by the addition af some field of extended color beyond them. A house, or a tree, may represent them all; and if we look at a tree, with a wall, or with the sky beyond it, we habitually think that the figure we see, is that of the tree exclusively. But, in truth, it no more belongs to the tree, than to the sky beyond.If it belong to the tree, it must appear green; Or, if to the sky, it must appear sky color: but it appears neither. Therefore, though the sky be many miles beyond the tree, yet one line is common between both the perceived colors, and belongs exclusively to neither. To attempt to refute this with a microscope would only illustrate its unalterable nature.

Thus no visible object has any figure exclusively its own; for every two adjoining ones have but one line to serve both. Now this is quite a different character from that of external bodies, each of which has a figure exclusively its own; and thus it is demonstrated, that perceived figure is not external figure. Besides this argument, I must repeat, we are conscious that every two co-existing contrasted colors, are lined at their change; and it is self-evident that where the sensations are, there also must be their change line. Thus, both external and internal evidence completely demonstrate my assumed position.

Visible figure, then, is not sensation, nor even colored like sensation: but it is a line really extended and mathematically void of width; revealed to us by the junction of two contrasted sensations of color. - It therefore appeals, (as I have always asserted) to consciousness, in a peculiar way. But a real line, though void of width, cannot be a line upon nothing. It must therefore have some substance, or rather seems itself substance; and this substance is demonstrated to be THE SUBSTANCE OF SENSATION. Yet more, A perceived widthless line, by returning into itself, forms figures of TWO DIMENSIONS: therefore, the substance that sustains these must be extended in two dimensions, that is, it has SURFACE.

Here I think we may rest upon evidences which appear neither to be disputed, nor traced farther: since (whatever be the character of external things) perceived figure must be what it is perceived to be; there being no higher judge to reverse it. But, putting the peculiar character of visible figure out of the question, we may assert, as a certain proof by itself, that the term VISIBLE FIGURE is nothing but another name for the ARRANGEMENT OF OUR CO-EXISTING VISUAL SENSATIONS. Colors give pleasure: but visible figure gives

far more. Now to say that visible figure gives delight, is only to say that THE ARRANGEMENT of our co-existing visual sensations gives delight. I think, no man will gainsay it.

Finally, I submit whether this is not the evidence, to oppose to Berkeley's scheme, instead of taking up such a position as that of Dr. Reid, that the notion of perceived figure only FOLLOWS the sensation; and that therefore the figure is the external tree, or moon, itself. But, had Reid recognised these evidences, in that instant the supposed inextension of the mind must have appeared to him exploded; as it now is, I trust, for ever.

It remains for others to judge, whether this amounts to that desideratum so long wanted to show how sensation consists with perceived figure; and how perceived figure differs from external figure.

The consequences of such a proof are immense, but the above sketch is too compressed even to do justice to the proof alone; and I have only to hope that the lovers of truth will afford it candid consideration in its present state.

NO. IX.

Pam.

VOL. V.

SUBSTANCE OF A DISCOURSE,

DELIVERED AT THE

ABBEY CHURCH IN BATH,

ON THURSDAY THE 31ST OF MARCH, 1814.

BEFORE THE

DISTRICT COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN THAT CITY;

GIVING A

CHURCHMAN'S REASONS

FOR

DECLINING A CONNECTION

WITH THE

BIBLE SOCIETY;

AND NOW MOST RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED TO

The Parent "Society for Promoting Christian knowledge;"

BY THE REV. CHARLES DAUBENY,

ARCHDEACON OF SARUM.

THE

SUBSTANCE OF A DISCOURSE,

&c. &c.

MAN, from his natural propensity, is an imitative being.

Hence the conclusion is, principles not less than A consideration which

A circumstance, which must at all times render it a matter of primary importance with whom he associates, and into what connection he enters. that by an injudicious association, manners are liable to be corrupted. ought to lead to general caution: whilst to determine the application of such caution to the particular case or subject in question, should be the exclusive province of sound judg ment and discretion.

To associate for the prosecution of any cause, in which the interests of true religion are concerned, with persons professing religious principles essentially differing from our own, must at all times be a venturous experiment. For that zealous affection to a cause, which goes a great way towards misleading the best of men in their judgment, concerning those with whom they are engaged in the prosecution of it, tends by degrees so to approximate the parties to each other, that those differences which, while principles remained unshaken, were thought to be irreconcileable, begin to be seen through a more favorable medium; till at