400. The by the practice in recent times of bestowing number of Attorneys and Solicitors increas- legal offices of honour on members of the ed from 1830 to 1840 at the rate of 32 per Bar only, to the exclusion of Attorneys and cent, but in the last 10 years less than one per cent. In fact, the number of certificated Attorneys was four less in 1853 than in 1843, when the annual registration VOL. XLIX. No. 1,398. In the Law List, Proctors, Notaries, and cetificated Conveyancers are included. In the above statement they are of course excluded. I |