communication with his magazines; but he had provided for this by taking six days' provisions for the army with him; and he could now force the French either to fight or to abandon Brussels, and retire toward Antwerp, the allies being between them and France. Still clinging to their fortified lines on the Dyle, and desirous of covering Brussels, they had only occupied the wood of Soignies with their right wing, while the allies occupied all the open country from Genappe to Frischermont and Braine la Leude, with their advanced posts pushed up to La Haye Sainte and Mont St. Jean. The allies now occupied the ground afterward covered by Napoleon's army; the forest of Soignies and approaches to Brussels were guarded by the French. Incalculable were the results of a victory gained in such a position: it was by success gained over an army of half the size that Napoleon established his power in so surprising a manner at Marengo. Impressed with such ideas, Marlborough, on the 18th of August, anxiously reconnoitered the ground, and, finding the front practicable for the passage of troops, moved up his men in three columns to the attack. The artillery was sent to Wavre; the allied columns traversed at right angles the line of march by which Blucher advanced to the support of Wellington on the 18th of June, 1815.

Had Marlborough's orders been executed, it is probable he would have gained a victory which, from the relative position of the two armies, could not but have been decisive; and possibly the 18th of Au

23. Marlborough prepares to at tack the French at Waterloo, 18th August. gust, 1705, might have become as celebrated in history as the 18th of June, 1815. Overkirk, to whom he showed the ground at Over-Ische which he had destined for the scene of attack, perfectly concurred in the expedience of it, and orders were given to bring the artillery forward to commence a cannonade. By the malice or negligence of Slangenberg, who had again violated his express instructions and permitted the baggage to intermingle with the artillery train, the guns had not arrived, and some hours were lost be

fore they could be pushed up. At length, but not till noon, the guns were brought forward, and the troops being in line, Marlborough rode along the front to give his last orders. The English and Germans were in the highest spirits, anticipating certain victory from the relative position of the armies; the French fighting with their faces to Paris, the allies with theirs to Brussels.

24.

But is again

the Dutch

But again the Dutch deputies and generals interposed, alleging that the enemy was too strongly posted to be attacked with any prospect of success. "Gen- thwarted by tlemen," said Marlborough to the circle of gener- deputies. als which surrounded him, "I have reconnoitered the ground, and made dispositions for an attack. I am convinced that conscientiously, and as men of honor, we can not now retire without an action. Should we neglect this opportunity, we must be responsible before God and man. You see the confusion which pervades the ranks of the enemy, and their embarrassment at our maneuvers. I leave you to judge whether we should attack to-day, or wait till to-morrow. It is indeed late; but you must consider that, by throwing up intrench ments during the night, the enemy will render their position far more difficult to force." Murder and massacre," replied Slangenberg. Marlborough, upon this, offered him two English for every Dutch battalion; but this, too, the Dutchman refused, on the plea that he did not understand English. Upon this the duke offered to give him German regiments; but even this was declined, upon the pretense that the attack would be too hazardous. Marlborough, upon this, turned to the deputies and said, "I disdain to send troops to dangers which I will not myself encounter. I will lead them where the peril is most imminent. I adjure you, gentlemen! for the love of God and your country, do not let us neglect so favorable an opportunity." But it was all in vain; and instead of acting, the Dutch deputies and generals spent three hours in debating, until night came on, and it was too late to attempt any thing. Such was Marlborough's chagrin at this disappoint

ment, that he said, on retiring from the field, "I am at this moment ten years older than I was four days ago.'

25.

Marlborough

Next day, as Marlborough had foreseen, the enemy had strengthened their position with field-works, so that is obliged to it was utterly hopeless to attempt getting the Dutch forego his advantages. to agree to an attack which had now become hazardous, though it was not so the evening before. The case was now irremediable. The six days' bread which had been provided was on the point of being exhausted, and a protracted campaign without communication with the magazines was impracticable. With a heavy heart, therefore, the English general remeasured his steps to the ground he had left in front of the Dyle, and gave orders for destroying the lines of Leau, which he had carried with so much ability. His vexation was increased afterward by finding that the consternation of the French had been such on the 18th of August, when he was so urgent to attack them, that they intended only to have made a show of resistance, to gain time for their baggage and heavy guns being removed to Brussels. To all appearance, Marlborough, if he had not been so shamefully thwarted, would have signalized the forest of Soignies by a victory as decisive as that of Blenheim, and realized the triumphant entrance into Brussels which Napoleon anticipated from his attack on Wellington on the same ground a hundred and ten years afterward.

Complaints

against Marl

borough.

Nothing further, of any moment, was done in this cam26. paign, except capturing Leau, and leveling the enof the Dutch emy's lines on the Gheet. Marlborough wrote a formal letter to the States, in which he regretted the opportunity which had been lost, which General Overkirk had coincided with him in thinking promised a great and glorious victory; and he added, "My heart is so full that I can not forbear representing to your high mightinesses on this occasion that I find my authority here to be much less than when I had the honor to command your troops in Germany."* * Marlborough to the States, Wavre, 19th of August, 1705. Disp., ii., 224.

The counter-memorial which the Dutch generals transmitted at the same time contains a curious picture of their idea of the subordination and direction of an army, and furnishes a key to the jealousy which had proved so fatal to the common cause. They complained that the Duke of Marlborough, "without holding a council of war, made two or three marches for the execution of some design formed by his grace; and we can not conceal from your high mightinesses that all the generals of our army think it very strange that they should not have the least notice of the said marches.”* It has been already mentioned that Marlborough, like every other good general, kept his designs to himself, from the impossibility of otherwise keeping them from the enemy; and that he had the additional motive for this reserve, in the case of the Dutch deputies and generals, of being desirous to "cheat them into victory."

27. Vexation and

conduct of

Chagrined by disappointment, and fully convinced, as Wellington was after his campaign with Cuesta and the Spaniards at Talavera, that it was in vain to magnanimous attempt any thing further in the face of such im- Marlborough. pediments thrown in his way by the allies, Marlborough retired, in the beginning of September, to Tirlemont, the mineral waters of which had been recommended to him; and, in the end of October, the troops on both sides went into winter quarters. His vexation at the conduct of the Dutch at this time was strongly expressed in private letters to his intimate friends;† but, though he exerted himself to the utmost during

* Dutch Generals' Mem. COXE, ii., 174.

"Several prisoners whom we have taken, as well as the deserters, assure us that they should have made no other defense but such as might have given them time to draw off their army to Brussels, where their baggage was already gone. By this you may imagine how I am vexed, seeing very plainly I am joined with people who will never do any thing."-Marlborough to Godolphin, August 24, 1705.

"M. Overkirk et moi avons d'abord été reconnaitre les postes que nous voulions attaquer, et l'armée etant rangée en battaille sur le midi, nous avions tout d'esperer, avec la benediction du ciel, vu notre supériorité, et la bonté des troupes, une heureuse journée; mais MM. les deputés de l'état

the suspension of operations in the field, both by memorials to his own government, and representations to the Dutch rulers, to get the direction of the army put upon a better footing, yet he had magnanimity and patriotism enough to sacrifice his private feelings to the public good. Instead of attempting, therefore, to inflame the resentment of the English cabinet at the conduct of the Dutch generals, he strove only to moderate it; and prevailed on them to suspend the sending of a formal remonstrance, which they had prepared, to the States General, till the effect of his own private representations in that quarter was first ascertained. The result proved that he had judged wisely, and his disinterested conduct met with its deserved reward. The patriotic party, both in England and at the Hague, was strongly roused in his favor; the factious accusations of the English Tories, like those of the Whigs a century after against Wellington, were silenced; the States General were compelled by the public indignation to withdraw from their commands the generals who had thwarted his measures; and, without endangering the union of the two powers, the factious, selfish men who had periled the object of their alliance, were forever deprived of the means of doing mischief.

28.

the cabinet

of Vienna and the Ger

But while the danger was thus abated in one quarter, it only became more serious in another. The Dutch Jealousies of had been protected, and hindered from breaking off from the alliance, only by endangering the fidelity man powers. of the Austrians; and it had now become indispensable, at all hazards, to do something to appease their jealousies. The Imperial cabinet, in addition to the war in Italy, ayant voulu consulter leurs généraux, et les trouvant de differentes sentiments d'avec M. Overkirk et moi, ils n'ont pas voulu passer outre. De sorte que tout notre dessein, après l'avoir méné jusque là, a échoué, et nous avons rebroussé chemin pour aller commencer la démolition des Lignes, et prendre Leau. Vous pouvez bien croire, Monsieur, que je suis au désespoir d'être obligé d'essuyer encore ce contretemps; mais je vois bien qu'il ne faut pas plus songer à agir offensivement avec ces messieurs, puisqu'ils ne veulent rien risquer quand même ils ont tout l'avantage de leur côte."-Marlborough au Comte de Wartenberg, Wavre, 20 Août, 1705. Dispatches, ii., 226.