we can arrive at the knowledge of the exiftence of things, when we are perfectly ignorant of their natures and properties; and can, on the other fide, examine and know the properties of things, without confidering whether they exift, or no; it is plain that these are diftinct acts of knowledge, which do not depend on each other, and that we may be certain as to the reality of things, however we may be puzzled and confounded when we enter into the confideration of their nature. And now pray confider, as to the cafe before us, what fort of knowledge it is that is neceffary to support religion in the world. If we are fure there is a God who will judge the world, is not that a fufficient foundation for holinefs? Does it fignify any thing, as to the neceffity of our obedience, to inquire into the manner or nature of his being? Does not the whole of religion evidently depend on this question, whether there certainly be a God who will judge the world? And, if it appears there is, is it of any confequence to fay there are great difficulties in conceiving how these things can be? For, if they certainly will be, they will be fome way or other, no doubt; and it concerns not us to know which way. Since therefore our Saviour has given the greatest evidence that can be of the certainty of a future ftate, and the foul's exiftence after death, it is impertinent and unphilofophical to confront this evidence with difficulties arifing from our conceptions as to the nature and manner of these things it is in truth to fet up ignorance against knowledge; for our difficulties fpring from our ignorance of nature, which is an argument we ought rather to be ashamed of, than to bring into competition with the clear evidence we have for the certainty and reality of the things themselves. Were this duly confidered, it would fet the great controverfy of religion upon the right foot, which ought to turn on this fingle point, whether there be fufficient evidence of a future ftate, or no? For, if fuch a state there be, let our conceptions concerning it be clear, or not clear, moft certainly we fhall be brought to account for all we do; which is enough, I think, to make us careful what we do. And this is the main concern of religion, and that which will fecure whatever is neceffary to it. Since then religion evidently depends upon the certainty and reality of a future ftate of rewards and punishments, and other the like articles, and not in the leaft upon the knowledge of the nature, or the philofophical account of these things; it had been abfurd in our Saviour, who was a preacher of religion only, a teacher fent from God, to have entered into thofe difficulties, which did not at all belong to his province. And, fince neither the practice of religion would have received any advantage by the difcuffion of these doubts, for, if we had the knowledge of angels, and faw the heavens as plainly as they do, yet the fame virtue and holinefs, without any change, would be neceffary to carry us thither; nor the motives of religion would have gained any new ftrength, fince the evidence for the reality of a future ftate is not affected by thefe doubts; it is ridiculous to expect the folution of them in the Gofpel, when, if folved, they would not ferve any one point in which the Gospel is concerned, but would end in mere philofophy and fpeculation. But perhaps it may be faid, that all this is true. indeed, where the existence of things is out of doubt in that cafe no difficulties can deftroy the evidence of their exiftence. But, where the exiftence of things is doubtful, there the feeming contradictions which arife in confidering the nature of the things, do mightily shake the presumption of their existence. This is a fair ftate of the case, and we ought to join iffue on it. e; Let us then proceed, in the third place, to fhew, that the Gospel has given us the greatest evidence of our own immortality, and of a future ftate, that can be thought on or defired. There are two things upon which our refurrection to life depends, as we learn from our Saviour's anfwer to the Sadducees: Ye do err, fays he, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God: which answer is a very clear for we can defire no more than to know that God certainly can raise us, and that he certainly will. The firft is to be learnt from our natural notions of God; the fecond from the Scripture, which is the declaration of his will to mankind. As to the power of God, it cannot be brought into question, without throwing off all pretence even to natural religion: for, if you allow God, that he made the world, and formed man into a living fout in the beginning; you cannot deny but that he, who made man out of nothing at firft, can as easily make him again, after death has diffolved the vital union. It remains then to inquire after the will of God, whether he, who certainly can, certainly will raise us at the laft day? The time will not permit me to enter largely into the argument; and therefore I fhall reft it upon one, but that a very clear point. It will not be denied but that we have our Saviour's promise and word for our refurrection often repeated in the Gospel: and confider, pray, did not he raise many dead to life again? Did he not at last raise himself from the grave, after he had been three days buried? Is it not plain then, upon the Gospel account, that he had the power of raifing the dead? and is it not as plain, that he has promised to raise us? Take both propofitions together then, and they will amount to this; that he, who has the power of raifing the dead, has promised and declared that he will raife us from the dead. God, we know, cannot lie, and therefore must ratify every word which he spoke by his holy child Jefus and hence arifes a fecurity which no doubts can fhake. Befides, as to difficulties in nature and philofophy, he has not indeed taught us to answer them; but he fully answered them himself, when he came from the grave; as he who got up and walked, baffled all the philofopher's arguments against motion. It is true, you will fay, this is very good evidence, but you find it hard to believe: and perhaps you might have been as hard of belief, if our Saviour had reasoned never fo philofophically. The question is, whether any objection lies against the Gospel for overlooking the difficulties which learned men raife? I have fhewed that none can lie, and that the Gospel has given a much better evidence than that which is defired: and this is |