and over again for ages together? This obfervation can arife only from what we fee among men; and, with respect to men, there is foundation for it: but it is great weakness, and want of thought, to transfer this obfervation to the works of God. Men are improving daily in knowledge and experience, and may have good reason to alter this year what they did the last, the better to fuit their pleasure or convenience: but can any man be fo weak as to think this to be the cafe of the Almighty? Do you imagine God was young and unexperienced when he made the world, and that he fees faults in it now which he did not fee then? If you do not think this, what reason can you give why the world should not go on now as it did from the beginning? If God made it in the best manner at first, and without doubt he did, can there be any just cause for alteration?

But farther; fuppofing the observation true, that the world is now where it was at the beginning; yet no conclufion can be drawn from thence as to the future continuance of the world. For though this fyftem of things fhall keep its appointed course, during the time determined by God for its continuance; yet neither can the prefent nor the past state of things enable us in the least degree to judge when the end will be. And whoever reafons in this way, may just as well fay, Such a man lived in good health the last twenty years, and therefore he fhall live in good health for twenty more. The argument concludes alike in both cafes, however the abfurdity may appear shocking only in one.

But fuppofing we should allow even the conclufion

to be right, and that the material world may go on without end what is it to the purpofe? Whatever becomes of the world, you can laft but a little time. Your condition hereafter will not depend upon the lafting of the fun or moon, or be in the least influenced by it. Let them move on for ever; yet if you in the mean time are to be miferable, and to fuffer for your iniquities, what will you be the better for it? If this world fhould laft for ever, may there not be other ftates for the reception of good and bad fpirits, when feparate from the body? If there may, how is religion, or the belief of God's government in the rational and moral world, at all concerned in this fpeculation? And how weak and how abfurd a thing is it for men, who know they muft die, and may die to-day or to-morrow, to harden their hearts against the belief of Providence, by fpeculating upon the durablenefs of things without themselves; when their only true concern is, and ought to be, to know what will become of themselves, being very sure that they cannot continue long here? Our Saviour has told us, that in his Father's houfe are many manfions : this manfion in which we now live may continue, and yet we may be transferred to other manfions to be happy or miferable, according as we have behaved ourselves in this.

: Let us confider now, whether the other part of the objection, pointed against God's moral government of the world, has any better foundation in reafon to support it.

The great irregularity obfervable in human actions, and the mischiefs and iniquities which abound на

VOL. I.

in the world, have tempted fome to think that God concerns not himself with the actions of men, but has given them up entirely to follow their own devices.

It is truly and juftly obferved, that there is this difference between the material and rational parts of the world; that the material world, and the several parts of it, act regularly and uniformly, pursuing conftantly the ends and appointments of nature; whilft moral agents act variously, and often inconfiftently with the great ends to which they are ordained. But I wonder any man, capable of making this obfervation, should not at the same time see the true reason of it, fuppofing both parts to be under God's government.

Matter, being capable of no action of itself, muft neceffarily follow the impreffions it receives: fuppofing God to govern the world, the material parts of it must follow the immediate impreffions of his hand; and where God is the mover, can you expect any thing less than order and regularity, and a conftant fubferviency to the great ends of the creation? To suppose therefore the material world to move irregularly and inconfiftently with the end to be served, would be fuppofing God to act irregularly and inconfiftently with the end of his own

creation.

But in the moral world the cafe is otherwise : men have a power of acting and choosing for themfelves; and, were it otherwise, they could not be rational or moral agents. Were God, therefore, to determine the actions of men as abfolutely and uncontrollably as he directs the motions of the mate

rial world, men would be, to all intents and purposes, as much parts of the material world as the trees and plants which grow in it. And fuch a method of government would deftroy and overthrow the very end for which rational agents were created: for, to what purpose was reafon and understanding given to men, but to guide and direct them, and to make them capable of discharging the duties of religion and morality? But if the powers of reason and understanding were to be perpetually overruled, to prevent the irregularities and mischiefs which proceed from the free use of them; what would it be but making men rational and moral agents by the law of their creation, and then putting them under a government which leaves no room for reafon or morality? Which is fuch a part as no wife man would act, and which no reasonable man would af cribe to God.

Indeed, this very difference obfervable in the conducting the material and the moral world, is the ftrongest presumption that the whole is under the direction of the all-wife Being. Upon fuppofition that God governs the world, would you not expect to fee all things directed in a way suitable to their nature, and the end for which they were made? Material beings require to be abfolutely and uncontrollably directed, for they have no power to direct themselves; consequently their motions must be juft and regular, or otherwife, according to the wisdom and ability of the director: and if God be that, director, they must ever be juft and regular.

Moral agents cannot be fo directed; for it is

effential to the nature of a moral being to act and choose for itself: and the actions of fuch beings will be wife and regular, in proportion to the wifdom of fuch beings; where they are weak and infirm, they will oftentimes be very irregular and blameworthy. That men are weak and infirm wants no proof; confequently, there must be great figns of weakness and imperfection in their moral behaviour.

Since then it is evident, a priori, that the government of the world, supposing it to be under the government of God, must be what it now appears to be; it can be only want of thought and reflection which furnishes objections, from the present ftate of things, against a divine Providence.

But farther; though it is neceffary to leave men, confidered as moral agents, to choose and act freely; yet this is far from excluding the providence of God from interpofing in human affairs: the reason is, because this may be done many ways confiftently with the freedom of men; and wicked men may be punished, and good men rewarded, even in this world, without overruling the wills or actions of either. A little reflection will clear this up to every man's mind; and therefore I fhall fay no more than is neceffary to explain my meaning.

The power of life and death, which is in the hand of God, is alone fufficient for conducting the great affairs of the world. It is natural for men to die; and when they do die, nobody is furprised at fo common an event; and yet it is evident, that the wellbeing of whole nations often depends upon the life or death of a few men: let