of the Norken. This sharp blow convinced the French leaders that a general action was unavoidable; and though, from the vigor with which it had been struck, there remained but little hope of overpowering the allied advanced guard before the main body came up, yet they resolved, contrary to the opinion of Vendôme, who had become seriously alarmed, to persist in the attack, and risk all on the issue of a general engagement.* 40. Forces on both sides, and com mencement of It was four in the afternoon when the French commenced the action in good earnest. The forces of the contending parties were nearly equal, with a slight superiority on the part of the French; they had the battle. eighty-five thousand, Marlborough eighty thousand men.† The Duke of Burgundy, who had a joint command with Vendôme, ordered General Grimaldi to lead Sistern's squadron across the Norken, apparently with the view of feeling his way preparatory to a general attack. That general set out to do so; but when, after passing the Norken, and arriving on the margin of the rivulet of Diepenbeck, he saw the Prussian cavalry already formed on the other side, he fell back to the small plain near the mill of Royeghem. Vendôme, meanwhile, directed his left to advance, deeming that the most favorable side for an attack; but the Duke of Burgundy, who nominally had the supreme command, and who was jealous of Vendôme's reputation, countermanded this order, alleging that an impassable morass separated the two armies in that quarter. These contradictory orders produced indecision in the French lines; and Marlborough, divining its cause, instantly took advantage of it. Judging with reason that the real attack of the enemy would be made on his left by their right, on his own left wing, in front of the castle of Bevere, he ordered up the twelve battalions of foot under Cadogan from Heurne and Eynes, which they occupied, to re-enforce the left. In the mean time, he placed a strong guard on the bridges of the Norken, and disposed musketeers in the woods on its sides. Marlborough himself, at the head of the Prussian horse, advanced by Heurne, and took post on the right flank of the little plain of Diepenbeck, where it was evident that the heat of the action would ensue. A reserve of twenty British battalions, with a few guns, was stationed under Argyle, near Schaerken, which proved of the most essential service in the ensuing struggle. Few pieces of artillery were brought up on either side, the rapidity of the movements of both having outstripped the slow pace at which those ponderous implements of destruction were then conveyed.* 988 of the Hardly were these defensive arrangements completed when 41. the tempest was upon them. The whole French Brilliant suc- right wing, consisting of thirty battalions, embracFrench right. ing the French and Swiss guards, and the flower of their army, debouched from the woods and hedges near Groenvelde, and attacking four battalions stationed there, quickly compelled them to retreat. Advancing then in the open plain by echelon, the right in front, along the downward bed of the Norken, they followed up their advantage with the utmost vigor. The action ran like a running fire along the course of this stream; the French constantly pressing on and outflanking the allies, till they completely turned their left, and made themselves masters of the hamlets of Barwaen and Barlancy. Their advance entirely uncovered the allied-left. Already the cries of victory were heard in the French right, which advanced in good order through the tangled and broken ground around those villages, with a rapid and well-sustained fire issuing from its ranks. This success exposed the allies to imminent danger; for in their rear was the Scheldt, flowing lazily in a deep and impassable current, through * Marlborough to Count Piper, 15th of July, 1708. Disp., iv., 115. COXE, iv., 144, 145. KAUSLER, 713. marshy meadows, crossed only by a few bridges, over which retreat would be impossible in of a victorious enemy; presence and the defeat already sustained by the left exposed them to the danger of being cut off from the friendly ramparts of Oudenarde, their only resource in that direction.* This alarming success of the French attracted the immediate attention of the vigilant English general. He 42. instantly hastened in person to the scene of danger of Eugene Operations on the right. on the left, where the Dutch and Hanoverians were, dispatching Eugene to take the command on the right, where the British troops, whose valor the prince had often observed and praised, were posted. Marlborough then directed Count Lottnow, with his twenty battalions, to extend his right to support Eugene; so that the Imperial general had now sixty battalions under his orders, while Marlborough had only twenty left. This re-enforcement came up just in time; for the prince was at first assailed by such superior numbers that he was wellnigh overwhelmed. Cadogan's men, under his orders, had been driven, after a stout resistance, out of the wooded coverts which they occupied near Herlelem, and were retiring somewhat in disorder over the plain in its front. Re-enforced, however, by the twenty battalions under Lottnow, Eugene again advanced in good order, and broke the first line of the enemy. General Natzmer, at the head of the Prussian cuirassiers, took advantage of their disorder, and charged headlong through the second line of the enemy's left, so as to reach the little plain near the chapel of Royeghem. But here their career was stopped by a line of the French Horse-guards in reserve, while a dreadful fire of musketry streamed out of every hedgerow and copse with which the plain was environed. Half his men were speedily stretched on the plain; the remainder recoiled in disorder, and Natzmer himself with difficulty escaped by leaping over a broad ditch, while the French household troops were thundering in pursuit.† * KAUSLER, 714. CoxE, iv., 140-145. COXE, iv., 146, 147. KAUSLER, 717, 718. 13. borough on the left. While Eugene was thus combating with various success on the right, Marlborough had a more arduous conAnd of Marl flict to maintain on the left. Placing himself at the head of the Dutch and Hanoverian battalions, which were with difficulty maintaining their ground against the advancing line and increasing vehemence of the enemy, the English general led them again to the attack. But it is no easy matter to make the French recede from the enthusiasm of victory to the hesitation which precedes defeat. They opposed a most desperate resistance to this onset. The ground on which the hostile lines met was so broken, that the battle in that quarter turned almost into a series of partial conflicts, and even personal encounters. Every bridge, every ditch, every wood, every hamlet, every inclosure, was obstinately contested; and so incessant was the roll of musketry, and so intermingled did the hostile lines become, that the field, seen from a distance, appeared an unbroken line of fire. If the resistance, however, was obstinate, the attack was no less vigorous; and at length the enthusiastic ardor of the French yielded to the steady valor of the Germans. Gradually they were driven back, literally at the bayonet's point; and at length, recoiling at every point, they yielded all the ground they had won at the commencement of the action.* Barlancy and Barwaen were soon regained, but not without the most desperate resistance; for not only did enemy obstinately contest every field and inclosure, but, in their fury, they set fire to such of the houses as could no longer be maintained. Despite all these obstacles, however, the English fairly drove them back, at the musket's point, from one inclosure to another, till they reached the hamlet of Diepenbeck, where the resistance proved so violent that he was compelled to pause. His vigilant eye, however, ere long observed that the hill of Oycke, which flanked the enemy's extreme right, was unoccupied. Conceiving that their right might be turned by this 44. Decisive movement by Marlborough against the French left. the * Coxe, iv., 146, 147. KAUSLER, 718. eminence, he directed Overkirk, with the reserve cavalry, and twenty Dutch and Danish battalions, to occupy it. The veteran general executed this important, and, as it proved, decisive movement with his wonted alacrity and spirit. The wooded dells round the castle of Bevere soon rang with musketry; the enemy, forced out of them, were driven over the shoulder of the Bosercanter, which being soon passed, the mill of Oycke, and the plateau behind it, were immediately occupied by the Danish and Dutch battalions.* 45. Vigor with which it was executed by Overkirk, who entirely Arrived on the summit, Overkirk made his men bring up their left shoulders, so as to wheel inward, and form a vast semicircle round the right wing of the French, which, far advanced beyond the center, was now thrown back, and grouped into the little plain of turns them. Diepenbeck. Observing the effect of this movement, Marlborough directed Overkirk to press forward his left still further, so as to seize the passes of Mullem and mill of Royeghem, by which the communication between the enemy's right and center was maintained. This order was executed with vigor and success by the Prince of Orange and General Oxenstiern. The progress of the extreme allied left round the rear of the French right was observed by the frequent flashes of their musketry on the heights above Mullem, to which they began to descend, driving the enemy before them with loud cheers, which re-echoed over the whole field of battle. The victory was now gained. Refluent from all quarters, enveloped on every side, the whole French right was hurled together, in wild confusion, into the plain of Diepenbeck, where seven regiments of horse, which made a noble effort to stem the flood. of disaster, were all cut to pieces or taken. 46. Gallant but in Seeing his right wing on the verge of destruction, Vendôme made a gallant effort to rescue it. Dismounting from his horse, he led the infantry of his left near Mullem, to the aid of their devoted comrades. But the thick and frequent inclosures broke their array; *KAUSLER, 715. CoXE, iv., 146, 147. effectual ef forts of Ven dôme to arrest the disorder. |