mean that the same portion of space appears are not qualities of matter (for results and of one hue, and so of the other qualities: qualities belong not to the same category), but but sensation or thought is never conceived mere facts or phenomena of a totally differe so to occupy space, or to characterise it; nor description, for the production of which the can those faculties be at all conceived as apparatus of some such organisation may, for being merely definite portions of space, en- the time, be necessary. dued with perceptible properties. In the third But the material thing is, that it is not to place, all the primary qualities of matter are the whole mass of our bodies, or their Lvng inseparable from it, and enter necessarily into organisation in general, that these phenomera its conception and definition. All matter are said by Dr. Priestley and his disciples to must necessarily be conceived as extended, belong, as proper qualities. On the contrary. solid, and figured: and also as universally they distinctly admit that they are not qualities capable of all the secondary qualities. It is of that physical mass generally, nor even of obvious, however, that thought or sensation those finer parts of it which constitute our is not an inseparable attribute of matter; as organs of sense. They admit that the eye by far the greater part of matter is entirely and the ear act the parts merely of optical or destitute of it; and it is found in connection acoustic instruments; and are only useful in only with those parts which we term organ- transmitting impulses (or, it may be, time subised; and with those, only while they are stances) to the nervous part of the brea: of in a certain state, which we call alive. If which alone, therefore, and indeed or iș of its it be said, however, that thought may re- minute and invisible portions, these singular semble those accidental qualities of matter, phenomena are alleged to be proper physical such as heat or colour, which are not insepa- qualities! It is difficult, we think, to make rable or permanent; then we reply, that the absurdity of such a doctrine more appa neither of these things can, in strictness, be rent than by this plain statement of its import termed qualities of matter, more than thought and amount. The only ground, it must always or sensation: They are themselves substan- be recollected, for holding that niind and all ces, or matter possessed of inseparable and its phenomena are mere qualities of matter, is peculiar qualities, as well as those which the broad and popular one, that we always address themselves to the other senses. Light find them connected with a certain visibi is a material substance, from which the mass of organised matter, called a living body: quality of colour is inseparable; and heat is But when it is admitted that they are not a material substance, which has universally qualities of this mass generally, or even of the quality of exciting the sensation of any part of it which is visible or perceptible warmth and both address themselves to, by our senses, the allegation of their being and are distinctly perceived through, our mere material qualities of a part of the brain. senses. If thought be allowed to be a sub-must appear not merely gratuitous, but inconstance in this sense, it will remain to show that it also is material; by being referable to space, capable of subsisting in every sort of body, of being perceived by the senses, of being transferred from one body to another, and liable to attraction, repulsion, condensation, or reflection-like heat or light.

It is to be remarked also, that wherever any proper quality, primary or secondary, can be ascribed generally to any perceptible body or mass of matter, that quality must exist and be recognised in every part of it. If the whole of any such body is hard, or coloured, or weighty, or hot, or cold, every part of it, whether merely considered and examined as separable, or actually separated and detached, must be hard, coloured, and weighty also: these qualities being truly conditions, and, in fact, the only real proofs of the material existence of such a body, and of all the parts of it. But though thought or volition may be said to have their residence somewhere within a human body, they certainly are not qualities of its material mass, in this sense; or to the effect of being sensibly present in every part or portion of it! We never, at least, have happened to hear it surmised that there is thought in the elbow-joint, or volition in the nail of the great toe: and if it be said that these phenomena are results only of the living organisation as a whole, it seems to us that this is a substantial abandonment of the whole argument, and an admission that they

sistent and absolutely absurd. If the eve and the ear, with their delicate structures and fine sensibility, are but vehicles and ap paratus, why should the attenuated and unknown tissues of the cerebral nerves be supposed to be any thing else or why should the resulting sensations, to which both are apparently ministrant, and no more than ministrant, and which have no conceivable resemblance or analogy to any attribute of matter, but put on the list of the physical qualities of the latter-which is of itself too slight and subtle to enable us to say what are its common physical qualities! But we have yet another consideration to suggest, before finally closing this discussion.

It probably has not escaped observation, that throughout the preceding argument, we have allowed the advocates for Material sm to assume that what (to oblige them) we have called thought or perception generally, was one uniform and identical thing; to which therefore, the appellation of a quality might possibly be given, without manifest and palpable absurdity. But in reality there is no ground, or even room, for claiming such an allowance. The acts or functions which me ascribe to mind, are at all events not ore, but many and diverse. Perception no doubt is one of them-but it is not identical with sersation; and still less with memory or image nation, or volition, or with love, anger, fear, deliberation, or hatred. Each of these, on the

contrary, is a separate and distinguishable sons: For, so long as they stuck to the geneact, function, or phenomenon, of the existence ral assertion, that thought might, in some way of which we become aware, not through per- or other, be represented as a quality of matception, or the external senses at all, but ter,-although it was not perceived by the through consciousness or reflection alone: and senses, and bore no analogy to any of its other none of them (with the single exception, per- qualities, and talked about the inherent cahaps, of perception) have any necessary or pacity of substance, to support all sorts of natural reference to any external or material qualities; although their doctrine might elude existence whatever. It is not disputed, how- our comprehension, and revolt all our habits ever, that it is only by perception and the of thinking,-still it might be difficult to senses, that we can gain any knowledge of demonstrate its fallacy; and a certain permatter; and, consequently, whatever we come plexing argumentation might be maintained, to know by consciousness only, cannot pos- by a person well acquainted with the use, sibly belong to that category, or be either ma- and abuse, of words: But when they cast terial or external. But we are not aware that away the protection of this most convenient any materialist has ever gone the length of obscurity, and, instead of saying that they directly maintaining that volition for example, do not know what thought is, have the couror memory, or anger, or fear, or any other age to refer it to the known category of Mosuch affection, were proper material qualities tion, they evidently subject their theory to the of our bodily frames, or could be perceived test of rational examination, and furnish us and recognised as such, by the agency of with a criterion by which its truth may be the external senses; in the same way as the easily determined. weight, heat, colour, or elasticity which may belong to these frames. But if they are not each of them capable of being so perceived, as separate physical qualities, it is plain that nothing can be gained in argument, by affecting to disregard their palpable diversity, and seeking to class them all under one vague name, of thought or perception. Even with that advantage, we have seen that the doctrine, of perception or thought being a mere quality of matter, is not only untenable, but truly self-contradictory and unintelligible. But when the number and diversity of the phenomena necessarily covered by that general appellation is considered, along with the fact that most of them have no reference to matter, and do in no way imply its existence, the absurdity of representing them as so many of its distinct perceptible qualities, must be too apparent, we think, to admit of any serious defence.

We shall not be so rash as to attempt any definition of motion; but we believe we may take it for granted, that our readers know pretty well what it is. At all events, it is not a quality of matter. It is an act, a phenomenon, or a fact :—but it makes no part of the description or conception of matter; though it can only exist with reference to that substance. Let any man ask himself, however, whether the motion of matter bears any sort of resemblance to thought or sensation; or whether it be even conceivable that these should be one and the same thing?-But, it is said, we find sensation always produced by motion; and as we can discover nothing else in conjunction with it, we are justified in ascribing it to motion. But this, we beg leave to say, is not the question. It is not necessary to inquire, whether motion may produce sensation or not, but whether sensation be motion, and nothing else? It seems pretty eviThe sum of the whole then is, that all the dent, to be sure, that motion can never proknowledge which we gain only by Perception duce any thing but motion or impulse; and and the use of our external Senses, is know- that it is at least as inconceivable that it should ledge of Matter, and its qualities and attri-ever produce sensation in matter, as that it butes alone; and all which we gain only by should produce a separate substance, called Consciousness and Reflection on our own in- mind. But this, we repeat, is not the quesward feelings, is necessarily knowledge of tion with the materialists. Their proposition Mind, and its states, attributes, and functions.is, not that motion produces sensation-which This in fact is the whole basis, and rationale of the distinction between mind and matter: and, consequently, unless it can be shown that love, anger, and sorrow, as well as memory and volition, are direct objects of sense or external perception, like heat and colour, or figure and solidity, there must be an end, we think, of all question as to their being material qualities.

But, though the very basis and foundation of the argument for Materialism is placed upon the assumption, that thought and perception are qualities of our bodies, it is remarkable that Dr. Priestley, and the other champions of that doctrine, do ultimately give up that point altogether, and maintain, that thought is nothing else than Motion! Now, this, we cannot help thinking, was very impolitic and injudicious in these learned per

might be as well in the mind as in the body; but, that sensation is motion; and that all the phenomena of thought and perception are intelligibly accounted for by saying, that they are certain little shakings in the pulpy part of the brain.

There are certain propositions which it is difficult to confute, only because it is impossible to comprehend them: and this, the substantive article in the creed of Materialism, really seems to be of this description. To say that thought is motion, is as unintelligible to us, as to say that it is space, or time, or proportion.

There may be little shakings in the brain, for any thing we know, and there may even be shakings of a different kind, accompanying every act of thought or perception;-but, that the shakings themselves are the thought or

(October, 1805.)

Academical Questions. By the Right Honourable WILLIAM DRUMMOND, K. C., F. R. S., F. R.S. E. Author of a Translation of Persius. Vol. I. 4to. pp. 412. Cadell and Davies. London: 1805.

We do not know very well what to say of that it is occupied with Metaphysical speenthis very learned publication. To some read-lations. To others, it may convey a more ers it will probably be enough to announce, precise idea of its character, to be told, that

may or may not be inferred from the fact, ac- | asmuch as there is a distinction between our cording to the views of the inquirer. The feelings of pain, resistance, &c., and our coninquiry is an inquiry into the functions and ception and belief of real external existences: operations of mind; and all that can possibly But they differ merely as one affection of be stated as fact on such an occasion, must re- mind may differ from another; and it is plainly late to the state and affections of mind only: unwarrantable to assume the real existence But to assume the existence of a material of external objects as a part of the statement world, in order afterwards to define one func- of a purely intellectual phenomenon. After tion of mind to be that by which it discovers allowing the reality of this distinction, there material qualities, is evidently blending hy- is still room therefore for considering the pothesis in the statement, and prejudging the second question to which we alluded in the controversy by assumption. The fact itself, outset, viz. Whether perception does neceswe really conceive not to be liable to any kind sarily imply the existence of external obof doubt or dispute; and yet the statement of jects. it, obvious as it is, seems calculated to retrench Upon this subject, we entertain an opinion a good deal from each of the opposite asser-which will not give satisfaction, we are afraid, tions. The fact, if we be not greatly mis- to either of the contending parties. We think taken, is confessedly as follows. that the existence of external objects is not necessarily implied in the phenomena of perception; but we think that there is no complete proof of their nonexistence; and that philosophy, instead of being benefited, would be subjected to needless embarrassments, by the absolute assumption of the ideal theory.

We have occasionally certain sensations which we call heat, pain, resistance, &c. These feelings, of course, belong only to the mind, of which they are peculiar affections; and both parties are agreed in asserting, that they have no resemblance, or necessary reference, to any thing external. Dr. Reid has made this indeed the very ground-work of his reasonings on the subject of perception; and it will not probably be called in question by his antagonists, who go the length of inferring from it, that nothing but mind can be conceived to have an existence in nature. This, then, is one fact which we may safely assume as quite certain and indisputable, viz. that our sensations are affections of the mind, and have no necessary reference to any other existence. But there is another fact at least as obvious and indisputable, which the one party seems disposed to overlook, and the other to invest with undue authority, in the discussion. This second fact is, that some of the sensations in question are uniformly and irresistibly accompanied by the apprehension and belief of certain external existences, distinguished by peculiar qualities. The fact certainly admits of no dispute; and, accordingly, the philosophers who first attempted to prove that this belief was without foundation, have uniformly claimed the merit of disabusing mankind of a natural and universal illusion. Now this apprehension and belief of external existences, is in itself as much an affection of mind, as the sensations by which it is accompanied; and those who deny the distinction between perception and sensation, might be justified perhaps in asserting, that it is only a sensation of another kind: at the same time, as the essence of it consists in the apprehension of an independent existence, there can be no harm in distinguishing it, by a separate appellation, from those sensations which centre in the sentient being, and suggest to him no idea of any other existence. It is in this sense alone, it appears to us, that perception can be understood in strict philosophical language. It means no more than that affection of the mind which consists in an apprehension and belief in the existence of external objects.

Now in this sense of the word, there can be no doubt that there is a real distinction between mere sensation and perception; in

The reality of external existences is not necessarily implied in the phenomena of perception; because we can easily imagine that our impressions and conceptions might have been exactly as they are, although matter had never been created. Belief, we familiarly know, to be no infallible criterion of actual existence; and it is impossible to doubt, that we might have been so framed as to receive all the impressions which we now ascribe to the agency of external objects, from the mechanism of our own minds, or the particular volition of the Deity. The phenomena of dreaming, and of some species of madness, seem to form experimental proofs of the pos sibility we have now stated; and demonstrate, in our apprehension, that perception, as we have defined it, (i. e. an apprehension and belief of external existences,) does not necessarily imply the independent reality of its objects. Nor is it less absurd to say that we have the same evidence for the existence of external objects that we have for the exist ence of our own sensations: For it is quite plain, that our belief in the former is founded altogether on our consciousness of the latter; and that the evidence of this belief is consequently of a secondary nature. We cannot doubt of the existence of our sensations, without being guilty of the grossest contradiction; but we may doubt of the existence of the material world, without any contradiction at all. If we annihilate our sensations, we annihilate ourselves; and, of course, leave no being to doubt or to reason. If we annihilate the external world, we still leave entire all those sensations and perceptions which a different hypothesis would refer to its mysterious agency on our minds.

On the other hand, it is certainly going too far to assert, that the nonexistence of matter is proved by such evidence as necessarily to command our assent: Since it evidently im plies no contradiction to suppose, that such a thing as matter may exist, and that an omnipotent being might make us capable of dis