of some affecting or interesting quality of mind. We learn from experience, that certain qualities of mind are signified by certain qualities of body. When we find similar qualities of body in inanimate matter, we are apt to attribute to them the same expression, and to conceive them as signifying the same qualities in this case, as in those cases where they derive their expression immediately from mind. Thus, strength and delicacy, boldness and modesty, old age and youth, &c. are all expressed by particular material signs in the human form, and in many cases by similar signs in the forms of animals. When we find similar appearances in the forms of inanimate matter, we are disposed to consider them as expressive of the same qualities, and to regard them with similar emotions. The universality of such associations is evident from the structure of the rudest languages. The strength of the oak, the delicacy of the myrtle, the boldness of a rock, the modesty of the violet, &c., are expressions common in all languages, and so common that they are scarcely in any considered as figurative; yet every man knows, that strength and weakness, boldness and modesty, are qualities, not of matter, but of mind, and that without our knowledge of mind, it is impossible that we should ever have had any conception of them. How much the effect of descriptions of natural scenery arises from that personification, which is founded upon such associations, I believe there is no man of common taste who must not often have been sensible.

5. We are led, by the constitution of our nature, also, to perceive resemblances between our sensations and emotions, and of consequence between the objects that produce them. Thus, there is some analogy between the sensation of gradual ascent, and the emotion of ambition-between the sensation of gradual descent, and the emotion of decay-between the lively sensation of sunshine, and the cheerful emotion of joy-between the painful sensation of darkness, and the dispiriting emo

what others are there? What do we learn from experience; and what remark follows? How is this remark illustrated? When we find similar appearances in the forms of inanimate matter, what is the consequence? From what is the universality of such associations evident? How is this illustrated? Of what must every man of common taste, often have been sensible? What other resemblances are we, by the constitution of our nature also, led to perceive? How is this remark fully illustrated? Of the objects, there

tion of sorrow. In the same manner, there are analogies between silence and tranquillity-between the lustre of morning, and the gaiety of hope-between softness of coloring, and gen. tleness of character-between slenderness of form, and delicacy of mind, &c. The objects, therefore, which produce such sensations, though in themselves not the immediate signs of such interesting or affecting qualities, yet in consequence of this resemblance, become gradually expressive of them, and if not always, yet at those times at least, when we are under the dominion of any emotion, serve to bring to our minds the images of all those affecting or interesting qualities, which we have been accustomed to suppose they resemble. How extensive this source of association is, may easily be observed, in the extent of such kinds of figurative expression in every language.

6. Besides these, language itself is another very important cause of the extent of such associations.-The analogies between the qualities of matter, and the qualities of mind, which any individual might discover or observe, might perhaps be few, and must of course be limited by his situation and circumstances; but the use of language gives, to every individual who employs it, the possession of all the analogies which so many ages have observed, between material qualities, and qualities capable of producing emotion. Of how much consequence this is, may be discovered in the different impressions which are made by the same objects on the common people whose vocabulary is limited by their wants, and on those who have had the advantage of a liberal education.

7. To all these sources of associations is to be added, that which is peculiar to every individual. There is scarcely any man who has not, from accident, from the events of his life, or from the nature of his studies, connected agreeable or interesting recollections with particular colors, or sounds, or forms, and to whom such sounds or colors, &c. are not pleasing from such

fore, which produce such associations, what is observed? From what may the extent of this source of association be perceived? What is another very important cause of the extent of such associations? How is this illustrated? In what may the importance of this be discovered? To these sources of association what is to be added? What illustration of this remark follows? How

an association.

They affect us, in some measure, as the signs of these interesting qualities, and, as in other cases, produce in us the same emotion with the qualities they signify.

These observations are probably sufficient to show the numerous and extensive associations we have with matter and its various qualities, as well as to illustrate some of the means by which it becomes significant or expressive to us of very differ. ent, and far more interesting qualities than those it possesses in itself. By means of the connexion, or resemblance, which subsists between the qualities of matter, and qualities capable of producing emotion, the perception of the one immediately, and very often irresistibly, suggests the idea of the other; and so early are these associations formed, that it requires afterwards some pains to separate this connexion, and to prevent us from attributing to the sign, that effect which is produced alone by the quality signified.

Whatever may be the truth of these observations, it cannot, at least, be doubted, that the qualities of matter are often associated with others, and that they affect us in such cases, like all other signs, by leading our imaginations to the qualities they signify. It seems to be equally obvious, that in all cases where matter, or any of its qualities, produces the emotions of sublimity or beauty, this effect must arise, either from those material qualities themselves, from their being fitted by the constitution of our nature to produce such emotions: or from some other qualities with which they are associated, and of which they operate as the signs or expressions.

It should seem, therefore, that a very simple, and a very obvious principle is sufficient to guide our investigation into the source of the sublimity and beauty of the qualities of matter. If these qualities are, in themselves, fitted to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, or, in other words, are in themselves beautiful and sublime, I think it is obvious that they must produce these emotions, independently of any association.

do these affect us? For what are these observations, probably, sufficient? By means of what connexion, does the perception of the one often suggest the idea of the other; and what follows? Whatever may be the truth of these observations, what cannot be doubted? What seems to be equally obvious? What, therefore, should seem evident? If these qualities are, in themselves,

If, on the contrary, it is found that these qualities only produce such emotions when they are associated with interesting or affecting qualities, and that when such associations are destroyed, they no longer produce the same emotions, I think it must also be allowed, that their beauty or sublimity is to be ascribed, not to the material, but to the associated qualities.

That this is in reality the case, I shall endeavor to show, by a great variety of illustrations. It is necessary, however, for me to premise, that I am very far from considering the inquiries which follow, as a complete examination of the subject. They are indeed only detached observations on the sublimity and beauty of some of the most important classes of material qualities,but which, however imperfect they may severally be, yet seem to possess considerable weight from their collective evidence.

fitted to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, what is obvious? What remark follows? How is it to be shown that this is, in reality, the case? What is it necessary to premise? Of these what is observed?

CHAPTER II.

ON THE SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY OF SOUND.

THE senses by which we chiefly discover beauty or sublimity in material objects, are HEARING and SEEING.

The objects of the first are soUNDS, whether SIMPLE or COM

POSED.

The objects of the second are, COLORS, FORMS, and MOTION.

SECTION I. ·

OF SIMPLE SOUNDS.

I shall begin with considering some of those instances, where simple sounds are productive of the emotions of sublimity or beauty. Such sounds are capable of many divisions, but it may be sufficient at present, to consider them in the following order

1. Sounds that occur in inanimate nature.

2. The notes of animals.

3. The tones of the human voice.

PART I.

OF MISCELLANEOUS SOUNDS.

Or the first class, or of those miscellaneous sounds that occur in inanimate nature, there are many which produce emotions of sublimity and beauty.

By what senses chiefly, do we discover beauty or sublimity in material objects? What are the objects of the first? What, of the second? With considering what does our author begin; and what is observed of them? In what order are they to be considered?

Of the first class of those miscellaneous sounds that occur in inanimate nature, what is observed? In the first place, what sounds are, in general,