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LORD STANLEY AND THE LUXEMBURG

QUESTION.

well as individual vanity. Not many years | promise is without danger, because "if all have passed since democratic writers, in- the Powers act together resistance would cluding MICHELET and VICTOR HUGO, held up moderate Governments to the contempt of patriots, because they neglected to resume the boundaries of the Republic and the Empire. As a German poet said with more truth than melody, the greedy ravens were always croaking themselves hoarse about the Rhine, which his countrymen, for their part, absolutely refused to surrender. It is one of the advantages of democracy that conversion operates simultaneously on masses, and that deserted creeds are instantly forgotten. Twenty years of victory had persuaded the French people that it was their mission to propagate civilization by conquest. Half a century of peace had scarcely untaught them the disastrous lesson; but the rise of Italy, and more especially of Germany, seems to have convinced Frenchmen of the present day that other nations also have rights, and that peace is better The Germans, having for centuries found themselves the victims of French ambition, were excusably suspicious, and jealous of making the first concession; but the intelligent opinion of Europe was unanimously opposed to an unnecessary contest, and in smoothing away the difficulties which impeded a friendly arrangement, the Conference has enjoyed the great advantage of swimming with the stream.

than war.

From the Spectator, May 11.

LORD STANLEY AND THE LUXEMBURG
QUESTION.

WHAT is an endorsement on the back of a bill? Is it a promise to pay if the other parties to the transaction do not, or only in case they do? We should have thought that a simple question enough in commercial ethics, but that the Times has chosen this week to assume the second answer. It declares that no man is responsible for his signature unless the acceptor has paid the bill, and so rendered the signature unneces

sary.

The Prussian Government has been asked to evacuate the fortress of Luxemburg as a concession to the sensitive dignity of France, and has agreed, it is reported, upon the condition that Europe shall guarantee its neutrality. In plainer words, each of the Five Powers is to pledge itself in writing to declare war upon any Power which may attempt to seize this military position. Thereupon, the Times declares that such a

be out of the question, while, on the other
hand, any repudiation by one Power of its
obligations would necessarily absolve the oth-
ers.' If the acceptor does not pay the en-
dorser ceases to be liable, a novel doctrine,
which proclaimed in big type in the City
article of the first commercial journal in the
world, will, we doubt not, carry much com-
fort to the souls of bankrupts, speculators,
and rogues generally. If Lord Stanley has
agreed to guarantee Luxemburg with any
such arrière pensée, he has simply agreed to a
fraud which, of all forms of political fraud,
we should have thought most alien to his
His forte is surely ju-
political character.
dicious directness, not diplomatic subtlety,
and till he himself avows it we refuse to be-
lieve that he is playing a game of which
Lord Palmerston would have been ashamed.
He did at least try to keep his pledge to
Denmark. The need of the guarantee can
only arise when Luxemburg has been occu-
pied by one of the Powers, and if that oc-
cupation of itself annuls the pledge, what
is the use of giving it? It is merely a
farce, a pledge to do that which, while
pledging ourselves, we acknowledge that
we never intend to do- -a grandiloquent
assertion that we will be responsible for the
bill if the acceptor pays it. Even the Times
seems to feel this is a little disreputable, for
after using this argument it argues that the
pledge after all is a little one, because we
already guarantee Holland. As a matter
of fact, that statement is a trick, for we do
not directly guarantee Holland against the
great Powers, but only against Belgium-
a very different thing; but suppose we do,
as Lord Stanley on Thursday seemed to as-
guar-
sume, what is that to the point? The
antee for Holland, on the Times' own show-
ing, is as unreal as any other. Nobody but
a great power can attack Holland, and the
moment a great power breaks its obligation
ours ceases, and we may skulk away con-
tented, like a hound who has stolen a bone
and escaped the expected whip. We are
not liable, because the contingency we
promised to provide against has occurred.
"If you hit that little boy again," says Fifth
Form, "I shall thrash you," and the bully
desists. By and by, plucking up his cour-
age, he hits the little boy, and Fifth Form
walks off, consoling himself as he goes by
muttering that if "people will not keep
their agreements he is not bound to keep
his."

We looked to Lord Stanley to pursue a manlier diplomacy than this, and must, till

in

rope is not worse than war, whether it does
not exhaust the nations more, more deeply
imperil the profits upon trade. At all
events, it is clear that there is a future price
at which even peace may be dear. If
France and Prussia equally accept our me-
diation, and find no new cause of quarrel in
some detail, and rest content without trying
their relative strength about Luxemburg,
then we shall have purchased a postpone-
ment of a war which we can keep out of, at
the price of a future war into which, if we
are decently honest and straightforward, we
must perforce enter.
We buy an escape
from the annoyance of giving evidence in
a Chancery suit at the price of a Chancery
suit to which we shall be principal parties.
That is at least exceedingly bad economy,
as Lord Stanley out of office would proba-
bly be the first to see.

he confesses the contrary, believe that he intends the guarantee, if he gives it, to be a reality, a promise to resist the use of Luxemburg by France against Germany. That is the common sense of the pledge, that is why it is asked, that is why it is conceded. And in this view, we believe, no more dangerous pledge could be made by Great Britain. It is nonsense to compare it with our guarantee of Belgium. We should fight for Belgium anyhow, and the guarantee makes no practical difference, except to give the advocates of war a new and unanswerable argument. But without the guarantee we should not dream of fighting for Luxemburg. Moreover, no power will attack Belgium merely as an incident a campaign; but Luxemburg is very likely indeed to be incidentally occupied. It is just the place a French General, wanting to sever railway communications It would be rather a grotesque finale for along the Rhine, would declare himself the negotiations if we found ourselves burcompelled to take, and then Prussia would dened with a guarantee without obtaining be able to demand our alliance against the compensatory peace. Of course, as France. We do not want to fight France. England assents to the sine qua non, war Except a war with America, no calamity can, if France and Prussia are equally wil1 could be so detrimental to us, to Europe, ling, be easily postponed, but are they wiland to civilization, so ruinous to commerce, ling? The Foreign Office thinks so apparso fatal to progress, so meaningless in re-ently, but the British Foreign Office has alsult. What have we to get from France? ways shown itself the most credulous of Yet if the guarantee does not mean that detective establishments, and the broad we are liable to a risk of this demand, to a facts do not bear out that theory. It is alsudden war with our nearest neighbour, or most certain, as certain as anything carefully a confession of cowardice before the world, concealed by officials can be, that France is what does it mean? If we are to allow arming fast, and that Berlin is taking either France to take Luxemburg, what does real or affected umbrage at these armaments, Prussia gain in exchange for her fortress? the reality and the affectation being about Just this, that if it is very convenient to equally dangerous. It is argued, of course, us to defend Luxemburg, we shall have le- in France that the collection of the camp gal locus standi when we say we intend to at Châlons two months earlier than usual, do it. What is the value of that to Prussia the enlargement of that camp, the compleof her right to ask an acquaintance to tion of the works at Metz, the incessant commence a grand Chancery suit for her manufacture of cartridges, the increase in own advantage and his detriment ? the effectives, and above all, the calling out of the reserves, are all precautionary measures; but they have been taken on a scale and at a cost which Sovereigns do not sanction unless they see very serious dangers ahead, and they are continuing now, when, to believe the newspapers and the funds, the reign of peace has been solidly re-established. Why is the Emperor embarrassing his exchequer, if he feels so certain that the Conference is sure to give him a great diplomatic victory, for the evacuation of Luxemburg is a victory for him? and why does Count von Bismarck pass the word to demi-official journals to complain of arma. ments which, as he knows, cannot be made the subject of official remonstrance? France will not take orders as to the extent of her

But we shall be told the guarantee is esrential to preserve the honour of Prussia, and so to maintain peace. It is a bit of high comedy, like an English duel, but one which it is necessary for the political grandees to go through with. There is a certain amount of truth in that suggestion, but then the question arises why England, which of all Powers manages high comedy worst, should be compelled to play her part. How is it her interest? The Times, which cares about nothing but the price of Consols, always assumes that peace is the grand interest of this country, and that might be true, were the peace real. But it may very well be doubted whether the condition of armed preparation now maintained all over Eu

no

armaments from any power in the world, as long as he has been in Parliament an alleast of all from the one which has so re- most extreme form of the principle of noncently excited her jealousy, and with which intervention, to come out as the direct heir she is in such open diplomatic conflict. It to Lord Palmerston's policy in both extortis not like Count von Bismarck to publish ing satisfaction for real injuries from weak statements so wounding to the amour propre but presumptuous nations, and in multiplying of an adversary merely because they are those vague and dangerous engagements of wounding, with no intention of following the English Crown, which we have more than them up, and no motive in calling the at- once had to regret bitterly in the past. We tention of the people behind him. The not only do not blame, we heartily approve clouds are very thick still, and though they of, Lord Stanley's policy in the case of the seem to be breaking, perhaps we may say dispute with Spain concerning the Queen are breaking, the barometer is still far from Victoria. It was not a pleasant thing for having risen to "set fair." Despite the England, who took so humble a part in the meeting of Conference, the acceptance of a great European dispute of 1864, to have to basis, the neutralization of the Duchy, take so high-handed a line with Spain in which does not involve the grand point at 1866. Parcere superbis, debellere subjectos, issue, and the optimist tone of the British has been rather too much the English motto official world, the grand security for peace under Lord Palmerston's foreign policy. But is still that if Napoleon fights he knows he that is not Lord Stanley's fault, and must succeed, and that in a war between Minister in his place could have done otherequals success is never certain. wise than he did in our little misunderstandOne word more. If the Conference suc- ing with Spain. But it will be, we think, ceeds in maintaining peace one fact will be his fault and greatly to his discredit if he established of far greater, importance than completes, as he intimates that he intends to any possible solution of the Luxemburg complete, this hitherto merely accidental question. The European tribunal dissolved resemblance, by launching England into by the Crimean war will have been re-es- new and large engagements, the true beartablished, to the immense benefit of man- ing of which on our own national interests, kind. There is no longer a power on the if ever we are called upon to fulfil them, no Continent which can do as it likes, without one can foresee; and the high probability consulting anybody, but many Powers so that we shall some day be called upon to equal and so bound together that they must fulfil them, every one can even now foresee. perforce prefer the régime of law to the Indeed, as far as we can understand, the régime of force. The fate of Belgium and only apology which is made for the policy of Holland, for example, is no longer depen- giving an English guarantee to the neutraldent upon Napoleon's fiat, or that of Den-ity of Luxembourg, is, that while it staves mark upon the policy of Berlin. The Powers are jealous again, and with reason, and every accession of territory, however small, every intrigue, however secret, will be watched with anxious care, and, if needful, arrested by the Council of Five, which alone has the strength to maintain the European peace and an interest in doing so. When France arms to obtain a bit of outlying land and cannot obtain it, Europe is safe from the aggression of any less potent State.

Te ar

off the war for the present, it does not much enlarge the extent of our engagements for the future. Now, the fact is quite the reverse. If we take these new engagements, honestly and with the sincere purpose of keeping them to the best of our ability, they do enlarge indefinitely, most dangerously, our liabilities for the future. If we take them in the strong hope, and with a halfformed resolve, that some way shall be found to relieve us of these engagements if ever they become troublesome, then we are guilty of one of the most dishonourable acts of which any nation could be guilty. Two great nations relying on our guarantee, and asserting that they would not rely on anything less, that we will assist in protecting the neutrality of Luxembourg from violation in case of any great European quarrel, retire from the threatening position they had just assumed. Each of them believes that we are now bound to prevent a very advantageous position from falling into the hands of its adversary; that if it should ever be

From the Economist, May 11. LORD STANLEY'S ENGLISH GUARANTEE.

LORD STANLEY admitted on Thursday night that he has engaged on behalf of England to give the guarantee of the neutrality of Luxembourg demanded by Prussia from the great Powers. It seems to be Lord Stanley's happy fortune, after representing

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cannot be expected to stand to ours,"
where was the force of the obligation ?
The whole guarantee is, then, a mockery,
delusion, and snare. It cannot have any ac-
tive effect until some one of the great Pow-
ers breaks through it. And if that is to jus-
tify us also in crying off, the whole thing is
a pretence and a sham. We maintain that
if we enter into this very serious obligation,
we ought to do so in all honour and scrupu-
lousness, and with the deliberate intention
of aiding those who are true to the treaty
against any who are untrue to it, at great
national sacrifice and cost.
To begin by

minds.

desired by that adversary, we are bound to help the other in recovering it, and punishing the breach of faith. They consider that this promise of help from us in preventing Luxembourg from becoming a stronghold in their adversary's hand, will compensate for any advantage they might now have, either in position or preparation. Prussia has at present a great advantage in position. She holds Luxembourg, and can stay there if she pleases. If she retires, she retires on the express understanding that we will aid her in preventing it from ever falling into French hands, or in recovering it from French hands and restoring its neutrality, if neces- insinuating that our obligation is no greatsary. If we are permitting Prussia to give er than that of others, and that we can cry up this great advantage of possession, in re-off if others do, is to begin with dishonouraliance on our aid for protecting the neutra- ble intentions already half-formed in our lity of Luxembourg against France in years to come, and yet are not ourselves prepared to sacrifice much, in life, and money, and prosperity, for the sake of redeeming that pledge, whenever it may be demanded from Ds, we are setting the disgraceful example of light promises and insincere professions. When the Times says, in apology for this most serious and important responsibility which we are undertaking, " England would never dream of committing herself to isolated action in this matter; she undertakes no responsibility which is not, to the same extent, shared by every member of the Confer"it is evident that it means to point out a probable mode of escape from the obligation we are incurring, founded on the likelihood that some other members of the guaranteeing Conference will repudiate their obligations. Now, we must say that to enter into this obligation in the express hope that if it should ever be incumbent on us to fulfil it, we can, probably, plead other bad examples as an excuse for not complying, is to accustom ourselves, from the very beginning, to the idea that we are not, in any serious sense, undertaking a national obligation at all. Of course, no question of putting the guarantee in execution can arise till some one power fails in her duty. If that one Power be a great power, such a power as France or Prussia for instance, it is not likely that she will fail alone. She will have supporters and advocates in the excuses she will make for her failure. In that case, and that alone, the true obligation of our guarantee comes into effect. We ought then to say at once, "We side against the power which violates the neutrality of Luxembourg;" and if, on the contrary, we say, "Our obligation to observe the treaty is no greater than that of the offending power; as France or Prussia is indifferent to national obligations, we

ence;

But we are told by Lord Stanley, by the Times and the Standard, that this guarantee for the neutrality of Luxembourg is no real enlargement of the engagements we have already taken, almost, indeed, a diminution of them, because it defines better what we are expected to do, and extends the number of our colleagues in the duty. Certainly this is a very important argument, if only it were a true one. Primâ facie, it does not seem very probable that it can be true. Prussia would scarcely insist on our giving this guarantee of neutrality as a sine qua non, if it did not give her any fresh security. We are told that war or peace depended on our giving this engagement. In that case, it does not seem a very plausible statement that our engagement is no practical addition to our national responsibilities. War or peace would scarcely depend on our sigui g à merely formal document, which could not alter the practical course of events. And, in truth, nothing can be more absurdly contrary to the fact than to say that the new guarantee does not extend, and extend in a very important way, the military obligations of England. What is argued by the organs of the Government, the Times and Standard,

is, that we have already guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, and, of course, of Belgian Luxembourg, so that to take in a few more square miles of neutral territory will not make much difference. Unfortunately, it makes this difference, that the territory now to be included is to be included precisely on this account, that it contains the key to a wholly new set of international jealousies and military positions. Belgium, as guaranteed at present, is a responsibility heavy enough. Practically, the guarantee of French Belgium is a guarantee against France, the only country speaking in any

said the 7th Article of the annex to that treaty," within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe neutrality towards all other States." We have never given any such guarantee as that to Holland or Dutch Luxembourg. The claims of Holland to that sort of European guardianship must be traced back to the general arrangements of 1814 and 1815, which have so constantly been violated by all the powers who were parties to those treaties, especially in the case of one of the strongest guarantees given, - the case of Cracow, that every one now admits that they have lost validity. The treaties of 1831 and 1839 give no sort of engagement on the part of Great Britain that it will defend the independence or the neutrality of Holland in general, still less of Dutch-Luxembourg. They only guarantee territory to Holland, territory and independence and neutrality to Belgium.

measure the same language with Belgium, | the territory now in question belongs, the and likely on any account to covet its pos- guarantee of the same powers for its political session. But the new piece of country is a independence and neutrality. "Belgium," fragment of German soil, and is likely to be coveted indeed, is coveted at present by both France and Germany alike. It is, what Belgium Luxembourg has never been, the bone of contention between two firstclass Powers of great military resources nay, it is what Belgian Luxembourg has never been, a military position of the first strategic importance, both from its natural advantages and from its holding the centre of a widely-branching railway system. So far is it from the truth, that we do not extend our obligations by taking this territory into the area where neutrality is guaranteed, that the effectual motive which has induced Lord Stanley to promise this guarantee is the entirely new security which it gives to Prussia and France that Great Britain will side with either in preventing the attempt of the other to seize, annex, or garrison it. Small as the territory of Dutch Luxembourg is, it is the key of a new and most important political and military position, which the rise of North Germany to its great European position has rendered one of the first importance to each of the great European rivals of the future. It is this wholly new political and military battle-ground, the neutrality of which we have for the first time engaged to guarantee.

When it is said that we have virtually guaranteed this before, it must be said in complete ignorance of our actual treaty obligations. Lord Stanley says that" we have guaranteed the Duchy of Luxembourg to the King of Holland in the most full, absolute, and unqualified manner." Now, in the first place, that is only a guarantee of territorial possession, and not a guarantee of neutrality; nor does it touch in the least the question now at issue, the right of garrisoning the fortress of Luxembourg. Nobody cares about the mere territorial possession. No one will go to war for a few square miles of country. It is the right of garrison now in dispute, and that is the real stress of the difficulty. The King of Holland might hold the territory for ever, and no one dispute it, if only Prussia or France could have either of them her way about the military question. The treaty of 1831 defined the limits of Belgium, and gave Belgium the guarantee of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, for its independence and neutrality. The treaty of 1839 altered the boundaries of Luxembourg as between Belgium and Holland; and again gave to Belgium, not to Holland, to whom

When it is said that it is not easy to imagine any campaign in which the Dutch territory of Luxembourg could be seized by any great Power, and in which the neutrality of Belgian Luxembourg would not also be violated, an argument is raised which has not only no force at all, but if it had, would be good for a gradual extension of our guarantee to the whole of Europe. If, because we have guaranteed one spot of ground liable to certain dangers, we are to guarantee all neighbouring spots of ground liable to other and different dangers, there is no reason why we should ever stop at all. The use of such an argument as this by the advocates of Lord Stanley's policy shows the essential weakness of Lord Stanley's position..

The simple truth is, that in guaranteeing the neutrality of the spot occupied by the present fortress of Luxembourg, we do enter once more on the dangerous policy of giving vague and most important engagements, the force of which we hardly know ourselves, and which, indeed, we set out by wishing to make light of, and the execution of which, whenever it is demanded from us, perhaps in a quite different state of Europe, may be contrary to our interests and contrary even to the true demands of political justice. We are going to do this on the spendthrift principle, that to accept a bill for an indefinite sum not due for an indefinite time, is always better than to make an immediate sacrifice of comfort, however small. It would