would stimulate the victor into the hope of
final victory. Every defeat would sting the
vanquished into new and more brilliant
efforts. Nor is it conceivable that between
two conterminous countries with so long a
boundary line, and a boundary line almost
every section of which has changed masters
in former wars, the war could be isolated,
as it was in the case of Russia, to any one
unhappy spot in which it could be fought
out like a desperate duel to its conclusion.
Such an isolation is not geographically pos-
sible in the case of a war between France and
Germany. It would involve a sacrifice of
half the best chances of war to attempt it on
either side, and if either side were willing
so to concentrate the horrors of the fight, it
would be impossible to secure the assent of
the other to so artificial an arrangement.
A war between France and Germany, nom-
inally for Luxembourg, means, then, some-
thing quite different from anything we have
known of late years,
a war between great
military Powers, of, probably, nearly equal
resources, a war for a symbol of suprem-
acy, not for any substantial end which even
the defeated Power could afford to admit as a
concession fair to make, -a war of jealousy,
not a war of patriotism, a war to measure
power between great nations, neither of
whose real power can be guaged in a month,
or even in a year.

tort a concession of some sort from Germany which shall, at least, prove to the French that the prestige of France has not yet been eclipsed by the growing prestige of Germany.

With these views of the character of the war which now threatens Europe, we confess we feel great uneasiness at the rumor of those "identical notes" in which it is said that England has taken part, and the tenor of which is supposed to be persuasions addressed to Prussia to agree to the neutralisation of Luxembourg. We do not attach any very great value to these rumours. At such a time, such rumours are sure to prevail. We have every reason as yet to put confidence in Lord Stanley's prudence. But the rumours to which we refer at least justify us in expressing a very strong opinion that it would be very unwise in England to take either part, even so far as to give advice. As her opinion was asked about the obligations incurred under the treaty of 1839, she could not, of course, refuse to express her opinion as to the nature of those obligations. But anything like pressure addressed to either party and we should say especially to Germany, who is in possession of the fortress of Luxembourg, and with whom the people of Luxembourg undoubtedly have more close ties of country than with France, to induce her to give way, would appear to us a very false step, of We fear, therefore, that if this war should which we cannot easily suppose Lord Stanbreak out, the very trivial ground of quarrel ley to be guilty. If the newspaper rumours, may prove a reason, not for its speedy set- to which, as we said before, we attach extlement, but for its long and exhausting char- ceedingly little importance, be true, Engacter. Economy means the skilful adapting of land's influence has been used, with that of a means to an end, so that your expenditure other powers, to persuade concession on the of means shall not be lavish in relation to part of Germany, and to justify to some the specific end you have in view. But the slight extent the policy of France. Now,. less specific is the end you have in view, the the initiative in this case undoubtedly beless is anything like economy practicable. longed to France. Germany only aspired You cannot economize war, or any other to maintain the status quo. If we have agency that is undertaken not for a specif- given a shadow of support to the French rep-ic end, but for a vague general end, like resentations, we have, in reality, rendered establishing the supremacy of one nation it much more difficult for the Emperor of over another as a European Power. That the French to recede. If he is so far in the is intrinsically an object which can only be right that the other powers appeal to Ger-. gained by absolutely exhausting the spirit many to make a concession, there would: or the resources of one or other of the com- seem to be something like fear in drawing batants. But neither Germany nor France back, and France cannot show fear. The: is likely to give in for want of spirit till she effect, therefore, as it seems to us, of any gives in for want of strength. And no short throwing of our influence on the French war can well drain the strength of either of side, must be to render France less likely to these great peoples. The more blood has give way. And as Germany is, and has been shed, the more lives have been sacri- long been, in possession of the disputed terficed, the less willing will either nation be ritorial point, and as it is necessarily much to make peace without achieving the end more difficult for national pride to give way for which they fought, Germany, to show so far as to evacuate a fortress at the comthat she will not give up an inch of German mand of another, than even to resign new. ground to please France, France, to ex-pretensions to a fortress which you have

never possessed, the fact of lending our moral aid to France must be, we think, to diminish the most considerable (even if inconsiderable) ground of hope for peace which existed at all. And, of course, the fact of our intervention, if we have in any sense intervened, to persuade Prussia to submit, cannot have been pleasing to Prussia. This we ought not to consider, if there were any good end either in the way of peace or justice to be gained by our interposition. But this, we think, we have shown to be very unlikely; and, on the other hand, we do know that if ever we have to redeem our pledges to defend Belgium, it will not be against Prussia but against France, while Germany would be our best ally in such a struggle. Could it be wise, then, to deepen the unfriendly feeling already too strong between England and Germany, by a policy which is not conceived either in the interests of peace or of justice?-for, as regards justice, while it is difficult to maintain that there is any important concession to justice involved in continuing to subject Luxembourg to the military power of Prussia, it is impossible to maintain that any such concession is involved in handing over Luxembourg to France. There never seems to us to have been a foreign complication in which it was so clearly, our duty to keep neutral, even to the point of withholding moral support from both parties alike. The struggle is really one for European supremacy, and on the question of the European supremacy of France or Prussia, England has certainly no conviction, and, probably, no strong wish.

a big friend whom some day we would set on Prussia to avenge us and Denmark. The German side of the quarrel is accordingly thrown into the background, and if we hear from German authorities that Prussia is determined not to give way, this resolution is treated as a piece of mad insolence or of blind and besotted obstinacy. Calling them names, however, will not make the Germans less determined; and if we wish to guess on fair grounds whether there will be war, we must begin by inquiring how it is that the Germans are so determined. If we do this, we shall soon find that with the Germans the present question is not a question of nationality. They do not claim Luxemburg as German, Count BISMARK has expressly renounced this view. Germany, as he declares, does not want Luxemburg, and Luxemburg does not want Germany. But Prussia is in possession, not of the territory of Luxemburg, but of the fortress, and why should Prussia be turned out? Prussia was placed there by Europe to watch against the ambition of France, and espe cially to protect Germany against France; and yet the King of HOLLAND thinks that he is to be allowed to sell this very fortress to France, and then the French are to tell the Prussians that they are on French soil, and must walk out. But the Prussians are told that they need not mind this, because things are changed, and they are so much relatively stronger than they were that they need not object to France being strengthened. That is, they are asked to give up a strong position to France because they are better able to fight her. In other words, Germany has to indemnify France for the injury France has sustained by a strong confederacy being substituted in Germany for a weak one. Why should this be? If Germany makes her unity THE best mode of approaching all ques- still more complete and her confederation tions affecting foreign nations is to study still more effectual, are the French to claim the claims, the views, and the feelings of some further compensation? Are they to that party to a quarrel which is least in have a slice, bigger or smaller, of the left favour with Englishmen. At present, Prus- bank of the Rhine, to make up for Bavaria sia is not so much in favour with English- and Wurtemberg associating their fortunes men as France is. The Prussians have altogether with those of the Northern been very successful lately, and bystanders States? This the Germans will never conhave an uncomfortable feeling at the spec- sent to. They may fight and be beaten, tacle of too much good fortune. The and may have to give up Luxemburg Prussians personally are an insolent, over- and a great many other places of more im bearing race; they make themselves far portance; but at any rate they will do their more disagreeable than the French do; and there is still lingering in some quarters the foolish feeling provoked by the Danish war, that although we could not conveniently fight Prussia ourselves, yet we had

From the Saturday Review, 27th April.

WILL THERE BE WAR?

best to keep what they have got. To Ger man eyes the case presents itself as a whole. They ask whether they are to admit the principle that, as between them selves and France, they are to be called on

to give up something to France because when the reign of the present EMPEROR they improve their political condition. Is terminates. The military despotism may it we alone, they may ask, that have im- continue, and the next EMPEROR may feel proved our political condition? Have we that, with a weaker title, and a more prealone made ourselves stronger for military carious hold on power, war is the first conpurposes ? Certainly not. France has sub-dition of his existence. The only way for stituted a military despotism for a constitu- Germany to avoid being victimised is to tional government, and one of the very show herself perfectly prepared for war, and strongest claims which the Second Empire perfectly ready to fight. A long and undehas on the feelings of Frenchmen is that, cisive war is as unfavourable to a military even if it makes them less free at home despot as no war at all. The Germans may it makes them more powerful abroad. reasonably hope that, if they either fight It enables them to carry on war more well now, or succeed in averting war by swiftly, effectually, and successfully The proclaiming themselves quite ready for war, Germans, in their turn, have adopted they may henceforth ward off a serious, a new organization, which enables them to pressing, and permanent danger. These, bring into the field more troops and better right or wrong, are the feelings and calculatroops under a better system; and then, tions of the Germans. They decline to because they have done this, and have so admit the principle that, because they infar followed the example of France, they crease their political and military strength, are told that they must give France France is entitled to ask for compensation. a fortress to make things square. Their They wish to convince the military despots only reply, the only reply possible for them of France that they are not to try to reto such a demand, is that, if the French cover prestige at the expense of Germany. want the fortress of Luxemburg, they must So far, therefore, as the preservation of come and take it. peace may be supposed to depend on the Germans giving way, it may be confidently said that there is no hope of peace. They most certainly will not give way.

The Germans have also a feeling that they are being most unfairly sacrificed to the necessities of the French Empire. They think that the EMPEROR feels his throne to be in danger, and wants a war to make himself safe. He has lost prestige in Mexico; he passed last year in a state of discreditable vacillation. Now he feels that war must come, or he will be lost; and the Germans strongly object to being made war upon in order that the French may be tempted to forget that they were ordered out of Mexico by the United States, and that the EMPEROR has no longer a very brilliant position in Europe. Nothing can be more aggravating to a nation than the thought that it is to have its commerce cut up, and its taxes doubled, and its families desolated, and its soldiers killed, because a foreign Sovereign calculates that it would suit him better to have a war than a revolution. People who feared that such an injustice was going to be done them might very well argue that the least concession would be ruin, and that nothing could possibly save them except a boldness which would show that to fight them would be a most dangerous risk, and that their enemy, if he wants war as a protection against revolution, would do well to make a war that promises to pay better. The Germans reflect that the causes which, as they conceive, are nearly producing war now, may produce it very easily hereafter. No one knows what will happen in France

But will France give way? No one can answer this. If the French nation thinks its honour involved in turning the Prussian garrison.out of Luxemburg, there must be war. A few weeks ago it was perfectly indifferent to Luxemburg and its garrison. Nor does it much care about either now. But a great many Frenchmen feel sore about Prussia. They think they have cut a very poor figure last year; and somehow, although they do not clearly know how, they now find themselves in such a position that, if they let this Luxemburg question drop quietly, they think their conduct will be ascribed to fear. Just as, to all appearance, the Germans are not actuated by an absurd desire to claim Luxemburg on the ground of nationality, so it must be confessed that the French do not appear to be actuated by a desire for territorial aggrandizement. The Germans are, in a general way, fond of making out that half-German races are wholly German; and the French are, in a general way, fond of acquiring territory, and their general habits of thought are not discarded entirely on this occasion. But the main motive, the leading thought, is not German nationality or French aggrandize ment. And it must also be said that even if the general theory entertained by the Germans about the character of the French Empire is correct, and although no one can

doubt that the present EMPEROR would But now Luxemburg is no longer a part prefer a war to a revolution, yet there are of Germany. The Germans do not wish tha no signs that the war, if it comes, will be his it should be so. It is a possession of the doing. He is not pushing on France to King of HOLLAND, who wants to be rid of it, war; it is France that is pushing on him. and it is a most glaring anomaly that Prussia The semi-official article just published in should retain the right of garrisoning a forthe Constitutionnel states probably what is tress in the midst of a territory that is entirely the simple truth, that the French Govern- alien to her. If she chooses to say that, ment did not think Prussia would object to having got the fortress, she will keep it the cession of Luxemburg or the evacuation whether she is right or not, and whether her of the fortress. It seemed as if Prussia had position is anomalous or not, she can do so, nothing to lose by this, and might be ex- and it is possible she may do so successfully. pected to be glad of showing in a graceful But she certainly, in doing this, abdicates her way that she was pleased that the wish- claim to hold Luxemburg by a European es of France should be gratified. The title. If she says that she must hold it for EMPEROR may not unnaturally think that he the protection of Germany, this does not has given no ground for suspecting that he really alter her position, for she still occuwants to take the left bank of the Rhine, or pies new ground. She is assuming more that he considers a new war necessary for than the European settlement gave her. She the maintenance of his power. He showed is, in fact, holding a non-German town for himself last year much more moderate than the protection of Germany, and the Powers his subjects; and when war was in some that placed her there never meant that this measure pressed on him, he seemed to ap- should be so. If the cession of Luxemburg peal to the good sense of the country, and is looked upon as a compensation to France, to lean for support on the growing dislike or as a sign that Germany will yield to with which war is regarded in France by claims made for the purposes of French polthose who most suffer from taxes and have itics, it is impossible to conceive that the to shed their blood most freely in battle. Prussian garrison will be withdrawn. But ifit Even at this eleventh hour the language of is looked at with reference to the general polthe French Government is studiously cour-itics of Europe, the case is very different. teous and conciliatory. Since Prussia unfortunately is not so accommodating as was expected, and asserts that she holds Luxemburg under a general European arrangement which is not to be disturbed by bargains between France and Holland, France is ready to accept this view, and to invite the other great Powers to consider what should be the destiny of the fortress of Luxemburg now that the territory of Luxemburg is no longer a part of the German Confederation.

It is undoubtedly open to Prussia to reply that the other Powers have nothing to do with the matter, and that Germany, having had this fortress entrusted to her for the protection, not only of Europe, but of Germany, cannot be dispossessed at the pleasure of other Powers. But it is obvious that, so far as Europe was concerned, it was because the province of Luxemburg was made a part of the German Confederation that the fortress was handed over to the safekeeping of German troops. The two things went together. In 1839 the Great Powers forced Belgium to give up Luxemburg to Holland on the express ground that, as it was a part of Germany, the Belgians could not be allowed to retain it as a portion of the territory which they had succeeded in wresting from Holland.

For, as between Europe and Prussia, the continuance of a Prussian garrison in non-Ger man territory is a sort of usurpation. But Prussia cannot be expected to admit that the fortress which she is asked to give up shall be given to France. If it is contrary to the spirit of the European settlement that she should hold Luxemburg now that Luxemburg is no longer German, it is still more contrary to the spirit of that settlement that the fortress she holds as against France should be given to France. But then it is urged that, if she withdraws, France, on the first opportunity, will be sure to seize it, and that to withdraw is virtually to give it to France. To this there is only one answer. If Luxemburg is placed under the same guarantee as Belgium, France can never seize it except by risking a war with the guaran tors. Prussia may be persuaded to consider this guarantee a sufficient security; and this is, we imagine, almost the only hope of peace being preserved. It is not a solution of the difficulty at all agreeable to us, for Englishmen view with the utmost dislike all projects for extending our engagements to defend foreign soil. But, as we have guaranteed Belgium, we should not be running a new risk. Or if, in a remote way, our risk is increased, this perhaps is not too great a sacrifice to make in order to preserve peace.

TO

From the Saturday Review.
THE PRIVACY OF THE DEAD.

of the literary harpies of the next age. Nobody thinks it wrong or indecorous to study the minutiae of his appetite, or his personal habits. The slaves of the lamp of one gen

affairs of their predecessors, the slaves of the lamp of the generation before. Not to know the chronological order of Lord Byron's intrigues, the secret history of Mr. Shelley's marriages, or the authentic details of Mr Coleridge's opium-eating, is a sort of blot upon one's literary cultivation. The thoroughly educated man is as much at home at Mr. Fox's dinner-table as at his own. It is the aim and object of our early studies to teach us to be able to button-hole all the illustrious dead to call Tommy Moore by his Christian name, and to be facetious and omniscient about Mr. Wordsworth's stout coarse shoes. For the slave of the lamp, when he is buried, there is no more privacy. The more secluded has been his life, the greater the crowd which flocks to him when he is dead, and inquisitive biographers think no more of taking up their permament quarters among his papers than the active tourist does of picnicking at the Pyramids or on the site of Veii.

MOST persons who have read the autobiog-eration are always busy over the private raphy of Goethe will remember the passage in which he describes the anxiety of his acquaintances, after the publication of Werther, to discover the lady from whom he borrowed the character of Charlotte. Tormenting inquiries upon the subject pursued him all through his life. And, looking back on them, the author of Werther wanders into a slight digression about the way in which the public treats those whose mission it is to write for public instruction and amusement. Perhaps a man who publishes his own autobiography is not the person to complain of intrusions on his privacy. Those who, like Goethe or Rousseau, deliberately choose to pose" in public, and to invite the microscopic attention of the curious, ought not to object to being stared at or even jostled by a crowd. In general, famous people are supposed at any rate to have a right to shut out the world from their drawing-rooms and their dinner-tables. Princes and princesses are believed to be an exception. Like the lions in the Zoological Gardens, they are national characters; and the public, which pays for them, wishes as far as possible to watch them even at their meals. Whether one Royal personage is on the best of terms with another, what is the exact level of matrimonial felicity among the princes and princesses who are grown up, and what the little princes and princesses who are not grown up say to the doctor who attends then for the measles, are topics of conversation at every village tea-table in the country. But, apart from such exceptional cases, a modified sort of privacy is permitted to great men during their lifetime. Occasionally the "Flâneur" of a daily paper hunts them down at a club or an evening party, and regales his readers on the length of one hero's hair and the whiteness of another hero's teeth; but such impertinences are blamed and discountenanced by educated men and women. As soon, however, as a hero dies he loses his claim to the protection of good manners. Naked the literary giant came into this world, and naked he goes out of it. He leaves behind, for the inspection of the world at large, his character and his clothes, his manners and conversation, the cut of his coat and the colour of his hair, his acquaintances, his amours, and the exact shade of his theological opinions. All that he has had or enjoyed in life becomes the property

An eminent Lord Chancellor is said to have once told the late Lord Campbell that his Lives of the Chancellors had succeeded in adding an additional terror to death. It may perhaps reasonably be doubted whether contemporary fame is an adequate compensation for the prospect of having one's life and letters subjected to the curious scrutiny of posterity. The two greatest poets that the world has ever known are singular in being an exception to the lot of their fraternity. Nobody knows anything about Shakspeare and Homer- if there ever was a Homer may at all events lay claim to the proud distinction of having successfully baffled the erudite efforts of biographers. But, with few exceptions, most great writers have been so dug over and explored that any privacy which they may have desired during their lives is utterly lost and sacrificed at their decease. The question is whether posthumous fame is worth this. One can well conceive of a great genius who calmly considered the matter in all its bearings, and who fully understood the eternal fuss that would be made by future ages about his neckhandkerchiefs, and his juvenile in-. discretions, coming deliberately to the conclusion that he preferred dying in obscurity. To be called Tommy to all time, and to have one's conjugal affection, and one's capacity for toadyism canvassed by coming ages, is a prospect which would have made Mr. Moore