tres, 1828, a theory which we denominate the rationalistic because it assumes the point of departure of human history to be in the spontaneous development of ideas, or perhaps more strictly accurate, in the development of the impersonal

reason.

The theory which we are now about to examine is in its more essential features borrowed from Hegel, between whom and Cousin there was a warm personal regard and friendship; but we shall set it forth as we have it from Cousin, because we are not sufficiently acquainted with Hegel's own system, to be able to rely on our own understanding of it; and because, from what we know of Cousin, we feel always assured that a system of philosophy, as it has passed through his hands and received his approbation, has come to us in its least objectionable form.

The rationalistic theory assumes that whatever enters into human history, necessarily pre-exists in the human intelligence. The whole life of humanity in time and space, consists in developing or actualizing in its deeds the ideas of its intelligence. All these ideas, however manifold and diverse they may appear to the superficial observer, are reducible to three categories, 1. The idea of the infinite; 2. The idea of the finite; 3. The idea of the relation of the two. These three ideas are the constituent elements of human intelligence, of human reason-of reason, intelligence in itself, therefore of God; and are in fact God. They being essential in the original ground and cause of all things, must be reproduced in all things. God can create only according to the laws of his own intelligence, that is to say, only according to the three ideas named. Hence creation taken as a whole and in detail can be nothing but a manifestation. of the infinite, the finite, and their relation. Of course, then, humanity in its life can only develope, manifest, or actualize the same. Certainly you can find nothing in creation not found in God the creator. In the Creator is found only these three ideas. Then is nothing but these three ideas to be found in creation. Nothing can be found in the history of humanity, not to be found in humanity itself; and as nothing but these three ideas can be found in humanity, it follows that nothing but these three ideas can be found in the history of humanity. We know now, a priori, what we are to look for in the history of mankind.

If the whole life of humanity consist in developing these three ideas, we may ask, does it develope them simultane

ously or successively? They all coexist in all epochs, but the human race developes them under the predominance first of one, then another, and then the last. The predominance of one does not exclude, but subordinates the other two, and always is one or another predominant. The predominance of an idea constitutes an epoch. As there are three ideas, so must there be three epochs in the life of humanity, that is to say, in history; and as there are only three ideas, so can there be only three epochs. The life of humanity is all embraced, then, within three epochs which, from the predominance of the one or the other idea, are termed, 1. The epoch of the infinite; 2. The epoch of the finite; 3. The epoch of the relation of the two. But in what order does humanity develope these ideas? It does it in the order we have named. The life of the race begins. under the predominance of the idea of the infinite; it then passes under the predominance of the finite, and then having exhausted both the infinite and the finite as separate, exclusive elements, it seeks to unite the two, and bring about union and peace. Hence eclecticism.

But does the human race commence its life by freely, voluntarily undertaking to develope the idea of the infinite! Not at all. Reason is impersonal, objective, not-me. It has, as we have seen in Jouffroy, a twofold activity, that of spontaneity and that of reflection. The spontaneous activity of the reason is an activity in which human personality, human will or freedom does not intervene. We, properly speaking, in spontaneity are not active, but passive; we are seized and carried away by a force not our own, which is out of us at the same time that it is in us, and is in us without being us; and a force which we are impotent to resist, and of which we can give no account. In fact, in the last analysis, this force, or the agency at work, is that of the infinite and eternal God, who himself carries us away whithersoever and howsoever he pleaseth, or rather not as he pleaseth, but according to the inward necessity of his own being. The reflective activity of reason or intelligence, is reason or intelligence subjected to the intervention of human freedom, and therefore, to human infirmity.

We have seen that all the facts of human history must pre-exist in the intelligence; but in which form The spontaneous, or the reflective? Not the reflective, as we have seen in commenting on Jouffroy, for certainly, reflec tion only turns back, contemplates, and cxplains what is

already in the memory of the individual or in that of the race. Hence, all the facts of history must pre-exist in the spontaneous intelligence, that is to say, in the impersonal reason. Hence, all the facts of human history must be impersonal in their principle and origin. Then, again, the human race, in its various and complex life in space and time, must be considered merely as the medium through which, without any agency of its own, spontaneous intelligence, that is to say God, is exhibiting or actualizing the three original ideas of which we have spoken.

It will be seen that this gives to the facts of human history an impersonal character. For this impersonal character Cousin very earnestly contends. As all the events which occur do really come from the impersonal reason, that is to say, from God, it follows that individuals are in no way personally responsible for the events which may happen, whatever their character or tendency. Nay, why speak of individuals? Individuality is always personal, and there is nothing personal in history. History knows no individuals; it knows only causes, only ideas; and individuals and nations have no reality, no significance for the historian, but as they represent certain ideas or causes. When two armies meet, what see we? Two masses of individuals collected and drawn up? Not at all. There are no men there. There are only two opposing ideas there, which have met to decide on the battle-field which shall be permitted to rule the future of humanity.

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Excluding in this way all intervention of human personality, we must look upon a nation or a people merely as representing the idea; never as obtaining an idea, and by its own free activity, under a sense of its own moral responsibility, consciously, with forethought laboring to carry it out, or to realize it in all the details of practical life. force or agency observable in the life of the nation is always back of the nation, acting out through the nation, never the agency of the nation itself. It is a foreign power, acting in and through it, rolling over and subjecting all its phenomena; so that the idea given, we can tell beforehand what will be the life of the nation or the facts of its history. In the same way, too, we must regard great men, heroes, philosophers, statesmen. These are not, as we sometimes fancy, great personalities, but merely the representatives of ideas or epochs, and instead of giving predominance to an idea which has been revealed to them and not to the mass,

and thus founding an epoch in history, they merely reflect better than any of their contemporaries the idea already dominant in all hearts, and working as a sort of Welt-geist in the whole community. We may indeed study an age, or a country, in its great men; but not because these men create the character of the age or country, impressing upon it, as it were, the stamp of their own personality, but because they sum up, are the résumés of its dominant ideas and tendencies. Thus, Alexander does not invade Asia, and with his handful of Grecks put an end to the power of the "Great King;" it is the idea or spirit of the Greek people, incarnating itself in Alexander, that does it. That idea or spirit is great, and reveals to you the character of the Greek people; but Alexander himself, as a personality, was a very pitiable concern, killing over his cups his best friend, and dying himself in a drunken bout.

Finally, as all comes from the impersonal reason, which in the last analysis is the Word of God, nay, God himself, we must absolve history from all blame, and accept whatever has been as that which must be, which had a right to be and to be just what, when, and where it was. The nation, party, cause, idea, at any time or in any country triumphing, triumphs by divine right. So no more sympathy with the defeated, the conquered; no more regrets; might gives right; and success is the stamp of merit.

This theory, which we have but slightly indicated, but which, we presume, most of our readers are already familiar with, for it is not now that Cousin is for the first time to be introduced to the American public, it will be seen differs from that of Jouffroy only in its greater profoundness, systematic harmony, and in its more clear and distinct assertion of the impersonality of the spontaneous intelligence. It is by this clear, distinct, unequivocal assertion rendered even more liable than Jouffroy's system, if possible, to the objection of excluding human agency from all intervention in the production of the phenomena of human history. Cousin unquestionably asserts human freedom, but he in reality, notwithstanding some attempts to the contrary, recognizes it only in the sphere of reflection. The whole of human history originates in the intelligence, so far as it has a human origin at all; not in the reflective intelligence, but in the spontaneous, which, while it is human, is not human. No man is or can be more particular to admonish us that reflection originates nothing. Nay, the whole of his system

of ontology rests upon the assumed fact that the agency at work in the spontaneous reason is not-me. All that reflection can do, that is, human agency properly so called, is to cast its eye over the past, clear up, explain, and legitimate what has been. Certain it is, then, that according to this theory, the facts of human history have their origin in an extra-human source, and therefore that individuals and nations can do nothing to direct, to impede, to hasten, or to retard the march of events.

It is the vice of this theory, that by excluding human personality from history, it annihilates humanity itself. Humanity lives only in individuals, and individuals are all entire in their personality. If we assert the impotency of individuals, of personalities, we necessarily assert the im potency of humanity. If we assert the impotency of humanity, it is idle to talk of the history of humanity. Humanity itself disappears, and with it disappear all the events of history. We could not, if this theory were embraced, feel ourselves responsible beyond the sphere of our individuality. We must feel that our good and evil could not go beyond ourselves, and in no way affect the course of history. Our existence in this case would, as Cousin has himself said in speaking of old pantheistic India, cease to be taken seriously, and all things would appear to us of equal worth, or worthlessness. We should fall into a state of absolute indifferency, smoke our pipe, and say, "God is great, what is written will be." Cousin, as well as Jouffroy, seems to have felt this. He is a man of an active temperament, of great energy, and noble sympathies, and yet he has no answer to the question, What shall we do? He says, humanity has done, humanity is doing, or rather, God in humanity is doing so and so; but pray, M. Cousin, tell us what ought humanity to do, and we as individual manifestations of humanity? No answer! We have interrogated your writings, we have questioned in all lights, in all moods, and demanded of them in all tones an answer to this question, and we have found only this cold, heartless answer, "Do nothing; fold thy hands and leave thyself to be borne onward by the irresistible current of the spontaneous reason." Suppose we resist, and seek to withstand this current? "Do so if you will, it makes no difference. The current flows on, and you with it, whether willingly or unwillingly." Carlyle's doctrine of Hero-worship, which concentrates all humanity in personalities, and reduces all history to biogra