His address

with that

This adroit compliment from a commander so great and justly celebrated, produced an immediate effect on 9. the Swedish monarch, who was passionately desirous and success of military glory. His satisfaction was visible in his monarch. countenance, and he returned a gracious answer in these terms: "The Queen of Great Britain's letter and your person are both very acceptable to me, and I shall always have the utmost regard for the interposition of her Britannic majesty and the interests of the Grand Alliance. It is much against my will that I have been obliged to give umbrage to any of the parties engaged in it. I have had just cause to come into this country with my troops; but you may assure the queen, my sister, that my design is to depart from hence as soon as I have obtained the satisfaction I demand, but not till then. However, I shall do nothing that can tend to the prejudice of the common cause in general, or of the Protestant religion, of which I shall always glory to be a zealous protector." This favorable answer was immediately followed by an invitation to dine with the king, who placed him at his right hand, and honored him with the most flattering attention. In the course of the evening the conversation turned chiefly on military matters, in which Marlborough exerted himself with such skill and success, that he obtained another long private audience of Charles; and before his departure, that monarch even exceeded his views by declaring that there could be no security for the peace of Europe till France was reduced to the rank she held at the date of the treaty of Westphalia.

10.

with which he Singular skill

avoided rous

Though the address and abilities of Marlborough, however, had thus removed the chief danger to be apprehended from the presence of the Swedish monarch at Dresden, yet other matters of great delicacy remained behind for adjustment, requiring all his prudence and skill to bring to a satisfactory issue. Not the least of these difficulties arose from the zeal of the King of Swe

ing religious

differences,

doubt by Lediard, who was then in Saxony, and gives it verbatim.-Seo LEDIARD, ii., 126.

den for the protection of the Protestant religion, and his desire to revive and secure the privileges granted to the German Protestants by the treaty of Westphalia. As Marlborough justly apprehended that the court of Vienna might take umbrage at these demands, and so be diverted from the objects of the Grand Alliance, he exerted himself to the utmost to convince his majesty that the great object in the mean time, even as regarded the Protestant faith, was to humble the French monarch, who had shown himself its inveterate enemy by the atrocious persecutions consequent on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes; and that, if this were once done, the emperor would be unable to prevent the insertion of the requisite stipulations in favor of the Reformed faith in the general treaty of peace which would follow. Charles was convinced by these arguments, which, in truth, were well founded, and even went so far as to propose a secret convention with England for the promotion of the Protestant interest: a proposal most embarrassing at the moment when Great Britain was in close alliance with the emperor, which Marlborough contrived to elude with admirable dexterity.

11.

His satisfac

Another matter of great delicacy was the conduct to be observed toward the dethroned King of Poland, Autory arrange- gustus, who was also at Dresden, and of course viewed the close intimacy between Marlborough

ment of the difficulties regarding Poland.

and his formidable enemy Charles with the utmost jealousy. But here, also, the diplomatic skill of the English general overcame all difficulties; for by skillfully taking advantage of the pecuniary embarrassments into which the king had fallen after his territories had been ravaged and exhausted by the Swedish forces, and by engaging that the emperor should take a large part of the Polish forces into his pay, he succeeded at once in gaining over the dethroned monarch, and securing a considerable body of fresh troops for the service of the allies. By these means, aided by judiciously bestowing on Count Piper and the chief Swedish ministers considerable pensions, which were paid in advance, Marlborough succeeded in

He

entirely allaying the storm that had threatened his rear. accordingly left the Saxon capital, after a residence of ten days, perfectly confident in the pacific intentions of the Swedish monarch, and having fully divined the intended direction of his forces toward Moscow.*

of the allied

The brilliant success with which this delicate and impor tant negotiation had been concluded, naturally in- 12. duced a hope that vigorous operations would be ousies and proRenewed jealundertaken by the allied powers, and that the crastinations great successes of the preceding campaign would powers. be so far improved as to compel the court of France to submit to such terms as the peace of Europe, and the independence of the adjoining states, required. The result, however, was quite the reverse, and Marlborough had again the indescribable mortification of seeing month after month of the summer of 1707 glide away, without a single measure conducive to the success of the common cause, or worthy of the real strength of the allied powers, having been attempted. They had all relapsed into their former and fatal jealousies and procrastination. The Dutch, notwithstanding the inestimable services which Marlborough had rendered to their republic, had again become distrustful, and authorized their field-deputies to thwart and mar all his operations. They made no secret of their resolution, that their interests being now secured, the blood and treasure of the United Provinces should no longer be expended on enterprises in which the emperor or Queen of England was alone concerned.

13.

Marlborough near Nivelles,

They never failed, accordingly, to interfere when any aggressive movement was in contemplation. Even when the duke, in the course of his skillful march- uties thwart The Dutch depes and countermarches, had gained the opportunity for which he longed, of bringing the enemy to 27th May. an engagement on terms approaching to an equality, they never failed to interpose with their fatal negative, and prevent any thing being attempted. They did this, in particu

* COXE, iii., 174-182.

lar, under the most vexatious circumstances, on the 27th of May, near Nivelles, where Marlborough had brought his troops into the presence of the enemy with every prospect of signalizing the place by a glorious victory. A council of war was held, which forbade the engagement in spite of Marlborough's most earnest entreaties, and compelled him, in consequence, to fall back on Branheim, to protect Louvain and Brussels. The indignation of the English general at this un worthy treatment, and at the universal selfishness of the allied powers, exhaled in bitter terms in his private correspondence.*

The

Which causes

to be wasted in useless maneuvers.

consequence of this determination on the part of the 14. Dutch field-deputies to prevent the undertaking of the campaign any serious operation was, that the whole summer passed away in a species of armed truce, or a series of maneuvers too insignificant to entitle them to the name of a campaign. Vendôme, who commanded the French, though at the head of a gallant army above eighty thousand strong, had too much respect for his formidable antagonist to hazard any offensive operations, or run the risk of a pitched battle, unless in defense of his own territory. On the other hand, Marlborough, harassed by the incessant opposition of the Dutch deputies, and yet not strong enough to undertake any operation of importance without the support of their troops, was reduced to merely nominal or defensive efforts. The secret of this ruinous system, which was, at the time, the subject of loud complaints, and appeared wholly inexplicable, is now fully revealed by the published dispatches. The Dutch were absolutely set on getting an accession of territory, and a strong line of barrier towns to be set apart for

"I can not venture unless I am certain of success; for the inclinations in Holland are so strong for peace, that, if we had the least disadvantage, it would make them act very extravagant. I must own every country we have to do with acts, in my opinion, so contrary to the general good, that it makes me quite weary of serving. The emperor is in the wrong in almost every thing he does."-Marlborough to Godolphin, June 27, 1707. COXE, iii., 261.

them out of the Austrian Netherlands; and as the emperor, not unnaturally, objected to being thus shorn of his territories, as the return for his efforts in favor of European independence, they resolved to thwart all the measures of the allied generals, in the hope that, in the end, they would in this manner prevail in their demands with the allied cabinets.*

15. Disasters of

the allies in

Spain and on

the Rhine.

It was not, however, in the Low Countries alone that the selfish views and jealousies of the allies prevented any operation of importance from being undertaken, and blasted all the fair prospects which the brilliant victories of the preceding campaign had afforded. In Spain, the allies had suffered a fearful reverse by the battle of Almanza, which in a manner ruined the Austrian prospects in the Peninsula, and rendered some operation indispensable to relieve the pressure experienced in that quarter. Peterborough, whose great military abilities had hitherto sustained, nearly alone, their sinking cause in Spain, had been deprived of his command in Catalonia, from that absurd jealousy of foreigners which in every age has formed so marked a feature in the Spanish character. His successor, Lord Galway, was far from possessing his military abilities; and every thing presaged that, unless a great effort was immediately made, the crown of Spain, the prize for which all contended in the war, would be lost to the allied powers. Nor was the aspect of affairs more promising on the Rhine. The Margrave of Baden had died there; and his army, before a successor could be appointed, sustained a signal defeat at Stodhoffen. This disaster having opened the gates of Germany, Marshal Villars,

*

I Dispatches, iii., 142-207. So much were the Dutch alienated from the common cause at this time, and set on acquisitions of their own, that they beheld with undisguised satisfaction the battle of Almanza, and the other disasters in Spain, as likely to render the emperor more tractable in considering their proceedings in Flanders. "The States," says Marlborough, "received the news of this fatal stroke with less concern than I expected. This blow has made so little impression in the great towns in this country, that the generality of the people have shown satisfaction at it rather than otherwise, which I attribute mainly to the aversion to the present government."—Marlborough to Godolphin, May 13, 1707. COXE, iii., 204.

P