rank in modern times, on similar subjects, will produce similar effects on futurity? just as when waters come from an eminence, they flow on rapidly, and, sparkling as they descend, are seen at a great distance. I Nor should the evidence of Blackstone be omitted; for though I cannot reconcile to fundamental principles what he says,-on the policy of receiving into our system some rules of the imperial and pontifical laws-on our religious liberties being fully established at the reformation on our civil and political liberties being completely regained under Charles II.-on the effect of the Test and Corporation Acts-on the powers and rights of juries-and on some few other points, ably illustrated by Dr. Furneaux; yet do his significant discriminations and open applauses, of what is to be admired in our constitution, carry considerable weight; and the blemishes alluded to, are perhaps rather to be referred to his professional bias, than his true British feelings. For when we fairly estimate the caution with which he often speaks, the concessions which he sometimes makes, the steps which he evidently measures back, his exposure of the oppressions and alterations of our laws under William the Conqueror, together with his remarks on the solid improvements introduced by Magna Charta under King John, and by King Edward; when, further, we perceive he admits, that "the royal prerogative was strained to a tyrannical and oppressive height under Harry VII.," even to the time of Charles II.; and that "our civil and religious liberties were not fully acknowledged till the revolution;" 2-when all these matters are duly estimated; and when, above all, we consider the liberal statement made by him, of natural rights-of civil and religious liberties, as involved in the claims of the English constitution; when the import of such testimony from our able commentator on the laws of England is considered, we must take it as ample and full-as a well meditated eulogium on the principles of English liberty, in a more enlarged, extensive sense. With respect to the legislative functions of the two houses of parliament, the reader is aware it is accounted essential that each should possess its distinct prerogatives-distinct privileges-distinct powers, as independent of the other; and that, as the higher house may not affect the independence of the lower in its legislative character, so, if any individual peer interrupts the purity of elections by bribery and corruption, he is liable to a severe fine. ' Dr. Furneaux's Letters to Judge Blackstone. But a nobleman can use his influence for good, that is, constitutional purposes, as well as for unconstitutional, which would be for bad. Nor have we any magical power, either in church or state, that can prevent a nobleman, truly great, from moving in a wider circle than that of Xenophon's maxim,-" Nobles_think only of nobles; the people will take care of themselves." I allude to a small work, written by a nobleman, the Earl of Halifax, intitled, Cautions for the Choice of Parliament-men. Its aim is to guard the elective franchise against every species of unconstitutional influence: it unites much closeness with much elegance, and is admirably calculated to promote the end for which it was written: it has accordingly been used, if I mistake not, by some members of both houses, for the most constitutional purpose, to preserve freedom and purity of election: I at least recollect, it was so used by one member, who printed a large edition of the work for the purpose of distribution.' But it is manifest that a nobleman, who could use this influence consistently, must forego that power, which by the same stroke destroys the elective franchise of thousands, and carries a shock to the House of Commons, which is felt through the whole body. I am aware, (as I before observed) a modern writer says, "that if the saleable boroughs were annihilated, the disease of the constitution would be scarcely affected: the executive power will influence the houses of parliament, as it influences the houses of convocation." The writer, however, does not avow that opinion as an apology for saleable boroughs; nor does any thing advanced by him affect my conclusion.2 3. I proceed next to consider the Prince Regent as an organ for transfusing the fundamental principles of the English constitution: for as no individual is so humble as to be below notice in this proposal, no individual should be considered so high as to lie beyond it. In civil society, every individual should feel his proper weight, and discharge his proper dues. The writer last alluded to observes, "that Machiavel would have a prince, who is ambitious of praise and immortality, choose for the scene of his glory a state, that is corrupt and decaying, and to rectify and restore it." He supposes this country to be at present in that state, and that the influence of certain proposals were intended for the mind of his Majesty, through the interposition of the heir apparent. He adds, "I should certainly not have pro It was reprinted in 1802. The pamphlet is extracted from MISCELLANIES, by the Earl of Halifax, published in 1700. 2 Preparatory Studies for Political Reformers. posed these thoughts as leading to a plan of reform, preferable to any requiring the interposition of the people, if I had not understood, that those high personages had been lately brought into numerous, affectionate, and confidential relations, by the circumstances of the times; and that the sentiments expressed by the prince are most becoming in respect to his royal parent, and most consoling to the people." The unfortunate malady of the King having interrupted this intercourse, it is unnecessary to inquire into its object, or its probable result; and knowing nothing of the subject beyond what that passage furnishes, I pass to the leading design of this essay. It is unreasonable, it would be impertinent, to suppose, that a prince, born to be one of the legislative organs, and the principal executive magistrate of a great empire, should have been so inattentive to the principles, on which its constitution is founded, and by which it is to be governed; and that an early bias should not have impelled his mind towards those studies from the writings of his tutor.' Who has so many interests, so many duties, and so many pleasures, involved in them, as the Prince of Wales? Who has possessed more opportunities for seeing the ruinous tendency of principles, opposing at once the more enlarged maxims of our English policy, and the laws of nations, than the Prince of Wales? Who more reason to lament over that spirit of commercial despotism-that affectation of rule on the seas and over the continent-those unfounded presumptions of our shackling, monopolising system of trade, than the Prince of Wales? Who to perceive the occasion of that combination of European powers against us-a dark host of departed friends, like the Prince of Wales? Who to inquire into the failures of our best-concerted expeditions; the derangement, the entire disorganisation, of all our financial systems-bubbles floating in the air, bursting, and disappearing-like the Prince of Wales? When we call that British politics, which is at variance with British principles-those politicians patriots, who are merely lovers of themselves, it is only as we give things nicknames. He who should be able to unite the interests of this country with the peace and happiness of Europe, would be a true British prince, qualified to foster and promote the genuine principles of liberty through his own favored island. England's boast is, her free constitution. All true Britons know this; but they also know, that a government by factions is not a free government, except as a nickname. A Prince Regent of Great Britain should not survey the country from the little Goshen of self-seeking politicians (to borrow an allusion of ! The late Bishop of Worcester's Dialogues on the English Constitution. Locke's), surrounded with partial laws, and exclusive privileges. He is by his station placed on an eminence, and should survey the full prospect round: he should contemplate the different sections of society, earnest for their civil rights, as urging a just claim, as warmed by an English spirit. And a prince, instrumental in their obtaining their due proportion of civil privileges, would, let us not say, be merely qualified to promote the principles of English liberty, he would by the very act do so; for, cemented as these different sections would instantly become by a common interest, there would flow out, in a thousand directions, a light, which would at the same time transfuse truth and extinguish faction; while the prince himself would be considered as a central point -the source of original communication and constitutional knowledge. Measures pursued in arbitrary times, however pleaded for on principles of civil or canon law, cannot be defended on those of the common law, the law of the land. And could it even be shown that the accidents of particular periods rendered them expedient, when that expediency ceases, the operation of those laws should cease; and a reflecting prince should examine those measures by the principles of the constitution, not bring the principles of the constitution to the standard of those measures. The restoration of long-lost rights, as being a medium of political information and political attachment, has, by numerous claimants, been repeatedly urged, and is now imperiously demanded by the times and Machiavel's rule, "for hereditary princes not to transgress the examples of their predecessors," should be taken in its connexion with the other-" to comply and frame themselves to the accidents that occur." : The examples of those predecessors, who themselves, by their personal authority, transgressed the limits of the constitution, would be bad precedents to one who is to be a constitutional king. Besides, were those measures constitutional, a wise prince should consider, that all human things change, and that constitutions change too, and may change for the better. With the increase of property, feudal severities have ceased, to the great improvement of civil society but the accidents that have occurred, and are occurring still, speak with a loud voice, That the political body moves with energy and force, by due assistance of its parts; and that the limbs, which have unnaturally been dissevered, should speedily be reunited, if we desire to restore the body to form an harmonious whole. : 4. As the king, in a constitutional sense, never dies, his personal malady does not affect this question: he exists in his two-fold ca pacity as one of the estates of parliament, and as the supreme executive magistrate. In his former capacity, the king can make no law-he can alter none. Each estate is independent of the other. Their separate movements coalescing in one will, produce law: a power exceeding that just movement, is unconstitutional, and may be called influence that more refined species of corruption, proclaimed to be essential to the English constitution. But I pass it, as an excrescence-no natural vital part of our body politic: I pass all the king's legislative function, too, as that by which he has no right to act on the other estates of the realm. By his executive power he may act he must act, either for good or ill; and which ever impulse he takes, the effects cannot be calculated; for as from fountains proceed all the rivers and all the lakes that are so proudly conspicuous; and all the rivulets, and the brooks, and the rills, which take a more secret course; and as the reservoirs are supplied thence, administering both to the necessaries and comforts of private life, so is the king, as supreme executive magistrate, the source of all executive power through the land; for he not only chooses his own counsellors and ministers, but all great officers of state-all the high functionaries of public trust, whether civil or ecclesiastical, or naval, or military; and in proportion as inferior officers originate in, and derive all their commissions from, higher, we see at once how the power of supreme magistrate reaches all authorities, and pervades each portion of the community. Nor does it rest here: for though, as one of the estates of parliament, he exercises no legislative authority in the house of lords, yet he is the fountain of nobility, by his prerogative in creating peers. So wide is the royal power!-so ceaseless its operations so unavoidable, unmeasurable its extent! How does a king of England promote the principles of English liberty? When, proceeding within the limits prescribed him by the constitution, he eyes its fundamental principles as the central point; not cutting and crossing our civil and religious liberties, but moving, as it were, in the same plane with them. Some of our kings, in arbitrary times, have given to their proclamations the force of laws; have overawed parliaments; and, as despots, have given laws, communicating to the people, like evil spirits, delusions and lies: but a true English king proceeds in constitutional order; and moving in harmony with the other legislative powers, like a guardian angel, encourages, invigorates, and recommends all that is excellent in our constitution. That "the king can do no wrong," in reference to the English constitution, is proved to be untrue by the principles avowed at the Revolution; as a political or legal maxim, every one understands |