his protection; to truft the hand that once made us, and has always faved us. When I complain, fays the Pfalmift, It is my infirmity; but I will remember the years of the right hand of the Moft High. I will remember the works of the Lord: furely I will remember thy wonders of old. I will meditate alfo of all thy works, and talk of all thy doings. Here then was his comfort, here the cure of all his grief: the scene around him was dark and gloomy; but, dark as it was, it was under the guidance and direction of the hand that had never failed the faithful, to deliver him out of all his troubles.

The text, and the occafion of it, thus explained, lead us to confider these two propofitions:

Firft, That all complaints against Providence proceed from weakness and the infirmity of human reason.

Secondly, That a settled peace of mind, with refpect to God, muft arise from a due contemplation of the great works of Providence, which God has laid open to our view for our confideration and inftruction.

The first propofition is, That all complaints against Providence proceed from weakness and the infirmity of human reafon. Under this head are included all the fufpicions that are apt to rife in men's minds against Providence, as well as the formal complaints brought againft it. And the firft of this fort, which naturally prefents itself to the mind, when we confider God and ourselves, is this, that God is too great and too excellent a being to humble himself to behold the things that are on earth. This one miftake feems to have been the

whole of Epicurus's divinity. He thought it would be endless for the gods to attend to every thing that paffed on earth, and to concern themselves with the conduct and behaviour of every particular man in the world: he thought they could not do this without being moved fometimes to anger and resentment, and sometimes to the paffion of joy; which he conceived to be equally inconfiftent with an uniform settled ftate of happines To make therefore his gods happy, he removed them from all government of men, and left men to shift as they could, without God or Providence, in the world.

The fame thought has in all times been the refuge of finners; their language has ever been, How doth God know, and is there knowledge in the Moft High? Perhaps too this fufpicion has entered into better minds, broken with grief and affliction, and tempted by their misfortunes to think that God regards not the things below.

But how different foever the grounds of this fufpicion may be in one case, and in another, yet in every cafe it is manifeftly weak and unreasonable.

To imagine that it is too much trouble, or any trouble, to God to govern the world, and all the beings in it, is a mere childish conceit; it is talking of God, as if God were a man, and as liable to be fatigued and tired with multiplicity of business as a man is. How do you know that there is any thing tirefome or difagreeable in much business, and in variety of employment? It is true, you find it is fo in yourself, and you observe it is fo in others: you therefore very well conclude, that much bufiness is tiresome to men like yourself: but by what

may

reafon do you extend this conclufion to God? unless you think he is in this refpect like you, and that he has no larger powers and abilities than you have.

As it is abfurd to argue from the powers of men to the powers of God, fo it is likewise to argue from the paffions of men to the affections of the Deity. Men may be grieved and tormented with seeing affairs under their conduct go wrong, may be overjoyed at fome unexpected fuccefs; but can this ever be the cafe of a being of infinite power and infinite wisdom? Nothing can happen but what he orders or permits, for his power is over all: nothing that he orders or permits can be wrong, for his wifdom is equal to his power. What disappointments then are there to grieve him? What unexpected fuccefs to transport him? You fee now that this fufpicion, which fet out with fuppofing God to be fo great and excellent a being, that the affairs of men were below his care, concludes with making him fo like a man, as not to be able to bear the fatigue and vexation of fo much bufinefs.

Epicurus and his followers, who denied God's government of the world, denied also that he made it. So far at least they were confiftent; for if they thought it too much trouble for God to govern the world, they could not confiftently put him to the trouble of making it. But if we turn the argument, and begin with confidering the works of the creation, and, according to the inftruction of the Pfalmift, call to remembrance thofe years of the right hand of the Moft High; we shall from these manifeft and undeniable works of God be led to juft conclufions with

refpect to the methods of divine Providence, lefs obvious to our obfervation, in the government of the world. When we fhall fee the hand of God employed in forming the loweft, and, in our eyes, the moft contemptible creatures on earth; ranging and adjusting all the parts of the world fo, that there is not a particle of matter but what has its proper place in fubferviency to the whole of the creation; it will be impoffible for a reasonable man to think that God has no care of this world, which with fo much care and wisdom he created; or that it fhould be below him to preserve those beings, which he did not think it below him to make. But this confideration belongs to the fecond propofition, and will meet us again in its proper place. To proceed then;

Another reason, which fome have for fufpecting that the affairs of the world are not under the conduct of Providence, is, that they cannot discern any certain marks of God's interpofing: on the contrary, they think it evident, that all the inanimate and irrational parts of the world follow a certain course of nature invariably; and that men act with all the figns of being given up to follow their own devices, without being either directed or reftrained by a fuperior power.

That many men talk and think in this way there is no doubt. The fcoffers in St. Peter's time fupported themselves upon this obfervation, that all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation; concluding, that they would go on fo for ever, and there was nothing beyond this present state of things for which they ought to be concerned.

But in this way of reafoning there are two great mistakes:

1. That the conclufion is not rightly drawn from the obfervation, fuppofing the obfervation to be

true.

2. Suppofing the conclufion to be true, it will not answer the purpose intended.

I. That the material world continues to answer the purposes for which it was created, is furely, when rightly confidered, the ftrongeft evidence that it was made, and is conducted, by the highest wisdom and power. Is it any praise to a workman, or any proof of his fkill and ability, that the house of his building is running to ruin? and that it wants reforming and supporting every year? Surely every man would choofe, if he could, to have his habitation fecured against the injuries of time and accidents. And can we expect lefs of an house, whose builder is God, than that it fhould continue firm and stable, and without decay, during the time intended and limited for its continuance? If all things therefore continue as they were from the beginning of the creation, it proves that they were extremely well made at firft, and have been extremely well preserved ever fince: and can this afford to a man of any thought or reflection an objection against Providence ?

It may be faid, perhaps, that it is not merely the continuing of the world that is the objection, but its continuing always in one unwearied courfe. The fun rises and sets now, juft as it did three or four thousand years ago and what fign is there of wifdom or contrivance in doing the fame thing over