36 Selections from Correspondence.-Notes of the Week. Laws relating to Bribery, Treating, and undue as made on the following day; and if made influence at Elections of Members of Parlia- after 2 o'Clock P.M. on Saturday, the service ment. Expires 10th August, 1855, and end shall be deemed as made on the following Monday." of then next session. SELECTIONS FROM CORRESPONDENCE. UNAUTHORISED CHARGE. A. B., an attorney, is instructed by his client, C. D., to write to E. F. complaining of some expressions he had used tending, as hai magined, to a defamation of character. E. F., on receipt of the letter, waits on A. B. and strongly denies the imputation. Well, says A. B., will you sign a letter to that effect? Certainly, he replied. A. B., C. D.'s attorney, instantly writes such a letter, which E. F. immediately signs. Soon afterwards the attorney had to settle an account he owed to E. F., and actually deducted 7s. from it for his trouble. Is he justified in this? and would not the Court, on a proper application order A. B. the money to be restored. REGULÆ GENERALES OF ALL THE COMMON LAW COURTS. NOTES OF THE WEEK. COMPULSORY ENFRANCHISEMENT OF COPYHOLDS. SOME facts have recently come to our knowledge, showing that some lords of manors have been subject to very considerable law and other expenses connected with compulsory enfranchisements. We hope to take an early opportunity of stating the circumstances more at length, and we think the result will manifest the great hardship to which lords of manors are at present subject, in having expenses imposed upon them which should be borne by the copyholder. We apprehend it will be incumbent on lords of manors to take into consideration the propriety of an application to Parliament to amend the existing Acts. LEGAL CHARGES ON PROFESSIONAL MEN. I shall be glad to be informed of the practice among the respectable portion of the Profession in case of a mortgage made by a professional man. Is it usual in such cases for the solicitor of the mortgagee to make his full charge, as in the case of a non-member of the Profession, or is a difference usually made by houses of respectability? I have recently seen charges for attendances of 11. 1s. and 17. 6s. 8d. in such cases, besides other objectionable items, and understand they have been pertinaciously insisted upon. I always imagined some consideration was due to the Profession. I remember even counsel in many cases returning fees to a solicitor in cases where he was personally concerned, and that both at Common Law and in Equity. WINDING-UP ACTS' AMENDMENT BILL. Section 1 of this Bill (which is introduced by Lord Brougham) proposes to enact, that the Judge or Master may by advertisement call meetings of creditors whose debts have been proved, for the purpose of appointing representative of creditors in the proceedings, who shall be elected as in the case of assignees under a bankruptcy. After such advertisement creditors shall be deemed parties to the wind Representatives of creditors may concur in the proceedings and in compromises, and all creditors to be bound thereby; s. 2. It is ordered that, in lieu of Rule 164 of the Practice Rules of Hilary Term, 1853, the following be substituted :-" Services of Plead-ing up. ings, Notices, Summonses, Orders, Rules, and other proceedings, shall be made before Seven o'Clock P.M., except on Saturdays, when it shall be made before Two o'Clock P.M. If made after Seven o'Clock P.M. on any day, except Saturdays, the service shall be deemed The Judge or Master may appoint Commissioners in Ireland and in England any other person than or in addition to those named in the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 108, s. 20, for receiving evidence; s. 3. Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor.-V. C. Kindersley.—Queen's Bench. The Act to be deemed part of the Windingup Acts; s. 4. LAW APPOINTMENTS. Mr. William Henry Cobb, Solicitor, of Warrington, has been appointed Deputy Coroner of Hulton, Cheshire. It is said by the Times that Lord Monck will fulfil in Mr. Grenville Berkeley's place those delicate duties under Mr. Hayter, in the House of Commons, which Mr. Grenville Berkeley has so long performed. LEGAL EDUCATION. 37 In the House of Commons on the 5th inst., Mr. Napier asked whether any steps had been taken by the Government to carry into effect the recommendations for the improvement of legal education contained in the report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Inns of Court. Sir G. Grey said, he could not say that any decided steps had been taken. The matter was still under the consideration of the Go vernment. RECENT DECISIONS IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS. Lord Chancellor. Brandon v. Brandon. May 3, 1856. OPENING DECREE AFTER MORE THAN 20 YEARS.-FUND IN COURT. Leave was granted for the re-hearing of a decree made in 1825, in respect of the distribution of a fund in Court, on the ground that some of the parties entitled to a share were omitted, and where the delay was occasioned by the parties being numerous and the suit having abated, and a compromise having been set on foot but which failed. THIS was an application for leave to have a re-hearing of this administration suit, and in which the decree was made in June, 1825, on the ground that some of the parties entitled to share in the fund in Court were omitted. The parties were very numerous, and it was impracticable to apply before by reason of the successive abatements of the suit, and also that negotiations for an arrangement had been in progress, but had ultimately failed. Baily and Hardy in support cited Gwynne v. Edwards, 9 Beav. 22; Bulwer v. Astley, 1 Phill. 422. The Lord Chancellor said, that the present case was a very fit one for the exercise of the discretion of the Court in allowing a re-hearing, although more than 20 years had elapsed, and granted the application accordingly. Vice-Chancellor Kindersley. Tanner v. Carter. May 6, 1856. WILL.-CONSTRUCTION.-PAYMENT OF TESTAMENTARY EXPENSES.-PRIORITY OVER LEGACIES. The testatrix directed, by her will, the payment of her debts and general and testamentary expenses, and then gave certain legacies. Her sole executrix proved the will through a proctor, whose bill of costs amounted to 1401. odd, and she afterwards died, having committed a devastavit. Her estate produced no assets, and that of her testatrix was insufficient to pay the legacies as well as the proctor's bill: Held, that the testamentary expenses were entitled to priority to the legacies. THE testatrix, by her will, after directing wwwwm the payment of her debts and funeral and testamentary expenses, gave various legacies and the residue to Nancy Eastabrook, whom she also appointed sole executrix of her will. This will was duly proved by the executrix, who however committed a devastavit and then died, having appointed the defendant her executrix. It appeared that there were no assets of Nancy Eastabrook, and that the estate of her testatrix was insufficient to pay the legacies. The proctor whom she had employed to prove the will carried in a claim of 1401. odd for his bill of costs against the estate, which was resisted. Shapter for the proctor; Terrell for the parties interested in the estate of the defaulting executrix; Stiffe for her executrix, the defendant. Cur. ad. vult. The Vice-Chancellor said, that the ordinary form for an administration decree was inter alia for an account of the debts and funeral expenses, but here the word testamentary was also inserted. It seemed that as the testatrix had directed the payment of her debts and funeral and testamentary expenses in the first instance, the proctor was entitled to his costs previously to the distribution of the estate, and order accordingly. Court of Queen's Bench. ATTORNEY.-TAXATION OF BILL.COSTS The bill of costs of an attorney as delivered> amounted to 361. odd, and about 71. was taxed off on taxation, although the Master added omitted items amounting to 11.4s. 8d.: Held, that the attorney was liable to the costs of taxation, under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37, as more than a sixth had been taxed off either the amended or the original bill. THIS was a rule nisi on the Master to review his taxation, whereby he had allowed an attorney the costs of taxation of his bill of costs, which, it appeared, amounted to 36. odd, and from which about 77. had been taxed off. The Master had, however, added a sum of 11. 4s. 8d. which the attorney had omitted to charge. 38 Phipson showed cause. Superior Courts: Queen's Bench. The Court (without calling on Lush in support), said, that as the amount actually taxed off was more than one-sixth of the bill as originally delivered, or as added to by the Master, the attorney was not entitled to the costs of taxation, and the rule would accordingly be made absolute.1 bell, C. J., the execution by the defendants was Bane v. Foxhall and another. May 5, 1856. Davis v. Jones, Com. B. On the trial of a plaint in the County Court THIS was a rule nisi for a prohibition to the Judge of the Norfolk County Court against further proceeding in this plaint, which was brought to recover damages from the defendants for spoiling a beechwood fence alleged to belong to the plaintiff. It appeared that on the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the Judge asked whether the defendant wished to ask the witnesses any question, and on his replying, "No, it's my property," gave verdict for the the plaintiff, with 51. damages. Lush showed cause against the rule, which was supported by Phipson on affidavits that a bona fide question of title was in question. The Court said that the Judge was wrong in overruling the question of property in the arbitrary manner he had done, and made the rule absolute accordingly for a prohibition. Pim v. Campbell and others. May 3, 5, 1856. ROL EVIDENCE. Evidence was held admissible to show that an agreement for purchase of a share in an invention was signed on the understanding it was not to take effect unless the invention were approved by a party named, and that he had pronounced it worthless. THIS was a rule nisi for a new trial on the ground of the improper reception of evidence. The action was brought to recover damages for the breach of an agreement in writing for the purchase of one-eighth share in the plaintiff's invention for grinding auriferous and other ores, and on the trial before Lord Camp Thomas, S. L., and J. H. Hodgson in support. The Court said, that the evidence admitted did not tend to vary or contradict the written one. The rule would be made absolute to enter agreement, but to show that there never was a nonsuit. Temperley v. Willett. May 6, 1856. LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1854.— A rule was refused for leave to a plaintiff to inspect or take a copy of a deed in the defendant's possession, where it appeared that the plaintiff's object was to use the same in another action against another defendant. THIS was a rule nisi under the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 46,' for leave to the plaintiff to inspect or take a copy of a deed alleged to be in the possession of the defendant, who was a renter of Covent Garden Theatre, and had sold the plaintiff a free admission to the pit. on the Lush and Creasy showed cause ground that the object of the motion was to as 1 Which enacts, that "upon the hearing of any motion or summons, it shall be lawful for the Court or Judge, at their or his discretion, and upon such terms as they or he shall think reasonable, from time to time to order such documents as they or he may think fit, to be produced, and such witnesses as they or he may think necessary, to appear and be examined vivá voce, either before such Court or Judge, or before the Master, and upon hearing Master, to make such rule or order as may be such evidence, or reading the report of such just." See also the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 6, which provides, that "whenever any action, or other legal proceeding, shall henceforth be pending in any of the Superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster," "such Court and each of the Judges thereof may respectively, on application made for such purpose by either of the litigants, compel the opposite party to allow the party making the application to inspect all documents in the custody, or under the control of such opposite party relating to such action or other legal proceeding; and, if necessary to take examined copies of the same, or to procure the same to be duly stamped, in all cases in which, previous to the passing of this Act, a discovery might have been obtained by filing a bill, or by any other proceeding in a Court of Equity at the instance of the party so making application as aforesaid to the said Court or Judge." Superior Courts: Queen's Bench.-Common Pleas. 39 certain whether the defendant could give evi- or a rule or order under 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, s. dence in another action brought by the plaintiff 4.3 The rule would therefore be discharged. against Mr. Gye, the lessee of the theatre, for expelling him from the pit stalls, where he had gone with the ticket in question. Matthew in support. The Court said, that the privilege of the inspection of deeds was a most salutary one, but that it must not be abused, and it would be, if it were granted to assist in another action. The rule would therefore be discharged. Court of Common Pleas. On the trial of an action before the Secondary THIS was a rule nisi to rescind the order of Coleridge, J., for the reviewal of the taxation of the plaintiff's costs in this action, which was brought before the Secondary of London to recover 371. odd, but in which, by reason of the defendant having proved a set-off, the plaintiff obtained a verdict for 41. only. Hawkins showed cause against the rule, which was supported by Petersdorff. The Court (after having taken time to consider) said, that the amount recovered was the criterion, and that if it were under 201. there would be no costs, under sect. 11' of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, unless there was a certificate of the presiding officer at the trial, under s. 12,2 1 Which enacts, that "if in any action commenced after the passing of this Act in any of her Majesty's Superior Courts of Record, in covenant, debt, &c., not being an action for breach of promise of marriage, the plaintiff shall recover a sum not exceeding 201., &c., the plaintiff shall have judgment to recover such sum only, and no costs, except in the cases hereinafter provided, and except in the case of a judgment by default; and it shall not be necessary to enter any suggestion on the record to deprive such plaintiff of costs, nor shall any such plaintiff be entitled to costs by reason of any privilege as attorney or officer of such Court or otherwise." Forster v. Smith. April 30, 1856. APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT.-COSTS. Held, that the successful party on a motion for a new trial of a County Court plaint, is entitled to costs. IT appeared, on this appeal from the Cambridgeshire County Court, that a new trial was ordered, and the question now arose as to costs. Field for the appellant; Collier for the respondent. The Court said, that in accordance with the decision of Leidemann v. Schultz, 14 Com. B. 38, the successful party was entitled to costs. Parker v. Midland Railway Company. May 6, 1856. RAILWAY COMPANY.-ADMISSION OF PAS SENGERS INTO STATION. Held, that a railway company is not bound to admit the driver of an omnibus with passengers into their station; although, semble, that the passengers could sue for their being so excluded. THS was a demurrer to the declaration in this action, which was brought by the driver of an omnibus at Stamford against the defendants for refusing to admit his omnibus and passengers into their station at that place. Beesley for the plaintiff. The Court (without calling on Phipson in support of the demurrer) said, that, although the passengers might have a right of action against the defendants, the plaintiff had not, and allowed the demurrer accordingly. plaintiff in such case shall have the same judgment to recover his costs that he would have had if this Act had not been passed." 3 Which enacts, that "in any action in which the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover his costs by reason of the provisions of the 11th section of such Act, whether there be a verdict in such action or not, if the plaintiff shall make it appear to the satisfaction of the Court in which such action was brought, or to the satisfaction of a Judge at Chambers, upon summons, that such action was brought for a cause in which concurrent jurisdiction is given to the Superior Courts by the 128th section of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, or for which no plaint could have been entered in any such County Courts, or 2 Which provides, that "if the plaintiff shall that such action was removed from a County in any such action as aforesaid recover a sum Court by certiorari, or that there was sufficient less than the sum in that behalf hereinbefore- reason for bringing such action in the Court mentioned, by verdict, and the Judge or other in which such action was brought, then and in presiding officer before whom such verdict any of such cases the Court in which such acshall be obtained, shall certify on the back of tion is brought, or the said Judge at Chambers, the record that it appeared to him at the trial that the cause of action was one for which a plaint could not have been entered in any such County Court as aforesaid, or that it appeared to him at the trial that there was a sufficient reason for bringing the said action in the Court in which the said action was brought, the shall thereupon, by rule or order direct that the plaintiff shall recover his costs; and thereupon the plaintiff shall have the same judg ment to recover his costs that he would have had if the before-mentioned Act of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, had not been passed.” 40 Superior Courts: Common Pleas.-Exchequer. Bousey v. Wordsworth. May 6, 1856. COUNTY COURT.-TRADESMAN'S BILL.-MATERIAL PART OF CAUSE OF ACTION.JURISDICTION. Where certain goods in a tradesman's bill were supplied to the defendant within the jurisdiction of a County Court, but others were not, held, inasmuch as the cause of action could not be divided and the bill constituted one cause of action, that the cause of action arose in some material part within the jurisdiction of the Court where the plaintiff dwelt. the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 18, against a resident in Guernsey, on a promissory note, for goods purchased here of the plaintiff, and which was made payable in London. The plaintiff had obtained an order for leave to proceed as if personal service had been effected, and had signed judgment: Held, that as there had been no appeal from this order it could not now be questioned, and a rule was refused to set aside such judgment. and an order had been made for leave to proceed as if personal service had been effected, under which the judgment in question was signed. THIS was a motion for a rule nisi to set aside the judgment signed in this action, which THIS was an action by the plaintiff, a butcher was brought on a promissory note, dated at at Uxbridge, to recover the amount of his bill Guernsey, for goods purchased in this country for goods supplied to the defendant, who lived of the plaintiffs by the defendant, who resided at Chesholt. It appeared that the greater part there, and made payable at Messrs. Delisle & of the goods had been ordered where the plain-Co., London. The writ was issued in the form tiff resided, and that some had been delivered prescribed by the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 18,' at the defendant's house. The plaintiff obtained a verdict, and now obtained this rule for his costs under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 128, which enacts, that "all actions and proceedings, which, before the passing of this Act, might have been brought in any of her Majesty's Superior Courts of Record where the plaintiff dwells more than 20 miles from the defendant, or where the cause of action did not arise wholly or in some material point within the jurisdiction of the Court within which the defendant dwells or carries on his business at the time of the action brought," &c., "may be brought and determined in any such Superior Court, at the election of the party suing or proceeding, as if this Act had not been passed." Honyman showed cause; Carter in support. Cur, ad. vult. The Court said, that according to the case of In re Aykroyd, 1 Exch. R. 479, the cause of action in one of this kind could not be split, and that, although each separate order might be sued for separately, when the bill containing several items was delivered, it became one cause of action, and the plaintiff was bound to sue for the whole in one suit. This was a convenient and proper rule of construction, and there was therefore in the present case one cause of action. The question then was, whether a material part of the cause of action did not arise where the defendant dwelt. As the whole bill was for one cause of action, and a material part, viz., the order for some of the items, had arisen within the jurisdiction of the County Court where the plaintiff dwelt, that Court had jurisdiction to try the whole cause of action, and the rule would therefore be discharged. Field in support, on the ground that the cause of action did not arise within the juris diction. The Court said, as the Judge was satisfied that the cause of action arose within the jurisfrom such order to the Court, it could not now diction, and the defendant had not appealed be questioned, and the rule would accordingly be refused. 1 Which enacts, that "in case any defendant, being a British subject, is residing out of the jurisdiction of the said Superior Courts, in any place except in Scotland or Ireland, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff to issue a writ of sumImons in the form contained in the schedule (A.) to this Act annexed, marked No. 2, which writ shall bear the indorsement contained in the said form, purporting that such writ is for service out of the jurisdiction of the said Superior Courts; and the time for appearance by the defendant to such writ shall be regulated by the distance from England of the place where the defendant is residing; and it shall be lawful for the Court or Judge, upon being satisfied by affidavit that there is a cause of action, which arose within the jurisdiction, or in respect of a breach of a contract made within the jurisdiction, and that the writ was personally served upon the defendant, or that reasonable efforts were made to effect personal service thereof upon the defendant, and that it came to his knowledge, and either that the defendant wilfully neglects to appear to such writ, or that he is living out of the jurisdiction of the said Courts in order to defeat and delay his creditors, to direct from time to time that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to proceed in the action in such manner and subject to such conditions as to such Court or Judge may seem fit, having regard to the time allowed for the defendant to appear being reasonable, and to the other circumstances of the case." |