preliminaries at Utrecht, that St. John felt the necessity of discontinuing any general negotiation, and converting it into a private correspondence between the plenipotentiaries of the English and French crowns.* Great difficulty was experienced in coming to an accommodation, in consequence of the rising demands of the French plenipotentiaries, who, deeming themselves secure of support from the English ministry, not only positively refused to abandon Spain and the Indies, but now demanded the Netherlands for the Elector of Bavaria, and the cession of Lille and Tournay in return for the seizure of Dunkirk. The sudden death, however, first of the Dauphiness of France, and then of the dauphin, the former of whom was carried off by a malignant fever on the 12th, the latter on the 18th of February, 1712, followed by the death of their eldest son on the 23d, produced feelings of commiseration for the aged monarch, now in his seventy-third year, and broken down by misfortunes, which rendered the progress of the separate negotiations more easy. England agreed to abandon its allies, and the main object of the war, on condition that a guarantee should be obtained against the crowns of France and Spain being united on the same head. this frail security, and the promised demolition of Dunkirk, the English ministry agreed to withdraw their contingent from the allied army; and to induce the Dutch to follow their example, Ypres was offered to them on the same terms as Dunkirk had been to Great Britain.† So overjoyed was Louis at the signing of these conditions on the part of Bolingbroke, that he immediately sent Queen Anne a present of six splendid dresses, and two thousand five hundred bottles of Champagne.‡ On The disastrous effects of this secret and dishonorable seces * "The French will see that there is a possibility of reviving the love of war in our people, by the indignation that has been expressed at the plan given in at Utrecht."-Mr. Secretary St. John to Brit. Plenip., Dec. 28, 1711. BOLINGBROKE's Corresp., ii., 93. t CoXE, vi., 189, 194. CAPEFIGUE, Louis XIV., vi., 249. 50. Forces of the al sion, on the part of England, from the confederacy, lies and French were soon apparent. Great had been the prepin Flanders, and arations of the continental allies for continuing desperate situation of Louis. the contest; and while the English contingent remained with them, their force was irresistible. Prince Eugene was at the head of the army in Flanders, and, including the British forces under the Duke of Ormond, it amounted to the immense force of one hundred and twenty-two thousand effective men, with one hundred and twenty guns, sixteen howitzers, and an ample pontoon train. To oppose this, by far the largest army the French had yet had to confront in the Low Countries, Villars had scarcely at his command one hundred thousand men, and they were ill equipped, imperfectly supplied with artillery, and grievously depressed in spirit by a long series of disasters. Eugene commanded the forces of the confederates; for although the English ministry had been lavish in their promises of unqualified support, the Dutch had begun to entertain serious suspicions of their sincerity, and bestowed the command on that tried officer instead of the Duke of Ormond, who had succeeded Marlborough in the command of the English contingent. But Marlborough's soul still directed the movements of the army; and Eugene's plan of the campaign was precisely that which that great commander had chalked out at the close of the preceding one. This was to besiege Quesnoy and Landrecies, the last of those fortresses forming the iron barrier of France which in this quarter protected the frontier, and immediately after to inundate the open country, and advance as rapidly as possible to Paris. It was calculated they might reach it in ten marches from Landrecies; and it was well known that there was neither a defensible position nor fortress of any sort to arrest the invaders' march. Already the light horse had overspread the country as far as the Oise, within forty miles of Paris, and a plan had even been formed for surprising the king in his palace of Versailles by a body of hussars, which had very nearly succeeded.* The court of Versailles was in despair; the general opinion was, that the king should leave Paris and retire to Blois; and although the proud spirit of Louis recoiled at such a proposal, yet, in taking leave of Marshal Villars, he declared, "Should a disaster occur, I will go. to Peronne or St. Quentin, collect all my troops, and with risk a last effort, determined to perish or save the state."+ But the French monarch was spared this last desperate alternative. The defection of the British cabinet saved his throne when all his means of defense you 51 The defection of Britain saves France, were exhausted. Eugene, on opening the cam- May 10. paign on the 1st of May, anxiously inquired of the Duke of Ormond whether he had authority to act vigorously in the campaign, and received an answer that he had the same authority as the Duke of Marlborough, and was prepared to join in attacking the enemy. Preparations were immediately made for forcing the enemy's lines, which covered Quesnoy, previous to an attack on that fortress. But at the very time that this was going on, the work of perfidious defection was consummated. On the 10th of May, Mr. Secretary St. John sent positive orders to Ormond to take no part in any general engagement, as the questions at issue between the contending parties were on the point of adjustment. Intimation of this *La Scarpe une fois passée, toute la province de Picardie fut couverte de partisans ennemies; on vit des hussards Allemands sur les bords de l'Oise, des hardis cavaliers vinrent même à quelquis lieues de Versailles pour effrayer le vieux monarque, dans son palais de Versailles, plein de grandeur et de merveilles.-CAPEFIGUE, Louis XIV., vi., 147, 148. ↑ Mém. de Villars, ii., 197. "Her majesty, my lord, has reason to believe that we shall come to an agreement upon the great article of the union of the monarchies as soon as a courier sent from Versailles to Madrid can return. It is, therefore, the queen's positive command to your grace that you avoid engaging in any siege, or hazarding a battle, till you have further orders from her majesty. I am, at the same time, directed to let your grace know that you are to disguise the receipt of this order; and her majesty thinks you can not want pretenses for conducting yourself, without owning that which might at present have an ill effect if it was publicly known. P.S.-I had almost forgot to tell your grace that communication is made of this order to the court of France, private order was sent to the court of France, but it was directed to be kept a positive secret from the allied generals. Ormond, upon the receipt of these orders, opened a private correspondence with Villars, informing him that their troops were no longer enemies, and that the future movements of the forces under his command would only be to get forage and provisions. noy, July 16. This correspondence was unknown to Eugene; but circum52. stances soon brought the defection of England to Siege and capture of Ques- light. In the middle of it, the allied forces had passed the Scheldt, and taken post between Noyeller and the Boiase, close to Villars's position. To bring the sincerity of the English to a test, Eugene proposed a general attack on the enemy's lines, which was open and exposed, on the 28th of May. But Ormond declined, requesting the operation might be delayed for a few days. The defection was now apparent, and the Dutch deputies loudly condemned such dishonorable conduct; but Eugene, anxious to make the most of the presence of the British troops, though their co-operation could no longer be relied on, proposed to besiege Quesnoy, which was laid open by Villars's retreat. Ormond, who felt acutely the painful and discreditable situation in which, without any fault of his own, he was placed, could not refuse, and the investment took place that very day. The operations were conducted by the Dutch and Imperial troops alone; and the town was taken, after a siege of six weeks, on the 16th of July.* 53. dignation cites in the By This disgraceful defection on the part of the English government excited, as well it might, the utmost inUniversal in dignation among the allies, and produced mingled which this ex- feelings of shame and mortification among all real allied powers. patriots or men of honor in Great Britain. abandoning the contest in this manner, when it was on the so that if Marshal de Villars takes, in any private way, notice of it to you, your grace will answer it accordingly."-Mr. Secretary St. John to the Duke of Ormond, May 10, 1712. BOLINGBROKE's Correspondence, ii., 320. *Eugene to Marlborough, June 9, 1712. Coxe, vi., 199. very point of being crowned with success, the English lost the fruit of TEN costly and bloody campaigns, and suffered the war to terminate without attaining the main object for which it had been undertaken. Louis XIV., defeated, and all but ruined, was permitted to retain for his grandson the Spanish succession; and England, victorious and within sight, as it were, of Paris, was content to halt in the career of victory, and lost the opportunity, never to be regained for a century to come, of permanently restraining the ambition of France. It was the same as if, a few days after the battle of Waterloo, England had concluded a separate peace, guaranteeing the throne of Spain to Joseph Bonaparte, and providing only for its not being held also by the Emperor of France. 54. Eloquent Speech of Lord Halifax against the peace in the House of Peers. Lord Halifax gave vent to the general indignation of all generous and patriotic men, when he said, in the debate on the address, on the 28th of May, after enumerating the proud list of victories which, since the commencement of the war, had attended the arms of England, "But all this pleasing prospect is totally effaced by the orders given to the queen's general not to act offensively against the enemy. I pity that heroic and gallant general, who, on other occasions, took delight to charge the most formidable corps and strongest squadrons, and can not but be uneasy at his being fettered with shackles, and thereby prevented from reaping the glory which he might well expect from leading on troops so long accustomed to conquer. I pity the allies, who have relied upon the aid and friendship of the British nation, perceiving that what they had done at so great an expense of blood and treasure is of no effect, as they will be exposed to the revenge of that power against whom they have been so active. I pity the queen, her royal successors, and the present and future generations of Britain, when they shall find the nation deeply involved in debt, and that the common enemy who occasioned it, though once near being sufficiently humbled, does still triumph, and design their ruin; and are informed that this proceeds from the conduct |